by Marsha B. Cohen

One of the more remarkable aspects of the recent news coverage of Iraq — the Maliki government’s loss of control over the northern region of the country, the deadly confrontations taking place between Iraqi Shia and Sunnis, and the clashes between Kurds and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIL [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Marsha B. Cohen

One of the more remarkable aspects of the recent news coverage of Iraq — the Maliki government’s loss of control over the northern region of the country, the deadly confrontations taking place between Iraqi Shia and Sunnis, and the clashes between Kurds and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIL or ISIS) — is the absence of any mention of Israel.

Commonalities between the Kurdish quest for a long-denied state of their own and Israel’s struggle to survive in a sea of geopolitical enemies are ubiquitous in reports on the Kurdish struggle, both in the Israeli press and among Israel’s supporters abroad. Indeed, it’s not unusual to see Kurdish separatism invoked and idealized as a reflection of the quest to establish a Jewish state, underscored by imagined historical parallels between  Jews and Kurds. For example, in an essay titled, “Surprising Ties between Israel and the Kurds,” in Middle East Quarterly’s Summer 2014 issue, Ofra Bengio, a senior research fellow specializing in Kurdish affairs at Tel Aviv University, points out several of these perceived parallels:

Both are relatively small nations (15 million Jews and 30 million Kurds), traumatized by persecutions and wars. Both have been leading life and death struggles to preserve their unique identity, and both have been delegitimized and denied the right to a state of their own. In addition, both are ethnically different from neighboring Arabs, Persians, and Turks, who represent the majority in the Middle East.

The idealized goals and strategies of sovereignty seeking Kurdish separatists are often contrasted with those of  Palestinian Arabs, as illustrated by Victor Sharpe at the American Thinker:

 …(A)fter the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the Kurds displayed great political and economic wisdom. How different from the example of the Gazan Arabs who, when foolishly given full control over the Gaza Strip by Israel, chose not to build hospitals and schools, but instead bunkers and missile launchers. To this they have added the imposition of sharia law, with its attendant denigration of women and non-Muslims.

The Kurdish experiment, in at least the territory’s current quasi-independence, has shown the world a decent society where all its inhabitants, men and women, enjoy far greater freedoms than can be found anywhere else in the Arab and Muslim world — and certainly anywhere else in Iraq, which is fast descending into ethnic chaos now that the U.S. military has left.

For decades, Israel has been a silent stakeholder in northern Iraq, training and arming its restive Kurds. Massimiliano Fiore, a fellow at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, cites a CIA document found in the US Embassy in Tehran and subsequently published, which reportedly attested that the Kurds aided Israel’s military in the June 1967 (Six Day) War by launching a major offensive against the Iraqi Army. This kept Iraq from joining the other Arab armies in Israel, in return for which, “after the war, massive quantities of Soviet equipment captured from the Egyptians and Syrians were transferred to the Kurds.” Former Mossad operative Eliezer Tsafrir has described in detail the decade of cooperation between 1965-75 of Israel’s Mossad and Iran’s SAVAK, the Shah’s secret police, in arming and training Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga forces. That cooperation ceased when, without warning, the Shah and Saddam Hussein made a secret deal that abruptly ended the Israeli-Iranian partnership in northern Iraq.

The First Gulf War in 1991 gave Kurds a safe haven with an unprecedented degree of autonomy in the no-fly zone enforced by the US-led Coalition. In oil-rich northern Iraq, Kurds held regional parliamentary elections in May 1992, establishing the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Jacques Neriah, a retired colonel who served as foreign policy advisor to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and as deputy head for assessment of Israeli military intelligence, explains in a 2012 report published by the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs:

After the collapse of the Kurdish uprising of March 1991, which broke out after Saddam Hussein’s defeat by the U.S.-led coalition, Iraqi troops recaptured most of the Kurdish areas and 1.5 million Kurds abandoned their homes and fled to the Turkish and Iranian borders. It is estimated that close to 20,000 Kurds died from exhaustion, hunger, cold, and disease. On 5 April 1991, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 688, which demanded that Iraq end its measures against the Kurds and allow immediate access to international humanitarian organizations. This was the first international document to mention the Kurds by name since the League of Nations’ arbitration of Mosul in 1925.

A decade ago, Seymour Hersh called attention to Israel’s close ties with the Kurds. Hersh’s “Annals of National Security: Plan B“, published in the New Yorker is noteworthy, particularly in light of mounting criticism against the Obama administration’s handling of the current crisis. US officials interviewed by Hersh told him that by the end of 2003, “Israel had concluded that the Bush Administration would not be able to bring stability or democracy to Iraq, and that Israel needed other options.” One of those options was expanding Israel’s long-standing relationship with Iraqi Kurds and “establishing a significant presence on the ground in the semi-autonomous region of Kurdistan.” Although the reliability of Hersh’s sources was challenged at the time, they have been affirmed by more recent articles and reports. Neriah, writing in August 2012, cites numerous reports in the Israeli media about the activities of Israeli security and military personnel working for Israeli firms in Kurdistan:

According to Israeli newspapers, dozens of Israelis with a background in elite combat training have been working for private Israeli companies in northern Iraq, helping Kurds there establish elite antiterror units. Reports say that the Kurdish government contracted Israeli security and communications companies to train Kurdish security forces and provide them with advanced equipment.

