by Derek Davison
Over the next few months, citizens in several Middle Eastern countries will take to the polls in a series of elections that will have a good deal to say about the direction the region’s politics will take. From Turkey, to Syria, to Iraq, to Egypt, there is [...]]]>
by Derek Davison
Over the next few months, citizens in several Middle Eastern countries will take to the polls in a series of elections that will have a good deal to say about the direction the region’s politics will take. From Turkey, to Syria, to Iraq, to Egypt, there is a danger that these elections will ratify a resurgent authoritarian tendency that has developed, in part, as a reaction to the so-called “Arab Spring” movement.
The most obvious example of this phenomenon is in Syria, where President Bashar al-Assad’s authoritarianism has remained constant despite the ongoing civil war it has sparked. Assad recently declared his intention to stand for reelection in June. In an interesting but certainly symbolic gesture, this year’s vote will be contested, as opposed to previous presidential elections in 2000 and 2007 that were conducted as referenda in which Assad’s name was the only one on the ballot. There is little reason to believe that this election will be any more legitimate than those were, and in many ways it will be much worse. The vote will only be permitted in areas of the country that are under government control, and there is no indication that the millions of Syrians who have been displaced by the war will be able to cast ballots. UN Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi has argued that elections will only further hamper efforts to reach a negotiated settlement in the three-year old conflict, though progress toward such a settlement has been imperceptible.
Turks have already voted once this year in municipal elections, where Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party won a clear, albeit not overwhelming victory. Erdogan is expected to run in August’s presidential election, where he is the presumptive favorite. Since ordering a violent crackdown on the Gezi Park protesters (whose protest movement is still active) last summer, Erdogan has been governing with an increasingly authoritarian bent by limiting press freedoms, increasing his direct control over Turkey’s judiciary, quashing a corruption probe that targeted his aides, and even banning social media inside Turkey. Although Turkey’s constitution establishes a parliamentary system with limited presidential authority and Erdogan tried and failed to change the constitution to increase that authority in 2012, he has pledged to use “all [his] constitutional powers” if he becomes president, which suggests he will assert the authority of the presidency as far as he can within constitutional bounds.
For Americans, the resurgence of authoritarianism in Iraq may be the most difficult pill to swallow, given the blood and treasure the United States expended, to say nothing of the hundreds of thousands of Iraqi lives it took, in a war that resulted in the only tangible result (since pre-war threats of Iraqi nuclear weapons turned out to be completely empty) of the overthrow of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. But since he was elected Prime Minister in 2006, Nuri al-Maliki has increasingly consolidated his authority over the Iraqi state, particularly by oppressing Iraq’s Sunni population, whose recent uprising has given Maliki an excuse to accelerate his accumulation of power. Maliki has governed in fear of a Baathist revival among the Sunnis, and has manipulated the state security apparatus to consolidate his hold on power even as the security situation in Iraq has collapsed, and while Iraqi infrastructure continues to crumble, Maliki’s attention seems to be focused solely on retaining power. The results of Iraq’s April 30 parliamentary elections are not yet known, and there is a chance that Maliki will have to make some concessions in order to form a coalition government, but the likeliest outcome is that Maliki’s State of Law Coalition will come away victorious and he will retain the premiership with a free hand.
In Egypt, the resurgence of authoritarianism hasn’t waited for Field Marshal-turned-civilian Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s likely election in May. It began, arguably, with the coup that removed former President Mohamed Morsi from power, but certainly revealed itself in August of last year, when Egypt’s interim government launched a violent crackdown against protesters and Muslim Brotherhood figures. That crackdown claimed 638 lives in a single day (August 14, 2013), with almost 4,000 injured, and has led to over 3,000 deaths in total (the majority in clashes between protesters and security forces), with another 17,000 injured and nearly 19,000 Egyptians imprisoned. The government declared the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization in December, a move with obvious ramifications in terms of stamping out political opposition and one that experts have warned could become a “self-fulfilling prophecy” by driving Brotherhood members toward terrorism as their only remaining means of opposition. Last month, an Egyptian judge sentenced 529 people, most or all of them Brotherhood supporters, to death over an attack on Egyptian police in August. This month, that same judge commuted all but 37 of the death sentences to 25-year prison terms — and then sentenced an additional 683 men to death. There is a possibility that the upcoming campaign will somehow put Egypt on a path toward democratic reform, but it seems more likely that Sisi’s election will cement Egypt’s complete return to authoritarian repression.
Each of these cases illustrates the limits and challenges facing US foreign policy in the region. The US’ unwillingness to take a strong stance on Egyptian repression was made clear when it refused to admit that the coup which removed Morsi from power was, in fact, a coup, because doing so would have triggered automatic cuts in US aid. Now, while it condemns the death sentences handed to hundreds of Muslim Brotherhood supporters as “unconscionable,” America continues to send military aid to Egypt (though not without Congressional opposition) because its security priorities (fighting Sinai terrorism, maintaining close Egypt-Israel ties, and ensuring that the Suez Canal remains open) require it. Turkey is a NATO ally whose collaboration is important to American policy on Syria, Iran, and even Russia, so there is little that Americas can do to rein in Erdogan even as the White House criticizes his more repressive policies. It’s been apparent for some time now that the US has little leverage with which to hasten Assad’s ouster, and given the makeup of the Syrian opposition, it’s not clear that a post-Assad Syria would actually be preferable from an American viewpoint, though millions of Syrians would disagree. Finally, as far as Maliki is concerned, it seems that Washington is content to remain relatively quiet as Maliki consolidates his power, as long as he keeps up the fight against jihadist forces like the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, which have used the discord among Iraqi Sunnis to expand their regional influence.
