On Friday, yet another poll on the Middle East was released. They seem to come in a very steady stream, and once you identify the questions, the results are almost entirely predictable.
But Shibley Telhami, the Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, regularly produces polls that are always worth looking at. Unlike most surveys of American views on US policy in the Middle East, Telhami tends to dig deep as opposed to simply establishing general opinions. The poll he released Dec. 5 includes some very interesting developments and reminders as to why things still aren’t changing—in the region or in Washington.
The most stunning development Telhami reported is that support among US citizens for a single-state in Israel and the Occupied Territories—where all would have full and equal rights—increased a whopping ten percentage points in the past year. The 34% who support that outcome now rivals the 39% who support two states, and it represents a jump of ten percentage points from a year ago.
What does this tell us? Most of the leading advocates for a one-state solution have based their advocacy on the idea that a single, secular and democratic state with equal rights for all represents the fairest, most just solution for all parties; that the two-state solution could not possibly fully address the grievances of Palestinian refugees; and that two states would leave most of the best land in the former area of pre-1948 Palestine in Israeli hands. (Two-state advocates have generally argued that partitioning the land was the fairest way to maintain security for Jews, who needed a state, and allow the Palestinians an opportunity to build an independent state of their own.)
Did a whole bunch of two-state advocates suddenly decide that the one-staters were right all along and that the single, democratic state was the more just option? This seems unlikely, especially since the two-state solution has been, and still is seen as the pragmatic choice.
No, that shift is the result of the despair that the collapse of the Oslo process has produced. Those shifting opinions are also coming from a realization that Israel is lurching ever rightward, making a two-state solution less likely in the near term, while settlements expand and make it increasingly difficult to conceive, much less achieve, two states in the longer term.
Of course, a one-state solution was never seen as a viable option among US citizens, much less in Washington. But now it has nearly as much popular support as two states, even while the discourse on Capitol Hill has not changed a bit. One reason for the split between the public and its representatives is included in this poll.
When asked whether the United States should favor one side or the other in the conflict, 64% said the US should favor neither, 31% said the US should favor Israel, and only 4% said it should favor the Palestinians. This is fairly consistent with long-term trends; most US citizens believe their government should be acting as a neutral arbiter in the conflict or not be involved in it at all, and polls have reflected this for a very long time.
But the minuscule figure who believe we should be favoring the Palestinians, as opposed to the significant minority that support favoring Israel, goes a long way toward explaining why policy and the Washington discourse is not following, even in a small way, the national discourse and gradually shifting views among US citizens. The Palestinians are a generally disliked group—essentially seen as “the bad guys.” Even among Democrats, who, for the most part, exclude those who base their support for Israeli policies on the Bible (most of these so-called Christian Zionists are overwhelmingly Republican), only 6% favor siding with the Palestinians, as opposed to 17% who favor siding with Israel.
You’ll be hard pressed to find another issue where public opinion among those who favor some type of intervention is so lopsidedly opposed to helping the downtrodden and dispossessed. For such an entrenched policy, which has the most powerful and active foreign policy special interest lobby pushing to maintain it, this lack of sympathy for the Palestinians is a major obstacle to change, no matter how much the discourse might shift.
That discursive shift has had the effect of seriously diminishing the positive view of Israel in the United States. The Netanyahu government has contributed more than its share to that cause, of course. But so have the efforts of Palestinian activists and other pro-peace groups who have made an issue of Israeli rejectionism and the flaws in US policy.
But none of that has changed the view of the Palestinian cause in the United States. As Telhami’s poll and a long line of polls preceding it imply, most in the US believe that Palestinians’ rights should be respected in the abstract, but Palestinians are still seen as the less sympathetic combatant in this conflict. And Israel’s diminishing image hasn’t changed that.
Nor is there sufficient support for punitive actions against Israel for settlement construction. Sixty-one percent of respondents in this poll said the US should do nothing or just stick to making statements against settlement construction. With a mere 39% supporting more concrete action, Congress will feel very safe in continuing its absolute opposition to any pressure on Israel to desist from this practice.
All of this helps explain why, despite Israel’s reduced appeal in the United States and despite the increasing popularity of a solution that protects democracy rather than Israel’s Jewish character, nothing has changed in Washington. But if the mood among the US public continues in this direction, could that change?
It could, over time, especially considering the profound partisan differences in how Democrats and Republicans view the conflict. That should be a clarion call for those who still want to see a two-state solution emerge. Right now, Israel is pursuing various permutations of a single-state solution, but one where institutionalized discrimination privileging Jews over Arabs is strengthened. The Israeli right can push this agenda in the vacuum created by the apparent death of the two-state solution.
Yet the notion of two states need not die. The Oslo process was flawed from the very beginning. It was born out of documents and agreements that never explicitly stated that a Palestinian state next to Israel was a goal, nor did they offer any sort of human rights guidelines, let alone guarantees. Efforts in Oslo to restrict violence were horribly lopsided, with a laser-like focus on Palestinian violence while virtually ignoring the violence of the occupation itself, as well as that of many of the Jewish settlers. And while the very structure of the occupation provided both Israel and the United States with methods of coercion and pressure against the Palestinians, nothing of the kind was regularly exerted against Israel when it failed to fulfill the letter or spirit of agreements.
Oslo and the two-state solution became synonymous and, as a result, when the process failed, many came to believe that it was the very notion of two states that was fatally flawed. The despair leads more and more to abandon the two-state concept entirely. But that need not be.
It is entirely possible that one state is a better solution, or that Israeli settlement expansion through the West Bank and East Jerusalem already have too much momentum and have gobbled up too much land for a viable two-state solution to be possible. But the failure of Oslo, in and of itself, tells us nothing about whether a two state scenario could work. A two-state model—that includes basic standards of human rights and equal rights (political, civil and national) for all people between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, including Gaza, and includes penalties for both sides for failures of compliance based on a broad but clear, internationally agreed upon vision of the final agreement—could still work.
Undoubtedly, support for a single, secular and democratic state is growing. As people of good will continue to work to resolve this long, bloody and vexing conflict, it is an idea that needs to be considered. It is increasingly popular and based on notions of fairness, and stands against myopic nationalism and ethnocentrism. But it shouldn’t be the only option. A two-state vision, one very different from Oslo, should accompany it. In addition to the conditions I mentioned above, it should also include agreements of cooperation on commerce, economics, resources (especially water) and security. It should not mean Palestine would be de-militarized and eternally vulnerable, enjoying only partial sovereignty. Instead, security for both states would be ensured, and prosperity for both states would be promoted, by interdependency, based on treaties and agreements.