Shlomi Michaels, an Israeli-American entrepreneur, and former Mossad chief Danny Yatom provided “strategic consultation on economic and security issues” to the Kurds, according to Neriah, although the Israeli government denied any official involvement.

Tons of equipment, including motorcycles, tractors, sniffer dogs, systems to upgrade Kalashnikov rifles, bulletproof vests, and first-aid items have been shipped to Iraq’s northern region, with most products stamped “Made in Israel.”The Kurds had insisted that the cooperation be kept secret, fearing that exposure of the projects would motivate terror groups to target their Jewish guests. Recent warnings that Al-Qaeda might be planning an attack on Kurdish training camps prompted a hasty exit of all Israeli trainers from the northern region. In response to the report, the Defense Ministry said: “We haven’t allowed Israelis to work in Iraq, and each activity, if performed, was a private initiative, without our authorization, and is under the responsibility of the employers and the employees involved.”

Laura Rozen, writing in Mother Jones in 2008, offered a less benign view of Michaels’ activities in Kurdistan.  Besides promoting corruption through kickbacks, Michaels attempted to sell — for $1 million — a dossier to the CIA that would prove Saddam Hussein had met with Ukrainian officials in order to develop a covert chemical  weapons program. Rozen also linked the 2005 AIPAC spy scandal to Israeli involvement in Kurdistan. In 2004, US intelligence agencies had heard rumors that Iranian agents planned to target Israeli and US personnel operating in northern Iraq. Larry Franklin, who worked for the Pentagon, had been caught leaking the intelligence to Washington hawks. That’s how he was was recruited by the FBI for a July 2004 sting operation that informed AIPAC officials about the alleged threat to Israelis operating in northern Iraq.  Franklin pled guilty to leaking classified information and was sentenced to 12 years in prison.

In her Middle East Quarterly essay, Bengio also mentions many of Hersh’s claims about Israeli involvement in Kurdistan a decade earlier, which she cautiously avers “remain unproven,” drawing upon Neriah’s account of Michaels’ adventures (without naming names):

The Yedi’ot Aharonot newspaper published an exclusive regarding Israel’s training of peshmergas, the Kurdish paramilitary force. Another Israeli source mentioned the activities of an Israeli company in the construction of an international airport in Erbil in Iraqi Kurdistan. The same source revealed “For their part, Iraqi sources, especially Shiite ones, have published lists of scores of Israeli companies and enterprises active in Iraq through third parties.

Less than a year ago, Lazar Berman of the Times of Israel, under the optimistic headline, “Is a Free Kurdistan, and a New Israeli Ally, Upon Us?” quoted Kurdish journalist Ayub Nuri who argued that Kurds were “deeply sympathetic to Israel and an independent Kurdistan will be beneficial to Israel.” Fast forward a year later to Neriah’s article titled, ”The fall of Mosul could become the beginning of Kurdish quest for independence,” where he says nothing about the stakes for Israel. Would an increasingly independent Kurdistan continue to look to Israel as its patron?

Or will Kurdistan fully join an anti-ISIS Iraqi alliance, backed jointly, if discreetly, by Iran, with the approval of the US? Any scenario in which Iran is part of the solution, rather than the underlying problem, is a nightmare for Israel. “[W]e would especially not want for a situation to be created where, because both the United States and Iran support the government of (Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri) al-Maliki, it softens the American positions on the issue which is most critical for the peace of the world, which is the Iranian nuclear issue,” Yuval Steinitz, the Israeli minister of strategic affairs, told Reuters. 

After so many decades of trying to make use of the Kurdish dream of independence as a narrative and nuisance against its enemies, Israel stands at the cusp of being the biggest loser in whatever comes next in strife-ridden Iraq.

This article was first published by LobeLog. Follow LobeLog on Twitter and like us on Facebook.

by Wayne White

The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or ISIS) has stunned Baghdad by overrunning most of Iraq’s second largest city in the north, Mosul. Yet, the Sunni Arab extremist group – in its zeal for a quick victory — may have overplayed its hand, sharply increasing the possibility of other [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Wayne White

The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or ISIS) has stunned Baghdad by overrunning most of Iraq’s second largest city in the north, Mosul. Yet, the Sunni Arab extremist group – in its zeal for a quick victory — may have overplayed its hand, sharply increasing the possibility of other parties entering the fray against it.

Reacting to the ongoing successes of Sunni Arab jihadists in Iraq, many wonder how the situation could have gotten this bad. By contrast, for several years now, I’ve been asking: “Why has it taken so long for Sunni Arabs to go on the warpath again?” Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, ruthlessly serving his narrow sectarian agenda, has made clear that Iraq’s Sunni Arab community has little stake in his Shi’a dominated Iraq. His policies have made Sunni Arab push-back (in essence a revival of the post-2003 war insurgency) inevitable. Although a way out of this crisis is unclear, Maliki is not part of the solution.

