by Wayne White

Mali finally signed a ceasefire with Tuareg separatists negotiated by the UN and the EU, potentially opening the way for the return of a central government presence to the key Saharan provincial capital of Kidal. Mali also recently secured a major Western aid package. Yet, tensions between the government [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Wayne White

Mali finally signed a ceasefire with Tuareg separatists negotiated by the UN and the EU, potentially opening the way for the return of a central government presence to the key Saharan provincial capital of Kidal. Mali also recently secured a major Western aid package. Yet, tensions between the government along with its southern Malian base and the northern Tuaregs remain high. Meanwhile, with foreign troops inside Mali, Islamic extremist groups with ties to al-Qaeda have shifted their base of operations to southern Libya, have become more difficult to track, and lately have been raiding Mali’s vulnerable eastern neighbor, Niger.

Late last year, militants of the MUJWA (Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa) capitalized on a Tuareg separatist rebellion in northern Mali to thrust south in an attempt to seize the entire country, advancing nearly to the Malian capital of Bamako. French forces intervened, along with some allied African forces, especially from Chad, to drive them mostly out of Mali, killing hundreds of extremist fighters. That left the Malian Tuareg in peril in their surviving enclave in the north centered on Kidal. The ceasefire with the Tuareg NMLA (National Movement for the Liberation of the Awazad — the Berber Tuareg name for the hazy Saharan region spanning northern Mali, northwestern Niger and southern Algeria) was needed to recover the rest of Mali before the national elections scheduled for July 28.

The humbled NMLA had little choice in the matter. Malian forces had been advancing on Kidal, threatening to attack if no agreement was reached (in which the NMLA agreed to disarm). Deep tensions persist because southern Mali’s African populations remain angry and resentful toward the NMLA for accepting jihadist aid that nearly led to the collapse of the country, and the Tuareg remain fearful of renewed southern repression. An Amnesty International report released last Friday accused the MNLA of abuses (holding southern prisoners, as well as robbing, beating and executing them), but also described Malian security forces’ overall human rights record as “appalling,” which is the reason why French and Chadian forces in Mali have only reluctantly turned militant prisoners over to Malian authorities. They fear more Malian government executions and torture, seen in various areas across the south.

So although a ceasefire has now been worked out with the MNLA, carrying with it the possibility of greater autonomy for the Tuareg north, restoring any real trust will take time. Nonetheless, relations between Tuareg and southerners in Mali must be repaired to the extent that both sides can settle into some sort of working relationship.  This means, most importantly, no further Tuareg-Malian government violence or jihadist penetration into the Tuareg north because one inevitably leads to the other.

In dealing with the threat posed by the MUJWA and other jihadist groups — all with links to al-Qaeda — Mali cannot be viewed in isolation. The largely Saharan Sahel region from Mauritania in the west to Chad in the east is much like Mali in terms of north-south tensions between southern capitals and populations tied closely to sub-Saharan Africa on the one hand and less settled Tuareg populations in the north with links to North Africa. So with southwestern Libya having precious little functioning central or even localized tribal militia governance, this trackless void now hosts most all the al-Qaeda linked extremist elements once thriving inside Mali. They now harbor ambitions to consolidate while continuing to lash out at western and unfriendly African targets.

First the notorious Mokhtar Belmokhtar unleashed his al-Qaeda linked break-away Islamist Masked Brigade in retaliation for French victories over jihadist forces in Mali against the Amenas natural gas facility in southeastern Algeria. It was seized along with hundreds of hostages in late January, triggering a major crisis. Then, probably responding to false reports of his death in April, he claimed partial responsibility for simultaneous May 23 MUJWA attacks against an army barracks in Niger’s northern provincial capital of Agadez and the French-owned Somair uranium mines at Arlit, deeper in the desert northeast of Agadez, killing 25. French forces had to intervene to wipe out the last of the Agadez barracks attackers. Also in May, apparently because Chad played the leading African role in Mali against the jihadists, a probable MUJWA attack on Chad’s consulate in the southern Libyan city of Sabha left one dead.

