by Francois Nicoulaud 

“No deal is better than bad deal:” that’s the mantra that has been heard ad nauseam in the recent past and presented as self-evident of U.S. toughness in the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program.

But is it really so? Of course, everybody knows what “no deal” means. It is [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Francois Nicoulaud 

“No deal is better than bad deal:” that’s the mantra that has been heard ad nauseam in the recent past and presented as self-evident of U.S. toughness in the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program.

But is it really so? Of course, everybody knows what “no deal” means. It is more difficult to discern at what point a deal becomes bad, rather than good, or even average. But plenty of experts are ready to help. A bad deal, they tell us, is a deal which would allow the Iranians to produce the material necessary for a bomb in less than six months. A bad deal is a deal which would not clarify once and for all what kind of research the Iranians have been pursuing in the past for manufacturing a nuclear explosive device. A bad deal is a deal which would allow the Iranians to pursue their ballistic missile program. And so on… One ends up understanding that any deal less than perfect would amount to an unacceptably bad deal.

But such an approach goes against any diplomatic process in which compromise and give and take are key notions. It leads to the conclusion that a perfect deal is a deal which does not have to be negotiated, a deal in which the winner takes all. And indeed, there are people who believe that non-proliferation is too important a question to be submitted to any kind of compromise. It deserves only perfect deals.

History, though, does not confirm this approach. The mother of all non-proliferation agreements, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), concluded in 1968, was in each and all its articles one big compromise. A few countries were allowed to develop nuclear arsenals, others not. The countries that agreed to forsake any military nuclear ambitions were allowed to bring their nuclear capabilities up to the thin red line beyond which could start the manufacturing of an explosive nuclear device. Nobody was happy at the result when the Treaty was signed and nobody is satisfied today by the state of affairs that has developed since.

Thus, the NPT was a deeply imperfect agreement, and indeed, a kind of bad deal. But would a “no deal” have been better? Obviously not. In a different field, the strategic arms limitation agreements concluded during and after the Cold War between the US and the USSR, later on Russia, and signed on the US side by Presidents Nixon, Carter, Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Obama… were certainly deeply imperfect. But, again, would “no deals” have been better?

Considering the Iranian negotiation, one could risk being provocative by saying that almost any deal (at least in the ambit of the current negotiation) could be better than no deal at all. No deal means the unchecked development of the Iranian program, the continuing increase of its enrichment capacities and stock of enriched uranium, the completion of a reactor of the plutonium-production type, and eventually the resumption of active research on engineering a nuclear device. By way of consequence, it would mean a growing tension between the international community and the Islamic Republic, possibly culminating in strikes on its nuclear facilities and in armed confrontation.

Compared to such a prospect, a far less-than-perfect agreement could appear indeed as highly desirable. Let us remember that international relations are nurtured by iterative and evolutionary processes. “Solve-all”, perfectly designed agreements, the epitome of which could well have been the Treaty of Versailles, seldom produce brilliant and lasting results. What is critical is to grab at the right moment the maximum of what is within reach. The art of diplomacy lies precisely in the ability to first discern, and then to join and knit together the extremes of what can be willingly accepted by the conflicting parties. It incorporates also the humility of leaving to others the task of solving at a later stage questions not yet fully addressed or wholly answered, in the knowledge that new circumstances created by an agreement will create new possibilities for progress. It keeps in mind that even an imperfect agreement, if faithfully implemented by the parties, can be a kind of confidence-building machine, opening the way to further advances. This is precisely what happened with the November 24 Joint Plan of Action between the P5+1 and Iran: that accord was transitory and therefore essentially imperfect, but it created the proper atmosphere for a more ambitious step forward.

Given the current state of the negotiations, how can these general considerations be translated into concrete terms? Let us limit ourselves to the most difficult point; that is, the acceptable level of Iranian enrichment activities. Here, the obvious line of compromise turns around capping them for a few years the present level of employed enrichment capacity – expressed in Separation Work Units (SWU) in order neutralize the consequences of the possible introduction of more efficient centrifuges. The figure to be retained would then be between 8,000 and 10,000 SWU per year.

For this, the Iranians have to admit that they do not need to develop an enrichment capacity on an industrial scale (about 50,000 SWU per year and over) as long as do not break ground on the main structures of their future nuclear power plants. And they should take advantage of this interval to develop more productive and more secure centrifuges than the primitive, outdated model that forms the bulk of their present stock of working centrifuges. They also need to progress significantly in the technology of nuclear-fuel manufacturing in order to be ready in due time if they want to meet at least partially the needs of their future nuclear power plants.

On the other side, the West should consider the enormous political difficulty the Iranian government would face if it had to dismantle even part of the nation’s hard-won enrichment capacity. It is true that accepting the preservation of this capacity at its present level would open the theoretical risk of the Iranians quickly acquiring significant quantities of highly enriched uranium, thus opening the way to the bomb. But considering the self-destructive consequences of such a blatant breach of agreement, the risk is very limited indeed, and by all means much more limited than the risks raised by the absence of any deal. Is this risk really unmanageable for the coalition of the world’s most powerful countries, given the sophistication of their diplomatic, intelligence, and contingency-planning capacities? Of course, such a compromise could be easily depicted with equal vehemence as a bad deal on both sides. And that is why it is probably the right compromise, and a fair deal.

Photo: The P5+1 foreign ministers, with Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif at United Nations Headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, November 24, 2013. Credit: State Department photo/Public Domain

by James A. Russell

Since the high-level talks that occurred in Geneva, conflicting messages have surfaced on what really stopped a groundbreaking deal over Iran’s nuclear program from being signed this weekend. On Monday, Secretary of State John Kerry said it was Iran and not France who could not accept [...]]]> via LobeLog

by James A. Russell

Since the high-level talks that occurred in Geneva, conflicting messages have surfaced on what really stopped a groundbreaking deal over Iran’s nuclear program from being signed this weekend. On Monday, Secretary of State John Kerry said it was Iran and not France who could not accept the final draft of an agreement. That same day, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif indirectly replied through his official Twitter account that a deal only began to fall apart after French objections. Whatever the case, there is little reason to doubt that France’s objections in some way impeded the deal that so many were expecting; Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius was, after all, the most vocal in opposing one save for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. With that in mind, it’s interesting to consider France and Israel’s previous stances on nuclear issues.