The rising ISIL threat

Since ISIL wrested Fallujah and parts of Ramadi from Iraqi government control in early January, Maliki’s security forces have failed to eliminate or even contain the militants. With its expansive attacks into other areas of Iraq’s Sunni Arab heartland, ISIL is now in a position to menace the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) enclave to the east, as well as locales farther south along Iraq’s central lines of communication, such as Samarra, Tikrit, and the key oil refining center of Baiji.

This dangerous challenge mounted by ISIL and some allied Sunni Arab tribal elements is not surprising.  ISIL’s fortunes have waned in Syria in the face of Assad regime counterattacks and intense clashes with more moderate Syrian rebels. That’s why ISIL is pursuing potentially more fruitful opportunities across the border in a broad sweep of the predominantly Sunni Arab Iraqi territory adjoining Syria. The Sunni Arab minority there has grown steadily more embittered over its treatment by Maliki & his governments. Indeed, for over two years now, violent Sunni Arab resistance in Iraq (much of it having little to do with ISIL) has rebounded alarmingly, with nearly 9,000 Iraqis killed, mostly in violence ascribed to attacks by such militants, in 2013.

Maliki the enabler

Maliki and his hardline Shi’a cohorts prepared the ground for ISIL and other Sunni Arab jihadists. Even with Iraq on the brink of civil war and with sectarian cleansing tearing greater Baghdad apart in 2006-07, Maliki vigorously opposed the US deal with most Sunni Arab insurgents that took them out of the fight against the Coalition and turned them into allies against al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). This was the so-called “Sunni Arab Awakening”.

Worse still, in late 2008, Maliki actually tried to destroy an Awakening unit working with US forces west of Baghdad by sending Iraqi troops to attack them. US troops blocked the attack by placing themselves between their new Sunni Arab allies and Iraqi troops. On another occasion, Maliki arrested relatives of an Awakening leader in an attempt to force the latter’s surrender. Eventually, Maliki did agree, albeit reluctantly and only partially, to pay Awakening cadres and incorporate a limited number of them into the Iraqi security forces.

Maliki would later fall short of even those limited commitments, reneging on commitments to Awakening personnel and using special Iraqi security units operating under his own personal orders to arrest or assassinate Awakening leaders. Quite a few of those Sunni Arab prisoners subsequently disappeared into extrajudicial prisons run by Maliki and his cronies (just one of the abuses of power in which Maliki has engaged in recent years).

Maliki’s refusal to capitalize on Sunni Arab assistance brokered by the US was a missed opportunity of vast importance. Back in 2007-08, most Sunni Arabs were profoundly war weary after several years of bruising combat with US forces. As a result, a community previously determined to resist US forces and a government dominated by Iraqi Shi’a and Kurds, reluctantly accepted new realities. In exchange for ending their resistance and helping to battle AQI, Sunni Arabs expected a fair share of Iraq’s political pie, more government employment, and an appropriate slice of the country’s revenues. This, however, was not to be.

Securing a freer hand to deal with Iraq’s Sunni Arabs more harshly appears to have been one reason Maliki and his Iraqi allies backed away from the immunity agreement needed to allow a limited US military presence to remain behind after the American withdrawal. Both the Bush and Obama administrations tried and failed to secure this. Then, within 48 hours of the departure of the last US troops in mid-December 2011, Maliki had an arrest warrant issued against Iraq’s most senior Sunni Arab official, Deputy Prime Minister Tariq al-Hashemi, charging him with alleged involvement in “terrorism.”

Sunni Arab advantages

Following ISIL’s startling triumph in Mosul, many are asking why US training of Iraq’s security forces was not more effective. Yet, Maliki’s government cut short the hands-on, in-country work on the part of US advisors intended to complete that training — a major factor in the disappointing performance of government forces in Mosul. Another reason for the panic among Iraqi police and soldiers is rather sobering: in early fighting against ISIL and other jihadists by the Syrian Army, even elite, experienced Syrian units buckled in the face of such fanatical combatants.

Maliki also woefully underestimated Iraq’s Sunni Arabs (the same mistake made by the Bush administration in 2003 when it cast aside the Sunni Arab establishment and initially downplayed the insurgency). The challenge facing Iraqi government forces now is extremely dangerous: in heavy fighting during 2003-06, even US forces could not crush the post-invasion Sunni Arab insurgency.

The Sunni Arab minority had held sway over Iraq, politically and militarily, not only since independence in 1932 until Saddam Hussein’s fall, but far earlier during Iraq’s time as a province of the Sunni Ottoman Empire. So until Saddam was ousted, Sunni Arabs comprised most of the Iraqi officer corps and the army’s most elite formations. More broadly, as a ruling class, enhanced Sunni Arab access to wealth and education enabled them to dominate key professional fields and governance. Although out of power now, this community still represents a potent force, especially with its back to the wall in the face of grievances and exclusion.

