by Francois Nicoulaud
“No deal is better than bad deal:” that’s the mantra that has been heard ad nauseam in the recent past and presented as self-evident of U.S. toughness in the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program.
But is it really so? Of course, everybody knows what “no deal” means. It is [...]]]>
by Francois Nicoulaud
“No deal is better than bad deal:” that’s the mantra that has been heard ad nauseam in the recent past and presented as self-evident of U.S. toughness in the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program.
But is it really so? Of course, everybody knows what “no deal” means. It is more difficult to discern at what point a deal becomes bad, rather than good, or even average. But plenty of experts are ready to help. A bad deal, they tell us, is a deal which would allow the Iranians to produce the material necessary for a bomb in less than six months. A bad deal is a deal which would not clarify once and for all what kind of research the Iranians have been pursuing in the past for manufacturing a nuclear explosive device. A bad deal is a deal which would allow the Iranians to pursue their ballistic missile program. And so on… One ends up understanding that any deal less than perfect would amount to an unacceptably bad deal.
But such an approach goes against any diplomatic process in which compromise and give and take are key notions. It leads to the conclusion that a perfect deal is a deal which does not have to be negotiated, a deal in which the winner takes all. And indeed, there are people who believe that non-proliferation is too important a question to be submitted to any kind of compromise. It deserves only perfect deals.
History, though, does not confirm this approach. The mother of all non-proliferation agreements, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), concluded in 1968, was in each and all its articles one big compromise. A few countries were allowed to develop nuclear arsenals, others not. The countries that agreed to forsake any military nuclear ambitions were allowed to bring their nuclear capabilities up to the thin red line beyond which could start the manufacturing of an explosive nuclear device. Nobody was happy at the result when the Treaty was signed and nobody is satisfied today by the state of affairs that has developed since.
Thus, the NPT was a deeply imperfect agreement, and indeed, a kind of bad deal. But would a “no deal” have been better? Obviously not. In a different field, the strategic arms limitation agreements concluded during and after the Cold War between the US and the USSR, later on Russia, and signed on the US side by Presidents Nixon, Carter, Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Obama… were certainly deeply imperfect. But, again, would “no deals” have been better?
Considering the Iranian negotiation, one could risk being provocative by saying that almost any deal (at least in the ambit of the current negotiation) could be better than no deal at all. No deal means the unchecked development of the Iranian program, the continuing increase of its enrichment capacities and stock of enriched uranium, the completion of a reactor of the plutonium-production type, and eventually the resumption of active research on engineering a nuclear device. By way of consequence, it would mean a growing tension between the international community and the Islamic Republic, possibly culminating in strikes on its nuclear facilities and in armed confrontation.
Compared to such a prospect, a far less-than-perfect agreement could appear indeed as highly desirable. Let us remember that international relations are nurtured by iterative and evolutionary processes. “Solve-all”, perfectly designed agreements, the epitome of which could well have been the Treaty of Versailles, seldom produce brilliant and lasting results. What is critical is to grab at the right moment the maximum of what is within reach. The art of diplomacy lies precisely in the ability to first discern, and then to join and knit together the extremes of what can be willingly accepted by the conflicting parties. It incorporates also the humility of leaving to others the task of solving at a later stage questions not yet fully addressed or wholly answered, in the knowledge that new circumstances created by an agreement will create new possibilities for progress. It keeps in mind that even an imperfect agreement, if faithfully implemented by the parties, can be a kind of confidence-building machine, opening the way to further advances. This is precisely what happened with the November 24 Joint Plan of Action between the P5+1 and Iran: that accord was transitory and therefore essentially imperfect, but it created the proper atmosphere for a more ambitious step forward.
Given the current state of the negotiations, how can these general considerations be translated into concrete terms? Let us limit ourselves to the most difficult point; that is, the acceptable level of Iranian enrichment activities. Here, the obvious line of compromise turns around capping them for a few years the present level of employed enrichment capacity – expressed in Separation Work Units (SWU) in order neutralize the consequences of the possible introduction of more efficient centrifuges. The figure to be retained would then be between 8,000 and 10,000 SWU per year.