The partnership between the two states on nuclear matters dates back to the late 1940s and 1950s, when France provided vital assistance in helping Israel set up its own clandestine reactor and enrichment facility at Dimona in southern Israel.

The site is today protected by a network of US radars stationed in Israel tied into the global US missile defense system and, one supposes, to Israel’s own missile defense system paid for by the United States. Israel is today an undeclared nuclear state with an arsenal estimated at between 200 and 400 warheads that can be delivered on its Jericho missiles.

Sixty years ago, France gave Israeli scientists free reign to wander around its nuclear research centers at Saclay and Marcoule as part of the then burgeoning nuclear partnership. In exchange, Israeli scientists are believed to have helped speed up France’s own nuclear program.

At the time, both states saw nuclear weapons as central to their prestige and national survival. It’s worth noting that the cooperation in nuclear matters happened in a wider context, with France also supplying Israel with arms that proved critical in Israel’s ongoing wars of independence.

Few remember that a French-supplied Mirage aircraft delivered the pre-emptive strikes on Egypt’s airfields at the outset of the 1967 Six –Day War. French President Charles DeGaulle subsequently ended the security relationship after the war when it became clear that Israel intended to illegally occupy the land seized in the conflict. He correctly foresaw that the occupation would only lead to continuation of the war through the scourge of terrorism. The Johnson administration then decided that the United States would assume the role taken by France, selling Israel advanced F-4 Phantom aircraft in 1968. Today, 45 years later, there are few weapons in America’s arsenal not now in service with the Israeli Defense Forces — by far the most powerful military in the Middle East.

This history provides an interesting backdrop to moves made by the French and the Israelis in undermining a first stage accommodation with Iran in Geneva. If the reports of the heavily guarded details of the deal are true, it seems sensible from the perspective of those seeking to reign in Iran’s program to do so in a phased approach in which Iran would gradually return to good standing with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations in exchange for sanctions relief. The net result would be a welcome reinforcement of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the only meaningful global mechanism to control the spread of nuclear weapons. Perhaps more importantly, such a deal would reduce the prospect of another regional war in the Persian Gulf and see Iran potentially readmitted to the international community in a positive way. A deal also opens the door to possible US-Iranian rapprochement, which would also reduce the prospects of war in the region.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s opposition to the deal is no mystery. He has made a career out of derailing peaceful accommodation with Israel’s adversaries, profiting politically from the resulting siege-like and perpetual war atmosphere that grips Israel in an unhealthy way. Israeli politics have swung inexorably in his direction over the last 15 years, as the Likud and its politics of confrontation and war dominate the political landscape. As long as Netanyahu is in charge, it is hard to imagine Israel agreeing to any meaningful political settlement with its enemies. Most recently, Israel’s disinterest in seeking a deal with the Palestinians was signaled by further Israeli illegal settlements as negotiations with the Palestinian Authority are underway.

More mysterious is France’s role in highlighting the shortcomings of the first stage of what would have to be a long-term deal to ensure Iran’s program returns to comprehensive IAEA oversight. As one of the five declared nuclear states, France clearly has a vested interest in ensuring that the NPT continues as the main vehicle to ensure that nuclear technology around the world is used solely for peaceful purposes. Surely a deal with Iran that gradually brings its program back under comprehensive IAEA safeguards and monitoring is in the interests of all the declared nuclear powers.

For the United States, the erosion of its relations with its two “twin pillars” in the Middle East (Saudi Arabia and Israel) is perversely affected by the lack of progress with Iran. Both the Saudis and Israelis appear terrified at the prospect of a deal to restrain Iran’s nuclear program, which, in turn might create circumstances for a better US-Iran political relationship. Ironically, neither states sees the strategic benefits to these developments, which would enhance the security of both states over the long run. Instead, both Saud Arabia and Israel continue to embrace the politics of confrontation that will only lead to more war, death, and destruction — potentially dragging the United States along behind them to clean up the resulting mess.

The Obama administration is right to pursue accommodation with Iran and correctly sees the strategic benefits of deal to restrain the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program. The next time around, however, maybe the phone calls from the White House need to be placed to Paris instead of Jerusalem.

by Mitchell Plitnick

The real Iranian nuclear threat has apparently already taken hold. New Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s so-called “charm offensive” has sent the war hawks scurrying as if the bomb had really gone off.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been relentless in his increasingly desperate efforts to cast Rouhani in [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Mitchell Plitnick

The real Iranian nuclear threat has apparently already taken hold. New Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s so-called “charm offensive” has sent the war hawks scurrying as if the bomb had really gone off.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been relentless in his increasingly desperate efforts to cast Rouhani in the same mould as his predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. As Marsha Cohen points out, however, his tones are ringing hollow. Ahmadinejad provided Netanyahu with the almost cartoonish foil he needed, but Rouhani strikes a much more reasonable pose.

In the US, the counter to the charm offensive is kicking into high gear. Representative Eliot Engel (D-NY), the ranking Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, was thoroughly dismissive of Rouhani’s speech at the UN General Assembly, which most observers considered conciliatory and matching a similar tone by US President Barack Obama. Engel, by contrast, said: “Far from engaging in a ‘charm offensive,’ he repeated too many of the same old talking points blaming the United States and our allies for all of the world’s ills.”

Even before Rouhani’s speech, the neoconservative Emergency Committee for Israel launched a web site attacking Rouhani. The site, dubbed “The Real Rouhani,” pieces together some legitimate and some questionable news reports on the Iranian president, most of which are quotes and citations taken out of context to sound more sinister than they are. They sum it all up by calling Rouhani a Holocaust denier, something Netanyahu has also done.

It’s fair to be dissatisfied with Rouhani’s evasion of questions on the Holocaust, which becomes an issue for outsiders largely because Ahmadinejad made such a spectacle of it during his time, a very real and despicable spectacle which was naturally magnified by the Western press. Rouhani initially ducked the question by saying he was not a historian. While in New York, and probably realizing that this response was not having the desired effect, Rouhani told CNN “…in general I can tell you that any crime that happens in history against humanity, including the crime the Nazis created towards the Jews, is reprehensible and condemnable…Whatever criminality they committed against the Jews we condemn.”