Maliki needs to go

After years of spurning Sunni Arab cooperation, hounding Sunni Arabs out of governance, and turning Sunni Arabs into 2^nd class citizens, Maliki is part of the problem, not the solution. Various pundits are urging that he make an “Awakening” like deal with Sunni Arab tribes, but his longstanding hostility toward the Sunni Arab community has left him badly discredited.

In the April 30 Iraqi parliamentary elections, Maliki made a strong showing, so a 3^rd term as prime minister seems certain. Yet he was over 70 seats short of a majority, and has not yet succeeded in pulling together a coalition government.

In the current crisis, the largely Shi’a parties Maliki has partnered with in the past may rally around him instinctively. There is also, ironically, a misperception among many within Iraq’s majority Shi’a community that Maliki is the only reliable bulwark against Sunni Arab violence (despite his leading role in feeding it). By contrast, in recent years more savvy Kurdish leaders became increasingly concerned over Maliki’s polarizing policies — including problems with the Kurds over oil exports and territory.

Enter Iran?

The burning question now is: what can be done to take back ISIL’s gains. In response to ISIL’s seizure of Fallujah, the Obama administration provided drones, Hellfire air-to-ground missiles, stepped up delivery of combat aircraft, and additional intelligence. Clearly, that was not nearly enough. What is needed most at this point, with the Iraq Army sagging, are additional and more reliable “boots on the ground.” This, however, appears unlikely to happen in terms of the US or its most capable allies.

There is another possibility: Iranian intervention.  Maliki’s government and the two dominant Kurdish militias in the KRG have close ties to Iran. While the US and other Western states have been concerned about Iranian influence in Iraq, ISIL’s gains have now alarmed Tehran. Just today, Iranian officials reflected this deep concern and called for the international community to address the crisis. The foreign ministry also indicated Iran’s willingness to assist Iraq in confronting “terrorism.”

In 1996, one Kurdish militia requested and received robust Iranian Revolutionary Guard intervention to help repel its leading rival. If ISIL and affiliated Sunni Arab combatants move against the KRG, or continue their advance south toward Baghdad advance, the KRG, Maliki, or both might feel compelled to request the commitment of Iranian ground forces.

This article was first published by LobeLog.

Photo: An undated image posted on a militant website in January shows fighters from the extremist Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIL, marching in Raqqa, Syria.

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by Derek Davison

Over the next few months, citizens in several Middle Eastern countries will take to the polls in a series of elections that will have a good deal to say about the direction the region’s politics will take. From Turkey, to Syria, to Iraq, to Egypt, there is [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Derek Davison

Over the next few months, citizens in several Middle Eastern countries will take to the polls in a series of elections that will have a good deal to say about the direction the region’s politics will take. From Turkey, to Syria, to Iraq, to Egypt, there is a danger that these elections will ratify a resurgent authoritarian tendency that has developed, in part, as a reaction to the so-called “Arab Spring” movement.

The most obvious example of this phenomenon is in Syria, where President Bashar al-Assad’s authoritarianism has remained constant despite the ongoing civil war it has sparked. Assad recently declared his intention to stand for reelection in June. In an interesting but certainly symbolic gesture, this year’s vote will be contested, as opposed to previous presidential elections in 2000 and 2007 that were conducted as referenda in which Assad’s name was the only one on the ballot. There is little reason to believe that this election will be any more legitimate than those were, and in many ways it will be much worse. The vote will only be permitted in areas of the country that are under government control, and there is no indication that the millions of Syrians who have been displaced by the war will be able to cast ballots. UN Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi has argued that elections will only further hamper efforts to reach a negotiated settlement in the three-year old conflict, though progress toward such a settlement has been imperceptible.

Turks have already voted once this year in municipal elections, where Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party won a clear, albeit not overwhelming victory. Erdogan is expected to run in August’s presidential election, where he is the presumptive favorite. Since ordering a violent crackdown on the Gezi Park protesters (whose protest movement is still active) last summer, Erdogan has been governing with an increasingly authoritarian bent by limiting press freedoms, increasing his direct control over Turkey’s judiciary, quashing a corruption probe that targeted his aides, and even banning social media inside Turkey. Although Turkey’s constitution establishes a parliamentary system with limited presidential authority and Erdogan tried and failed to change the constitution to increase that authority in 2012, he has pledged to use “all [his] constitutional powers” if he becomes president, which suggests he will assert the authority of the presidency as far as he can within constitutional bounds.