Both two-state and one-state scenarios have weaknesses and inherent flaws that can doom them. Given the hopelessness with which Israelis, Palestinians and all who care about the issue are facing now, we need to avoid throwing the baby out with the bathwater. While those who believe in such scenarios work to promote their one-state visions, two-state supporters need to immediately re-align their vision and reset the two-state idea. What’s needed in Israel and Palestine is not stubborn ideology, but a willingness to accept the best idea for moving forward. And the way to start doing that is by opening minds to new possibilities rising out of the inevitable failure of the process that laid exclusive claim to “peace” for twenty years.
Photo: The Shuafat refugee camp can be seen across the separation wall from the Pisgat Ze’ev Israeli settlement. Credit: Jillian Kestler-D’Amours/IPS.
]]>Shibley Telhami, the Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, has just released a major new poll of US public opinion on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which Mitchell Plitnick will analyze on this site in the next few days.
The survey also contains some very interesting data that suggest Islamic State (ISIS or IS) is now seen as a significantly greater threat to the United States than Iran. The data and Telhami’s analysis appear in a blog post entitled “Linking Iran and ISIS: How American Public Opinion Shapes the Obama Administration’s Approach to the Nuclear Talks” at the Brookings website. (Telhami is a long-time fellow at Brookings, and the poll results were released there.)
Briefly, the poll, which was conducted Nov. 14-19, found that nearly six times as many of the 1008 respondents said they believed that the rise of IS in Iraq and Syria “threaten(ed) American interests the most” in the Middle East than those who named “Iranian behavior in general.” Respondents were given two other options besides those to choose from: “the violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict” and “instability in Libya.” Libya was seen as the least threatening (3%); followed by Iran (12%), Israel-Palestine (13%), and ISIS (70%). The only notable partisan difference among the respondents was that Republicans rated Iranian behaviour (15%) slightly higher than Israel-Palestine (11%) as a threat, while Democrats rated Israel-Palestine (13%) slightly higher than Iran (9%).
In some respects, these results are not surprising, particularly given the media storm touched off by the beheading of American journalist James Foley in August. A Pew poll shortly after that event showed growing concern about Islamic extremist groups like al-Qaeda and IS compared to “Iran’s nuclear program.” Thus, while Iran’s nuclear program was cited by 68% of Pew’s American respondents as a “major threat to the U.S.” in November 2013—behind Islamic extremist groups (75%), only 59% rated it a “major threat” immediately after Foley’s murder.
Still, Telhami’s results are pretty remarkable, if only because neoconservatives, Israel’s right-wing government and the Israel lobby more generally have been arguing since IS began its sweep into Iraq, and particularly since Foley’s death, that Washington should avoid any cooperation with Iran against IS, in part because Tehran ultimately poses a much greater threat.
In June, for example, John Bolton, an aggressive nationalist at the neoconservative American Enterprise Institute (AEI), insisted that Washington should ignore Iraqi appeals for help against ISIS and instead “increase …our efforts to overthrow the ayatollahs in Tehran” because “Iran is clearly the strongest, most threatening power in this conflict.”
In a New York Times op-ed in October, Israel’s Minister of Intelligence, Yuval Steinitz, appealed for Washington not to “repeat (the) mistake” it made in 2003 when it went to war in Iraq “…at the expense of blocking a greater threat: Iran’s nuclear project.”
“The Islamic Republic of Iran,” he wrote, “remains the world’s foremost threat.”
And one month later, speaking to the General Assembly of the Jewish Federations of North America shortly after Foley’s execution, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu warned against any cooperation with Iran against IS: “The Islamic State of Iran is not a partner of America; it is an enemy of America and it should be treated as an enemy,” he declared.
At least for now, it appears these arguments have not made much headway with US public opinion. Here’s Telhami:
[T]he Obama administration appears to have decided to risk appearing open to an Iranian role in fighting ISIS, as it certainly allowed the Iraqi government to coordinate such a role, and Secretary of State John Kerry described it as a good thing. There is evidence from recent polling that this may not be unwise when it comes to American public opinion. Obama assumes that nothing he is likely to do in the Iran nuclear negotiations will appease Congressional Republicans and thus his best bet is getting the American public on his side. Evidence shows the public may be moving in that direction.
The starting point is not about Iran as such; it’s all about shifting public priorities.
The survey also asked respondents which of two statements (you can read them in full on Telhami’s blog) was closest to their views—that Palestinian-Israeli violence was likely to draw more support for IS among Muslims worldwide or that it wouldn’t have any appreciable effect on IS’ support. In that case, 30% percent of all respondents agreed with the latter statement, while 64% said the former was closer to their view. Remarkably, given their leadership’s strong support for Israel’s right-wing government, Republicans (71%) were more likely than Democrats (60%) to believe that violence between Israelis and Palestinians would boost support for IS.
Finally, respondents were asked to choose between four options as to which country or countries are “most directly threatened by Iran”—the US, Israel, Washington’s “Arab allies,” and “Other”. Overall, 21% of respondents named the US, and another 21% named Arab allies, while 43% opted for Israel. Twelve percent chose “Other.” The poll found little difference between Republicans and Democrats on the Iranian threat posed to the US—19% and 24%, respectively. The major difference was on the perception of the threat to Israel: 38% of Democrats said Israel was most directly threatened by Iran, compared to 54% of Republicans. (Only 31% of independents.)
]]>A variety of recent opinion polls indicate that a significant portion of the American public remains deeply fearful of international terrorism. Many Americans even feel less safe now than they did before the 9/11 attacks.
A CNN poll conducted in September found that 53% of Americans believe that more terrorist attacks on the homeland are likely. Seven out of ten Americans meanwhile believe that Islamic State (ISIS or IS) has operatives in the United States who are planning future attacks.
These deep-seated fears formed part of the backdrop in the recent US midterm elections that swept Democrats from power in the Senate and added to the Republican majority in the House. America today lives in an age of fear, loathing, and anxiety that might have produced good copy by Gonzo journalist Hunter S. Thompson, if he was alive today, but which bespeaks a republic that has lost its confidence as well as its emotional and intellectual moorings.
Yet it’s hard to understand why if we consider our present circumstances. As noted by terrorism expert Peter Bergen at a recent symposium (echoing figures from a variety of sources) 22 Americans have lost their lives in the United States since the 9/11 attacks in violence perpetrated by attackers expressing support for Islamic extremist causes. Of those 22, 13 were killed in a single attack inside a US military base at Fort Hood, Texas in November 2009.
The numbers of Americans killed outside their borders due to terrorist attacks is somewhat higher, but still remains small. According to the State Department, 16 Americans lost their lives as a result of terrorism related violence around the world in 2013.
In short, Americans have more to fear from slipping in the shower or falling down the stairs than they do of terrorist-inspired violence. They definitely have more to fear from random handgun-related violence in their neighborhoods, which has lead to nearly 1,000,000 fatalities and injuries since 9/11 in the United States. Yet many people resist even rudimentary steps to control access to guns at home while enthusiastically supporting America’s trigger-happy foreign policy around the world.