That’s better, but it probably leaves the Holocaust denial bullet in Netanyahu and the neocons’ gun. Doubtless, Rouhani is trying not to raise more hackles among the Iranian conservatives that Ahmadinejad represents than he has to, but this is probably one he can and should go farther with. Still, even before Rouhani’s clarification, the Holocaust denier trope didn’t seem to be getting much play, certainly nothing like it did with Ahmadinejad. But right now, people are looking with hope to Rouhani; if that should change, his weak response to this question will certainly come back to haunt him.

Some have expressed disappointment with Rouhani’s UN speech, having hoped for a bolder step forward toward the U.S. This is reinforced by the White House claim that they proposed a brief meeting on the margins of the UN but were rebuffed by the Iranians, who said it was too complicated at this time.

The naysayers are wrong. A meeting with Obama, however brief, would certainly have pleased Western peace supporters, but in Iran, where crippling sanctions are hammering people every day and where, despite Obama’s conciliatory words, people are understandably skeptical of U.S. intentions, such a meeting would have been premature. It could easily be used by conservatives to demonstrate weakness on Rouhani’s part, portraying it as a warm gesture to a government that is strangling Iranians with no promise, or even indication that an easing of the sanctions regime is on the horizon.

Even in the West, it is probably better that no chance encounter took place. Although the U.S. tactic of refusing to talk is a dead end that produces no tangible benefits for anyone (as Stephen Walt aptly points out), since we have pursued it, raising hopes for a quick breakthrough is probably unwise. Expectations need to be managed.

The U.S.-Iranian impasse is much deeper than the nuclear issue and the mutual antipathy between Israel and the Islamic Republic. Many more issues are involved, and they mount on top of a long history of problems between the U.S. and Iran, of which the 1953 CIA-backed coup and the 1979-80 hostage crisis are only the best known.

Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies offers a good rundown of the various issues and complications facing the two countries in any attempt to thaw relations. The major flaw, though, in Cordesman’s piece is that he frames the current issue within the notion of a relentless Iranian march toward a nuclear weapon. This doesn’t mesh with the facts, as intelligence estimates for the past six years, including those of the U.S. and Israel, agree that Iran has halted its pursuit of a nuclear weapon, while retaining the ability to start the process again. An Iranian weapons program only seems to have existed in the early years of the century, when U.S. ambitions for regime change were at their height.

Beyond that point, Cordesman gives a good description of the complexities inherent in trying to turn back years of U.S.-Iranian enmity. But he does an even better job of laying out the case for why the status quo serves neither country well and why a warming of relations can bring great benefits to both countries and the entire Middle East.

One major issue that divides the two countries is, indeed, Israel. If Iran and the U.S. wanted to try to patch things up, even if the nuclear issue was resolved to mutual satisfaction (something that is complicated but far from impossible in and of itself), the Israel-Palestine question moves to center stage. What becomes of Iranian support for the Palestinian cause, for Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the more meager support it offers to Hamas?

More than likely, this is why Obama, in his speech, put the two issues so closely together. While he didn’t specifically link the two, their proximity in the text was suggestive, and explained a bit of why he and Secretary of State John Kerry have put so much effort into rekindling talks between the two peoples. Obama understands, and he’s subtly communicating to Israel, that he needs to see a Palestinian state created, one which Iran can support, if there is to be sufficient warming of U.S.-Iran relations to enable a reasonable chance of resolving the nuclear issue.

This is precisely why Netanyahu is so alarmed by the prospect of a negotiated deal, as opposed to an Iranian surrender, on the nuclear issue. The prospect of a viable deal on Iran’s nuclear program will allow and encourage domestic and international pressure on Israel to make a deal, and, even if it is a deal remarkably favorable to Israel, Netanyahu does not want to engage in that political fight with his own party and the rest of his right-wing coalition. Much better to see Iran be forced, whether by sanctions or firepower, to give in to international demands. Moreover, those demands will be very different in the context of negotiations.

Obama, in his speech, recognized Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear power. That affirmation, though self-evident, indicates a willingness to allow enrichment on Iranian soil, something Netanyahu adamantly opposes, but which, with sufficient transparency, will satisfy every other country in the world if the United States gives the program its blessing. In the context of an Iranian surrender, it is much more likely that enrichment programs could be transferred to a third country, like Russia.

So, Netanyahu has gone on an anti-Rouhani crusade. With the most extreme of neocon groups joining him, it is likely — if Netanyahu persists and if Rouhani does not sufficiently influence Western hearts and minds fast enough (which he likely can’t do without agitating his own right flank) — that other right-wing groups, followed by more centrist hawks, will soon add their voices to the anti-Rouhani chorus.

Pro-dialogue forces will have a tough task. The process simply can’t move too fast or it will careen off the tracks. But a slow process gives more opportunity for the hawks. Persistence in support of a rational approach will not be easy, but standing fast to support dialogue and the gradual easing of sanctions in exchange for gradually increasing transparency in Iran is the best and wisest option.

Lobe Log publishes Hawks on Iran every Friday. Our posts highlight militaristic commentary and confrontational policy recommendations about Iran from a variety of sources including news articles, think tanks and pundits.

John Bolton, Washington Times: The former UN Ambassador and outspoken proponent of via Lobe Log

Lobe Log publishes Hawks on Iran every Friday. Our posts highlight militaristic commentary and confrontational policy recommendations about Iran from a variety of sources including news articles, think tanks and pundits.

John Bolton, Washington Times: The former UN Ambassador and outspoken proponent of military action against Iran rebukes President Obama for creating ”the most antagonistic relationship ever between Israel and the White House” by not preemptively striking Iran for Israel due to his “ideological inclination”:

There is, however, a serious problem. Israel’s assessment and its ultimate decision are complicated precisely because of the superiority of American military strength. If Jerusalem defers to Washington and does not strike early enough, Iran’s program could well pass the point where Israel has the necessary capabilities to break Iran’s control over the nuclear fuel cycle. Or, even worse, Iran could fabricate nuclear weapons before being detected by either U.S. or Israeli intelligence, risking that a strike by either country could bring a nuclear response from Iran.

