by Mohammad Ali Shabani

by Mohammad Ali Shabani

Iran and the P5+1 — the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany — are set to resume nuclear talks in Kazakhstan on 26 February, but little appears to have changed since their previous meeting in Russia last summer.

In [...]]]> via Lobe Log

by Mohammad Ali Shabani

by Mohammad Ali Shabani

Iran and the P5+1 — the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany — are set to resume nuclear talks in Kazakhstan on 26 February, but little appears to have changed since their previous meeting in Russia last summer.

In terms of concessions, the P5+1’s “updated” proposal reportedly includes an “easing” of sanctions targeting exports of gold and precious metals to Iran. This is in addition to last year’s offer of selling Iran aviation spare parts and providing fuel for a medical reactor and other civil nuclear cooperation.

The P5+1 doesn’t seem to have changed its demands. Iran continues to be urged to stop enrichment to 19.75%, shut down its Fordow plant and ship out its stockpile of this grade of uranium. Speaking to Reuters on condition of anonymity, a Western official has said the P5+1 wants its demands to now “build in buffer time” to ensure that it would take Iran “more time to restart Fordow.” The same Western official insisted that “we use very careful wording such as decreasing readiness of Fordow”, emphasizing that “these are face-saving words.”

The only Iranian reaction specific to the reported P5+1’s demands so far has come from influential MP Alaeddin Borujerdi, who reportedly said that “Fordow will never be shut down.” Pointing to the site’s well-protected nature, Borujerdi added that “our national duty is to be able to defend our nuclear and vital centers against an enemy threat.” To be clear, parliament has little say over the nuclear issue. However, according to former chief nuclear negotiator Hassan Rowhani, members of the parliamentary national security & foreign policy commission (which Borujerdi heads) used to be invited to meetings of the foreign policy committee of the Supreme National Security Council. In short, while Borujerdi has little say over the nuclear issue, he likely has real insight into debates within the body in charge of the matter.

More broadly, Iran’s Supreme Leader said in a speech Saturday that the Islamic Republic doesn’t want atomic weapons, adding that if it “intended to possess nuclear arms, no power could stop us.” Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called on Washington to show “logic”, underscoring that “this is the only way to interact” with Iran. Crucially, he linked this argument to a portrayal of American-devised sanctions as the main obstacle to dialogue between Iran and the United States.

It is encouraging to see the P5+1 start recognizing the importance of saving face for Iran. However, from an Iranian point of view, the crucial element of reciprocity is still lacking in the group’s offers.

Iran started enriching uranium to 19.75% at its Fordow plant on February 9th 2010. It did so after failing to purchase fuel for its US-supplied Tehran Research Reactor, which produces medical isotopes used in the treatment of over 800,000 Iranians.

Ever since, the United States and the European Union have imposed unilateral sanctions targeting Iranian banks, shipping and insurance, oil sales, repatriation of crude export revenues, sales of gold and precious metals — the list continues.

Demanding Iranian acceptance of “stop-shut-ship” is tantamount to asking Tehran to turn back the nuclear clock to February 8th 2010.

From Tehran’s point of view, that might be a possibility — if the sanctions clock would be turned back three years, too.

That’s not what the P5+1 reportedly has in mind. US sanctions targeting Iran’s barter trade with gold came into effect on February 6th this year. Offering to “ease” such penalties in Kazakhstan on February 26th would amount to offering to turn back the sanctions clock three weeks.

The P5+1’s current posture can be viewed through two lenses. On one hand, the mainly Western members of the group may simply think it’s unnecessary to make any serious concessions, motivated by the belief that time is on their side. In this vein, the P5+1 might be preparing the ground for more pressure on Iran by starting to play the blame game.

On the other hand, the P5+1 may be ready for serious concessions, but consciously avoiding making Iran an offer it can’t refuse. As the Western officials who leaked the P5+1’s position underscored, the lack of flexibility is due to a belief that Iran won’t agree to anything before its crucial June presidential elections. This view is shared by most analysts. Thus, presenting an offer that’s designed to be rejected on fair grounds may in fact be a way to avoid putting the Islamic Republic in a position where it will face sole blame for a potentially continued deadlock. Implicit here is a signal from the P5+1 that it’s willing to wait for Iran to get its house in order before resuming serious negotiations.

Regardless of which of the two scenarios is most accurate, the six months from now until the inauguration of the next Iranian president in August need not be a waste of time. All sides must take the opportunity to examine common positions so the ground can be prepared for tangible progress on the nuclear issue when the time is right.

 - Mohammad Ali Shabani is a doctoral researcher at the School of Oriental & African Studies, University of London and the Editor of Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs.