For Americans, the resurgence of authoritarianism in Iraq may be the most difficult pill to swallow, given the blood and treasure the United States expended, to say nothing of the hundreds of thousands of Iraqi lives it took, in a war that resulted in the only tangible result (since pre-war threats of Iraqi nuclear weapons turned out to be completely empty) of the overthrow of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. But since he was elected Prime Minister in 2006, Nuri al-Maliki has increasingly consolidated his authority over the Iraqi state, particularly by oppressing Iraq’s Sunni population, whose recent uprising has given Maliki an excuse to accelerate his accumulation of power. Maliki has governed in fear of a Baathist revival among the Sunnis, and has manipulated the state security apparatus to consolidate his hold on power even as the security situation in Iraq has collapsed, and while Iraqi infrastructure continues to crumble, Maliki’s attention seems to be focused solely on retaining power. The results of Iraq’s April 30 parliamentary elections are not yet known, and there is a chance that Maliki will have to make some concessions in order to form a coalition government, but the likeliest outcome is that Maliki’s State of Law Coalition will come away victorious and he will retain the premiership with a free hand.

In Egypt, the resurgence of authoritarianism hasn’t waited for Field Marshal-turned-civilian Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s likely election in May. It began, arguably, with the coup that removed former President Mohamed Morsi from power, but certainly revealed itself in August of last year, when Egypt’s interim government launched a violent crackdown against protesters and Muslim Brotherhood figures. That crackdown claimed 638 lives in a single day (August 14, 2013), with almost 4,000 injured, and has led to over 3,000 deaths in total (the majority in clashes between protesters and security forces), with another 17,000 injured and nearly 19,000 Egyptians imprisoned. The government declared the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization in December, a move with obvious ramifications in terms of stamping out political opposition and one that experts have warned could become a “self-fulfilling prophecy” by driving Brotherhood members toward terrorism as their only remaining means of opposition. Last month, an Egyptian judge sentenced 529 people, most or all of them Brotherhood supporters, to death over an attack on Egyptian police in August. This month, that same judge commuted all but 37 of the death sentences to 25-year prison terms — and then sentenced an additional 683 men to death. There is a possibility that the upcoming campaign will somehow put Egypt on a path toward democratic reform, but it seems more likely that Sisi’s election will cement Egypt’s complete return to authoritarian repression.

Each of these cases illustrates the limits and challenges facing US foreign policy in the region. The US’ unwillingness to take a strong stance on Egyptian repression was made clear when it refused to admit that the coup which removed Morsi from power was, in fact, a coup, because doing so would have triggered automatic cuts in US aid. Now, while it condemns the death sentences handed to hundreds of Muslim Brotherhood supporters as “unconscionable,” America continues to send military aid to Egypt (though not without Congressional opposition) because its security priorities (fighting Sinai terrorism, maintaining close Egypt-Israel ties, and ensuring that the Suez Canal remains open) require it. Turkey is a NATO ally whose collaboration is important to American policy on Syria, Iran, and even Russia, so there is little that Americas can do to rein in Erdogan even as the White House criticizes his more repressive policies. It’s been apparent for some time now that the US has little leverage with which to hasten Assad’s ouster, and given the makeup of the Syrian opposition, it’s not clear that a post-Assad Syria would actually be preferable from an American viewpoint, though millions of Syrians would disagree. Finally, as far as Maliki is concerned, it seems that Washington is content to remain relatively quiet as Maliki consolidates his power, as long as he keeps up the fight against jihadist forces like the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, which have used the discord among Iraqi Sunnis to expand their regional influence.

by Wayne White

Last week, Jasmin Ramsey pointed out how problematic the recent US decision to deliver attack helicopters to Egypt is in terms of US human rights policy. The move also portrays the US as actively taking sides in a conflict pitting a repressive regime against armed opposition, with potentially [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Wayne White

Last week, Jasmin Ramsey pointed out how problematic the recent US decision to deliver attack helicopters to Egypt is in terms of US human rights policy. The move also portrays the US as actively taking sides in a conflict pitting a repressive regime against armed opposition, with potentially adverse consequences for the US and its citizens. It mirrors Washington’s decision earlier this year to send Iraq’s abusive Shi’a-dominated government advanced weaponry to use against Sunni Arab militants. And then there is the possibility that Egyptian leaders might not have done all they could to secure Sinai, in part to extract US military aid.

Smokescreens and inconsistencies

Seemingly in no mood to help Washington defend its decision, Egypt declared officially on April 24 — two days after the delivery of 10 US Apache helicopters and $650 million in military aid to Egypt was announced — that its army had “complete control over the situation” in the Sinai! This statement directly contradicted the Pentagon’s rationale for delivering the helicopters:  to “counter extremists [in Sinai] who threaten US, Egyptian and Israeli security.”

The Egyptian army’s claim appears to be unfounded, merely self-serving propaganda. A less questionable source, a recent Reuters investigation, concluded several hundred militants were still at large in Sinai and “are nowhere near defeat.” To wit, the day before the army’s announcement, a Sinai-based group almost certainly carried out a bombing that killed an Egyptian police general near Cairo (in addition to various attacks by Sinai militants in recent weeks).