How do we explain the incongruence and disconnects between the American public’s perceptions and these realities? Political and military leaders are part of the problem.
Instead of reassuring the public about the threat of terrorism relative to other dangers, political leaders have actively played upon public fears by continually asserting the imminent dangers of new and more dangerous attacks.
One result has been the establishment of the national security surveillance state by the generation of Vietnam War protesters that once took to the streets to protest the overreach of the state in the 1960s and 70s. Even the postal service recently disclosed that it had received 50,000 requests from the government to read people’s mail during 2013 in national-security related surveillance. Not to mention the intercepted phone calls and emails, to say nothing of those who are being watched in other countries. The public has greeted this development with little more than a yawn.
Of course, even as political leaders from both sides of the aisle mercilessly exploit people’s fears, the fact is that they are mirroring general public attitudes and perceptions. The slide of the American public into fear and loathing post-9/11 has paralleled the state’s political descent into anarchy at home. Republican religious zealots and conservative ideologues have brought their version of the Taliban home to the United States, just as our armies sought in vain to drive the group away from major Afghan cities in America’s longest war.
Therein lies the strategic consequences of the 9/11 attacks that went far beyond Osama Bin Laden’s wildest dreams when he and his lieutenants concocted the idea of flying airplanes into buildings. It’s the gift that just keeps on giving to Islamic extremists as America spies on its citizens at home and careens around the world blasting away at real and imagined enemies in a vain attempt to bomb them into submission. Unfortunately, the latest crusader army that has been taking shape since the end of the Bush administration only confirms the extremists’ vision of a Western-led war against Islam.
The atmosphere of fear and loathing at home in the United States will only gather momentum with the Republican-led Congress, and the squeamish, defeatist democrats meekly following along. Republican candidates around the country cloaked their winning message in the fear and loathing parlance for which the party has become known for in the post-9/11 era. And it’s not entirely clear what the Republicans are hoping for any more—other than aiding the wealthiest among us and enhancing fortress America to keep out immigrants.
What does this mean for the Middle East? It means that America’s fruitless bombing campaign will continue for the foreseeable future—a slippery slope of commitment that will inevitably involve additional ground troops in the region. America’s quarter century of war in Iraq isn’t ending any time soon.
Another casualty of this campaign may be the failure to reach an agreement to limit Iran’s nuclear program—if a weakened and chastened Obama administration retreats in the face of the Republican (and Israeli) pressure. Meanwhile, a new intifada in the simmering occupied territories would serve as icing on the proverbial cake of America’s failed endeavors that litter the Middle East like shattered glass.
Hunter S. Thompson would have had a field day in today’s world. His drug-infused delirium, which led to his famous novel, Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas, was his only release from the madness surrounding him—but what about us? Unfortunately, it’s Osama bin Laden who has so far had the last laugh from his watery grave in this plot—and the joke is on us.
Photo: Hunter S Thompson with his IBM Selectric Typewriter. Credit: Michael Ochs Archives/Getty
]]>by Jim Lobe
Sixty-one percent of the American public prefers a deal permitting Iran to continue limited uranium enrichment and imposing intrusive inspections on its nuclear facilities in exchange for some sanctions relief, according to a unique new survey released here Tuesday.
In contrast to previous polling on attitudes toward Iran’s nuclear program, the survey, conducted [...]]]>
by Jim Lobe
Sixty-one percent of the American public prefers a deal permitting Iran to continue limited uranium enrichment and imposing intrusive inspections on its nuclear facilities in exchange for some sanctions relief, according to a unique new survey released here Tuesday.
In contrast to previous polling on attitudes toward Iran’s nuclear program, the survey, conducted by the Program for Public Consultation and the Center for International & Security Studies at the University of Maryland between June 18 and July 7, also found no significant differences between self-identified Republicans and Democrats on the issue.
The poll, which was released as negotiations between Iran and six world powers intensified in Vienna in advance of the July 20 deadline for an agreement, was distinct in the level of detail provided to the respondents before they ultimately had to choose between “a) making a deal that allows Iran to enrich but only to a low level, provides more intrusive inspections and gradually lifts some sanctions; [and] b) not continuing the current negotiations, imposing more sanctions, and pressing Iran to agree to end all uranium enrichment.”
As noted by George Perkovich, who heads the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the survey methodology “modeled a rational thought process” much more rational than that which can normally be found in the US government. “Most members of Congress don’t spend much time on this except when they meet with someone who’s writing a check,” he said at the survey’s release.
Nonetheless, he and Suzanne Maloney, an Iran specialist at the Brookings Institution, agreed that the survey’s findings suggests that, if indeed a deal is reached with Iran, the Obama administration will be in a good position to sell it.
This “Citizen Cabinet” method simulated the policy-making process: respondents were given briefings on the subject and arguments — both for and against — the two options before they were asked to make a final recommendation.
The briefings and arguments were vetted in advance by independent experts and Congressional staffers from both sides of the aisle, according to Steven Kull, the Program’s director, to ensure as much accuracy and balance as possible within the US political context. You can judge this for yourself by examining the study and its methodology (beginning on p. 5). More than one staffer, Kull said Tuesday at a press briefing, commented that the respondents “are going to know more than their Member (of Congress) knows” after reviewing the material.
“At this point, the public doesn’t have a clear idea,” said Kull. “[This survey] tells us what would happen if we had a bigger debate,…and people had more information.”
All of the briefing materials were provided to respondents via the Internet, and access was arranged for those who lacked it. According to Kull, only 16 out of the 748 randomly selected respondents did not complete the exercise, which also required participants to assess each of the arguments separately for their persuasiveness before making a final policy choice. I won’t bore you with further details about the methodology, but here are the main findings:
- 61% of all respondents ultimately opted for a deal, while 35% chose the sanctions route.
- 62% of self-identified Republicans opted for a deal, compared with 65% of Democrats and only 51% of independents. Kull said they found no significant differences between respondents living in “red” and “blue” districts.
- Support for a deal correlated strongly with education levels. While 71 percent of respondents with at least a college degree supported a deal, that was true of only 46 percent of respondents who did not graduate from high school and 54% of those with only a high school diploma.
Still, it’s worth noting that the numbers who prefer a deal over increased sanctions are not so very different from those taken last November when the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) was being negotiated between the P5+1 (the US, UK, France, China, and Russia plus Germany) and Iran in Geneva. Sixty-four percent of respondents in an ABC News/Washington Post poll conducted a week before the Geneva accord said they supported “an agreement in which the United States and other countries would lift some of their economic sanctions against Iran, in exchange for Iran restricting its nuclear program in a way that makes it harder to produce nuclear weapons.” Thirty percent were opposed.