There are three principal reasons not to credit Mr. Obama’s assurances. First, the president’s every ideological inclination is not to use U.S. military force pre-emptively. By contrast, two months before Pearl Harbor, Franklin Roosevelt defended American attacks against Nazi submarines in the North Atlantic, saying, “When you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until he has struck before you crush him.” Plainly, Mr. Obama is no Franklin Roosevelt.

Elliott Abrams, Weekly Standard: The former Deputy National Security Adviser to George W. Bush considers Israeli general Amos Yaldin’s call for the US to commit to striking Iran in 2013 if the Iranian “problem” is not solved reasonable but unrealistic, so he proposes a Congressional authorization for the use of force against Iran instead:

More persuasive than the Ross or Yadlin proposals would be an effort by the president to seek a formal authorization for the use of force from Congress. This is the way for him to show seriousness of purpose, and for Congress to support it—and send an unmistakable message to the ayatollahs. This path was suggested here in THE WEEKLY STANDARD early July, by Jamie Fly and Bill Kristol, and this is the moment to move forward with it. Like the joint resolutions for the Gulf Wars in 1991 and in2002 and the joint resolution passed after 9/11 regarding terrorism, a new resolution would not declare war; it would say “The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate” to achieve the goal. In this case, that goal would not be to counter “the continuing threat posed by Iraq” or “against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001…in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States.” It would be to prevent Iran—the world’s foremost state sponsor of terrorism, in violation of countless U.N. Security Council and IAEA board of governors resolutions, and under international sanctions—from obtaining nuclear weapons.

Jennifer Rubin, Washington Post: The “Tiger Mom of the neocon movement” alleges that President Obama’s “Iran dilemma” boils down to being blamed for Israeli losses if he does not strike Iran on Israel’s behalf or being unprepared in the event of being “forced” into another mideast war:

An Israeli strike would be a blatant signal of distrust in Obama by the Jewish state. If the action is less than successful, or if large casualties in Israel result, fingers will point at Obama for having failed to deploy superior U.S. force. And if he believes an Israeli strike will set off a Middle East war, the president, who is in the business of diminishing U.S. military presence, could well be forced into a conflagration.

Rubin also describes going to war with Iran as a form of carpe diem:

Obama, as he has done so frequently, can wait and hope the Israelis don’t act. That might “work,” insofar as Israeli leaders might want to stretch out the timeline just a little bit longer. But passivity has its price, both geopolitically and electorally. It will be interesting to see whether Obama or Romney seizes the moment. It would certainly be an act of political leadership if one does.

Charles Krauthammer, Washington Post: Like Rubin, the neoconservative Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer references Elliot Abrams’ call for congressional authorization for the potential use of force against Iran (without naming Abrams) in an article that criticizes the President’s approach to Iran. In this instance, Krauthammer argues that Anthony Cordesman’s suggested approach to Iran, which includes hardening the US’s stance and upping the threat of force, needs to be seriously considered before the military option is exercised. Also like Rubin, Krauthammer agitates for action under the pretext of the time-is-running out claim:

Would Iran believe a Cordesman-like ultimatum? Given the record of the Obama administration, maybe not. Some (though not Cordesman) have therefore suggested the further step of requesting congressional authorization for the use of force if Iran does not negotiate denuclearization.

First, that’s the right way to do it. No serious military action should be taken without congressional approval (contra Libya). Second, Iran might actually respond to a threat backed by a strong bipartisan majority of the American people — thus avoiding both war and the other nightmare scenario, a nuclear Iran.

If we simply continue to drift through kabuki negotiations, however, one thing is certain. Either America, Europe, the Gulf Arabs and the Israelis will forever be condemned to live under the threat of nuclear blackmail (even nuclear war) from a regime the State Department identifies as the world’s greatest exporter of terror. Or an imperiled Israel, with its more limited capabilities, will strike Iran — with correspondingly greater probability of failure and of triggering a regional war.

All options are bad. Doing nothing is worse. “The status quo may not prevent some form of war,” concludes Cordesman, “and may even be making it more likely.”

Yesterday I picked up a copy of the July/August issue of Arms Control Today, the magazine of the non-profit Arms Control Association (ACA) that’s based here, in Washington, DC. Those who follow events surrounding Iran’s nuclear program and US-Iran relations will appreciate the ACA’s output, which, while not exclusively [...]]]> via Lobe Log

Yesterday I picked up a copy of the July/August issue of Arms Control Today, the magazine of the non-profit Arms Control Association (ACA) that’s based here, in Washington, DC. Those who follow events surrounding Iran’s nuclear program and US-Iran relations will appreciate the ACA’s output, which, while not exclusively focused on Iran, consistently provides a wealth of related expert analysis and resources.

There are three important articles in this year’s Summer issue (available in print or online), the most interesting of which seems to be a piece penned by Hossein Mousavian, a former member of the Iranian government and nuclear negotiator who is now a research scholar at Princeton. Mousavian, who is no friend of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (he was briefly imprisoned in 2007 under dubious-sounding charges of spying), is considered an authority on matters related to Iran’s nuclear program especially when it comes to explaining the Iranian perspective. He does just that in Arms Control Today while charting the “origins” of and “current options” for the nuclear dispute. Missed opportunities and the constant imposition of pressure and punitive measures against Iran by the West have resulted in Iranian advances of its nuclear program, argues Mousavian, before listing 7 points in support of his thesis including historical triggers for Iranian nuclear advances such as the West’s withdrawal from nuclear deals that were made during the era of Iran’s last Shah, US support for Saddam Hussein’s savage use of chemical weapons against Iranian forces during the bitter Iran-Iraq war and Western failures to take advantage of deals proposed by Iran that would have satisfied almost all of the outcomes being sought today. Counterproductive seems to be the word for summing up the West’s approach to Iran according to Mousavian:

At the time of [the June 18-19 talks in Moscow], Iran had not only mastered enrichment to the 20 percent level, it had achieved milestones few could have imagined: the domestic production of fuel rods for use in the Tehran reactor, about 10,000 centrifuges, more than 6,000 kilograms of LEU, and 150 kilograms of 20 percent enriched uranium. Yet, the West still is not ready to respect the right to enrichment to 20 percent or even 5 percent. Not only has the West pushed Iran to seek self-sufficiency, but at every juncture, it has tried to deprive Iran of its inalienable right to enrichment. This has simply propelled Iran to proceed full throttle toward mastering nuclear technology. The Iranians never intended to go this far and would have been content with the West or another country supplying their fuel. The irony is that the progress of Iran’s nuclear program is the product of Western efforts to pressure and isolate Iran while refusing to recognize Iran’s rights.