Photo Credit: European External Action Service

by Laicie Heeley & Usha Sahay

After months of deliberation, Iranian negotiators and representatives of the 6-world power P5+1 negotiating team have agreed to meet on February 26 in Almaty, Kazakhstan. Hopeful watchers may read some symbolism into the location: Kazakhstan is one of the few nations to have voluntarily [...]]]> via Lobe Log

by Laicie Heeley & Usha Sahay

After months of deliberation, Iranian negotiators and representatives of the 6-world power P5+1 negotiating team have agreed to meet on February 26 in Almaty, Kazakhstan. Hopeful watchers may read some symbolism into the location: Kazakhstan is one of the few nations to have voluntarily given up nuclear weapons, and no doubt Western negotiators hope for a similar outcome with Iran’s controversial nuclear activities. Previous negotiations with Iran fell apart in the summer of 2012, and the question on everyone’s mind is: will this time be different?

There’s reason to hope that it will. Certainly, some circumstances have shifted in ways that could be favorable to a deal. Most obviously, the squeeze of sanctions has made it much more difficult for Iran to defy the international community. The depletion of Iran’s currency reserves is testing the regime’s ability to sidestep sanctions, and leaders are worried about public discontent with the state of the economy. Iran has also been downgrading some of its enriched uranium to a level that can’t easily be converted to weapons-grade, which may be a small indication that the government is willing to moderate its stance. Key Iranian figures from the foreign minister to the intelligence ministry have also expressed a measure of willingness to cooperate with Western diplomatic efforts.

On the other hand, the path to negotiations has seen a number of stumbling blocks. Signals from Iran have been mixed at best. Supreme Leader Ali Khameini recently rejected the idea of negotiating with the United States, saying that Iran “would not be intimidated” by US pressure. Iran also just revealed plans to install thousands of new centrifuges at its Natanz nuclear facility. Finally, it’ll soon be election season in Iran, which means officials will be anxious not to be seen as caving under Western pressure.

Ultimately, though, all of this may not tell us much, because what lies behind us is far less important than what lies ahead. The hopeful or ominous developments of the past few months only matter insofar as they signal what negotiators will or won’t be willing to put on the table. To that end, it’s worth speculating not just about what this new centrifuge and that new statement might mean, but also about what compromises could be made to make this round the one that matters.

The crucial issue to resolve is Iran’s production of 20% enriched uranium, and Iran has been relatively more flexible on this than other matters. A workable deal might require Iran to deposit its existing stockpile of 20% enriched uranium abroad, stop enriching at the Fordow facility, and agree to limit future enrichment to a low level suitable for civilian power reactors. Under such a deal, Iran would also need to implement the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol, to facilitate future inspections. In exchange, the P5+1 could offer sanctions relief and a freeze on new sanctions.

That’s how a deal might ideally resolve the thorniest issues in Iran’s standoff with the West. But the talks could bring progress even if we don’t make it that far. An alternative strategy could focus on confidence-building measures, or “baby steps” that ease the two sides out of the straitjacket of mistrust that has constrained previous efforts. For instance, Iran could agree to temporarily halt uranium enrichment or to downgrade its existing stockpile of 20% enriched uranium to the less potent form needed for civilian reactors. In exchange, the P5+1 could agree to temporarily suspend some key sanctions, which would open the door for further sanctions relief once other issues (the Fordow facility, the Additional Protocol, enrichment levels in the future) are resolved.

Negotiators might also take a big-picture approach that brings in other, more long-standing concerns, such as Iran’s alleged links to terrorist groups, suspicions of previous weapons development, and the question of gradually normalizing diplomatic and economic relations between Iran and the West.

In sum, although some forecasts for the talks have been gloomy, there actually is no dearth of options available — that is, if negotiators want to take them. It’s almost a truism to say, but a rehash of last year’s negotiations will only bring a rehash of last year’s dismal outcome. As Einstein famously said, insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.

So this time in Almaty, let’s try a new approach, one oriented around mutual concessions rather than stubborn digging into unworkable positions. If we do that, with any luck, this time really can be different.

- Laicie Heeley is the senior policy analyst and Usha Sahay a Hurbert J. Scoville Peace Fellow, both at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, a Washington-based non-profit think tank.

Photo: The 19 September 2012 meeting of  EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton and Dr. Saeed Jalili, the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, in Istambul, Turkey. (Credit: European External Action Service – EEAS)

As former top State Department intelligence specialist Wayne White points out for Lobe Log, in the absence of a tenable ceasefire agreement, the quagmire that is the Syrian civil war will likely intensify, thereby only worsening post-Assad scenarios.

“The bottom line is that a sort of Catch-22 situation is [...]]]> via Lobe Log

As former top State Department intelligence specialist Wayne White points out for Lobe Log, in the absence of a tenable ceasefire agreement, the quagmire that is the Syrian civil war will likely intensify, thereby only worsening post-Assad scenarios.