A second poll taken by CNN on the eve of the agreement found 56 percent of respondents in favor of “an interim deal that would ease some …economic sanctions and in exchange require Iran to accept major restrictions on its nuclear program but not end it completely and submit to greater international inspection of its nuclear facilities.” Thirty-nine percent opposed. In that poll, however, there was a much more significant gap between Republican and Democratic respondents than that found in the survey released Tuesday. While 66% of Democrats supported such a deal in the CNN poll; only 45% of Republicans did.
In addition to the questions about a possible nuclear deal, the new survey asked respondents a number of other pertinent questions after they completed the briefings and made their final recommendations on the nuclear negotiations:
- 61% said they favored US cooperation with Iran in dealing with the ongoing crisis in Iraq; 35 percent opposed. There was no meaningful difference in support among Democrats and Republicans.
- 82% said they favored direct talks between the two governments on “issues of mutual concern;” 16% opposed.
- Iran’s image in the US has appeared to improve compared to eight years ago when Kull’s World Public Opinion asked many of the same questions: 19% of respondents said they had either a “very” (2%) or “somewhat” (17%) favorable opinion of the Iranian government. That was up from 12% in 2006. And, while roughly the same percentage (79%) of the public said they held an unfavorable opinion of Iran’s government as in 2006, those who described their view as “very unfavorable” fell from 48% to 31%.
On possible confidence-building bilateral measures, the survey found that:
- 71% of respondents said they favored greater cultural, educational, and sporting exchanges and greater access by journalists of the two countries to the other, while 26% were opposed.
- 55% said they favored more trade; 41% were opposed — a finding that will no doubt be of interest to many US businesses which, according to a new study released Monday by the National Iranian American Council (NIAC), have lost out on well over $100 billion in trade with Iran between 1995 and 2012.
- Only 47% of respondents said they favored having more Americans and Iranians visit each other’s countries as tourists. A 50% plurality opposed that option.
- 69% said they favor a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East that includes Israel as well as its Islamic neighbors; only 28% were opposed.
In responding to the individual arguments made in the survey for and against a deal with Iran, Republicans generally tended to be somewhat more hawkish than Democrats, although independents tended to be substantially more so. More significant partisan differences appeared in their opinions about Iran’s government: 40% of Republicans said they held a “very unfavorable view” of Tehran, compared to 24% of Democrats and 27% of Republicans. Perhaps the most striking difference emerged on the questions regarding the compatibility of the Islamic world and the West: while 62% of Republicans said they considered conflict between the two inevitable, only 33% of Democrats agreed with that view.
Photo: Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, US Secretary of State John Kerry shake hands after world powers reached an interim agreement with Iran over its nuclear program on Nov. 24, 2013 in Geneva. Credit: Fabrice Coffrini/AFP/Getty Images)
]]>by Dilip Hiro
Since September 11, 2001, Washington’s policies in the Middle East have proven a grim imperial comedy of errors and increasingly a spectacle of how a superpower is sidelined. In this drama, barely noticed by the American media, Uncle Sam’s keystone ally in the Arab world, Egypt, like [...]]]>
by Dilip Hiro
Since September 11, 2001, Washington’s policies in the Middle East have proven a grim imperial comedy of errors and increasingly a spectacle of how a superpower is sidelined. In this drama, barely noticed by the American media, Uncle Sam’s keystone ally in the Arab world, Egypt, like Saudi Arabia, has largely turned its back on the Obama administration. As with so many of America’s former client states across the aptly named “arc of instability,” Egypt has undergone a tumultuous journey — from autocracy to democracy to a regurgitated form of military rule and repression, making its ally of four decades appear clueless.
Egypt remains one of the top recipients of U.S. foreign aid, with the Pentagon continuing to pamper the Egyptian military with advanced jet fighters, helicopters, missiles, and tanks. Between January 2011 and May 2014, Egypt underwent a democratic revolution, powered by a popular movement, which toppled President Hosni Mubarak’s regime. It enjoyed a brief tryst with democracy before suffering an anti-democratic counter-revolution by its generals. In all of this, what has been the input of the planet’s last superpower in shaping the history of the most populous country in the strategic Middle East? Zilch. Its “generosity” toward Cairo notwithstanding, Washington has been reduced to the role of a helpless bystander.
Given how long the United States has been Egypt’s critical supporter, the State Department and Pentagon bureaucracies should have built up a storehouse of understanding as to what makes the Land of the Pharaohs tick. Their failure to do so, coupled with a striking lack of familiarity by two administrations with the country’s recent history, has led to America’s humiliating sidelining in Egypt. It’s a story that has yet to be pieced together, although it’s indicative of how from Kabul to Bonn, Baghdad to Rio de Janeiro so many ruling elites no longer feel that listening to Washington is a must.
An Army as Immovable as the Pyramids
Ever since 1952, when a group of nationalist military officers ended the pro-British monarchy, Egypt’s army has been in the driver’s seat. From Gamal Abdul Nasser to Hosni Mubarak, its rulers were military commanders. And if, in February 2011, a majority of the members of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) abandoned Mubarak, it was only to stop him from passing the presidency on to his son Gamal on his 83rd birthday. The neoliberal policies pursued by the Mubarak government at the behest of that businessman son from 2004 onward made SCAF fear that the military’s stake in the public sector of the economy and its extensive public-private partnerships would be doomed.
Fattened on the patronage of successive military presidents, Egypt’s military-industrial complex had grown enormously. Its contribution to the gross domestic product (GDP), though a state secret, could be as high as 40%, unparalleled in the region. The chief executives of 55 of Egypt’s largest companies, contributing a third of that GDP, are former generals.
Working with the interior ministry, which controls the national police force, paramilitary units, and the civilian intelligence agencies, SCAF (headed by General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, doubling as the defense minister) would later orchestrate the protest movement against popularly elected President Muhammad Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood. That campaign reached its crescendo on June 30, 2013. Three days later, SCAF toppled Morsi and has held him in prison ever since.
The generals carried out their coup at a moment when, according to the Washington-based Pew Research Center, 63% of Egyptians had a favorable view of the Muslim Brotherhood, 52% approved of the Brotherhood-affiliated Freedom and Justice Party, and 53% backed Morsi, who had won the presidency a year earlier with 52% of the vote.
Washington Misses the Plot
Remarkably, Obama administration officials failed to grasp that the generals, in conjunction with Interior Minister Muhammad Ibrahim, were the prime movers behind the Tamarod (Arabic for “rebellion”) campaign launched on April 22, 2013. Egyptians were urged to sign a petition addressed to Morsi that was both simplistic and populist. “Because security has not returned, because the poor have no place, because I have no dignity in my own country…,” read the text in part, “we don’t want you anymore,” and it called for an early presidential election. In little over two months, the organizers claimed that they had amassed 22.1 million signatures, amounting to 85% of those who had participated in the presidential election of 2012. Where those millions of individually signed petitions were being stored was never made public, nor did any independent organization verify their existence or numbers.