Belmokhtar and other extremist leaders have learned some survival skills from their defeat in Mali. French and Western forces using aerial surveillance to locate militant convoys for targeting have now observed that jihadis no longer travel in large convoys, but rather in single or only several vehicles difficult to distinguish from private and commercial vehicles (that frequently have to travel “off-road” because of the paucity of infrastructure). Also, MUJWA and other extremist groups have recruited large numbers of disaffected sub-Saharan Africans who can infiltrate countries like Niger better than their Algerian, Tuareg and other northern cadres. Despite French, US and British reconnaissance aircraft and drones participating in widespread monitoring of this huge region, a US official recently admitted: “At any given time, they could be anywhere.”

Another problem has been weak regional cooperation. Niger and more distant Chad are doing just about everything they can to help. But Algeria, from which much of this Islamic extremism originally emanated in the late 1990’s as Algerian rebel militants retreated farther into the desert, resents French involvement in the region. Algiers gave only minimal assistance to the campaign in Mali. And Mauritania flanking Mali to the West downgraded ties with Mali in 2010 over the Malian release of a Mauritanian al-Qaeda detainee in a hostage situation. Such local drawbacks caused French President Francois Hollande to concede in late May that, albeit reluctantly, French forces may have to be used elsewhere in the Sahel well beyond Mali.

Mali remains a work in progress with a dicey national election fast approaching to hopefully advance its transition back to a more democratic system lost in a 2012 coup. And clearly a lot remains to be done to achieve a final compromise with the MNLA in the north to suppress further bloodshed. These needs prompted last month’s generous $4.3 million Western aid package to help get Mali back on its feet.  Meanwhile, still formidable extremist leaders and combatants regrouping in lawless southwestern Libya promise more regional violence and will remain a daunting challenge to counter-terrorism and anti-insurgency efforts elsewhere in this vast, arid, impoverished region.

by Wayne White

Continuing extremist attacks in northern Mali are a reminder that this vast Saharan region, given to raiding and smuggling for more than a millennium, could remain an attractive haven even for a much weakened al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM). Now that sweeping French and allied African military [...]]]> via Lobe Log

by Wayne White

Continuing extremist attacks in northern Mali are a reminder that this vast Saharan region, given to raiding and smuggling for more than a millennium, could remain an attractive haven even for a much weakened al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM). Now that sweeping French and allied African military operations have decimated AQIM’s larger forces and driven surviving AQIM bands to switch to localized terrorist assaults, concerned parties have shifted their priorities toward more enduring counterinsurgency operations and peacekeeping. Yet, for those seeking to deal further, lasting blows to AQIM must remain mindful of the ethnic complexity of the Malian Sahara.

Demonstrating it is still a force to be reckoned with, AQIM claimed responsibility for another attack on the northern Malian city of Timbuktu over the weekend. A checkpoint outside the city was bombed as a diversion to enable more than 20 fighters to infiltrate the city while defenders rushed first to the site of the bombing. A few infiltrators managed to gain brief access to the grounds of the Hotel Colombe (frequented by journalists and aid workers), possibly a prime target. The local Malian governor and his staff at the hotel had to be evacuated hastily amidst efforts to hunt down the infiltrators. One Malian soldier was killed; several Malian troops and one French soldier were wounded. A probable AQIM land mine placed on a road also recently inflicted casualties on African forces participating in operations in support of the Malian government.

Given the sheer size of the largely ungoverned northern third of the country, plus some of its forbidding terrain, most likely it would be impossible to fully eradicate AQIM, especially since small groups could take refuge in similarly trackless areas of neighboring Niger, Mauritania or Algeria from which they could continue such attacks. Consequently, all parties involved in addressing the problem are wisely shifting to more drawn out strategies.