“The bottom line is that a sort of Catch-22 situation is continuing on the diplomatic front,” wrote White last week. “[T]he side that believes it has the upper hand and will eventually prevail militarily (currently the opposition) is unlikely to accept a truce because a ceasefire would interfere with its ability to sustain intense military pressure on the other side.”

Anyone hoping for even a temporary cessation to the deadly violence would have been shattered by Bashar al-Assad’s rare speech in Damascus on Sunday, where he thanked his base for showing “the whole world that Syria is impervious to collapse and the Syrian people impervious to humiliation.” The defiant president refused to step down while claiming he was ready to talk with the opposition. But as White noted, Assad did so while urging his supporters to continue fighting against the “bunch of criminals” who oppose him.

This political gridlock makes creative diplomacy appear all the more important in bringing an end to the ongoing carnage that’s ravaging the country. Asked if the Iranians should be included in diplomatic efforts, former top CIA analyst Paul Pillar told Lobe Log that ”Any multilateral diplomatic initiative has a better chance of success if all the parties with leverage to exert are included.”

Pillar is well aware of the fact that this may be easier said than done. UN and Arab League mediator Lahkdar Brahimi remains in between a rock and a hard place — expected to please everyone while not being able to please anyone. The brutal force that the government deployed to crush what were initially peaceful protests seems to have pushed both sides beyond the point of no return. Presently, the opposition’s recent disgust with Brahimi’s choice of Russia as the venue for his recent truce initiative has been overshadowed by the regime’s accusations of Brahimi’s “bias toward sides known for conspiring against Syria and the Syrian people.”

It was in this atmosphere of hopelessness that news surfaced Wednesday of over 2,130 Syrian prisoners being released by the regime in exchange for 48 Iranians abducted during what they claimed to be a religious pilgrimage in August. (The opposition had said that the Iranians were members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, which Tehran adamantly denied.) The massive exchange again raises the question of whether Iran has a role to play in bringing an end to the Syrian crisis.

This question may be more difficult to answer now than it was when the fighting first broke out over a year ago. On the one hand, the prisoner swap supports the argument that Iran holds considerable influence over Assad’s government and could help shift events toward a “peace process”. Throughout last year, Iran tried to inject itself into diplomatic processes taking place over Syria by, for example, supporting a failed United Nations-Arab League peace plan and making is own proposal in December.

“On Syria, Iran is pursuing a dual track policy of support for the Syrian Government as it faces internal instability, while pressing Damascus to take measures to reduce tensions, open the grounds for negotiations with the opposition and find a path towards national unity and conciliation,” said Ambassador Seyed Hossein Mousavian, the former spokesperson for Iran’s nuclear negotiating team (2003 to 2005) and now a visiting scholar at Princeton University.

“Iran can play a major constructive role on the Syrian crisis,” he said.

That Iran reportedly included Syria in its five-point proposal presented during nuclear talks in Moscow last June could be an indication that it would be willing to bargain away its support for the regime — if it was provided with enough incentive. (Recall how the government of Mohammad Khatami reportedly offered to end Iran’s material support to Palestinian groups opposing Israel in a March 2003 proposal for “broad dialogue” with the US that was rejected by the Bush administration.)

On the other hand, this prisoner swap, which amounts to about 44 Syrians for every 1 Iranian, displays the extent to which Iran is tied to Assad’s repression. If the war in Syria is really about the major powers that are backing each side (Russia, Iran and China for the regime, and Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Western countries for the opposition), and since the fall of Assad would indeed be a “major blow” to the Iranians, can Tehran really be expected to help its foes?

For now, talks with Iran over its nuclear program are expected to resume shortly, even if they’re already off to a bad start. But as the fighting in Syria produces ongoing suffering while the Israeli-led campaign against Iran’s nuclear program continues to involve the potential of a costly military conflict, considering all options on the Syrian diplomatic table be more important now than ever.

“If the Iranians are excluded from a joint effort to do something helpful, they are only more likely to do something unhelpful, said Pillar, who advocates a more flexible US negotiating posture with Iran.

“Engagement with Iran over Syria also can reap secondary benefits in other areas, such as the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, by expanding channels of communication and bargaining space,” he said.

Photo: Feb. 23, 2012. A Free Syrian Army member prepares to fight with a tank whose crew defected from government forces in al-Qsair. Freedom House photo/Creative Commons/Flickr.  

Last week I attended an event hosted by the Arms Control Association and the National Iranian American Council on how to make diplomacy work with Iran. I wrote about it here. Keynote speaker Zbigniew Brzezinski was the last to speak and showed up minutes before he took [...]]]> via Lobe Log

Last week I attended an event hosted by the Arms Control Association and the National Iranian American Council on how to make diplomacy work with Iran. I wrote about it here. Keynote speaker Zbigniew Brzezinski was the last to speak and showed up minutes before he took the stage. The former National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter politely denied an interview request with Voice of America before making his way to the podium, whereupon he joked about being presented with — as a child — the opportunity to become the foreign minister of Iran during the Shah’s era.