As the Tamarod campaign gained momentum, the interior ministry’s secret police infiltrated it, as did former Mubarak supporters, while elements of the police state of the Mubarak era were revived. Reports that cronies of the toppled president were providing the funding for the campaign began to circulate. The nationwide offices of the Free Egyptians — a party founded by Naguib Sawiria, a businessman close to Mubarak and worth $2.5 billion – were openedto Tamarod organizers. Sawiria also paid for a promotional music video that was played repeatedly on OnTV, a television channel he had founded. In addition, he let his newspaper,Al Masry al Youm, be used as a vehicle for the campaign.
In the run-up to the mass demonstration in Cairo’s iconic Tahrir Square on June 30th, the first anniversary of Morsi’s rule, power cuts became more frequent and fuel shortages acute. As policemen mysteriously disappeared from the streets, the crime rate soared. All of this stoked anti-Morsi feelings and was apparently orchestrated with military precision by those who plotted the coup.
Ben Hubbard and David D. Kirkpatrick of the New York Times provided evidence of meticulous planning, especially by the Interior Ministry, in a report headlined “Sudden Improvements in Egypt Suggest a Campaign to Undermine Morsi.” They quoted Ahmad Nabawi, a Cairo gas station manager, saying that he had heard several explanations for the gas crisis: technical glitches at the storage facilities, the arrival of low quality gas from abroad, and excessive stockpiling by the public. But he put what happened in context this way: “We went to sleep one night, woke up the next day, and the crisis was gone” — and so was Morsi. Unsurprisingly, of all the ministers in the Morsi government, Interior Minister Ibrahim was the only one retained in the interim cabinet appointed by the generals.
“See No Evil”
Initially, President Obama refused to call what had occurred in Egypt a military “coup.” Instead, he spoke vaguely of “military actions” in order to stay on the right side of the Foreign Assistance Act in which Congress forbade foreign aid to “any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree.”
Within a week of the coup, with Morsi and the first of thousands of Muslim Brotherhood followers thrown behind bars, SCAF sidelined the Tamarod campaigners. They were left complaining that the generals, violating their promise, had not consulted them on the road map to normalization. Having ridden the Tamarod horse to total power, SCAF had no more use for it.
When Morsi supporters staged peaceful sit-ins at two squares in Cairo, the military junta could not bear the sight of tens of thousands of Egyptians quietly defying its arbitrary will. Waiting until the holy fasting month of Ramadan and the three-day festival of Eid ul Fitr had passed, they made their move. On August 14th, Interior Ministry troops massacred nearly 1,000 protesters as they cleared the two sites.
“Our traditional cooperation cannot continue as usual when civilians are being killed in the streets and rights are being rolled back,” said Obama. However, in the end all he did was cancel annual joint military exercises with Egypt scheduled for September and suspend the shipment of four F-16 fighter jets to the Egyptian air force. This mattered little, if at all, to the generals.
The helplessness of Washington before a client state with an economy in freefall was little short of stunning. Pentagon officials, for instance, revealed that since the “ouster of Mr. Morsi,” Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel had had15 telephone conversations with coup leader General Sisi, pleading with him to “change course” — all in vain.
Five weeks later, the disjuncture between Washington and Cairo became embarrassingly overt. On September 23rd, the Cairo Court for Urgent Mattersordered the 85-year-old Muslim Brotherhood disbanded. In a speech at the U.N. General Assembly the next day, President Obama stated that, in deposing Morsi, the Egyptian military had “responded to the desires of millions of Egyptians who believed the revolution had taken a wrong turn.” He then offered only token criticism, claiming that the new military government had “made decisions inconsistent with inclusive democracy” and that future American support would “depend upon Egypt’s progress in pursuing a more democratic path.”
General Sisi was having none of this. In a newspaper interview on October 9th, he warned that he would not tolerate pressure from Washington “whether through actions or hints.” Already, there had been a sign that Uncle Sam’s mild criticism was being diluted. A day earlier, National Security Council spokeswoman Caitlin Hayden stated that reports that all military assistance to Egypt would be halted were “false.”
In early November, unmistakably pliant words came from Secretary of State John Kerry. “The roadmap [to democracy] is being carried out to the best of our perception,” he said at a press conference, while standing alongside his Egyptian counterpart Nabil Fahmy during a surprise stopover in Cairo. “There are questions we have here and there about one thing or another, but Foreign Minister Fahmy has reemphasized to me again and again that they have every intent and they are determined to fulfill that particular decision and that [democratic] track.”
The Generals Axe the Secular, Pro-Democracy Movement
Fahmy and Kerry were looking at that democratic “track” from opposite perspectives. Three weeks later, the military-appointed president, Adly Mansour, approved a new law that virtually outlawed the right to protest. This law gave the interior minister or senior police officials a power that only the judiciary had previously possessed. The minister or his minions could now cancel, postpone, or change the location of protests for which organizers had earlier received the permission of local police. Human Rights groups and secular organizations argued that the 2013 Protest Law was reminiscent of Mubarak’s repressive policies. Washington kept quiet.
Two days later, critics of the law held a demonstration in Cairo that was violently dispersed by the police. Dozens of activists, including the co-founders of the April 6 Youth Movement, Ahmed Maher and Muhammad Adel, seminal actors in the Tahrir Square protests against Mubarak, were arrested. Maher and Adel were each sentenced to three years imprisonment.
Following the coup, the number of prisoners rose exponentially, reaching at least 16,000 within eight months, including nearly 3,000 top or mid-level members of the Brotherhood. (Unofficial estimates put the total figure at 22,000.) When 40 inmates herded into a typical cell in custom-built jails proved insufficient, many Brotherhood members were detained without charges for months in police station lockups or impromptu prisons set up in police training camps where beatings were routine.
The 846 Egyptians who lost their lives in the pro-democracy revolution that ended Mubarak’s authoritarian regime were dwarfed by the nearly 3,000 people killed in a brutal series of crackdowns that followed the coup, according to human rights groups.
The sentencing of the founders of the April 6 Youth Movement — which through its social media campaign had played such a crucial role in sparking anti-Mubarak demonstrations — foreshadowed something far worse. On April 28, 2014, the Cairo Court for Urgent Matters outlawed that secular, pro-democracy movement based on a complaint by a lawyer that it had “tarnished the image” of Egypt and colluded with foreign parties.
With this set of acts, the post-coup regime turned the clock back to Mubarakism — without Mubarak.
Setting the World’s Mass Death-Penalty Record
On that same April day in the southern Egyptian town of Minya, Judge Saeed Elgazar broke his own month-old world death-penalty record of 529 (in a trial that lasting less than an hour) by recommending the death penalty for 683 Egyptians, including Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohammed Badie. The defendants were charged in an August 2013 attack on a police station in Minya, which led to the death of a policeman. Of the accused, 60% had not been in Minya on the day of the assault. Defense lawyers were prevented from presenting their case during the two-day trial.