French President Francois Hollande said late last week that French troops (originally slated for withdrawal after a few months) will now stay through the end of the year in limited numbers, and has offered 1,000 troops to stay even longer as part of a hoped for UN peacekeeping operation. He reiterated the latter on April 4. Meanwhile, the European Union has begun the first phase of a 15-month training operation under the guidance of military personnel from 7 EU countries with an initial contingent of Malian army trainees. The EU training mission eventually is slated to field 500 such trainers. On a mission to the Malian capital of Bamako on April 2, Senator John McCain said the US also would explore ways of providing equipment and training to assist the EU mission and technology to support the French efforts to help run down AQIM elements still at large. Intelligence sharing among the US, the UK, France and key EU governments on AQIM-related developments undoubtedly will expand.

Last week UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called upon the Security Council to authorize the transformation of the various African forces in Mali along with additional police assets into a UN peacekeeping force of over 12,000 (that the French could then bolster with troops of their own). Ban cited the challenge posed by AQIM’s “residual threat” as justification for the deployment of such a force in being. Clearly, statements by Hollande, Ban and McCain illustrate the international community has become more resigned to a continued presence in Mali to provide the Malian government a reasonable chance to bounce back from the recent AQIM challenge.

To head off potential trouble on a closely related front, however, both Malian authorities and their foreign allies must tread carefully around longstanding tensions between the Tuareg Berber population of the Saharan north and Mali’s dominant, sub-Saharan African peoples of the south. The Tuareg National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (NMLA), although wary — even hostile — toward AQIM, vainly attempted to coexist with AQIM as the latter embarked on its offensive against Malian government forces last year. With the AQIM routed by the French, the more secular NMLA last week named its own civil administrator for the key northern regional capital of Kidal; the NMLA and its core Tuareg constituency remain deeply suspicious — even hostile — toward Malian troops and central governance.

Those hoping to bring as much stability as possible to the situation in northern Mali must bear in mind that not only was there a protracted Tuareg rebellion in both Mali and Niger during 2007-2009, but what morphed into the AQIM power grab in Mali late last year started with an NMLA revolt in northern Mali in January 2012. At least some AQIM cadres probably are Tuareg; other Tuareg who are not, but participated in the Libyan civil war, likely remain especially restive. Yet, the Tuareg are far more knowledgeable than any others about the wild Saharan terrain in which many AQIM cadres have sought shelter, and could assist foreign — and perhaps even Malian — forces root out AQIM remnants. But that may well require serious concessions, perhaps toward a measure of self-governance, to address longstanding northern grievances.

The crisis affecting Mali and southern Algeria is only the latest phase in a long pattern of conflict. The often nomadic Saharan Tuareg, with populations spreading far beyond northern Mali, have never had a stable relationship with the more settled populations to the south. They have been in rebellion or on [...]]]> via Lobe Log

The crisis affecting Mali and southern Algeria is only the latest phase in a long pattern of conflict. The often nomadic Saharan Tuareg, with populations spreading far beyond northern Mali, have never had a stable relationship with the more settled populations to the south. They have been in rebellion or on the verge of it for much of the last 22 years, and Libya as well as Algeria have played disruptive supporting roles in the course of that troubled period.

The latest blow-up in the southern Sahara cannot be viewed in isolation, especially as various outside parties cast about for ways of resolving it. Mali, neighboring Niger, or both have been wracked by a series of rebellions, largely Tuareg (1990-1995, 2007-2009), and a mix of Tuareg and Islamic extremists in 2012-2013. Tuareg grievances have ranged from greater freedom from central governments based along the Niger River to the south, to, increasingly in Mali, demands for outright autonomy or independence. Beginning nearly a decade ago, they have been taking on more of a militant Islamic character (once again, mainly in Mali).

Muammar Qadhafi was involved as an enabler in the first rebellion in Niger in the 1990’s, providing weapons, training and safe haven for Tuareg rebels fighting and raiding in Niger. In 2009 he played a role in ending the second rebellion, but the rebels again enjoyed access to Libya. The current rebellion was enhanced greatly by the massive infusion of Libyan arms brought down from a fractured Libya by Tuaregs and other militants present there as a result of the previous episodes (with some southerners even used by Qadhafi as combatants in his vain, bloody effort to stave off defeat).