While Mousavian states that the West seems positioned towards limiting its options to embarking on a disastrous military campaign or implementing measures that will only compel the Iranians to make further nuclear advancements, he still sees “a way out”:

All is not lost, however. Iran and the P5+1 could agree on a face-saving solution under which Iran would adhere to all international nuclear conventions and treaties at the maximum level of transparency defined by the IAEA. Furthermore, Iran would be flexible on 20 percent enrichment, its stockpile of material enriched to that level, and every other confidence-building measure to assure the international community that the country would remain a non-nuclear-weapon state forever. This would ensure the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activity. In response, the United States and the other members of the P5+1 would agree to recognize Iran’s legitimate right to enrichment under the NPT and gradually lift the sanctions. This framework can be realized in forthcoming talks through a step-by-step plan based on the NPT, mutual confidence building, and appropriate reciprocity as agreed in the Istanbul talks in April.

Also in the magazine is an editorial by ACA Executive Director Daryl Kimball, a steadfast charter of Iranian nuclear developments, wherein he counters claims (most loudly made by hawkish commentators regularly tracked at Lobe Log) that all hope is lost over the possibility of resolving the current impasse peacefully:

A deal that ties Iran’s enrichment activities and its stockpiles to the actual needs of Iran’s nuclear power plants, combined with more extensive IAEA safeguards, could sufficiently guard against a nuclear-armed Iran. Pursuing such a course is difficult, but it is the best option on the table.

Finally, Harvard’s Olli Heinonen, who served for 27 years at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, lists Iran’s nuclear program advances, which he believes show that “Iran is positioning itself as a virtual or latent nuclear-weapon state”. But even Heinonen, a widely quoted expert who is never shy about shining a glaring light on worrying Iranian actions, says a “potential solution is still in sight”:

The involved parties already have charted the rough outlines of a long-term deal, comprising efforts by Iran to undertake practical steps to ensure that its nuclear program cannot be used for nuclear weapons and to give the international community confidence that this is the case. In return, Iran would receive cooperation with the West in a number of areas. These could include, as part of a comprehensive package, addressing Iran’s nuclear power needs, giving assurances of nuclear fuel supply, providing fuel for its Tehran Research Reactor to produce radioisotopes for medical and industrial purposes, replacing that reactor with a modern civilian reactor, and providing assistance in nuclear safety and security.

Heinonen concludes by urging continued participation in the diplomatic process with Iran:

The road of negotiations after Moscow will continue to be rocky, but it is crucial to keep diplomacy on track. This means focusing on the overall goal that would address the proliferation concern of preventing a nuclear-armed Iran, instead of becoming bogged down in the process itself.

Lobe Log publishes Hawks on Iran every Friday. Our posts highlight militaristic commentary and confrontational policy recommendations about Iran from a variety of sources including news articles, think tanks and pundits.

Michael Singh (WINEP), Washington Post: The managing director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (aka [...]]]> via Lobe Log

Lobe Log publishes Hawks on Iran every Friday. Our posts highlight militaristic commentary and confrontational policy recommendations about Iran from a variety of sources including news articles, think tanks and pundits.

Michael Singh (WINEP), Washington Post: The managing director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (aka the Washington Institute or WINEP), a think tank that was created by the American Public Israel Affairs Committee (AIPAC), calls for imposing more pressure on Iran while bolstering the military option:

Like any good pugilist, Washington should follow the heavy blow of oil sanctions with further unrelenting pressure.
…
Finally, Washington should bolster the credibility of its military threat. Recent steps to strengthen its force posture in the Persian Gulf are a good start. They should be accompanied by more serious statements about U.S. willingness to employ force and an end to statements exaggerating the downsides of military action.

Former top CIA middle east analyst Paul Pillar responds in the National Interest:

If the oil sanctions aren’t enough, what other pressure does Singh say should be used? One is “bolder” efforts, whatever that means, to oust the Assad regime in Syria, and regardless of whatever implications that may have for escalation of that conflict. Another is an ill-defined reference to “cultivating Iranians outside the narrow circle around” the supreme leader or “providing support to dissidents” in Iran. No mention is made of how to get around the inherently counterproductive aspect of outside efforts to manipulate internal Iranian politics, or how one more indication that regime change is the ultimate Western objective is supposed to make the current regime more interested in making concessions. Finally, Singh calls for more military saber rattling—as if the threat of a military attack is supposed to make the Iranians less, rather than more, interested in a nuclear deterrent to protect themselves from such attacks. That makes as much sense as pushing yet again on the “pull” door.

We probably should not take the purveyors of such advice at their word. Surely at least some of them, including probably Singh, are smart enough to understand the basics of Sanctions 101. Their objective evidently is not success at the negotiating table but instead the indefinite perpetuation of the Iranian nuclear issue for other reasons or the checking off of a box on a pre-war checklist.

Lee Smith (FDD), Tablet Magazine: Hawks on Iran regular Lee Smith of the neoconservative-dominated Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) quotes retired Army Gen. John Keane (see biographical note below) before undermining repeated warnings from high-level defense and administration officials that a military strike would only set back Iran’s alleged nuclear aspirations by a few years:

In contrast, the Obama Administration has pulled out of Iraq and will soon pull out of Afghanistan. Yet the White House continues to repeat the trope that the program can, at best, be delayed a few years. Just as politics informed the Bush White House’s insistence on the delay-not-destroy mantra, politics of a different sort are informing this White House: This administration is conducting a public diplomacy campaign with the purpose of undermining the capability of a U.S. attack because the administration has no intention of striking.

