by Robert E. Hunter
The consensus in Washington is that President Barak Obama had a bad year in 2013. Indeed, the Washington Post selected him as the person who had the worst year. The problem with a “consensus,” of course, is that it is often wrong.
This column will not try [...]]]>
by Robert E. Hunter
The consensus in Washington is that President Barak Obama had a bad year in 2013. Indeed, the Washington Post selected him as the person who had the worst year. The problem with a “consensus,” of course, is that it is often wrong.
This column will not try to assess how Obama “did” in domestic affairs — except to note that the economy is getting stronger, there is a powerful US automobile industry, the mess he inherited in the financial world has largely been dissipated (in major part through his efforts) and the so-called “Obamacare” fiasco, which was a problem waiting to happen that an honest assessment and delay in requiring signups could have handled, will eventually sort itself out. The only problem with Obamacare (in my judgment) is that interest groups with a lot of money refused to allow the United States to join the rest of the civilized world and adopt some form of national health insurance — single payer.
Now, to foreign policy. In 2013, how Obama fared can be measured in part by what happened at home, and what happened at home will continue to plague him.
Thus the best news this year was undoubtedly the “the curious incident of the dog in the night-time” — what bad things did not happen to the US economy, the global financial structure, and US leadership of both. 2013 was only one step in a progression that began when Obama took office, facing the worst financial meltdown since the Great Depression. By the end of 2013, the domestic US economy still has a way to go, in particular with the living standards of the middle class (as opposed to the burgeoning wealth of the so-called 1%), but the US reputation abroad in this area has been fully salvaged. This was no mean feat, and one for which the US president will get little credit, despite the steady nerves he had to show throughout.
A sideline to this good news is the sudden appearance in US popular perceptions of something the “oil business” has known for some time: that new explorations and new techniques for oil and gas extraction in the US and Canada are rapidly diminishing US dependence on foreign sources, including the politically volatile Middle East. That will change the “terms of political trade” in relation to the Persian Gulf oil producers, but it won’t make the US truly independent, since other major Western states will still be as dependent as before, and as China, especially, begins to compete heavily in these once Western-exclusive preserves.
The next most important item of “good news” was Obama’s selection of John Kerry to be the Secretary of State, which has brought the State Department back into the fray on major issues after a too-long hiatus. Kerry did initially get ahead of himself by pressing for the resumption of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks and setting a deadline (April 2014) for the conclusion of an “interim agreement” that has little hope of being fulfilled (I hope and pray that this prediction will be confounded!). And he did delay in putting together a first-rate team to “mind the store” and “do strategic thinking” while he was travelling, but some of his travels have been paying off, big time.
First was Kerry’s adeptness — or in part good luck (Ronald Reagan: “I would rather be lucky than smart”) — in rescuing President Obama from his unfortunate drawing of a “red line” over the use of chemical weapons in Syria. That ill-thought-out statement became grist to the mill of Obama’s domestic political opponents, without their thinking of the damaging consequences for the United States if the President had actually redeemed his rash pledge.
That Secretary Kerry needed help from Russia in gaining Syrian agreement to eliminate its chemical weapons does not detract from the fact that a US use of force in Syria would have led us into yet another Middle East war, with untoward consequences and opposition of the American people (at least after the first blush, when we all “rally ’round the flag”). Note, as well, that a few months later, the “Syrian chemical weapons” issue has all but been forgotten. Some casus belli!
The denouement of this mini-crisis did complicate another major achievement that was not negative — a trap escaped. This was the first genuine opening to Iran in 34 years. Key, of course, was the Iranian presidential election, which brought to power — or at least semi-power, given the leading role of the Supreme Leader — the Western-educated Hassan Rouhani, who looked even better compared to his wildcat predecessor. With his experienced and also Western-educated foreign minister, Mohammad Javid Zarif, Rouhani reached out to the West. The result has been the first direct official US-Iranian contacts since the period following the Iranian Revolution: a cell-phone call between Obama and Rouhani and a limited agreement that could gain for both sides a lid on Iran’s nuclear program and some lifting of economic sanctions. Still a long way to go. Still the risk of a “slip ‘twixt the cup and the lip.”And still intense rear-guard actions attempting to defeat a sensible agreement led by the Revolutionary Guards in Iran and, on the other side, by Israel, the Gulf Arab states, and their American supporters — the domestic angle for Obama that is his most potent threat to defusing the festering Iran time-bomb.