Lately, the focus has been on Algeria because of the 4-day ordeal at the Ain Amenas natural gas complex in the Algerian southeast. Much media coverage has been sympathetic to Algeria’s long struggle against Islamist “terrorism.” The facts cast Algeria in a somewhat darker light.

The authoritarian, dysfunctional, notoriously corrupt, and military-heavy elite in Algeria panicked after the Islamic Salvation Front (or FIS, based on its French title) won the first round of Algeria’s only truly fair national assembly elections in 1991. The military cancelled the second round in January 1992, replacing a President and possible progress toward greater democracy with a military junta and a brutal crackdown.  The Islamists, most previously relatively moderate, took up arms against this ruthless cabal (with support from many ordinary, downtrodden and neglected Algerians more generally).

Algeria was destabilized amidst what became a virtual civil war through 1997, taking the lives of up to 200,000 people.  Ironically, in crushing the uprising, the Algerian military used many of the same ruthless tactics employed by the French during their war to suppress Algerian independence. Later in the conflict, quite a few embittered Islamist fighters turned to extremism, with one offshoot eventually forming the militant Salafist Group for Call and Combat (or GSPC from its French name). Splinter elements of the GSPC took refuge from Algerian forces in the north of an impoverished Mali over a decade ago.

Long shunned by much of the international community for its various abuses in the 1990’s, Algeria, led by authoritarian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika (reelected with purportedly over 90% of the vote in 2009), broke out of its isolation after 9/11.  A Bush Administration eager to rope in any assistance curbed the US’ policy of wariness toward the Algerian regime, viewing the latter’s long battle with Islamist “terrorism” as a valuable resource, despite its dismal track record otherwise.

Fragments of the GSPC later morphed into al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), also setting up shop across the border in Mali.  Although the GSPC engaged in kidnappings, drug trafficking, killings and even occasional terrorism back in Algeria, Algerian security forces did relatively little to cooperate actively with countermeasures aimed against the GSPC and AQIM beyond their own borders (despite the near absence of Malian central governance in its Saharan north). While still serving with the US Intelligence Community during an operation against a dangerous GSPC cell in northern Mali some years ago (when Mali had asked for American and Algerian assistance), the Algerians remained largely passive.

For decades there also has been a desperate need for political change in an Algeria where far too little of its growing oil and gas revenues reach the bulk of the population. Yet, the “Arab Spring” fizzled there. Even though demonstrations (including self-immolations) occurred in many locales causing President Bouteflika to terminate (at least formally) a 19-year state of emergency and promise reform, little has changed. Many Algerians remain cowed by the sheer scale of brutality during the grueling internal warfare of the 1990’s.

Many aspects of the hostage crisis at Ain Amenas bear the hallmarks of the chequered performance of Algeria’s government and security forces. First off, after agreeing to allow France over-flights and to provide some intelligence related to the French blitzkrieg against the extremists in northern Mali, Algiers should have been bracing for potential trouble days before the French struck. Instead, Algerian security was caught off guard (despite their familiarity with this highly mobile foe and a nearby Algerian Army base). Next, Algiers resisted meaningful international cooperation and instead launched its own initially clumsy rescue attempt during which Algerian helicopters reportedly blasted trucks containing hostages (hence the grumbling in some foreign capitals).

Stepping back a bit, a major factor to bear in mind as this crisis evolves more broadly is whether the problem will remain primarily confined to Mali — especially if and when French, Malian, and African forces press deeper into northern Mali.  Borders mean precious little in this trackless area to either AQIM or the Tuareg. This mess could easily spill over into the adjacent and equally ill-governed deserts of Niger or Mauritania.

Photo: Tuaregs at the January 2012 Festival au Désert in Timbuktu, just before the MNLA launched the Azawadi rebellion later that month. By Alfred Weidinger (Wikimedia Commons).

As I reported last month, [...]]]>

UN Photo/WFP/Phil Behan

As Beyonce’s video celebrating World Humanitarian Day continues to make its rounds through the internet, humanitarian workers on the ground in the drought-affected Sahel arguably have bigger fish to fry as they try to stave off deteriorating conditions in Niger and Mali amidst staggering shortages in relief funding.