Elgazar was a grotesquely exaggerated example of a judiciary from the Mubarak era that remained unreconciled to the onset of democracy. It proved only too willing to back the military junta in terrorizing those even thinking of protesting the generals’ rule. A U.S. State Department spokesperson called the judge’s first trial “unconscionable.” But as before, the military-backed government in Cairo remained unmoved. The Egyptian Justice Department warned that “comments on judicial verdicts are unacceptable, be they from external or internal parties as they represent a serious transgression against the independence of the judiciary.”
When the second mass sentence came down, Kerry murmured that “there have been disturbing decisions within the judicial process, the court system, that have raised serious challenges for all of us. It’s actions, not words that will make the difference.” A defiant Nabil Fahmy responded by defending the verdicts as having been rendered by an independent judiciary “completely independent from the government.”
One predictable response to the military junta’s brutal squashing of the Brotherhood, which over the previous few decades had committed itself to participating in a multi-party democracy, was the swelling of the ranks of militant jihadist groups. Of these Ansar Bait al Muqdus (“Helpers of Jerusalem”), based in the Sinai Peninsula and linked to al-Qaeda, was the largest. After the coup, it gained new members and its terror attacks spread to the bulk of Egypt west of the Suez Canal.
In late December, a car bomb detonated by its operatives outside police headquarters in the Nile Delta town of Mansoura killed 16 police officers. Blaming the bombing on the Muslim Brotherhood instead, the interim government classified it as a “terrorist organization,” even though Ansar had claimed responsibility for the attack. By pinning the terrorist label on the Brotherhood, the generals gave themselves carte blanche to further intensify their ruthless suppression of it.
While SCAF pursued its relentless anti-Brotherhood crusade and reestablished itself as the ruling power in Egypt, it threw a sop to the Obama administration. It introduced a new constitution, having suspended the previous one drafted by a popularly elected constituent assembly. The generals appointed a handpicked committee of 50 to amend the suspended document. They included only two members of the Islamist groups that had jointly gained two-thirds of the popular vote in Egypt’s first free elections.
Predictably, the resulting document was military-friendly. It stipulated that the defense minister must be a serving military officer and that civilians would be subject to trial in military courts for certain offenses. Banned was the formation of political parties based on religion, race, gender, or geography, and none was allowed to have a paramilitary wing. The document was signed by the interim president in early December. A national referendum on it was held in mid-January under tight security, with 160,000 soldiers and more than 200,000 policemen deployed nationwide. The result: a vote of 98.1% in favor. (A referendum on the 2012 constitution during Morsi’s presidency had gained the backing of 64% of voters.)
The charade of this exercise seemed to escape policymakers in Washington. Kerry blithely spoke of the SCAF-appointed government committing itself to “a transition process that expands democratic rights and leads to a civilian-led, inclusive government through free and fair elections.”
By this time, the diplomatic and financial support of the oil rich Gulf States ruled by autocratic monarchs was proving crucial to the military regime in Cairo. Immediately after the coup, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) poured $12 billion into Cairo’s nearly empty coffers. In late January 2014, Saudi Arabia and the UAE came up with an additional $5.8 billion. This helped Sisi brush off any pressure from Washington and monopolize power his way.
The Strongman as Savior
By then, huge photographs and portraits of General Sisi had become a common fixture on the streets in Cairo and other major cities. On January 27th, interim president Mansour promoted Sisi to field marshal. Later that day, SCAF nominated him for the presidency. A slew of stories started appearing in the state-run media as well as most of its privately owned counterparts backing Sisi and touting the benefits of strong military leadership.
Sisi’s original plan to announce his candidacy on February 11th, the third anniversary of Mubarak’s forced resignation, hit an unexpected speed bump. On February 7th, Al Watan, a newspaper supportive of the military regime with longstanding ties to the security establishment, printed an embarrassing front-page story placing Sisi’s worth at 30 million Egyptian pounds ($4.2 million). Within minutes of its being printed, state officials contacted the paper’s owner, Magdy El Galad, demanding its immediate removal. He instantly complied.
Sisi continued to place his henchmen in key positions in the armed forces, including military intelligence. On March 26th, he resigned from the army, declaring himself an independent candidate. Nonetheless, as Alaa Al Aswany, a prominent writer and commentator, revealed, senior military commanders continued to perform important tasks for him. There was nothing faintly fair about such an election, Aswany pointed out. Most other potential candidates for the presidency had reached a similar conclusion — that entering the race was futile. Hamdeen Sabahi, a secular left-of-center politician, was the only exception.
Despite relentless propaganda by state and private media portraying Sisi as the future savior of Egypt, things went badly for him. That he would be crowned as a latter-day Pharaoh was a given. The only unknown was: How many Egyptians would bother to participate in the stage-managed exercise?
The turnout proved so poor on May 26th, the first day of the two-day election, that panic struck the government, which declared the following day a holiday. In addition, the Justice ministry warned that those who failed to vote would be fined. The authorities suspended train fares to encourage voters to head for polling stations. TV anchors and media celebrities scolded and lambasted their fellow citizens for their apathy, while urging them to rush to their local polling booths. Huge speakers mounted on vans patrolling city neighborhoods alternated raucous exhortations to vote with songs of praise for the military. Al Azhar, the highest Islamic authority in the land, declared that to fail to vote was “to disobey the nation.” Pope Tawadros, head of Egypt’s Coptic Christian Church whose members form 10% of the population, appeared on state television to urge voters to cast their ballots.
The former field marshal had demanded an 80% turnout from the country’s 56 million voters. Yet even with voting extended to a third day and a multifaceted campaign to shore up the numbers, polling stations were reportedly empty across the country. The announced official turnout of 47.5% was widely disbelieved. Sabahi described the figure as “an insult to the intelligence of Egyptians.” Sisi was again officially given 96.1% of the vote, Sabahi 3%. The spokesman for the National Alliance for the Defense of Legitimacy put voter participation at 10%-12%. The turnout for the first free and fair two-day presidential election, held in June 2012 without endless exhortations by TV anchors and religious leaders, had been 52%.
Among the regional and world leaders who telephoned Sisi to congratulate him on his landslide electoral triumph was Russian President Vladimir Putin. No such call has yet come in from President Obama.
For Washington, still so generous in its handouts to the Arab Republic of Egypt and its military, trailing behind the Russian Bear in embracing the latest strongman on the Nile should be considered an unqualified humiliation. With its former sphere of influence in tatters, the last superpower has been decisively sidelined by its key Arab ally in the region.
Dilip Hiro, a TomDispatch regular, has written 34 books, including After Empire: The Birth of a Multipolar World. His latest book is A Comprehensive Dictionary of the Middle East.