On top of his escape in Syria and a chance for major success with Iran — both, note, in the Middle East — Obama also wrote an end to the direct US military involvement in the ill-gotten war in Iraq (the worst US blunder in foreign policy since Vietnam), and set a goal for getting most forces out of Afghanistan by the end of this year — though with the future as murky as it always is in that benighted and much-abused country with its unfortunate people.
Not a bad year’s work. But then there is the Dark Side, again, in the Middle East. President Obama made another unfortunate pledge two years ago, that Syria’s president Bashar Assad “must go.” Well, he hasn’t gone. And there is no obvious way of ending the civil war in Syria. It has also now become obvious that the revolt in Syria was not just a spontaneous occurrence like that in Tunisia (a success), in Egypt (a failure) and Libya (jury still out, but progress poor). What happened in Syria is also an extension of — yes, the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, as Saudi Arabia and other Sunni states sought to “right the balance” of Sh’ia-Sunni power in the region by trying to get rid of a Sh’ia (Alawite) minority regime in a largely-Sunni country (Syria), the reverse of what happened in Iraq.
In the process, while the US government tried to figure out a workable outcome to the Syrian civil war (there might not be one) and to keep the US powder dry (heartily desired by the American public), al-Qaeda and its affiliates flooded into Syria, thus increasing the chances that, if Assad and his Alawite community are forced from power, the Islamists will reign supreme. That would be a major failure, but in part one of America’s own making, by refusing, for the umpteenth time since 9/11, to tell Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and other Sunni regimes to stop permitting their rich and religiously-zealot citizens to inspire, fund and arm Islamists who, among other things, promote the killing of US and other troops in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the region.
One consequence of the continued turmoil in the Middle East and continued US preoccupation with it — while trying to ignore Pakistan, still one of the most dangerous places in world politics — is that the so-called “pivot to Asia” (more diplomatically termed by the Pentagon as “rebalancing”) will have to take place while the US and its European allies remain mired in Middle East messes. Taking seriously the rise of China (and India) is, of course, inevitable; and so is the need to fashion a set of coherent policies, especially toward China, that are now dominated in the US by competing satrapies — military/security, economic/business, geopolitics (North Korea), and human rights in the Middle Kingdom. The “pivot” was also inelegantly launched, such that the European allies feel slighted and, indeed, have been. To be sure, the risk of conflict in Europe, beyond a skirmish or two in the Balkans, died by the end of the 1990s with the successful building of a post-Cold War political, economic, and security regime on the Continent, except, of course, for the continuing ambitions of Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, based more on illusion, continued hurt pride over losing the Cold War, and his own domestic agenda of reaffirming the centrality of Moscow-power.
The specter of Russia, hanging in particular over Eastern Europe, continues to lead the NATO allies to want the US strategically committed to Europe — hence, the willingness of all the allies (and others) to “go to Afghanistan” when almost none of them had a direct strategic interest. What will now replace that impetus for the US to continue being strategically engaged in Europe (though without a sizeable military presence, which is not needed to show political will)? The Europeans need to be involved, at least economically as well as in private and public sectors in the new preoccupation with Asia, as well as with deep (non-military) engagement in the Middle East, North Africa (both economically and politically), and Africa south of the Sahara (in part militarily — with France in the lead).
The best news for President Obama in Europe is the silent weapon that both sides are developing: the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the US and the European Union, which will, when completed, bind the two sides of the Atlantic even more closely together economically, and also help to provide glue for the overall transatlantic relationship that NATO no longer provides to the degree it did before. The TTIP may not get done in 2014, but it is already having a positive impact, though on neither side of the Atlantic have governments sufficiently brought together, with a clear sense of purpose and mandate, the old compact of politics, economics and strategic engagement. This dearth includes the US, where overall strategic thinking has been in short supply.
There is much more to consider about President Obama’s foreign policy record in 2013. Notable was a moment’s work: shaking hands with Cuba’s president, Raoul Castro and potentially presaging the ending of one of the stupidest acts of US foreign policy driven by Florida politics: the isolation of Cuba two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union provided any rational basis for continuing to penalize the Cuban people for their government.
Leaving aside other developments, including the upward drift of US reputation in the world (except in some countries in the Middle East that have for too long believed that the US will forever deny its own self-interests in order to support theirs), all of this will do to get on with. And to return to my first point, Obama got much worse press this past year than he deserved. He faces as much a challenge with domestic constituencies — where, especially, on Iran, major parts of the US Congress are ignoring US interests in promoting further sanctions – - as he does abroad. He also did well in changing his team in Washington (Kerry at State, Susan Rice at the NSC and Chuck Hagel at Defense) — though there is still not a team-in-depth, nor people at the top reaches of the administration who are adept at the strategic thinking needed for the long haul.