For this, the Iranians have to admit that they do not need to develop an enrichment capacity on an industrial scale (about 50,000 SWU per year and over) as long as do not break ground on the main structures of their future nuclear power plants. And they should take advantage of this interval to develop more productive and more secure centrifuges than the primitive, outdated model that forms the bulk of their present stock of working centrifuges. They also need to progress significantly in the technology of nuclear-fuel manufacturing in order to be ready in due time if they want to meet at least partially the needs of their future nuclear power plants.
On the other side, the West should consider the enormous political difficulty the Iranian government would face if it had to dismantle even part of the nation’s hard-won enrichment capacity. It is true that accepting the preservation of this capacity at its present level would open the theoretical risk of the Iranians quickly acquiring significant quantities of highly enriched uranium, thus opening the way to the bomb. But considering the self-destructive consequences of such a blatant breach of agreement, the risk is very limited indeed, and by all means much more limited than the risks raised by the absence of any deal. Is this risk really unmanageable for the coalition of the world’s most powerful countries, given the sophistication of their diplomatic, intelligence, and contingency-planning capacities? Of course, such a compromise could be easily depicted with equal vehemence as a bad deal on both sides. And that is why it is probably the right compromise, and a fair deal.
Photo: The P5+1 foreign ministers, with Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif at United Nations Headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, November 24, 2013. Credit: State Department photo/Public Domain
]]>It was just over four years ago, on 5 April 2009, that President Obama delivered remarks on the future of nuclear weapons in the 21st century. His remarks were received with hopeful enthusiasm throughout the world. They may have contributed to the decision to award him a Nobel Peace Prize later that [...]]]>
It was just over four years ago, on 5 April 2009, that President Obama delivered remarks on the future of nuclear weapons in the 21st century. His remarks were received with hopeful enthusiasm throughout the world. They may have contributed to the decision to award him a Nobel Peace Prize later that year.
If today the Obama administration’s achievements are measured against the agenda that the President sketched out on that spring morning in Prague, the record can best be described as “mixed”.
The conclusion, in 2010, of a substantial agreement with the Russian Federation to reduce the number of nuclear warheads deployed by both sides is a worthy achievement. The administration has imparted momentum to global efforts to secure vulnerable nuclear material, and high-level political commitment. US support has helped to bring about the creation of an international nuclear fuel bank, so as to increase confidence in the sustainability of nuclear fuel supplies and narrow the rationale for national fuel supply programs.
But that’s about all.
The administration has not attempted to secure US ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which opened for signature in 1997 and, to date, has been ratified by 159 States. This is a serious blow to the cause of nuclear non-proliferation, because US non-ratification has provided Egypt, Israel, Iran, Pakistan, India, China and North Korea with an excuse not to ratify. Ratification by two of these States, Iran and North Korea, would in one case serve as an additional nuclear confidence-building measure, and in the other inhibit the development of reliable nuclear weapons.
The proposal for a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty remains becalmed. To be fair, this is not for want of US effort. It nonetheless has to be accounted as a setback on the President’s proclaimed path to a nuclear-weapon-free world.
And, third, the administration has failed to have any discernible impact on the nuclear program of the one state that was a manifest nuclear proliferation threat when the President spoke in Prague: North Korea. On the contrary, since April 2009 North Korea has conducted two nuclear tests, has threatened the deliberate first use of nuclear weapons, and has acquired at least one uranium enrichment plant to complement a small stock of plutonium.
Furthermore, the outlook for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has darkened. In 2010 the administration was able to take pride in having engineered a successful NPT review conference and stilled fears about the US commitment to the Treaty, fears which had been aroused by the G. W. Bush administration’s cavalier approach to the 2005 review conference.
On 29 April 2013, however, Egypt walked out of the second of three conferences tasked with preparing the 2015 review conference. They did so because the US, as they saw it, had failed to secure Israeli participation in exploratory work on creating a Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ).