Around this time last year, the famed geostrategist was urging the Obama administration to engage Iran when few were so bold. Now, when many are talking about diplomatic strategies to avoid a costly war, Brzezinski is discussing US options if diplomacy fails.

Brzezinski emphasized that he prefers a “negotiated outcome that meets to some extent the principle desires of our negotiating side but doesn’t necessarily humiliate the Iranians”, and that war would be an “act of utter irresponsibility” and “significant immorality if the United States was part of it.” He also showed a little of his characteristic pep when he stated that the US shouldn’t follow like “a stupid mule, whatever the Israelis do.” But his focus on what to do if talks head nowhere — as they have in the past — suggests he’s not optimistic about their prospects.

There have been some positive signs from the White House. On Friday, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said the US wants bilateral talks at Brookings’ Saban Center. The administration also expressed opposition to yet another sanctions bill approved on Friday by the Senate. But as Josh Rogin notes in his report, the Obama administration has often touted the sanctions regime pushed by Congress even while criticizing it. Add to this Iran’s own paranoid, hardening domestic political environment, and Brzezinski’s position is hard to dismiss.

Following are 4 options Brzezinski offered should talks fail. From the transcript:

Then, what really are our options in that setting?  My bottom line answer to the question which I have just posed is that there are no good options.  But there are, of course, still options, but they range from the worst to the least bad.  But at least, there’s a choice.  The least attractive – the worst, in fact, would be if the United States and/or Israel, or jointly, attacked Iran.  I think that is a fact.  I have spoken to that many times.

So let me merely say in brief that this would produce a regional crisis and widespread hatred, particularly for the United States because the United States would be seen as the deciding partner in such an undertaking, whether jointly with Israel or subsequent to Israel or by the United States alone.  The United States would be drawn into, therefore, a protracted conflict in the region, first of all with the Iranians and perhaps the Iranian people as well.

For while the attitudes of the Iranians by and large, to the extent that we can tell, towards the United States are not hostile and on the whole, in the larger cities, quite benign, a conflict in which the United States was acting as, in their perspective, an aggressor and engaging in military action would certainly precipitate long lasting hatred for the United States.  And that would be a fact of life in that part of the country, and not an insignificant one since it would involve some 85 million people.

In the more immediate perspective, of course, there would be regional disruption.  The region would be literally set aflame with the conflict probably spreading through Iraq to Syria, creating one large belt of conflict, complicating our withdrawal from Afghanistan, particularly in the western parts of Afghanistan where Iran has the capacity to make life miserable for us.  It would be disruptive of course in terms of the security of oil flowing through the Strait of Hormuz, even if it was kept open by the United States.  But still, even then the price of insurance for the flow of oil would dramatically increase.

And there is a further uncertainty involved in that kind of an operation, namely how successful would it be.  In fact, in estimates by Israeli experts regarding Israel’s potential to be decisively effective, are pessimistic.  And American estimates depend on the scale of the American attack.  Even a relatively modest attack by the United States would inflict in any case serious casualties on the Iranians, precipitating the death of a large number of Iranian scientists and probably, in some cases given the location of the facilities, also civilians.

And there is still the unknown factor of what happens if radiation is released as a consequence of these attacks.  And that could be a significant factor in terms of civilian casualties, particularly in places that are larger, semi-metropolitan.  And of course, some facilities that would be destroyed are located – for example, Isfahan.

All of that, I think makes an attack not a very attractive remedy for dealing with the problem, a problem which then would pale in insignificance compared to the consequences of the attack once the dynamic consequences were set in motion.  So I dismiss that as a serious alternative.  I think it would be an act of utter irresponsibility and potentially a very significant immorality if the United States was part of it.

A second alternative, not either very good – neither are very good is a campaign of covert subversion – ranging from sabotage through assassinations, maybe even to cyberwarfare – directed at Iran in order to prevent it from acquiring an effective nuclear weapon.  I think the result of that is troublesome, not in terms of its immediate outcome because the asymmetry of capabilities between the United States and Iran is so wide that obviously Iran would be much more negatively affected.

But in the longer run, we cannot entirely dismiss the fact that inherent in such a strategy one sets in motion a degradation of the international system, a degradation of the international rules of the game, which could prove, in the longer run, very damaging to American national interests, if one assumes that the United States wishes to be essentially a status-quo power, not one that precipitates massive disruptions of the international order, but has a national interest in consolidating the international order and, indeed, even in expanding its international effectiveness.

So the losses in that sense to American national interests of such a campaign would be significant.  And it is not clear that they would necessarily lead to the desired – otherwise desired outcome, namely deprivation of Iran of capability to have a militarily significant nuclear potential.  Indeed, implicit perhaps in that second strategy would be an eventual outcome very similar to the first strategy, that the United States would find it necessary, would find itself compelled or driven by others into undertaking option one, but making it even in a more negative context.