Nevertheless, at the dawn of 2014, Mr. Obama and the US are in better shape in the world than at this time a year ago. A sigh of relief, of course; but also a possible sign of the good work that this president can still achieve, abroad as well as at home.
]]>by Mitchell Plitnick
All was not as it seemed during President Barack Obama’s appearances in Jerusalem and Ramallah, where he addressed audiences of Israelis and Palestinians. On the surface, it looked like Obama was swearing fealty to Israel, and pledging unconditional US support for any and all Israeli actions. But a [...]]]>
by Mitchell Plitnick
All was not as it seemed during President Barack Obama’s appearances in Jerusalem and Ramallah, where he addressed audiences of Israelis and Palestinians. On the surface, it looked like Obama was swearing fealty to Israel, and pledging unconditional US support for any and all Israeli actions. But a closer look at what was and was not said, as well as some of the surrounding circumstances, suggests that what Obama was really doing was paving a road toward a reduced US role in the Israel-Palestine conflict.
The contradictions in evidence abound, and could be seen from the very beginning. Obama kept calling Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu by his nickname, Bibi, at their joint press conference. “Oh, yes, we’re just the best of friends. Don’t worry, AIPAC,” Obama seemed to be saying. “Any friction between us is a thing of the past.” Yet, Obama had made a pointed decision to deliver the keynote speech of his trip not at the Knesset, but to an audience from Israel’s major universities. The many students invited excluded only those from Ariel University, the lone Israeli university located in the West Bank settlements.
The ham-handed excuse offered by the US embassy, that they only invited those universities with whom they partnered, was a convenient one. They don’t work with that university because of the political ramifications, and the exclusion here was for the same reason. And that sent a message to Obama’s “good friend,” Bibi.
Not speaking to the Knesset sent a message as well, and it was reflected in Obama’s speech. There is no reason for Obama to speak in a chamber where there is so much hostility toward him. Instead, he told his young Jerusalem audience: “let me say this as a politician — I can promise you this, political leaders will never take risks if the people do not push them to take some risks. You must create the change that you want to see.” Translation: “I can’t work on peace with your current government. You need to drive the change and open the door.” That, too, was a message to Bibi.
But more important than what was said was what was not said. For all the fawning that Obama did, he offered nothing new or of substance — not the slightest deviation from his well-established policies. There’s no new version of Dennis Ross, Anthony Zinni or George Mitchell being sent to the Middle East. There are no new incentives or confidence-building plans, however pointless. There was just a whole bunch of pronouncements about the unshakeable bond between the US and Israel.
Does that sound like a president who intends to maintain the US’ current level of involvement? It seems more like a President who is telling Israelis exactly what AIPAC is buying. The annual military aid will continue, as will money for Iron Dome, and never mind the many federal employees who were just sequestered out of a job or furloughed. The security and intelligence cooperation is likely to continue as well. Israel will, as Obama put it, remain “…the most powerful country in this region. Israel has the unshakeable support of the most powerful country in the world.”
While the US president sent a clear signal that he holds little hope that the current Israeli government is able or willing to pursue peace in any substantive way, he also cautioned Israelis about their growing peril. “Given the frustration in the international community about this conflict, Israel needs to reverse an undertow of isolation,” Obama said. “And given the march of technology, the only way to truly protect the Israeli people over the long term is through the absence of war. Because no wall is high enough and no Iron Dome is strong enough or perfect enough to stop every enemy that is intent on doing so from inflicting harm.”
Note that it’s Israel that needs to reverse this trend, and there’s no mention of any kind of US charm offensive or even advocacy on Israel’s behalf to assist the effort. The implication is clear: Israel’s policies and actions are to blame for its troubles and the US can’t change that, and, because of the political problems it would cause, this administration will not try. Could that also result in a somewhat diminished defense at the United Nations and other international arenas, on the part of the US? Time will tell.
Obama also let the Palestinian Authority know they should look elsewhere. By choosing to condemn Hamas for the rockets that hit Sderot earlier that day during his Ramallah speech rather than in Israel, he surely alienated many in the crowd he was addressing. By refusing to use even moderately stern language on settlements or promise even the mildest pressure on Israel, he seriously undermined Mahmoud Abbas, the man he was purportedly coming to support. Throughout his speech, despite his expressions of sympathy for the daily struggles of Palestinians, Obama never mentioned Israel’s responsibility to end the occupation, let alone to respect human rights or abide by international law.
