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IPS Writers in the Blogosphere » Peter Crail https://www.ips.org/blog/ips Turning the World Downside Up Tue, 26 May 2020 22:12:16 +0000 en-US hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.5.1 Lieutenant Colonel Leif Eckholm on Invading Iran: Lessons from Iraq https://www.ips.org/blog/ips/lieutenant-colonel-leif-eckholm-on-invading-iran-lessons-from-iraq/ https://www.ips.org/blog/ips/lieutenant-colonel-leif-eckholm-on-invading-iran-lessons-from-iraq/#comments Thu, 01 Sep 2011 23:02:21 +0000 Jasmin Ramsey http://www.lobelog.com/?p=9742 Peter Crail has a post up on the Arms Control Association’s blog, Arms Control NOW, summarizing a recent analysis by Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Leif Eckholm which compares the invasion of Iraq with possible Iran invasion scenarios. As Crail notes, the comments made by Eckholm and other U.S. generals (not to [...]]]> Peter Crail has a post up on the Arms Control Association’s blog, Arms Control NOW, summarizing a recent analysis by Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Leif Eckholm which compares the invasion of Iraq with possible Iran invasion scenarios. As Crail notes, the comments made by Eckholm and other U.S. generals (not to mention former Mossad Chief Meir Dagan) who have seriously considered the “military solution” against the Islamic Republic point out the serious challenges and consequences of pursuing this route by ground or air.

Writes Eckholm:

Proponents of a more comprehensive military intervention will argue that a full-scale invasion is the only means by which to crush the regime and its military apparatus, guarantee total elimination of the Iranian nuclear enterprise, and create a window for democratic change. But the price of invasion would be astronomical, and the nationalistic reaction would be fierce; thus, the projected cost in life and treasure must be weighed against the envisioned, yet unpredictable, advantages of a new regime in Tehran.

Crail ends by noting that:

So when members of Congress say we should consider military force, or presidential candidates talk about a “military solution” to Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions, it is important to ask just what kind of military action they propose, and whether they have also addressed the types of consequences that military leaders and defense analysts describe.

In doing so he is also alluding to the fact that the majority of U.S. intelligence and military analysts are opposed to invading Iran, which raises the question of why certain members of congress and presidential candidates keep bringing the “military solution” up. Who are they being influenced by and who are they trying to please by adopting this kind of aggressive posturing?

Read Crail’s entire post below.

The Military Option on Iran: Be Careful What You Wish For

By Peter Crail

TIME Magazine has recently highlighted an analysis entitled “Invading Iran: Lessons from Iraq” by Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Leif Eckholm, who works in the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (the analysis was published by Stanford’s Hoover Institution, where Eckholm served as a defense fellow).

As the title suggests, the analysis examines many of the challenges in securing a post-invasion Iraq, and how they would be similar, different, or magnified in the context of Iran.

One of the key takeaways, however, is a brief cost/benefit assessment of the decision to attack Iran and a recognition that the only sure-fire way that military force could stop Iran’s nuclear program is through an Iraq-style invasion and occupation:

Should tensions over nuclear ambitions rise to the point of military intervention, an air campaign seems a more likely course of action. Military airstrikes provide a stand-off capability that could severely hamper or delay Iran’s march towards weapon production without bearing the cost of occupation and reconstruction, but not without a price of its own. Targeting the key nuclear infrastructure sites like the Bushehr Research Reactor, the Arak Heavy-Water Reactor/Plutonium Separation Facility, the Natanz Uranium Enrichment Plant, and the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center would certainly be a major setback to Iran’s nuclear ambitions, but the regime has devoted considerable effort to hide, diversify, and protect its nuclear assets, and the regime’s determination to acquire nuclear weapons actually may well increase after such a strike. Furthermore, the regime would remain in place and likely benefit from a nationalistic reaction that would strengthen domestic political support. Proponents of a more comprehensive military intervention will argue that a full-scale invasion is the only means by which to crush the regime and its military apparatus, guarantee total elimination of the Iranian nuclear enterprise, and create a window for democratic change. But the price of invasion would be astronomical, and the nationalistic reaction would be fierce; thus, the projected cost in life and treasure must be weighed against the envisioned, yet unpredictable, advantages of a new regime in Tehran.