The administration may be inclined to shrug this off as a temporary glitch, which can be rectified by subjecting to pressure an Egyptian government that is financially dependent on the US and some US allies. If that is the case, however, the administration may be underestimating the importance Egypt attaches to the NWFZ concept and the readiness of the Egyptian government to risk US displeasure on this account. Israel’s un-avowed possession of nuclear weapons is a long-standing affront to Egyptian self-respect and a cause around which it is easy to rally the Non-Aligned States which constitute nearly two thirds of the NPT community.
I come at last to my main point. If I were a US official who had the ear of the President, I would want to argue for the burnishing of this mixed post-Prague record by treating Iran as a nuclear non-proliferation opportunity.
To those who are accustomed to hearing Iran described as a nuclear proliferation threat, that will sound like a crazy paradox. But that description does not accord with the facts. In reality the evidence points to Iran being a NPT party that is ready to re-affirm its non-proliferation commitment, to offer state-of-the art international monitoring of that commitment, and to clear up concerns about certain nuclear-related activities prior to 2004, in return for the US accepting that Iranian enrichment of uranium under safeguards and for peaceful purposes, is not a breach of the NPT, and lifting obligations imposed, at US behest, by the UN Security Council.
Settling the Iranian case on such terms would be entirely consistent with the vision sketched out by the President in Prague. It would show that the US had reverted to a classical interpretation of the NPT, to the interpretation which has helped to motivate 185 States formally to renounce nuclear weapons since 1968. It would strengthen, not weaken this central pillar of the international system.
Photo: President Barack Obama delivers his first major speech stating a commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons in front of thousands in Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)
]]>This was the best of weeks; this was the worst of weeks. I am referring to last week’s ministerial meeting at the UN General Assembly – and of course I’m exaggerating.
For all who want to see Iran’s nuclear quarrel with the West resolved peacefully Prime Minister Netanyahu’s appearance before the [...]]]>
This was the best of weeks; this was the worst of weeks. I am referring to last week’s ministerial meeting at the UN General Assembly – and of course I’m exaggerating.
For all who want to see Iran’s nuclear quarrel with the West resolved peacefully Prime Minister Netanyahu’s appearance before the Assembly was a god-send. This, surely, was the moment when he finally lost all credibility. Not only did he flirt with the grotesque by producing a ridiculous comic-book drawing of a bomb, he also implied that for the umpteenth time he had miscalled the imminence of an Iranian Armageddon.
Yet something tells me we have not heard the last from Mr. Netanyahu. Like Italy’s Silvio Berlusconi, he bounces back from making a fool of himself. At home in recent weeks he has been severely criticised for his misjudgements by Israel’s equivalent of the Great and the Good. Yet it seems his convictions remain intact.
And no doubt he will continue to be taken seriously by the mainstream media. When reporting on Iran the media like to recall – despite evidence to the contrary – that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons. In future they ought to recall, when reporting the premonitions of Mr. Netanyahu, that his years in office have unbalanced him. But of course they won’t.
And so Mr. Netanyahu will continue to create political difficulties for all those who are trying to devise sensible solutions to a very difficult problem.
At least we can be confident that, if Mr. Obama is re-elected, he will not allow himself to be influenced by this hysteria. Twice this year the President has demonstrated that he has the measure of his Israeli “ally”. Last week, in his intervention before the Assembly, he made clear that he draws the line, sensibly, at Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons and not, as Mr. Netanyahu wants, at the acquisition of a weapons capability, long since a fait accompli, in any case, so far as the production of fissile material is concerned.
As for the worst – well, actually, the disappointing – I am thinking of a paper produced by Stephen Hadley and published by Foreign Policy on 26 September. The title was promising: Eight Ways to deal with Iran. But the contents could have been written in 2003. One peruses in vain for evidence that lessons have been learnt from the last nine years of Western dealings with Iran over its nuclear programme.
Instead, Mr. Hadley offers us strategic and tactical options that are familiar and stale, the same mix of carrots and sticks that have failed to deliver a solution because Iranians, as they like to remind us, are not donkeys. They are men as we are – men who understand the importance of maintaining self-respect and who know their rights.
The flawed nature of Mr. Hadley’s vision is apparent early on. He asserts that action is needed to stop Iran:
- - pursuing weapons of mass destruction
- supporting terrorists
- intervening in the internal affairs of neighbours
- infringing the freedom and human rights of the Iranian people
- and denying these people the right to a democratic future.