Note: Keane has close ties with U.S. neoconservatives and was one of the main architects of George W. Bush’s surge in Iraq. In 2006, Gen. George Casey and the chief of the U.S. Central Command, Gen. John Abizaid  recommended reducing troop levels in Iraq, but Keane and his neoconservative allies started looking for someone that would support escalation instead–ultimately General David Petraeus. As documented by Bob Woodward in the War Within, Keane ignored the chain of command while heavily promoting Petraeus. He also helped persuade Bush to reject the Iraq Study Group’s findings and recommendations by aggressively pushing an alternative strategy he wrote with Frederick Kagan at the American Enterprise Institute called “Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq.” That report led to the military buildup that followed.

Lee also uses Keane’s words to repeat his call for a ramped up military option:

…long before the United States decides to attack Iran, we need to communicate our seriousness to the regime. “There is only one guy you need to convince here to voluntarily give up the nuclear program and that is the Supreme Leader Khameini,” Jack Keane argues. “He must know we are dead serious about a military strike, as a last resort, and this is not just about the nuclear facilities—their military will be decapitated. This is the U.S. military. Believe me, we will destroy you.”

United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI): The neoconservative-aligned Iran sanctions-enforcement organization ramps up its pressure campaign against the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), the financial messaging system used to arrange international money transfers, aimed at further crippling Iran’s economy:

Said UANI CEO, Ambassador Mark D. Wallace:

Now is the time for a full banking blockade against the Iranian regime, and SWIFT needs to play its part. SWIFT made the right decision in February to deny access to Iran’s Central Bank and some other institutions, but it has thus far failed to cut off all Iranian banks and entities. SWIFT should immediately sever its ties with all Iranian banks, particularly the ten that have been sanctioned by the U.S. government but still maintain SWIFT access.

Every day that SWIFT permits these illegitimate banks to have continued access to its network is a day the Iranian regime will continue to circumvent international sanctions. As the world weans itself off of Iranian crude, there is not a need to maintain conduits for energy related payments, but a need for an international banking embargo against Iran.

Clifford D. May (FDD), Scripps Howard: The president of the FDD repeats colleague Mark Dubowitz’s recommendation of blacklisting the entire Iranian energy sector as a “zone of primary proliferation concern” and reiterates his own call for U.S.-assisted/backed regime change:

[President Obama] should announce his support for legislation introduced by Rep. Ted Deutch (D-Fla.), Rep. Robert Dold (R-Ill.) and Sen. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) that would blacklist the entire Iranian energy sector as a “zone of primary proliferation concern.”
…
Such a speech should be followed by other measures in support of Iranians willing to take the risks necessary to replace a regime that has failed domestically, a regime that has been at war with the U.S. since it seized our embassy in 1979; a regime that four years later instructed Hezbollah to suicide-bomb the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut; a regime that has facilitated the killings of hundreds of Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan; a regime that plotted to blow up a restaurant in Washington, D.C., just last year.

Alan Dershowitz, Times of Israel: The pro-Israel Harvard Law Professor who “met for 45 minutes one-on-one with US President Barack Obama to discuss Iran” criticizes the J-Street lobbying group for “undercutting American policy toward Iran” by not pushing the military option on Iran:

Dershowitz said that by “explicitly undercutting Obama on Iran,” it actually “makes it more likely that Israel will have to go alone. As George Washington said a long time ago, the best way to preserve peace is to be ready for war, and that’s been the Obama policy.” For J Street to undercut it and misrepresent prominent Israelis’ positions on it, he said, “takes it out of the pro-Israel camp. I don’t think it’s debatable that J Street is pro-Israel. It is not.”

Lobe Log publishes Hawks on Iran every Friday. Our posts highlight militaristic commentary and confrontational policy recommendations about Iran from a variety of sources including news articles, think tanks and pundits.

Editorial Board, Wall Street Journal: For months the Journal’s editorial board published hawkish articles about Iran on [...]]]> via Lobe Log

Lobe Log publishes Hawks on Iran every Friday. Our posts highlight militaristic commentary and confrontational policy recommendations about Iran from a variety of sources including news articles, think tanks and pundits.

Editorial Board, Wall Street Journal: For months the Journal’s editorial board published hawkish articles about Iran on a weekly basis. We highlighted some of them here, here and here. Then they stopped, perhaps due to the heating up of the presidential campaign and the crisis in Syria. But this week the editors returned to reminding readers about their hardline position on Iran by arguing that current sanctions are not strong enough and filled with “loopholes”. Interestingly, they criticize the measures for being inadequately painful and advocate more “pain” while simultaneously claiming that they are unlikely to be effective:

But enough pain to stop the 30-year nuclear drive of a revolutionary regime built around a messianic cult of martyrdom? A regime with foreign currency reserves between $60 billion and $100 billion, and which would net more than $40 billion in oil revenue even with a 40% drop in sales?

We’ve never considered sanctions likely to persuade Iran to drop its nuclear program, but it’s dangerous to pursue them half-heartedly while claiming progress and keeping the international temperature down as Iran’s centrifuges spin. That’s been the Obama Administration’s consistent approach, and it’ll probably continue at least through Election Day in November. It’s a good way to comfort adversaries in Tehran and Beijing while undermining friends in Jerusalem and beyond.

Benjamin Weinthal, Jerusalem Post: A fellow from the hawkish Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and frequent JPost contributor praises his superior’s call for “economic warfare” on Iran. (Find a response to “Battle Rial” here.):

Writing in late June on the website of Foreign Policymagazine, Mark Dubowitz, a leading US sanctions expert, urged greater “economic warfare” targeting Iran’s entire energy apparatus and branches of its non-gas-and-oil sectors.

Dubowitz,the executive director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, advocates a creative piece of US legislation from Rep. Ted Deutch (D-Florida), Rep. Robert Dold (R-Illinois) and Sen. Mark Kirk (R-Illinois) that designates Iran’s entire energy sector as a “zone of primary proliferation concern.”

Benjamin Weinthal, National Review Online: In a piece titled “Economic Suffocation for Iran’s Rulers” Weinthal says the Obama administration should begin rounding up a coalition of the willing for an attack on Iran:

The Obama administration could begin preparing a blueprint for a coalition of governments that would support a military option within a defined timetable. In addition to Israel, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands have also maintained that a military option should remain on the table.