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by Charles Naas
President Barak Obama is currently besieged on his Middle East policy — or lack thereof — by both liberals and conservatives.
The noise of the critics is not unusual. In the last couple of decades there has rarely been a national consensus on the role of the US [...]]]>
by Charles Naas
President Barak Obama is currently besieged on his Middle East policy — or lack thereof — by both liberals and conservatives.
The noise of the critics is not unusual. In the last couple of decades there has rarely been a national consensus on the role of the US in foreign affairs, particularly in the Middle East, where there is a strong domestic pressure group that rides roughshod over differing views. The president’s cautious approach to any overt stance of action is, however, fully defensible and by no means feckless and directionless as his critics hold.
It wasn’t always like this. From the end of World War II until the late 80′s and 90′s, the Cold War dominated our policies. Rarely did most Americans find fault with the overriding strategy of opposition to the ideology and expansionism of the Soviet Union. There were at times bitter arguments over specific actions or failure to follow a preferred path by one pressure group or another, but not with our aims.
In the Middle East, the US and the Soviet Union sought regional governmental backing for their policies. We used the full, complex panoply of actions expanding upon the Truman Doctrine; the Central Treaty Organization; the bilateral treaties of 1959 with Pakistan, Iran and Turkey; large economic and military assistance programs; special relationships and cooperation in intelligence; state visits; entry visas for university studies; and much more.
The US was most influential in Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, the gulf Emirates, Jordan, Saudi Arabia or Israel. Iraq, Egypt (under Nasser), Syria and Libya accepted Soviet assistance. India and Afghanistan joined the non-aligned nations. Many of the governments tried to use their favoured statuses to garner our support for their regional rivalries.
In return, we received political support, military base rights, special intelligence facilities and the consideration of our wishes when these governments decided upon controversial domestic decisions.
In days past, all of the countries except Turkey were governed by monarchs or authoritarian rulers who, with the support and loyalty of their military, permitted little public opposition to their decisions. Today, a substantial number of these leaders are gone — the Shah of Iran, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Saddam Hussain in Iraq, Ben Ali in Tunisia and Muammar Qaddafi in Libya.
The 9/11 tragedy was pretty much the last time of marked national unity. The invasion of Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban and search for Osama bin Ladin was widely approved by the populace. Soon thereafter the Iraq conflict sharply divided the nation and Obama inherited a nation in doubt over our economy and questioning our overall strategy. What do we want to accomplish? What are our clear national interests? And, if they are definable, how do we achieve them? In addressing these questions, Obama has faced a more perplexing conundrum than any of his predecessors.
Today there is no overarching understanding of strategy nor policy priorities for the Middle East. Each nation faces severe internal regional rivalries; religion versus state issues; the old struggle of Shiism and Sunnism; democracy versus a return to one-man rule; very young populations; faltering economies; and more.
Whatever action Obama opts for in one nation is unacceptable in others and our domestic pressure groups continue to insist on the importance of their own hobby horse.
We swallowed hard when confronted with the electoral victory of the Brotherhood, an Islamist organization feared for decades. But we recognized the new government chosen in an honest election and started to try to work with it based on mutual interests. The overthrow a week ago of Mohamed Morsi has forced the Obama administration to face the dichotomy of continuing our support of the democratic decision of the Egyptian people a year ago or backing the military-takeover brought on by the millions of Egyptians who again filled the streets of Cairo protesting Morsi’s actions.
The decisions before Obama with respect to Syria are equally difficult with probably no national consensus. Do we arm the Syrian National Army faction alone or include other factions and, if so, only small arms or heavy arms? How do we ensure that the Islamic extremist al-Nusra Front does not gain control of the arms? Roughly a week ago, the Syrian National Army and al-Nusra had a serious armed clash that highlighted this issue.
US military and economic power and the appeal of our principles will always ensure that our views and assistance will be sought. But the president must deal with the fact that US influence upon governments in the Middle East and the surrounding region has significantly changed. A quick review is convincing evidence. In Pakistan, less than 10% of the population looks favourably on the US; Iran and the US have been at loggerheads for over thirty years; Nour al-Maliki in Iraq has turned down a continuing presence of the US military and is generally impervious to our advice regarding the civil conflict tearing his country apart; in Syria no one faction of the dozens of separate religious/ethnic and tribal elements speak for the revolutionaries (some want a strong US intercession and just as many factions condemn US involvement); Shia-Sunni divisions have engulfed the region; the Gulf states make decisions at times with no reference to American wishes; Egypt’s trauma is self evident; and in Tunisia — so far a success in advancing to democracy — difficult divisions remain over the issue of religiously conservative governance.
There are no simple answers to demands for a long-term strategy that comes close to being satisfactory to our domestic pressure groups or, for that matter, to the countries in the region.
Perhaps the first requirement is to search for some sort of domestic understanding of the nature of the challenges we face and the range of possible reactions. Our Congress may be too divided for the responsible Committees to undertake the effort. The Senate, however, showed the other day with the “nuclear option” on voting practices that hard as it was, compromise can be reached on tenacious matters. It remains to be seen if the same holds true for foreign affairs.
In the meantime, the president does not have the luxury of ignoring his domestic critics or the life and death trials of our strength throughout the region. He has no option but to continue to side with the informal association of Israel and the monarchical Arab states, even if the possibility of slowly improving relations with Iran’s new government on nuclear and regional issues should be at the top of his list. Although the idea of a conference on Syria has not yet gone far, there is little to lose and much to gain by continuing to advocate it. Otherwise we should understand that most of the Middle East is in a post-colonial, post-Cold War era and they must find their own solutions to the key questions and crises they face.
We can aid on the margins — only when invited.
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