The third not desirable option, but perhaps somewhat less immediately destructive, is of course a policy of the continuous imposition of sanctions on Iran that would range from painful to strangulating.  That is to say, a policy in which one assumes that at some point Iran would accommodate and accept an outcome which otherwise was not achieved in the process of negotiations.

This is a complicated undertaking because it’s very difficult in that context to clearly distinguish between what sanctions are designed to achieve the nuclear objective, and which ones are designed to achieve other objectives on the grounds of which they were initially imposed.  For example, support for Hezbollah and for other so-called terrorist organizations.

In other words, will we be trying to change the behavior of the regime?  Would we be trying to force it to comply with our position on the nuclear issue?  Or would we be trying to change the regime?  Careful discrimination of this context is very difficult to achieve and, hence, it is also very difficult to envisage an outcome in advance that would be clearly productive insofar as the original point of departure for the sanctions is concerned.

And that brings me to the fourth and least – the least objectionable of the bad options, all of that being based on the assumption that we’re not able to achieve our desired outcome by serious negotiations.  And that is to combine continued painful, but not strangulating sanctions – and be very careful in that distinction – with clear political support for the emergence of eventual democracy in Iran, an objective with which I think many Iranians would associate themselves.

And at the same time an explicit security guarantee for U.S.-friendly Middle Eastern states, including Israel, modeled on the very successful, decade-lasting protection of our European allies from an overwhelming Soviet nuclear threat, and also modeled on the successful protection of South Korea and Japan from the recently emerged North Korean threat, and perhaps earlier on, implicitly but not explicitly, from possible Chinese intimidation.

We succeeded in that policy over many decades and with good result for all concerned, including the Soviet Union and us, including the Russian people and the American people, and certainly to the benefit of those whom we were protecting.  We now know, for example, from secret Soviet war plans, that the Soviets were contemplating, even in the case of the conventional war in which they were moving westward, the use of nuclear weapons against cities.

For example, on the third day of a Soviet offensive, according to Soviet war plans, tactical nuclear weapons, several of them, were designed or were targeted for use against Hamburg – a very large urban center.  And there were others in Western Europe, depending on how the offensive was moving forward.  All of that was avoided by a policy of deterrence that was credible.

This is then the fourth option, which is not the same as the achievement of our objective, but it is an option which creates a condition which might endure for quite a while, because it is difficult to imagine any Iranian regime embarking on a nuclear adventure if it simply has the bomb.  What does that mean, it simply has the bomb?  Has it really been tested?  Is it already related to delivery system?  Does one use it when one has only one?  Does one wait until one has 10?

One has to consider in these circumstances the consequences of their use.  And given an explicit commitment by an overwhelmingly stronger nuclear power, which has demonstrated a willingness to protect with others with credibility and commitment, I think that at least is some degree of assurance that we are gaining time in a very turbulent setting, in a very turbulent time.  And that in itself is an advantage.

This is not an argument for it to be the central focus of our policy.  Obviously a negotiated outcome that meets to some extent the principle desires of our negotiating side but doesn’t necessarily humiliate the Iranians and forces them into an unconditional surrender, so to speak, is still preferable.

But short of that, if in fact the negotiations do not succeed in the near term, I think a shift by the United States to a combination of sanctions, but oriented specifically to the promotion of internal democratizing change and at the same time to serve as a deterrent and involves all of our friends in the Middle East, is the best option – or it’s the least objectionable options of the options that have failed otherwise in the achievement of their ultimate objective.

I don’t know the answer to the question I’ve posted above, but today’s news may offer an indication:

The EU imposes new sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program and reaffirms its said commitment to reaching a peaceful, diplomatic solution:

…the objective of the EU remains to achieve a comprehensive, negotiated, long-term settlement, [...]]]> via Lobe Log

I don’t know the answer to the question I’ve posted above, but today’s news may offer an indication:

The EU imposes new sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program and reaffirms its said commitment to reaching a peaceful, diplomatic solution:

…the objective of the EU remains to achieve a comprehensive, negotiated, long-term settlement, which would build international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme, while respecting Iran’s legitimate rights to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in conformity with the NPT, and fully taking into account UN Security Council and IAEA Board of Governors’ Resolutions.

Israel nods approvingly but doesn’t rejoice:

[Benjamin] Netanyahu, speaking Tuesday at the start of a meeting in Jerusalem with European Union member state ambassadors, called the sanctions “tough” and said Iran was “the greatest threat to peace in our time.”

“These sanctions are hitting the Iranian economy hard, (but) they haven’t yet rolled back the Iranian program. We’ll know that they’re achieving their goal when the centrifuges stop spinning and when the Iranian nuclear program is rolled back,” he said.