This assessment echoes the acknowledgement by former Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman General James Cartwright during an April 2010 Senate hearing that the only way military action would end Iran’s nuclear program would be through invasion and occupation. Cartwright went on to say during the hearing that, while the United States military could carry out such an operation, “there would be consequences to our readiness and the challenges that we already face in this nation economically to pay for war.”

It is important to note that an air campaign against select nuclear facilities wouldn’t be a walk in the park either, as former DIA analyst and Washington Institute Defense Fellow Jeffrey White said during an ACA event in June:

I think there are a lot of issues – important issues – related to an “attack,” in quotes, on Iran and so it would be very complicated, problematic in some ways.  I think the desired levels of destruction could be achieved, especially by us.  But it would not be an easy operation and it is, I think, in my mind kind of in a last resort category.

Discussing Israel’s own military option, Former Mossad Chief Meir Dagan was even more straightforward, saying it was “the stupidest thing I have ever heard.”

Lt. Col. Eckholm’s analysis provides an important contribution to answering questions that were not adequately addressed prior to the Iraq invasion, including what are the likely consequences and is it worth it? Military leaders naturally need to prepare for the possibility that they would be asked to undertake such operations. At the same time, those who are or aspire to be in a position to order those operations need to be aware of the extent of the military and economic commitments they, and ultimately the American people, would be making.

So when members of Congress say we should consider military force, or presidential candidates talk about a “military solution” to Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions, it is important to ask just what kind of military action they propose, and whether they have also addressed the types of consequences that military leaders and defense analysts describe.

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Senate Iran Hawks: 'No enrichment' for Tehran https://www.ips.org/blog/ips/senate-iran-hawks-no-enrichment-for-tehran/ https://www.ips.org/blog/ips/senate-iran-hawks-no-enrichment-for-tehran/#comments Thu, 09 Dec 2010 15:10:40 +0000 Ali Gharib http://www.lobelog.com/?p=6500 Five Senators sent a letter to U.S. President Barack Obama on Monday warning the administration not to offer concessions in upcoming talks with Iran over its nuclear program. If Obama takes the advice, experts say, it could sink his engagement efforts with Tehran.

The letter (PDF, with full text below), broken by Foreign [...]]]> Five Senators sent a letter to U.S. President Barack Obama on Monday warning the administration not to offer concessions in upcoming talks with Iran over its nuclear program. If Obama takes the advice, experts say, it could sink his engagement efforts with Tehran.

The letter (PDF, with full text below), broken by Foreign Policy‘s Josh Rogin, calls for zero enrichment on Iranian soil as a U.S. pre-condition for any negotiated deal to end Iran’s standoff with the West over its nuclear program.

“[G]iven the government of Iran’s patterns of deception and noncooperation, its government cannot be permitted to maintain any enrichment or reprocessing activities on its territory for the foreseeable future,” said the letter. “We would strongly oppose any proposal for diplomat endgame in which Iran is permitted to continue these activities in any form.”

But the Iranians have placed a high priority on domestic enrichment, and would likely oppose a deal precluding such activity. Iran denies accusations from the West that eventual weaponization is the goal of its nuclear program, which is widely considered a point of Iranian national pride.

Even some U.S.-based non-proliferation experts are questioning the wisdom of taking such a hard line as the Senators’ letter.

“There are mixed views in the arms control community,” said Peter Crail, a non-proliferation analyst at the Arms Control Association (ACA). “But there seems to be growing sentiment that if we’re looking at a negotiated solution, ‘zero enrichment’ is not going to be an option.”

“This attempt by congress to bind the adminsitration would kill negotiations,” he added.

Signed by Senators Jon Kyl (R-AZ), Mark Kirk (R-IL), Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), Robert Casey (D-PA), and Joe Lieberman (I-CT), with John McCain (R-AZ) reportedly later adding his name, the letter also called on Obama to “continue ratcheting up” U.S. and international pressure on Iran.