*This article was first published by Tom Dispatch and was reprinted here with permission.
Follow TomDispatch on Twitter and join us on Facebook and Tumblr. Check out the newest Dispatch Book, Rebecca Solnit’s Men Explain Things to Me.
Photo Credit: Mohammad Omer/IPS
Copyright 2014 Dilip Hiro
]]>by Derek Davison
This Monday marked the end of a five-day conference (May 15-19) in Kiev, called “Ukraine: Thinking Together,” organized by The New Republic and specifically its literary editor, Leon Wieseltier. The conference press release promised that “an international group of intellectuals will come to Kiev to meet Ukrainian counterparts, [...]]]>
by Derek Davison
This Monday marked the end of a five-day conference (May 15-19) in Kiev, called “Ukraine: Thinking Together,” organized by The New Republic and specifically its literary editor, Leon Wieseltier. The conference press release promised that “an international group of intellectuals will come to Kiev to meet Ukrainian counterparts, demonstrate solidarity, and carry out a public discussion about the meaning of Ukrainian pluralism for the future of Europe, Russia, and the world.” However, Wieseltier’s remarks at the conference, delivered on May 17, focused very little on “Ukrainian pluralism” and instead painted a picture of a crisis that bears little resemblance to what we actually know about the situation in Ukraine.
Wieseltier should be familiar to anyone who has been paying attention to the neoconservative policy world. Despite being considered a liberal thinker, he has worked on behalf of the Project for a New American Century (PNAC) and its offshoot, the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq (CLI), as well as continues to be affiliated with PNAC’s successor, the Foreign Policy Initiative (FPI). FPI has written many letters, all including Wieseltier’s signature, to prominent DC politicians, endorsing a litany of neocon policy goals: military intervention in Syria, increased hostility toward Iran, and belligerence toward Russia. Wieseltier himself insists that he is not a neocon, and former LobeLog contributor Ali Gharib once declared him a “liberal neocon enabler and booster” rather than a neocon in his own right. This may be a distinction without much of a difference.
During his remarks in Kiev, Wieseltier began by placing his feelings on the situation in Ukraine in the context of his “somewhat facile but nonetheless sincere regret at having been born too late to participate in the struggle of Western intellectuals, some of whom became my teachers and my heroes, against the Stalinist assault on democracy in Europe.” That desire seems to have motivated Wieseltier to concoct a new narrative of recent events that papers over the very real internal struggle going on among the Ukrainians themselves, in order to make the crisis entirely about Russian aggression. He concedes that “Putin is not Stalin,” at least, and no one could challenge his assertion that “Putin is bad enough,” but Wieseltier was still trading in half-truths through much of his speech.
For starters, Wieseltier opines that “[t]he Ukrainian desire to affiliate with the West, its unintimidated preference for Europe over Russia, is not merely a strategic and economic choice; it is also a moral choice, a philosophical choice, a societal decision about ideals, a defiance of power in the name of justice, a stirring aspiration to build a society and a state that is representative of some values and not others.” This assumes facts not in evidence — specifically, of a “Ukrainian desire to affiliate with the West.” According to polling data, prior to Crimea’s secession in March, when Ukrainians were asked which economic union their country should join if it could only join one, support for joining the European Union never polled higher than a slim plurality of Ukrainian citizens. A Gallup poll taken in June-July 2013 found that more Ukrainians saw NATO as a “threat” than as “protection” (a plurality chose “neither”). Predictably, Ukrainians in the country’s east have been more likely to have a negative view of NATO and the EU than Ukrainians in the west.
Even now, after Crimea’s secession and the implied threats of a Russian invasion, only 43% of Ukrainians want stronger relations with the EU to the exclusion of stronger relations with Russia, and only 45% of Ukrainians have a positive view of the EU’s influence on Ukraine. These are both pluralities, yes, but they hardly speak to some universal “Ukrainian desire to affiliate with the West.” In fact, there is evidence to suggest that recent polling that indicates growing support for joining the EU reflects the Ukrainians’ response to what they see as Russian aggression and does not necessarily involve any abiding Ukrainian desire to join the West.
Wieseltier talks about four principles that guide the Ukrainian “revolution”: liberty, truth, pluralism, and moral accountability, but in each case his remarks obscure what is really happening in Ukraine. He talks about liberty, “the right of individuals and nations to determine their own destinies and their own way of life,” but ignores the fact that, for many Crimeans and Russian speakers in eastern Ukraine, the Euromaidan protests that ousted former President Viktor Yanukovych took away their rights, as individuals, “to determine their own destinies.” This was not a democratic or electoral transfer of power; it was a coup against what was by all accounts a legitimately elected government. Weiseltier seems unconcerned that Ukraine’s revolution effectively disenfranchised vast numbers of Ukrainian citizens by short circuiting their electoral process. He also criticizes Russian propaganda that calls the Kiev government “fascist” without acknowledging that there are fascist or soft fascist elements involved with Euromaidan who have been given a significant role in the government.
But it is on the principle of “pluralism” where Wieseltier is most confounding. He says that “[t]he crisis in the Ukraine is testing the proposition that people who speak different languages can live together in a single polity. That proposition is one of the great accomplishments of modern liberalism. Putin repudiates it.” But Putin’s geopolitics aside, it was, in fact, the new Ukrainian parliament installed by Euromaidan that initially repudiated that proposition; its very first act was a repeal (passed but not signed into law) of a 2012 law that allowed regional languages to attain semi-official status in parts of Ukraine with sizable non-Ukrainian populations. The impact of this action in terms of stoking the fears of Ukraine’s Russian population about the intentions of the new government probably can’t be overstated.
It seems clear that, as Jim Sleeper writes, Wieseltier has “learned nothing from his moral posturing on Iraq.” As he and his colleagues in PNAC and the CLI did a decade ago, Wieseltier is still using the language of principle and moral absolutes to mask reality and support the desire for a more muscular American foreign policy.
]]>by Jim Lobe
It’s no secret that much of the foreign policy establishment here — most notably in recent memory, former CentCom commander Gen. David Petraeus (ret.) — consider the perception of unconditional U.S. support for Israel’s actions in the Middle East as contributing to anti-American sentiment throughout the region. This [...]]]>
by Jim Lobe
It’s no secret that much of the foreign policy establishment here — most notably in recent memory, former CentCom commander Gen. David Petraeus (ret.) — consider the perception of unconditional U.S. support for Israel’s actions in the Middle East as contributing to anti-American sentiment throughout the region. This is not just at the popular level, but at the elite level as well. In a remarkable exchange with Foreign Policy CEO David Rothkopf, even former Israeli Amb. Michael Oren admitted this was a problem, noting, “As for arousing enmity, I have no doubt that America’s alliance with Israel fans Middle Eastern outrage.”