The extent to which Iran is guilty of these abuses could be questioned. So could the right of other states to put a stop to some of them. The sole point I want to make is that many other states, some of them on friendly terms with the US, are engaging in one or more of these practices; so why single out Iran for special treatment? Is the core issue the enforcement of international norms or the punishment of dissent?
One is hardly surprised to discover, on turning to option 6, a military strike, that Mr. Hadley makes no mention of the legal obstacles to attacking another state. To expect him to be familiar with UN Security Council resolution 487, which condemns military attacks on nuclear facilities as a violation of norms of international conduct and a threat to the nuclear safeguards regime, may be unreasonable. But can he really have spent all those years in the White House without reading the UN Charter?
Nor does he mention the highly toxic nature of the uranium gases that an attack on Iran’s plants would release into the atmosphere. Or the risk retaliation could pose for Saudi desalinated water supplies.
He suggests the US could avoid being seen as responsible for an attack. I suggest that, if Iran’s facilities are attacked, large parts of the world won’t wait for evidence or an avowal before determining responsibility. They’ll be as sure they know who’s responsible as is Mr Netanyahu when, within half an hour of a terrorist outrage, he proclaims Iran’s guilt.
In short, it appears Mr. Hadley has not seen that we need to break out of the mind-set which has doomed efforts to resolve this problem since 2003. We need policies which will minimise the risk that Iran will be tempted to exploit a dual-use capability which is not outlawed by the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. We need a diplomacy that addresses this motivational element in the threat equation, not least by recognising that Iran is entitled to have national interests and that double standards weaken global governance.
]]>The front page of the 13 July edition of the Daily Telegraph caused a stir in Britain. The headline, amplified by that morning’s BBC News, read: “We foiled Iranian nuclear weapons bid, says spy chief”. Referencing a speech by the Chief of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) to [...]]]>
The front page of the 13 July edition of the Daily Telegraph caused a stir in Britain. The headline, amplified by that morning’s BBC News, read: “We foiled Iranian nuclear weapons bid, says spy chief”. Referencing a speech by the Chief of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) to 100 civil servants, the article begins with these two sentences:
Sir John Sawers said that covert operations by British spies had prevented the Iranians from developing nuclear weapons as early as 2008.
However, the MI6 chief said it was now likely they would achieve their goal by 2014, making a military strike from the US and Israel increasingly likely.
Later in the day The Guardian’s Julian Borger reported on his blog that Whitehall (British government) sources were saying that the point Sawers was trying to make was that without the combined work of Western intelligence agencies, Iran would have been even closer to obtaining the capacity to make a nuclear weapon.
That seems to be a likelier account, not least because it’s consistent with what the US intelligence community has been saying since 2007. (Over the years I’ve noticed a SIS weakness for exaggeration when it comes to trumpeting their achievements, despite their attachment to secrecy “in the national interest” when blunders have to be veiled).
So, it’s striking that Borger’s piece was not followed by an official clarification of what Sawers had said or meant. Instead, millions of Telegraph readers and BBC listeners who do not read Borger’s blog have been left with the impression that Iran is intent on acquiring nuclear weapons and will do so by 2014.
To my mind this failure is symptomatic of a Western reluctance to acknowledge that the balance of probability has shifted since 2003: the evidence suggests that Iran switched that year from the goal of possessing nuclear weapons to the goal of possessing a “threshold” capacity – and to adjust policy accordingly.
Yet, legally there is a significant distinction between seeking weapons and seeking a threshold capacity: one is outlawed by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the other is not.
As far back as 1968, US State Department officials were aware that under the freshly-minted NPT it would not be unlawful for a non-nuclear-weapon-state to achieve what they termed “nuclear pregnancy”. (Since 1968 several such states have done just that. If Iran acquires and is allowed to retain a nuclear weapons capacity, it will be in good company.)
It can even be argued that seeking “nuclear pregnancy” is for certain states a logical corollary to being an NPT party. Those who are familiar with the NPT will know that it includes a provision for withdrawal in the event that “extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardised the supreme interests” of a party.