Mark Dubowitz, NPR: The executive director of the FDD is arguably the most enthusiastic advocate of crippling sanctions against Iran from the world of Washington think tanks, and yet, he regularly admits that sanctions won’t impede Iran’s alleged nuclear ambitions:

So, are sanctions working to make Iran less of a nuclear threat?

Some experts are skeptical.

“The regime has been bracing for this,” says Mark Dubowitz, executive director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. “It has large foreign exchange reserves, and it is still earning $40 [billion] or $45 billion a year from oil sales.

“The supreme leader’s economic expiration date — when his cash hoard falls low enough to set off a massive economic panic — may still be far off,” Dubowitz argues. “If the [Obama] administration wants to bring that date closer, it needs to make clear that the United States and our allies will do everything in their power to destroy Iran’s energy wealth unless the regime compromises.”

Amotz Asa-El, Market Watch: The Israeli pundit and former Jerusalem Post executive editor praises crippling sanctions against Iran because he believes they will lead to political upheaval:

via Lobe Log

Iran watchers are no doubt aware that recently Iran’s “Shabake-ye Khabar” news network of the Islamic Republic’s official “Seda va Sima” television and radio network, conducted an internet poll regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.

Respondents were asked whether Iran should cease uranium enrichment in exchange for sanctions relief. [...]]]> By Eskandar Sadeghi-Boroujerdi

via Lobe Log

Iran watchers are no doubt aware that recently Iran’s “Shabake-ye Khabar” news network of the Islamic Republic’s official “Seda va Sima” television and radio network, conducted an internet poll regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.

Respondents were asked whether Iran should cease uranium enrichment in exchange for sanctions relief. 58% of respondents called for the cessation of uranium enrichment in exchange for sanctions relief. A screen shot can be found here.

In a screen shot posted on Radio Free Liberty in any article by Golnaz Esfandiari, the percentage against nuclear enrichment exceeds 60%. No doubt due to the respective sites taking their screen shots at different times. According to Ms. Esfandiari, Radio Free Liberty took the screen shot shortly before the poll’s removal.

As the news site realised its bungle, and the story was picked up by international outlets, it replaced the nuclear internet poll, with another one, asking respondents whether they would support the Majles plan to close the Strait of Hormuz in response to the EU oil embargo. 89% of respondents stated that they were against the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Here’s the relevant screen shot.

After this second gaff, the network steered clear of the nuclear issue and sanctions altogether and instead posted a poll relating to Iranian football.

This wasn’t a scientific opinion poll, and according to the news site about 2,000 people participated. Iranian state media later and rather bizarrely accused BBC Persian service of hacking their site and doctoring the opinion poll. BBC Persian firmly rejected this charge.

That being said, I would not be surprised if many Iranians are questioning the wisdom of the current nuclear policy. Many are under immense pressure because of the currency crisis, rampant inflation and many other economic ailments, all exacerbated by economic and financial sanctions.

In Iran there has not been a genuine, frank and open discussion of the nuclear file and the costs involved with the government’s programme in the face of several UNSC resolutions and extreme pressure from the US and its European allies. If a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis were placed before Iranians in the public area, it would be most interesting to see and hear what they might conclude. That being said, we very rarely, if ever, see foreign, national security and nuclear energy policy considered in accordance with Iranian public opinion. Another debate for another time, no doubt.

–Eskandar Sadeghi-Boroujerdi is an Iran researcher at the Oxford Research Group and a third year doctoral candidate at the University of Oxford. He has published widely on Iran. His latest with Paul Ingram and Gabrielle Rifkind is “Iran’s Nuclear Impasse: Breaking the Deadlock”. Follow him on twitter: @essikhan

via the American Security Project

“It’s time to act before it’s too late”–the new ominous tagline featured in the Emergency Committee for Israel’s commercial trumpeting the need for action on Iran, rings with truth. It is time for the United States to act–act in a strategic way that will benefit [...]]]> By Derek Bolton

via the American Security Project

“It’s time to act before it’s too late”–the new ominous tagline featured in the Emergency Committee for Israel’s commercial trumpeting the need for action on Iran, rings with truth. It is time for the United States to act–act in a strategic way that will benefit its national security interests–and this means not undertaking a military strike against Iran.

The purely strategic implications of a U.S. strike on Iran will far outweigh any limited gains it may bring about and will be far more costly than many realize. It would also ultimately leave the U.S. in a much weaker and exposed position while creating a more volatile Iran that will be further inclined to gain nuclear weapons capability.

As Micah Zenko at the Council of Foreign Relations writes, “It’s true throughout history: there’s always the belief that the next war will go much better than the last war” and that when faced with a problem such as Iran, people “want to ‘do something,’ and nothing ‘does something’ like military force.” Thus, contrary to the simplistic ‘drop a few bombs and stop the bad guys’ viewpoint, the reality of this situation is far more complex, and any strike will ultimately lead to a broader and more devastating conflict.

Consider, for example, former DIA analyst and current defense fellow at the Washington Institute Jeffery White and his in-depth analysis on how a U.S. strike on Iran would play out. He writes:

While a war with Iran might begin in the military domain, it would likely expand to others, and while it might begin at the operational or tactical level it would soon encompass strategic and political levels as well.

There is no denying the U.S.’s technological or military superiority over Iran. However, one need only look to past and ongoing conflicts to see how this advantage can be outmaneuvered by enemies, and how the U.S. can find itself in a protracted conflict where by simply not winning, we lose.

Accordingly, should the U.S. attack Iran, even with the limited aim of striking its nuclear facilities, Iran would seek to expand and then protract the conflict in an attempt to erode the U.S.’s morale and commitment. One need only point to Iran’s conventional force structure, access to organizations such as Hezbollah, and strategic geographic positioning along the Strait of Hormuz, to highlight how Iran could widen the conflict.

As White surmises, the U.S. would quickly find itself, “involved in a “secret war” of terrorist attacks and special counter terror operations…a “political war” involving Iranian and allied diplomatic and information operations to weaken support from other states and actors … an “economic war” featuring Iranian efforts to disrupt the oil market… and a “social war” [that] would involve appeals to Islamic solidarity and attempts to weaken popular support.” White concludes that “[i]n such a broad and protracted contest, the United States might not enjoy a favorable balance of advantages”.