As does the former EU and US terrorist-designated organization the Mujahadeen-e Khalq (aka MEK, NCRI, PMOI) while reaffirming its commitment to regime change in Iran:

Therefore, although comprehensive sanctions are an essential and indispensible element to stop the clerical regime’s nuclear weapons project, the ultimate and definitive solution for the world community to rid itself of the terrorist mullahs’ attempt to acquire nuclear weapons is a regime change by the Iranian people and Resistance. Thus, recognizing the Iranian people’s efforts to overthrow religious fascism and to establish democracy in Iran is more essential than ever.

Iran complains loudly while tooting its resistance regime horn and allegdly hitting back against cyber attacks waged against its nuclear program.

And all the while average Iranians (and terminally ill ones) continue to carry the brunt of the weight:

The measures come as Iran’s economy continues to reel in the wake of previous Western sanctions targeting the country’s crucial oil exports and access to international banking networks. Iranians are suffering economically amid inflation and the sharp devaluation of the Iranian currency against the dollar.

Shop owners in downtown Tehran said that prices had risen 50% since last month and that they were expecting things to only get worse.

Amir Mosayan, who sells watch batteries wholesale, said that immediately following the sanctions the price of his goods went up 70%.

 

The National Iranian American Council’s Reza Marashi, who served at the Office of Iranian Affairs at the US Department of State during the transition from the Bush to Obama administration, on the key foreign policy issue facing the next president of the United States:

Political parties in the US do [...]]]> via Lobe Log

The National Iranian American Council’s Reza Marashi, who served at the Office of Iranian Affairs at the US Department of State during the transition from the Bush to Obama administration, on the key foreign policy issue facing the next president of the United States:

Political parties in the US do not dictate the range of options available to an American president. Obama and Romney face the same reality: the tools of statecraft are simple – war or diplomacy. Anything else – whether it is called containment, regime change or dual track – is simply a tactic that delays the inevitable choice between these two options. The inconvenient truth of statecraft is that most conflicts – even war – end via negotiations; and everything before negotiations – including war – is for leverage. Efforts to delay this inevitable choice have only added pressure to escalate to the worst possible outcome.

If the next US President wants peace, he must recalibrate US policy to consider seriously the political, economic and security incentives sought by Iran – incentives that any diplomatic solution would have to address. This does not imply that concessions must be made on each of these fronts. Only robust diplomacy can determine whether it is in America’s interest to address Iranian concerns. But if America does not lead a process of sustained negotiations, then diplomacy will be deemed one-sided, and will fail without having being executed in good faith.

Naturally, it takes two to tango. No policy can guarantee success, and it remains unclear whether Iran will reciprocate American overtures. But if peace is the metric of success, then diplomacy provides a better guarantee than war. With that in mind, the next US President can best avoid mistakes like the Iraq war by learning from limits of American military prowess – and placing the same level of confidence in the power of American diplomacy.

By Gary Sick

Every few months there is a concocted “crisis” involving suggestions that Israel is just on the verge of attacking Iran. This cycle started almost a decade ago, and it has repeated itself roughly annually, though sometimes more frequently.

In the early days, these alarms typically began with [...]]]> via Gary’s Choices

By Gary Sick

Every few months there is a concocted “crisis” involving suggestions that Israel is just on the verge of attacking Iran. This cycle started almost a decade ago, and it has repeated itself roughly annually, though sometimes more frequently.

In the early days, these alarms typically began with a series of “leaks” by anonymous sources, usually to well connected Israeli or pro-Israeli reporters. For years it appeared that the US and world media would bite every time, with no apparent recollection that they had heard that tune before.

But when you have cried wolf so many times, even the main stream media, which loves an exciting story, begins to wonder if it is not being led by the nose. More important, over the past two years, as the veiled threats of an attack became ever more shrill, virtually the entire Israeli security establishment came out in opposition to such an operation. For a good summary, click here. Their reasoning was simple:

• Israel could not finish the job by itself; it could launch an attack by aircraft and cruise missile, which might do damage to the Iranian nuclear infrastructure, but Israel could not finish the job. For that, they needed the United States.
• A unilateral Israel strike would very likely speed up Iran’s nuclear weapon development; Iran might well withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, kick out the IAEA inspectors who are our eyes and ears on the ground, and announce that, since they had been attacked by a nuclear weapons state, they were no longer bound by their pledge not to produce a weapon.
• The entire Persian Gulf region would be thrown into chaos and the price of oil would probably go sky high for some time. The costs to delicate world economies, still struggling to recover from the Great Recession, would be severe.
• The Iranian people, at least initially, would probably rally around their hard line leadership, as they have in the past when their national sovereignty was challenged. The Green reform movement would be undercut, since they would not dare associate themselves with external invaders.
• The United States would be blamed (and not only by Iran) for complicity in the attack, regardless of whether it was true. Iran and its allies might well retaliate against US military and civilian targets, in addition to Israel, thus sparking a much wider regional conflict.
• If an air strike did not work, the logical next step would be to go after the leadership. And, as we learned in Iraq, that means boots on the ground.