Jihadist activity in and emanating from Sinai soared following the military’s overthrow of former Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi last year. Three groups stand out: Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM), Ansar al-Sharia of Egypt, and, since early this year, Ajnad Misr (AM).  Although there have been attacks against the Israeli border and foreigners, the vast bulk of them since Morsi’s overthrow have targeted Egyptian military and police personnel.

Despite the army’s sweeping public reassurance concerning Sinai, senior Egyptian officials must have shared a more sober assessment with Washington. Indeed, more pessimistic Egyptian analysis was likely discussed during Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel’s exchange with his Egyptian counterpart last Tuesday.

Meanwhile, US policy aimed at reducing repression in Egypt, already struggling, has been further undermined.  To justify the helicopter delivery, Kerry on April 29 cited in his news conference with Egyptian Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy the passage of the Egyptian constitution as a “positive step forward.” This is hardly in line with the facts. It hands more power to the military, and was passed with a highly suspicious 98% of the vote amidst relatively low turnout. Kerry himself back in January expressed great concern about the entire constitutional process, noting “the absence of an inclusive drafting process or public debate before the vote, the arrests of those who campaigned against it, and procedural violations during the balloting.”

The decision to go forward with the helicopter delivery became especially embarrassing on April 28 when the Egyptian government resumed its harsh repression in a stunning fashion: a judge sentenced Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohamed Badie and nearly 700 supporters to death. This threw Kerry even more on the defensive; while sticking with the helicopter decision, he conceded in the same news conference, among other things, that “disturbing decisions in the judiciary process” pose “difficult challenges.”

Terrorism trumps pluralism and human rights

An ominous pattern of US regional policy choices appears to be taking shape that, effectively, sweeps aside very real concerns about widespread repression and abuse in order to help regimes friendly to the US crackdown on Muslim extremists.

To place this in perspective, despite what many believe, extremists do not typically place a high priority on attacking Americans, the US and other foreigners. Most are highly localized franchises, seeking mainly to overthrow local regimes. And even when they do target foreigners, attacks almost always involve only those inside countries where the violence is taking place.

Related to the pattern noted above, for years the US has pressed Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to end his exclusionist, repressive policies toward much of Iraq’s Sunni Arab community. Maliki ignored these appeals. Mostly the result of Maliki’s purging from government, arresting, and even assassinating Sunni Arabs, al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) — nearly defeated during Iraq’s Sunni Arab “Awakening” (welcomed by the US, but largely shunned by Maliki) — has rebounded dramatically in a devastating wave of violence.

Then, with its fortunes declining in Syria, fielding a sizeable Iraqi component, and responding to protests against Baghdad’s ill treatment of Sunni Arabs, a contingent of the jihadist Sunni Arab Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) group seized and held the Iraqi city of Fallujah (and a few portions of nearby Ramadi) in early January; it was joined by some disgruntled Sunni Arab tribesmen. Unable to oust ISIL from Fallujah, Maliki appealed for urgent US military aid.

Despite Maliki’s role in provoking Sunni Arab violence and ignoring US pleas for moderation, Washington quickly dispatched Hellfire air-to-ground missiles, as well as ScanEagle and Raven drones to help him retake Fallujah. Since then, ISIL and its allies in Fallujah have suffered significant losses from Hellfire missile strikes.

There was, of course, a long history of American military assistance to governments with loathsome human rights records going back decades — driven by Cold War imperatives and the “friendliness” of such regimes.  More recently, however, with the emergence of robust militant Islamic groups, a new driver for such aid emerged: terrorism. This trend became especially compelling after 9/11.

Potential anti-US blowback

There is, however, danger associated with such assistance: the US risks becoming a far more important target of extremist groups on the receiving end of regime repression than is the case now.

With respect to Algeria, the US distanced itself from a military-backed regime never close to the US during most of the 1990’s in reaction to its anti-democratic and ruthless behavior that played a major role in triggering and sustaining a huge Islamist uprising. Up to 200,000 died in a savage conflict that eventually spawned several extremist groups.

By contrast, France helped the Algerian regime crush the rebels and became a prime target for extremist reprisals. When the last militant holdouts morphed into al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), they shifted their operations out of Algeria into the weaker nations of the Francophone Sahel.

France was compelled to step in militarily last year to prevent Mali from being overrun by a collection of northern Malian separatists, AQIM and other extremists.  In defeat, AQIM and closely aligned militants fell back into a lawless portion of Libya, but quickly lashed out at a southern Algerian natural gas facility in order to get their hands on foreigners there.

Likewise, Sinai extremists along with ISIL in Syria and Iraq, especially in their bitterness if and when they are defeated, could shift from a narrow focus on Egyptian, Syrian and Iraqi government targets toward Americans and the US. Yet, whether Iraq (where Maliki never retook Fallujah), Syria (where ISIL’s woes stem mainly from regime forces and rebel rivals), and Egypt (where US military aid probably will not determine the outcome in Sinai), the US could loom far larger as an enemy and scapegoat.

In Sinai, for example, surviving jihadists could make a far more serious effort to target the largely American Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) peacekeeping contingent based along the southern coast. Until now, MFO has been left alone except for one September 2012 attack against its base camp.