Nuclear-weapon-state lawyers have doubtless strained to interpret this splendid example of diplomatic obscurantism in ways that favour the possessor states. The natural meaning, though, is that if a party feels that its security is threatened by a state possessing nuclear weapons, it may withdraw from the treaty.
It can be inferred that the drafters of the NPT could envisage without blanching that certain states might want to acquire a latent capacity to produce weapons quickly in certain extreme circumstances; they recognised that withdrawal would serve no useful purpose to a threatened party if that party had to embark from scratch on weapons research and the production of fissile material.
Morally, practically, politically and psychologically, too, the weapons/capacity distinction is important.
There is no double standard involved in objecting to Iran becoming nuclear-armed; refusing to tolerate an Iranian “pregnancy” is a double standard.
A nuclear-armed state may reasonably be thought to present a “clear and present danger” to other states (though in practice the reality of the threat is usually questionable), whereas a threshold state cannot.
None of Iran’s more respectable friends — it has more of these than Western propaganda admits — want Iran to get nuclear weapons. But they are philosophical about Iran attaining threshold status.
Iran’s leaders know that crossing the line separating capacity from possession would be fraught with consequence. As Frederick the Great once observed, one can get away with one breach of faith (in this case Iran’s NPT safeguards violations prior to 2004) but not two.
Yet Western leaders have failed to take a consistent stand on the high ground offered by this distinction.
One reason for this may be that our leaders believe that tolerating an Iranian weapons capacity — and acknowledging tacitly that “nuclear pregnancy” is not unlawful — could trigger proliferation. The same Telegraph reporter claims that earlier this year Sawers warned Ministers about a potential threat to Britain from a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. I shall address this possibility in a future piece.
]]>The 92nd Street Y and the Clarion Fund are having trouble getting the big names attached to their Iran war mongering panelon Nov. 7. First, New York Times Jerusalem Bureau Chief Ethan Bronner canceled his appearance on the panel after ThinkProgress called attention to Clarion’s history of [...]]]>
The 92nd Street Y and the Clarion Fund are having trouble getting the big names attached to their Iran war mongering panelon Nov. 7. First, New York Times Jerusalem Bureau Chief Ethan Bronner canceled his appearance on the panel after ThinkProgress called attention to Clarion’s history of promoting anti-Muslim documentaries and the upcoming panel discussion’s role in promoting the organization’s bomb-Iran documentary,Iranium. ThinkProgress can now report that former U.N. Ambassador John Bolton, an outspoken proponent of militaryaction against Iran, has dropped off the panel as well.
But Bolton, who even appears in the film to warn about the existential threat of an Iranian nuclear weapon, was more concerned with his appearance fee than Clarion Fund’s track record of hyping Islamophobia. A spokesperson at the 92nd St. Y told ThinkProgress:
There were not the funds we originally thought there were to bring John Bolton up. We were very sorry that he couldn’t but that’s what happened.
A source close to John Bolton confirmed that Bolton was not attending the event because of the 92nd St. Y’s inability to pay for his appearance.
Obviously Bolton is free to charge a speaking fee, but given his dire warnings about Iran’s nuclear program and his prominent role in Iranium, it’s interesting that he would only appear at the event if his speaking fee was paid. In Iranium Bolton warns:
I think Iran has as a long-term objective dominance within the Islamic world and dominance in the Middle East as well as becoming a great power internationally. [...]
All American administrations have consistently said that they find [that] Iran pursuing nuclear weapons is unacceptable. But unfortunately, unacceptable turns out to really mean unacceptable. Since the various U.S. governments have not taken adequate steps to prevent Iran from achieving that unacceptable result.
Watch a Clarion Fund compilation of Bolton’s comments in Iranium:
Given Bolton’s prominent role in the film and his regular calls for harsher policies to confront Iran, it’s surprising that the matter of an appearance fee has led him to cancel an opportunity to promote Iranium and warn the country — the event will be simulcast in over 20 locations across the U.S. — about what he believes to be an existential threat. But apparently for Bolton, a notorious proponent of military action and use of force, the lack of a satisfactory speaking fee trumps the importance of warning the country about the threat of a nuclear Iran.