In short, an Israeli (or American) attack would very likely leave the situation much worse than it was before taking military action. Israel’s security would not be improved; in fact, it might be imperiled by the negative response of even Israel’s closest allies. And Iran’s creeping approach to nuclear capability might turn into a sprint.

This awareness of the “day after” effect has persuaded many security specialists that an Israeli attack would be the very definition of a Pyrrhic victory.

It is worth remembering that Israel acquires significant leverage from this constant perception of imminent war. By keeping the Iranian nuclear case at the forefront  of the world’s media, political leaders everywhere are more likely to pay a price in the form of lost revenues and political sparring with Iran, rather than facing the calamity of an outright war.

The problem is that economic sanctions and covert interference with Iran’s nuclear program have been pushed to such a level that they are morphing into outright economic and political warfare. Iran has lost roughly fifty percent of its national income in the past six months, in addition to a series of assassinations and cyber attacks on its infrastructure. Inflation and unemployment are soaring — affecting all levels of society, especially the poor. There is no longer even the pretense that these are “smart” sanctions directed only at Iran’s political and military leadership.

Iran has responded to this onslaught by entering into negotiations and offering some compromise positions, such as potentially terminating its uranium enrichment to the 20 percent level and eliminating its stockpile of such uranium. But the US and its allies have taken a hard line position that Iran must cease ALL enrichment if they want to see any relief from the sanctions.

It is doubtful that the US can make any significant concessions during an election year, and Iran has shown little willingness to yield to the pressure by terminating all uranium enrichment.

That is the context for the latest crisis about a possible Israeli attack.

Based on the experience of a decade of such crises, all of which faded away with no military action, I can only be skeptical. I am aware that “This is the Middle East…” i.e. that nations are capable of acting against their own interests in the hysteria of the moment.

My only concern is that Prime Minister Netanyahu, having made the case so often and so publicly for Israel’s right and even duty to attack, will have painted himself into a corner where there is no escape without actually risking national catastrophe.

Yes, that is a possibility. But I have sufficient confidence in the operation of Israeli democracy and the instinct for self preservation of its leaders to regard that possibility as vanishingly small.

National Security and Nuclear Diplomacy was published in Iran during the autumn of 2011 but most people only learned about it a few months ago after it was made available during Tehran’s International Book Fair in May. It’s significant because the author is Hassan Rowhani, the country’s nuclear negotiator for 22 [...]]]> via Lobe Log

National Security and Nuclear Diplomacy was published in Iran during the autumn of 2011 but most people only learned about it a few months ago after it was made available during Tehran’s International Book Fair in May. It’s significant because the author is Hassan Rowhani, the country’s nuclear negotiator for 22 months during the Khatami presidency – just one of the many positions he has held since the inception of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The book – a publication of the Center for Strategic Studies (CSR), which Rowhani directs – is now in its third printing. CSR is affiliated with the Expediency Council in which Rowhani continues to be a member.

Going beyond the nuclear issue, I recommend this book to anyone who is interested in understanding Iran’s post-revolutionary politics and how the fundamental changes in its structure of power have transformed the decision-making process in the country from one-man rule to a collective enterprise.

The details revealed in Rowhani’s book about how decisions were made in restarting Iran’s nuclear program in the late 1980s, as well as in negotiations with the EU 3 (Britain, Germany and France) are very interesting. The section explaining why negotiations failed with the EU 3, titled “Why Europe Could not Capitalize on the Opportunity?”, should be read by anyone who believes that Iranian negotiators had no reason to be suspicious of the EU 3’s intent and mode of operation. Those interested in learning about the dynamics of Iran’s national security calculus will also find ample information about the changes that occurred in the Supreme National Security Council after 9/11 and Rowhani’s take on why these changes are not sufficient to overcome some basic flaws in Iran’s decision-making process. Rowhani’s opinions about wrong policy choices made by subsequent nuclear teams are also included in National Security and Nuclear Diplomacy.

But the value of this book really lies first in the fact that it was written with a domestic audience in mind and second in the frank defense – and by implication promotion – of that approach to the same domestic audience. But let me be clear that by “domestic audience” I do not necessarily mean the Iranian population at large whose views about national security are, like in every other country, shaped more by the national security establishment than the other way around. More than anything else, this is a book generated from debates and disagreements within Iran’s political establishment that is intended to influence the continuing mutation of that debate. After all, today, the Khatami era nuclear negotiators are routinely accused of passivity, even treason, by Iran’s hard-line security establishment.