Egyptian scheming?

Lastly, Egyptian leaders appear to assign Sinai security a much lower priority than Egypt proper despite US and Israeli concerns. I learned when I served a year in Sinai as a peacekeeper that Egyptian troops loathed duty in Sinai, regarding it as a wasteland of little value compared to Egypt’s Nile Valley core. And unlike more rugged south Sinai, the north (where most attacks occur) is considerably less difficult to monitor.

This negative Egyptian attitude toward Sinai, combined with the government’s keen desire to secure renewed US military support, might have inclined Egypt’s military brass not to pursue Sinai security full-bore. If true, not pressing the fight to the maximum while Sinai simmers might be meant, at least in part, to increase Egypt’s chances of getting US policymakers to do precisely what Cairo wanted: release their hold on attack helicopters of great value in suppressing opposition in Sinai, but also in Egypt proper.

Photo: Sinai militia carrying al-Qaeda flags head for a funeral of killed militants on August 10, 2013. Credit: Hisham Allam/IPS.

The signing on 6 December of a US-Iraq Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) concerning defense cooperation might suggest ties between Washington and Baghdad remain close, but such is not the case. In fact, the two sides have more generally experienced somewhat chilly relations in recent years, mainly because of actions taken by [...]]]> via Lobe Log

The signing on 6 December of a US-Iraq Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) concerning defense cooperation might suggest ties between Washington and Baghdad remain close, but such is not the case. In fact, the two sides have more generally experienced somewhat chilly relations in recent years, mainly because of actions taken by Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki’s government that are at odds with American goals in Iraq and within the Middle East region more broadly. One Iraqi policy in particular could soon have ominous consequences for Maliki and his allies.

Maliki and his military commanders need advanced military hardware such as F-16 fighters and the nearly 150 M1A1 Abrams tanks sold under prior agreements with the US as well as associated American training. These weapon systems outclass those of most of Iraq’s neighbors and will greatly help offset the glaring superiority in numbers of heavy weapons enjoyed by all surrounding states with the exception of Jordan and Kuwait. The MOU covers 5 years of exchanges, professional training on such complex systems, the development of Iraqi military intelligence and counterterrorism cooperation. Yet, even with this MOU, Baghdad may turn to cheaper sources, like Russia or the Ukraine, for a hefty slice of its defense needs. With so much materiel needed to equip a sizeable and competitive military, deals with non-US suppliers (like Moscow, which already has had military talks with Baghdad) would require less money per item, allow more units to be equipped, and involve sales with less strings attached. Additionally, most Iraqi military personnel are more familiar with Soviet-style armaments as a result of decades of purchases from the former Soviet Union, China, and others during the Saddam Hussein era.

There is, however, little else to be bullish about concerning the bilateral relationship. Maliki and his Shi’a backers largely opposed the late 2006 American program to partner with the bulk of Iraq’s Sunni Arab insurgents against al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). This opposition was disruptive enough while the US had a substantial military presence in Iraq, but especially since the US departure, far too many Sunni Arab fighters who did so much to beat back the AQI threat have been denied employment in the Iraqi security forces and hounded by the regime. Some have even been hunting down and killed. These actions occurred in parallel with the exclusion of most Sunni Arabs from Maliki’s Shi’a=dominated and increasingly high-handed government and the Iraqi political mainstream in general. All this conflicted with the American vision of an inclusive and more genuinely democratic Iraq. Additionally, Sunni Arab interests in assisting Maliki and his allies against AQI have fallen off, and AQI’s ability to carry out devastating, mostly anti-Shi’a terror bombings remains robust and a major security threat, especially in central Iraq. Likewise, despite a host of electoral promises, Maliki has been unwilling to meaningfully address territorial demands on the part of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in the north. Admittedly, the KRG has shown little interest in compromise either. Consequently, the overall atmosphere in the north between the government in Baghdad and the leaders of the KRG has been extremely tense for quite some time. Attempts at US and other outside mediation between the parties have either been unsuccessful or shunned by Maliki. So this festering ethnic dispute is likely to persist well into the future.

Most unsettling to the US has been Maliki’s close ties with Iran. Overall, it is clear that Tehran has had far more influence over decisions in Baghdad than has Washington for nearly five years. In fact, the more Maliki alienates both the Sunni Arab and Kurdish communities in Iraq, the more he needs a strong Shi’a ally hostile to the first and with some influence over the second. As a result, this relationship is likely to endure. Probably most disturbing — even infuriating — to the Obama Administration and much of the international community (including the Arab League) over the past two years has been Maliki’s failure to join in condemning the depredations of the Assad regime in Syria. Worst still, Iraq has allowed its airspace to be used for important Iranian resupply flights to Damascus. This is directly related to Baghdad’s close ties to Tehran and somewhat ironic considering the longstanding hostility between the pre-2003 Iraqi regime and the Assad’s.