]]>On May 6, just before dawn, Ameer Makhoul was arrested. Initial reports state that the Haifa home of the director of Ittijah, a network of NGOs and grassroots organizations representing the interests of Arab citizens of Israel, was invaded by 16 Israeli security agents police officers. They confiscated documents, maps, computer hard drives, a camera and a tape recorder belonging to the couple and their two daughters. Ameer was taken away, as another security service team raided Ittijah‘s offices, taking possession of documents and computer hard drives.
On May 7, the IAEA released the preliminary agenda for its June 2010 meeting, and for the very first time, Israel’s nuclear program is slated to be scrutinized as never before.
So?
Ameer has a brother, Issam. Between 1999 and 2006, Issam was an elected member of Israel’s parliament (Knesset), representing the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality, better known as Hadash (New), a small Arab-Jewish “communist” political party. Issam became the first Member of Knesset (MK) to break the taboo on any public discussion of Israel’s nuclear policy. In a speech he delivered to the Knesset on Feb. 2, 2000, he dared to speak the unspeakable:
The international community has recognized that the nuclear issue is not an internal affair of any state, but has implications that reach beyond national and geographic borders and require international attention. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and other treaties relating to this issue are the sum total of worldwide human wisdom mobilized to defend us from nuclear holocaust. Israel has chosen to remain outside the realm of human wisdom. That was a dangerous choice. The mentality of ‘a nation unto its own’ entails, in the context of the issue at hand, the syndrome of national suicide. Our lives and our security will not be guaranteed by the reactor in Dimona, nor by the hundreds of atomic bombs, nor by the millions of biological warfare germs that are produced at the Biological Institute in Nes Tsiona, nor by the chemical weapons that Israel is developing. Rather, our security would come from an inspired initiative to make the Middle East free of all weapons of mass destruction. Israel is the party that started the race, and it bears the responsibility for changing that course.
Makhoul praised the recent release of portions of the transcripts from the trial of Mordechai Vanunu. [Vanunu was a 31 year old technician at Israel’s Dimona nuclear reactor who described Israel’s secret nuclear weapons program in detail to the British Sunday Times,which published his revelations on Oct. 5, 1986. Subsequently, a seductive Mossad agent named “Cindy” facilitated Vanunu's involuntary repatriation to Israel, where he was tried in secret, and spent 18 years in prison, most of it in solitary confinement.] But more had to be done.
Makhoul declared that the Dimona reactor should be opened to international inspection, and Israel should declare a moratorium on the production of all weapons of mass destruction–nuclear, biological, and chemical. Not only did Makhoul propose the release of all information about the quantity of bombs that Israel possesses, but further demanded that Israel announce, as a confidence-building measure, its willingness to begin unilateral nuclear disarmament, to be completed in the framework of a general Middle East treaty.
Members of the Likud, the National Religious Party, Shas and several other Jewish parliamentarians had stormed out of the Knesset in protest even before Makhoul began to speak. Those who stayed excoriated Makhoul. The Hebrew daily Yediot Aharonot reported the next day (Feb. 3, 2000) that the ruling coalition’s parliamentary chairman, the dovish Ophir Pines-Paz of the Labor party, had shouted at Makhoul, “You are committing a crime against Israeli Arabs today!” Yosef Pritzky of the secular and relatively progressive Shinui (Change) party told Makhoul, “If anyone needed justification why Arab Knesset Members should not be members of the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, you just provided it.”
“What are you blabbering about? Makhoul yelled back at his hecklers. “What I said appears in every newspaper in the world. You’re dummies!”
In spite of an attempt on his life in 2003 – a small bomb rigged under the family car exploded, nearly killing his wife — Issam Makhoul hasn’t given up—or shut up—about Israel’s weapons of mass destruction program. This past October, he wrote an article for the Hiroshima Peace Media Center: “Hiroshima and the World: From the Old Nuclear Order to the New Anti-Nuclear Order”. In it, Makhoul pointed out:
What motivates the public debate in the nuclear question today is not really the dangers facing countries who possess nuclear weapons, but rather the obsessive desire of these countries to preserve the old nuclear order which grants them, arbitrarily, a monopoly of nuclear weapons, both globally as well as regionally. This is especially the case with countries that are not signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), such as Israel, but threaten disastrous war on those nations that aspire toward nuclear capability. Those who oppose the Iranian nuclear project and wish to stop it cannot turn a blind eye to the extensive Israeli nuclear arsenal without being accused, and rightfully so, of hypocrisy.