Iran should be squeezed until it freezes enrichment and passes International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections (including submitting to the Additional Protocols, an extended set of safeguards measures), the letter said.

The Senators wrote that their positions are ”reflective of a consensus among a broad, bipartisan majority in Congress.” Despite Peter Baker of the New York Times‘s suggestion that the Senators’ letter was a show of “bipartisan support,” it appeared to instead be a threat of push-back from Congress should Obama pursue a deal that allows any Iranian enrichment.

“[T]he letter makes the point that there will be very strong opposition to any kind of proposal that allows the Iranians to keep some sort of enrichment capability,” an anonymous Senate aide, explaining the “thinking behind the letter,” wrote to the Washington Post‘s new neoconservative blogger Jennifer Rubin. “This is an extremely dangerous idea that it is important to knock down.”

But experts think the tack — pressure for strict pre-conditions to talks — could be repeating the same mistakes of recent U.S.-Iran relations, where Iran was further isolated as its nuclear programs continued.

“This again shows that part of the problem in negotiations has been a lack of political space domestically for both sides,” said Trita Parsi, President of the National Iranian American Council and a Woodrow Wilson center fellow. “Obama realizes that in order to get a deal, there needs to be mutual compromises on both sides.”

“What you have now is that some members of Congress are adopting the (President George W.) Bush position, that, ‘No, we’re not going to compromise on anything, It has to be maximalist approach,” Parsi said. “That has caused problems in the past becaue it makes it impossible to have a real negotiation.”

The Senators pressed Obama just as the first two-day round of talks between the P5+1 group, which includes the U.S., were getting underway. Little had been accomplished as the negotiations drew to a close Tuesday, but another round is expected in January.

Going into the latest round, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton hinted in an interview in Bahrain that the U.S. might be willing to accept Iranian enrichment.

“They can enrich uranium at some future date once they have demonstrated that they can do so in a responsible manner in accordance with international obligations,” Clinton reportedly told the BBC.

“During the Obama period, there has been some ambiguity about whether (zero enrichment) is the American red line,” said NIAC’s Parsi, pointing to Clinton’s comments. “The position that these law makers are taking (in the letter) is identical with the Israeli and Bush red lines, and seems to be at odds with the Obama red line.”

Rumors are already flying that the second round of the latest talks, to be held in Turkey, could see the U.S. offer a deal whereby a fuel swap agreement — involving sending nuclear fuel to Russia for reprocessing — would allow Iran to maintain domestic enrichment.

While Iran says it has a right to domestic enrichment as a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Crail of the ACA notes that the treaty only guarantees “a peaceful nuclear program.”

“In the end, there is an implicit understanding that, yes, countries can enrich,” he said, adding, however, that he prefers that the technology not spread and all nuclear fuel production be internationalized.

But Crail emphasized that Iran, too, must be willing to make some concessions: “According to the NPT, in order for Iran to get all its rights under the NPT, Iran needs to cooperate with international inspections.”

The full text of the letter:

December 6, 2010

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As diplomats from the United States join talks today between the P5+1 and Iran in Geneva, we write to share some thoughts about these discussions, and our broader Iran policy. In particular, we wish to express our support for a set of principles that we believe are reflective of a consensus among a broad, bipartisan majority in Congress, who stand ready to work with you and your Administration to stop Iran from achieving a nuclear weapons capability — a grave threat that would compromise our security and the security of all our allies in the Middle East.

First, we strongly support the cascade of measures that have been put in place over the past several months by your Administration, in cooperation with our partners around the world, to increase the pressure on the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. We applaud and are encouraged by the strong actions taken thus far by the Administration to secure meaningful economic and diplomatic sanctions against the Iranian regime, which are absolutely essential for any prospect of a peaceful resolution to this challenge.