Less than two weeks ago, during a meeting with Iranian officials, the Leader Ali Khamenei stated that the EU 3 would not even agree to the Iranian offer of “only 3 centrifuges running” and that had he not intervened in the nuclear file, the Iranian “retreat” would have continued. But unlike Rowhani’s other detractors, Khamenei does acknowledge that the failed negotiation with the EU 3 was a needed experience. And, by using direct quotes from Khamenei, this is a point that Rowhani keeps highlighting: every decision made on the nuclear dossier was made by consensus and had Khamenei’s endorsement. Moreover, preventing the referral of Iran’s nuclear dossier to the UN Security Council at a time when the US was at the height of its military adventurism was a major achievement that assured Iran’s security and also provided the country with time to prepare for future challenges.

However, the defense of his nuclear team’s performance is not the only aspect of Rowhani’s book. He not only sheds light on the nature of domestic opposition to the 2003-05 nuclear negotiations (political as well as based on ignorance about Iran’s posture in the negotiations), he also criticizes the mistakes made by subsequent negotiating teams. Rowhani chastises, for example, the Larijani-led team for thinking that there was no need to continue negotiations with Europe despite his warning that reliance only on the  “East” – read Russia and China – was a mistake. He also suggests that the new nuclear team did not take seriously enough the “very dangerous” September 2005 resolution of the International Atomic Energy Association’s (IAEA) board of governors. Rowhani states flatly, “it was after September 2005 that the new nuclear team realized the [limited] weight of the East! And then they went looking for the West, which was of course already too late.”

As to Iran’s current predicament, Rowhani acknowledges Iran’s technological progress: “We can say that 20 percent enrichment has in some ways created increased deterrence”. But he adds that given the “heavy cost paid”, Iran’s technology “should have progressed more.” More significant is Iran’s undesirable political and legal struggle given the referral of Iran’s file to the Security Council. Rowhani concludes National Security and Nuclear Diplomacy by stating:

…now taking [Iran’s file] out of the Security Council is a complex and costly affair. In effect, we have endured the biggest harm in the areas of development and national power. We may have not benefitted much on the whole in terms of national security either. The foundation of security is not feeling apprehensive. In the past 6 years, the feeling of apprehension has not been reduced.

Rowhani does not challenge Iran’s nuclear posture. He is a committed member of the Islamic Republic and supporter of its nuclear program in the face of what he considers to be recalcitrant hostility. His criticism is quite different than the criticism of those – mostly among the Iranian Diaspora – who have challenged the utility of Iran’s nuclear program or the objectives of Iran’s rulers. His charge is much more ordinary and damning: the subsequent nuclear teams made key mistakes, miscalculated, and politicized the nuclear dossier in order to enhance their domestic standing and harmed the interests of the Islamic Republic during the process.

Given the fact that, according to Rowhani, none of the nuclear decisions made in Iran could be made without Khamenei’s endorsement, this book is also a devastating critique of the latter’s endorsement of the clumsy way Iran has negotiated with West.

Rowhani may be right or wrong in arguing that Iran’s condition would have been different with better Iranian negotiators, a better understanding of Iran’s predicament and limitations in finding allies, and better diplomacy. After all, the American and European posture of no enrichment in Iran has persisted with or without Rowhani.

What I do not doubt, however, is the fact that no one could have published a book like this before the revolution!

Song: “Stranger in Moscow” by the late and great, Michael Jackson

Julian Borger, Laura Rozen and Scott Peterson report on the “wide gap” and the “nitty gritty” details of the latest round of nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of [...]]]> via Lobe Log

Song: “Stranger in Moscow” by the late and great, Michael Jackson

Julian Borger, Laura Rozen and Scott Peterson report on the “wide gap” and the “nitty gritty” details of the latest round of nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany) in Moscow. Long story short: Iran is arguing that the West–though primarily the U.S. egged on by the “Zionist regime” and a like-minded Congress–are asking for too much while offering too little. The Iranians are accordingly at least posturing like they won’t move on a major point of interest unless something gives. (Recall that prior to the disappointment of Baghdad, Iran indicated that it could budge on 20% enrichment and offer increased and “permanent” monitoring of their nuclear program in return for real incentives.) Iranian hyperbolic paranoia notwithstanding, when it comes to Congress, Tehran’s argument is hard to deny. For its part the West seems unwilling to go big as some have suggested or reconsider its recent offering which was received by the Iranians like a bunch of sticks and a half-eaten, moldy carrot. While the lack of real progress gives the usual suspects reason to be gleeful since the prospect of a military confrontation will seem more likely, people with real-world policy expertise remind us that diplomacy is a marathon, not a sprint.

Meanwhile Jonathan Bernstein injects some sense into the opinion pages of the Washington Post regarding Mitt Romney’s latest ridiculisums on Iran, Kenneth Waltz pens a taboo opinion on Iran nuclear weapons, the U.S. continues its dangerous bargaining game with the terrorist-designated Mujahideen-e-khalq (MEK), and George Perkovich explains why “A Nuclear Deal Helps Human Rights in Iran“.