As I reported last month, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) recently adjusted its needs projections for 2012 upward in light of what can be called a foreseeable escalation of the food crisis in the Sahel that started last fall.

Now it looks like cholera and locusts are further foiling already underfunded relief efforts across West Africa.

With four months left to the year, only 51 percent of the funding goal for the region has been met according to latest numbers by the U.N.’s Financial Tracking Service.

So far, an estimated 19 million people in the region are in dire need of assistance, many of whom were expected to rely on emergency food aid as primary means of sustenance by August.

In a special humanitarian bulletin on the Sahel crisis published last week, OCHA now warns of a developing locust infestation that could affect another 50 million people and diminish yields in the upcoming October harvest.

“Desert locust infestation remains dangerous as more egg-laying and hatching are expected in the coming weeks. Agricultural crop production, food and nutrition security, and the livelihood of some 50 million people in Chad, Mali and Niger are currently at risk, according to the FAO. This threat is the most serious since 2005.

Ground teams in Niger have treated 1,200 hectares against the pest since 5 June but ground surveys need to be scaled up to determine the scale and extent of current breeding, especially in those areas where rains have recently fallen.”

Still, rains are badly needed, as an early end to the current rainy season would further affect the upcoming harvest and increase food prices, according to a special report by the Famine Early Warning System Network.

As if that weren’t enough to juggle, cholera is now becoming an increasing worry in Niger, where refugee camps are a potential hotbed for the disease that could affect neighbouring countries along the Niger river, such as Mali, Nigeria and Benin.

About 52.000 people have fled political upheaval in Mali for Niger where 394,000 children under five will need treatment for severe acute malnutrition this year, according to UNICEF, which warns that malnutrition increases the chances of cholera outbreaks.

Nigeria has seen three times the number of cholera cases this year that it registered in 2011, according to Innocent Nzeyimana, the World Health Organization (WHO) Emergencies Manager in Niger in a recent OCHA story. “At this rate, we should be prepared for at least 9,000 cases by December.”

More from Nzeyimana:

“With high levels of water contamination and inadequate sanitation, our area is so prone to cholera. We’ve had cases in 2010 and 2011, but this time it is really getting serious.”

“In a closed environment like a camp, the spread is very fast and we may end up dealing far beyond the 9,000 projected cases. We don’t want that to happen.”

Prevention and treatment of cholera, meanwhile remains underfunded across the Sahel, with only 21 percent of the projected 53 million dollars needed for such programmes covered so far. In Niger only 30 percent of the roughly 8-million-dollar projected sanitation need has been met.

Organizations increasing their appeals

Last week, U.K.-based NGO Christian Aid doubled down on its aid appeal amidst reports by the World Food Programme (WFP) that without increased international support an estimated quarter million people fleeing political instability in Mali for neighbouring Niger, Mauritania and Burkina Faso, will go hungry in just weeks.

WFP is appealing for urgent contributions of 115 million dollars to address pipeline shortfalls for the next three months, according to last week’s OCHA bulletin, as the region is going through its lean season.

As the region awaits the fall harvest and food prices soar, many families continue to sell off their life stock, thus further diminishing their future capacity to foresee in their own livelihoods.

The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), which aims to build farmer’s resilience to future crises has seen less than 25 percent of its 112-million-dollar appeal met, threatening FAO’s ability to support preparations for the next food production campaign from October to December.

FAO is appealing for 10 million dollars to tackle the locust situation. So far France has contributed 550,000 dollars, and another 2.8 million has been pledged bi-laterally.

Last month, British NGO Development Initiatives released a comprehensive report on Humanitarian Aid that projected record shortfalls for 2012. Among other conclusions, the report showed a disproportionate funding for the 2010 mega-disasters in Haiti and Pakistan that syphoned away funds from other countries, including crisis prevention in countries in the now heavily affected Sahel region.

A quote from an OCHA rep in a recent AP article sums it up nicely, I think:

“Pictures of starving goats do not attract aid in the same way as images of dying children.”

Well, folks, we’re getting there.