Second, we believe that it is absolutely essential that the United States and its partners make clear to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran that we intend to continue ratcheting up this pressure, through comprehensive enforcement of existing sanctions as well as imposition o new measure, until the full, verifiable, and sustained suspension by Iran of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and heavy water-related activities, as demanded by multiple UN Security Council resolutions. The pressure track should likewise continue on its current trajectory until Iran resumes full cooperation with the IAEA and the Additional Protocol; resolves all outstanding concerns about its nuclear program and complies with the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors and multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions directed at its nuclear program. The government of Iran must undersand that there is absolutely no possibility of any freeze or reduction in the momentum of the pressure track until these minium requirements have been met.

Third, we remain concerned about the possibility that the Iranian regime will seek to buy time or otherwise dilute the focus of our diplomacy through unrelated “confidence-building measures” that fail to address the core concerns associated with Iran’s illicit nuclear activities. Such tactical maneuverings are of course no substitute for a real negotiation, and therefore should not be mistaken as such.

Fourth, we believe that it is critical that the United States and our partners make clear that, given the government of Iran’s patterns of deception and noncooperation, its government cannot be permitted to maintain any enrichment or reprocessing activities on its territory for the foreseeable future. We would strongly oppose any proposal for diplomat endgame in which Iran is permitted to continue these activities in any form.

We thank you for your continued leadership on this matter of critical importance to our national security. We pledge to you our continued support to do all that is necessary to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.

Best Regards,

Joseph I. Lieberman
UNITED STATES SENATOR

Jon Kyl
UNITED STATES SENATOR

Kirsten E. Gillibrand
UNITED STATES SENATOR

Robert P. Casey, Jr.
UNITED STATES SENATOR

Mark Kirk
UNITED STATES SENATOR

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ACA's Crail to WaPo: Iran is Monitored Until a Military Strike https://www.ips.org/blog/ips/acas-crail-to-wapo-iran-is-monitored-until-a-military-strike/ https://www.ips.org/blog/ips/acas-crail-to-wapo-iran-is-monitored-until-a-military-strike/#comments Tue, 14 Sep 2010 21:39:29 +0000 Ali Gharib http://www.lobelog.com/?p=3469 The Arms Control Association’s Peter Crail has a letter to the editor in today’s Washington Post. The note is a response to the newspaper’s editorial of September 10 (covered in our Talking Points that day) asserting that sanctions are not working to curb Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons aspirations. The headline [...]]]> The Arms Control Association’s Peter Crail has a letter to the editor in today’s Washington Post. The note is a response to the newspaper’s editorial of September 10 (covered in our Talking Points that day) asserting that sanctions are not working to curb Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons aspirations. The headline of the editorial wondered aloud whether the IAEA would be able to detect a shift of Iran’s nuclear program into a “final push” for weapons. Crail responds emphatically: “yes,” that it would.

Crail also makes the interesting point that this would certainly cease to be the case if Iran was attacked over its nuclear program. In other words, the inspections are working well enough, and the main threat to IAEA monitoring of Iran’s program is a military strike on its nuclear sites.

Here’s the full letter to the editor:

Meaures are in place to track Iran’s nuclear ambitions

Tuesday, September 14, 2010

The secondary headline on the Sept. 10 editorial “Iran enriches” asked: “If Tehran launches a final push for a weapon, can U.N. inspectors detect it?”

The answer is yes.

For a “final push” to reach fruition, Iran would need to enrich its 2,800 kilograms of low-enriched uranium to weapons grade. Even though Tehran does appear to want a secret facility to carry out that enrichment, its low-enriched uranium is still under safeguards. Cameras provide real-time monitoring, seals indicate any tampering, and unannounced visits by inspectors throughout the year provide a thorough accounting of the material.

Moreover, Iran keeps getting caught building secret facilities. Its attempt to construct a clandestine plant near Qom was discovered last year, and Tehran appears to have lost interest in completing the facility.

Shedding light on Iran’s nuclear program has made it more costly and time-consuming for Iran to achieve a nuclear weapons capability. In the event of a military strike against Iran, however, that light would go dark, and uncertainties about Iran’s capabilities would only increase.

Peter Crail, Washington

The writer is a nonproliferation analyst with the Arms Control Association.

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