Potential danger lurks in the sympathy Maliki has shown toward the now teetering Assad regime. That regime appears likely to be replaced with not only a Sunni Arab order, but one that could be somewhat Islamist. Before stability is restored, however, there also could be a prolonged period of infighting that would involve some robust Sunni extremist elements. Either of these scenarios would pose a security risk for a neighboring government that not only facilitated support for the Syrian regime, but also mistreats its prominent Sunni Arab minority. Adjacent to the Syrian border, Iraq’s Sunni Arab community (especially militants within it) could become the recipient of considerable assistance from sympathetic Sunni Arab elements within Syria or even a resentful and far more Islamist successor regime in Damascus, potentially further destabilizing the less than ideal situation already prevailing inside Iraq.

- Wayne White is a Policy Expert with Washington’s Middle East Policy Council. He was formerly the Deputy Director of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research’s Office of Analysis for the Near East and South Asia (INR/NESA) and senior regional analyst. 

Instead of [...]]]> In yesterday’s Daily Talking Points we covered Michael Hanna‘s Atlantic piece about how the U.S. tends to exaggerate Iranian influence in Iraqi electoral politics. Indeed, with Iran-based Muqtada al-Sadr throwing his support behind Nuri al-Maliki recently, there have been a lot of neocon hysterics about the role that Iran played.

Instead of tendentious conclusions that would, for the most part, support escalating measure against Iran, Hanna actually looks at the Iraqi political machinations that have resulted in an apparent second term as prime minister for Maliki.

After that, he offers reasons why — both on the left and the right — the U.S. view of these political maneuvers tends to see out-sized U.S. influence. It’s got little to with Iraq or Iran, actually. It’s all about electoral politics in the U.S. And here’s the rub: The hyperventilating is actually bad for Iraq and, therefore, bad for U.S. interests there.

Here’s a chunk from Hanna at the Atlantic website, with my occasional emphasis:

Our perception of Iran as the puppet master of Baghdad is rooted in decades of enmity between the U.S. and Iran, which continue today. Also, Iran’s broad support for Hezbollah in Lebanon and its monetary support for Hamas in Gaza makes it easy to imagine Iran replicating this strategy in Iraq. But the biggest factor in our willingness to see exaggerated Iranian influence in Iraq is something much simpler: partisan U.S. politics. For years, both parties have exaggerated Iran’s role to score political points. Iran hawks on the right have done so to bolster their case for greater U.S. hostility to the perceived Iranian menace. During the 2008 presidential primaries and general election, Republicans also used the threat of Iranian encroachment to argue against any drawdown in Iraq. Today, they maintain this line in attacking President Barack Obama’s Iraq policies as strengthening Iran. Meanwhile, voices on the left have, since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, latched onto to the notion of an unstoppable Iran expanding its influence throughout the region. This extension of the recriminations against the Iraq war, much like the conservative criticism of Obama, is an effort to further discredit President George W. Bush’s invasion by accusing him of ceding Iraq to Iran. This distortion on both sides is unfortunate because it paints Iraq as a mere prop for the purpose of polemics and because it is unmoored from the more prosaic reality of contemporary Iraq.

It is true that the toppling of Saddam Hussein was a strategic windfall for the Islamic Republic, but it has not allowed Iran to dictate Iraq’s agenda. Iraqi nationalism and suspicion of Iranian intentions, nearly universal in Iraq, simply do not allow for the kind of Iranian power one hears about in the U.S. While Maliki and Sadr’s ascent in Baghdad are in line with the Iranian desire for Shiite Islamist supremacy, their rise is a reflection of Iraq’s demography and politics. Of course a Shiite-majority, Islamist-leaning country will elect a Shiite-majority, Islamist-leaning government. Unfortunately, this is how democracy works in a war-scarred country where ethno-sectarian identity remains stubbornly vital to political affiliation. Sadr’s political participation, though it may make Iraq less likely to follow every American interest, is simply a reflection of the realities of Iraq’s nascent, flawed democracy.

Vilifying and exaggerating Iran’s role in Iraq will cloud U.S. perception of both countries and runs the danger of contributing to the formulation of bad policy. Simplistic notions of Iranian hegemony will poison U.S.-Iraqi bilateral relations, with each development judged in blunt zero-sum terms of whether it benefits the U.S. or Iran. In assuming such inherent conflict, the U.S. will be tempted to try to use Iraq as an American proxy in a broader struggle against Iran. This would serve no useful purpose; why wage a proxy war where none exists? Worse, it would weaken Iraq and enable the very Iranian influence we are so afraid of. In fact, American and Iranian long-term interests converge in Baghdad to a great extent. At root, both countries need a stable Iraq.

While still dependent to a large degree on outside assistance, thus prone to interference and meddling, Iraqis are not interested in being a puppet of either the U.S. or Iran. Pushing a proxy conflict and asking Iraq to be a front-line pillar in the wider regional struggle against Tehran would subordinate Iraqi interests to those of United States, alienate Iraqis, and potentially undermine Iraq’s relative stability.