Focusing primarily on the military capabilities of Iran and its allies, one can forecast what an Iranian response may consist of. For starters, Iran has an arsenal of short-medium range ballistic missiles.

Short range missiles consist of the Fateh-110, Shahab-2 (also called the Scud-C), and CSS-8, though it should be noted that the “U.S. Air Force’s National Air and Space Intelligence Center estimates Iran has less than one hundred (PDF) short-range delivery systems”.

Meanwhile Iran’s medium range arsenal consists of the Shahab-3, believed to be ranged between 1,500-2,500 kilometers. In 2008 Iran also introduced the new Sajjil, which unlike the liquid-fueled Shahab-3, is solid fueled and can thus be launched in a matter of minutes instead of hours.

These missiles in turn would allow Iran to strike targets in Israel and Turkey, as well as U.S. instillations and forces in the region. Such attacks would have to be met with appropriate responses by the U.S. and its allies, expanding the scope of strikes from just nuclear facilities to military installations.

With regard to the Strait of Hormuz, a report from Harvard’s Olin Institute for Strategic studies has shown that should Iran close the strait with mines, missiles, and small boats,“it could take many weeks, even months, to restore the full flow of commerce, and more time still for the oil markets to be convinced that stability had returned.”

Iran also has first hand experience with naval engagement in the waters stemming from the Iran-Iraq war, and has tailored its current naval doctrine accordingly. Iran has access to small, mobile, and hard to detect systems and ships, easily deployable mine capabilities, and land based cruise missiles.

Having learned hard lessons from previous naval engagements with the U.S., Iran would in a future engagement focus on a passive defense or “a defense without weapons [that] comprises a range of measures that reduce vulnerability and increase endurance against foreign threats.” This would in turn allow Iran to conduct asymmetric naval operations against U.S. forces and disrupt or close the Strait of Hormuz.

Regarding Iran’s allies, Hezbollah now has access to far more advanced missiles and rockets than in the past. This arsenal is now accurate enough to pinpoint military installations and capable of launching 500-600 projectiles a day. Hezbollah also maintains its capacity to undertake terrorist operations against civilians and other targets. This would spread the conflict throughout the region.

There is also the possibility that in lieu of a conflict, Hezbollah could gain access to Syria’s P-800 Yakhont supersonic cruise missile system, allowing it to strike targets up to 300km from the Lebanese coast.

Table 5. Reported Hizballah Rockets and Missiles (source: Washington Institute)

System                    Type                 Range (km)             Warhead Weight (kg)         Supplier

Zelzal-2                  Rocket                    210                                          600                                             Iran

Nazeat                     Rocket                    100–140                      1300(6)/250(10)                          Iran

Fajr-3                      Rocket                    43                                            45                                                 Iran

Fajr-5                      Rocket                    75                                            90                                                Iran

302 mm                  Rocket                    75                                            100                                             Syria

220 mm                  Rocket                    70                                            unknown                                  Syria

122 mm                   Rocket                    20–40                                      30                                          Iran/Syria

107 mm                   Rocket                    6                                              unknown                                Iran/Syria

M600/Fateh-110 Missile                   210–250                                  500                                       Iran/Syria

Scud variant            Missile                   300–700*                                985                                        Syria

* Depending on variant: Scud-B, 300 km; Scud-C, 500 km; Syrian Scud-D, 700 km. The Scud system is not confirmed to be in Hizballah’s hands in Lebanon at present

Additionally, despite its technological inferiority compared to Hezbollah, one should not discount the role Hamas could play in a conflict. While its capabilities rest largely on mortars and rockets, Hamas is still capable of striking critical targets in Israel such as Tel Aviv, further aggravating the overall situation for the U.S. and expanding the scope and complexity of the conflict.

Syria too may feel compelled to intervene in some manner, though it is largely preoccupied with internal dissent and thus currently may be unable to play any sort of leading role in the conflict.

Iran is unlikely to use all the tricks in its bag at once. Being a rational actor, and one that does not seek its own demise, Iran will respond with appropriate levels of force. However, these actions will be geared towards expanding the conflict to a much broader field where U.S. military and technological advantage is reduced.

Any strike against Iran will likely require much more than we think. As a March 2012 Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) report notes:

Limited bombing campaigns are unlikely to destroy Iran’s main capability to produce weapon-grade uranium…. Iran has dispersed its centrifuge program across many facilities, several whose locations remain secret. More importantly, Iran has mastered the construction of centrifuges and has likely even secretly stockpiled an unknown number of centrifuges…

Many analysts accordingly believe multiple sorties will be required, thereby expanding the scope of a strike and in turn the Iranian response.

Following a strike the U.S. will find itself in a prolonged conflict that will include conventional forces that are geared towards asymmetric warfare, an economic downturn and high oil prices stemming from instability in the Strait of Hormuz and non-state actors conducting operations across the region.

Soon U.S. escalation will be required to counter these challenges and it will eventually be forced to admit its shortcomings or double down and undertake the now forsaken term ‘regime change’. Should the U.S. undertake the former, it will have to live with a further destabilized region, yet another military setback, and an Iranian nuclear program most likely delayed, but far from destroyed.

As the ISIS report concludes:

An ineffective bombing campaign that does not eliminate these capabilities would leave Iran able to quickly rebuild its program and would motivate it to launch its own Manhattan Project, resulting in a Middle East region that is far more dangerous and unstable.

White similarly concludes that

A beaten, humiliated but still defiant Iran with essentially the same political system and approach to the region and the world would be a long-term, growing danger similar to Iraq after the First Gulf War (or Germany after World War I).

In short, if the U.S desires another long term engagement that will lead to further destabilization, a huge  military and financial commitment and what will likely be Iranian commitment to nuclear weaponization, then it should start down the long road of ‘limited strikes against Iran’s nuclear facility’.

However, should the U.S.  like to ‘act before it’s too late’ and undertake strategically responsible actions, it should refrain from militarily attacking Iran and continue to engage with it instead.

–Derek Bolton is a Policy Analyst and Research Intern at the American Security Project. Find his complete bio here.