Issam’s brief bio appended to the above article noted that he is “a member of the International Planning Committee of the NPT Review Conference in May.” That NPT Review Conference is taking place right now in New York, (May 3-28, 2010). Whether Issam is actually there now, actively involved or on the sidelines, or just served on a planning committee whose work is done, is unclear at this time.
Nevertheless, Issam Makhoul now has a support base of unknown but presumably somewhat influential nuclear experts from around the world who also are working on nuclear non-proliferation issues. From a public relations perspective, the Israeli government can’t afford another Vanunu scenario, especially right after the Dubai assassination of Mahmoud al-Mabhouh back in January, allegedly by Mossad-linked agents carrying forged international passports, which is currently being investigated by various governments, Is it conceivable that, rather than attempting to rein in Issam, the Israeli security apparatus might go after his brother Ameer instead?
About two weeks before the beginning of the NPT Review Conference, on April 21, Israeli Interior Eli Yishai had barred Ameer from leaving the country for 60 days for unspecified reasons of “national security.” The security officers and police who took Ameer from his Haifa home on May 6 claimed they had a warrant for his arrest signed on April 23. Why did the Israeli security services (not usually known for dragging their feet on matters concerning security threats) wait until two weeks after the warrant was issued to arrest him–one day before the IAEA announced its June agenda?
Understandably, human rights groups and political activists are viewing Ameer Makhoul’s arrest as another example of Israeli repression of Arabs, which, of course, it is. But no one yet appears to have considered the possibility of a link between Issam’s efforts to bring an end to Israeli nuclear “ambiguity” and to subject Israel to the kind of international accountability and scrutiny it demands be imposed on Iran.
Of course it might all just be a coincidence. Issam is not his brother’s keeper (Israeli security officials apparently are, at least at the moment), nor is Ameer responsible for Issam’s activities. Surely a “Jewish and democratic state” like Israel would never arrest an Arab political activist and hold him without charges—no discussion in the media allowed!—on account of something his brother had done? Like pinching Israel’s nuclear nerve again and again, and watching its politicians squirm…?
When the Israelis break the silence surrounding Ameer’s arrest, perhaps we’ll learn that these speculations are totally off base and the dots don’t connect at all. Even so, Issam’s writing on the Israeli nuclear issue–past and present– makes for some interesting and timely reading.
******
Updates: May 10, 8:30 am
The Israeli military censor’s gag order on any discussion of Ameer Makhoul’s arrest has now been lifted. Haaretz reports that Makhoul and Omar Said have been detained by the Shin Bet on suspicion of spying for Hezbollah:
Unofficial sources say Makhoul was in contact with a number of foreign activists, some with links to groups classified by the government as terror organizations. These include a Lebanese citizen, Hassan Geagea, who is married to the daughter of Palestinian writer and historian Akram Zaitar.
Hussein Abu Hasin, a lawyer who has handled several cases of spying charges, told Haaretz that espionage laws in Israel were so wide-ranging that an internet chat or telephone conversation with anyone in an ‘enemy state’ could lead to prosecution.
In another Haaretz article, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak insists that there is “No Threat to Israel’s Policy of Nuclear Ambiguity“:
]]>Despite recent international pressure pressure on the Netanyahu government to answer claims it holds atomic weapons, there is no real threat to Israel’s policy of nuclear ambiguity, Defense Minister Ehud Barak said on Monday.
“I do not think there is a real or significant danger to Israel’s traditional stance of nuclear ambiguity,” Barak told the Knesset foreign affairs and defense committee.
Israel has neither confirmed nor denied having nuclear arms. But the country is widely believed to have begun a weapons program in the 1950s and analysts estimate that Israel now has as many as 200 atomic warheads.