That sent a very clear message: don’t look to the United States to deliver the goods. If Abbas was listening at all, he must know that internationalizing his cause, as he did last year at the UN, is the only option Obama has left for him. It was so clear, it had to be a deliberate message.
This might all be considered fanciful until one considers the changing position of Israel in the US view. As Aluf Benn, editor-in-chief of the Israeli daily, Ha’aretz points out, the entire Middle East region is of considerably less importance in the broader geo-political strategic view of the United States. “U.S. President Barack Obama said Wednesday his visit to Israel was meant to be a reassuring one,” Benn writes. “He is here to make it clear to Israelis that America stands behind them and will ensure their security, even though the neighborhood has become tougher… The visit comes at a time when the United States is withdrawing from its deep involvement in the Middle East, amid the growing fear of Israel and other regional allies that America will abandon them to radical Islamic forces.”
Benn’s alarmist language aside, he’s right. A big part of this is the oft-discussed “pivot to Asia,” that is the cornerstone of Obama’s foreign policy. Asia’s importance is growing as the Middle East’s is shrinking. The Middle East, particularly the Arabian Peninsula, was once called the “greatest material prize in history” by the US State Department because of its wealth of oil resources. But the US and Europe both see themselves on the road to “energy independence.” This sounds a little more grandiose than it really is. Local oil resources and increased reliance on alternative energy sources will significantly diminish the role of Middle Eastern oil both in terms of serving energy needs and in terms of its role in the global economy, but it won’t eliminate it. OPEC will still be a major force in determining the price and supply of oil, but it won’t have the near-monopoly it does today.
But that’s not the only factor. The so-called “Arab Spring” is not the simple romantic vision of emerging democracy that so many in the West thought it was, while they watched Egyptians oust Hosni Mubarak. It’s also not just the massive violence of Libya and Syria. Even in Tunisia and Egypt, transitions have been bumpy and marked with dissatisfaction and political jockeying as well as some very fundamental debates about the role of women, the military, religion and other key groups and institutions in their respective societies. Moves toward true independence and self-determination in these countries will be a long and unpredictable road. And no matter who ends up controlling the oil, they will have less leverage over the West than their predecessors with even more of a need to sell their oil there. So the strategic situation will be less favorable for the Arab governments that arise from this situation.
Not to mention the situation on the ground. Israel has elected a new government that has no interest in peace with the Palestinians. Settlement expansion continues while the Israeli bunker mentality is fortified. For their part, the Palestinians remain trapped between a Palestinian Authority which has lost virtually all legitimacy in the eyes of its people but is the only acceptable “partner” for the US and Israel, and a Hamas government that no one will talk to. Both sides of that divide seem as uninterested in reunification as Netanyahu is in a viable Palestinian state.
But then there’s the big mitigating factor, the US Israel Lobby. Obama has a lot of work to do in the next four years, and he needs Congress to do it. Much of that work focuses on domestic economic issues, but there are foreign policy questions as well. He simply cannot afford to spend the political capital of his second term fighting with AIPAC all the time. Nor do his colleagues in the Democratic Party wish to see him jeopardize their chances of making gains in the midterm elections by picking a fight with Israel.
But that domestic pressure is really all that is holding the US to Israel at this point. Powerful as AIPAC is, the President can still set broader policy priorities, as he seems to be. Asia will have its own difficulties, but the interests there are growing, while the US stake in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Tunisia, Yemen, and yes, even Israel and Palestine, are diminishing. To be sure, there is still a significant US stake in the Israel-Palestine conflict. And AIPAC will make sure we pay attention to it, as will the fact that Israel is a long-standing ally and while AIPAC may represent a small minority of US citizens, most do not want to see Israel as vulnerable to attack.
Ultimately though, Obama knows that the US has spent inordinate time and energy on this issue. He also knows that it’s becoming less and less vital for US concerns that really matter to him as time goes on. So, he goes to Israel, warms some hearts and minds and gives AIPAC the platitudes and assurances it wants. As Benn wrote, “With every passing day, Israel becomes less capable of taking out Iran’s nuclear facilities by itself, while its dependence on the United States for military superiority just keeps growing.” The US will continue to lead on Iran, which is something Obama wants.
As for the peace process? Obama would like to see Israel make peace possible, but absent that, he’s sent them a message: we’ll help if you want, but until you show some interest in changing the status quo, we have bigger fish to fry.
Photo: President Barack Obama waves to the audience after delivering remarks at the Jerusalem Convention Center in Jerusalem, March 21, 2013. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)
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