In addition to fueling anti-Americanism, it appears that Israeli actions may also promote anti-Semitism. At least that’s what I glean from a closer look at the monumental survey on global anti-Semitism released earlier this week, which both Marsha and I covered at the time. (Please note that the ADL does not agree with that conclusion. You will see below its response to that hypothesis.) Among many other questions, the survey, which, despite numerous complaints (see here, here, and here), contains an amazing wealth of material, asked its more than 53,000 respondents in 102 countries and the Occupied Territories several questions, the answers to which deserve broader attention. The questions included:
1) Do you have a favorable or unfavorable or unfavorable opinion of Israel?
2) Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of Palestine?
3) Do actions taken by the State of Israel influence your opinions about Jews, or do they not influence your opinions about Jews? Respondents were given options of “major influence,” “minor influence,” or “do not influence.” They could also volunteer that they don’t know.
4) Would you say that the actions Israel takes generally give you a better opinion of Jews or a worse opinion of Jews? This question was asked only of those who in question 3 above said the actions of Israel influence their opinons of Jews.
Now, one of the great things about this interactive survey is that you can find out how respondents in each country and region answered these questions. (To get to specific answers, go to the global map, and press the “See More” caption just under the circle that provides the “index score.” After you press “See More,” you press “Choose a Subject” on the middle right side of the screen to see all the various topics covered by the survey. This post is based primarily on the “Attitudes Toward Israel and the Middle East” subject on that list.)
Now, at the global level — that is, for all 53,000-plus respondents — here are the results:
On question 1 about how they felt about Israel, 35% said they had a favorable opinion; 30% unfavorable, and 35% declined to rate.
On question 2, about Palestine, 36 percent were favorable; 25% unfavorable, and 38% didn’t rate.
On question 3 — whether actions by the State of Israel influenced respondents’ opinions about Jews — 16% said “major influence,” 19% “minor,” 42% said none; and 23% volunteered that they “didn’t know.”
And on question 4, for the 35% who said Israel’s actions did influence their opinions about Jews, 25% said they had a better opinion, but 57% said their opinion of Jews was worsened by Israel’s action, while another 17% volunteered that they didn’t know how they were influence.
Now, those are not insignificant numbers. According to the ADL, the 53,000-plus respondents represent nearly 4.2 billion people, which means the 35% who said that Israel’s actions influenced their opinions of Jews represent nearly 1.5 billion people. Fifty-seven percent of those 1.5 billion adults translates to 855 million people who, if we extrapolate from the survey’s methodology, are willing to tell pollsters outright that Israel’s actions make them see Jews in a more negative light; which is to say, make them anti-Jewish or more anti-Jewish than they already were.
Of course, as you might expect, this is most pronounced in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, the only area in which there is a strong and consistent correlation between anti-Semitism and anti-Israeli sentiment, according to the ADL. Only nine percent of respondents there have a favourable opinion of Israel; 84% are unfavourable, while, conversely, 84% are favourable to Palestine; only 11% unfavorable. And 58% percent of respondents in the region said Israel’s actions exert either a major (46%) or minor (12%) influence on their view of Jews, which is significantly higher than any other region. Finally, of that 58%, nearly nine out of ten (89%) say that influence is negative.
On to Western Europe, where 46% of respondents said they have a favorable opinion of Israel, 26% unfavorable, and 28% declined to answer. Remarkably, sentiment about Palestine was very similar: 48% favorable; 24% unfavorable; 28% declined to answer. On the question of whether actions taken by Israel influenced respondents’ views about Jews, a not insignificant total of 40% said they did, 18% in a major way, 22% in a minor way, and 52% of respondents said Israeli behavior had no influence on their opinion of Jews. Of that 40% who said they were influenced, however, 64% said it affected their opinions of Jews for the worse, while only 16% said they had a more positive view. These findings must surely be of concern to Bibi Netanyahu who, of course, knows very well that Western Europe is Israel’s biggest trading partner by far and that the Boycott Divest Sanctions (BDS) movement appears to be gaining momentum.
In Eastern Europe — despite the fact that the ADL survey found it to be the second-most anti-Semitic region after MENA — more than six in ten respondents (61%) said they had a favorable opinion of the country, compared to only 46% who said the same about Palestine. Just over a third of respondents (34%) said Israeli actions influenced their opinions about Jews (14% major influence, 23% minor). Of that 34%, 55% said Israeli actions gave them a worse opinion of Jews; 21% said Israeli actions gave them a better opinion.
Sixty-one percent of respondents in the Americas, which is treated by ADL as one region, also hold a favorable opinion of Israel (73% in the U.S.), while only 40% have a similar view of Palestine (45% in the U.S.). Only one in four respondents (16% in the U.S.) said they believed Israeli actions influenced their opinion of Jews, equally split between major and minor. Of those, 35% said Israeli actions gave them a better opinion of Jews, while 45% said they gave them a worse opinion. In the U.S. those percentages were roughly reversed — 46% better versus 36% worse. In fact, the U.S. was just about the only country outside of sub-Saharan Africa where Israel’s actions gave respondents a better impression of Jews than a worse one. In Canada, for example, of the 21% of respondents who said Israel’s behavior influenced their opinion of Jews, 69% said they were affected negatively. Even in Oceania (Australia and New Zealand), where two-thirds of respondents reported having a favorable opinion of Israel (and 60%, remarkably, a favorable opinion of Palestine), of the 23% of respondents who said Israeli actions influenced their opinions about Jews, 71% said those opinions were affected negatively.
In Asia (which included Caucasian states like Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, as well as India, China and Japan), opinions about both Israel and Palestine were roughly evenly split — 26% favorable, 30% unfavorable and 28% favorable, 25% unfavorable, respectively. About one third of respondents (34%) said Israeli actions influenced their opinions about Jews (13% major, 21% minor). Of those, 54% said their attitudes were affected negatively; 27% positively.
Finally, in sub-Saharan Africa, Israel was viewed favorably by 52% of respondents, unfavorably by 22%, while only 27% felt positively about Palestine compared to 39% who had an unfavorable impression. A total of 35% of respondents reported that Israel’s actions influenced their views about Jews, evenly split between major and minor. Of that percentage, slightly more respondents said Israeli actions gave them a better impression (44%) than a worse one (42%).
So it’s quite clear that MENA is very much the outlier (although, given its proximity to Israel, it’s quite a pertinent one) on the question of to what extent Israeli actions contribute to negative views of Jews in general. But of those respondents who say that Israel’s behavior influences their views of Jews, pretty solid majorities in Western Europe (64%), Eastern Europe (55%), Asia (54%) and Oceania (71%) — and a plurality in the Americas (45%) — assert that their impression of Jews is more negative. It is difficult, therefore, to escape the conclusion of some correlation between Israeli actions and the rise or intensification of anti-Semitism as a result in key regions beyond MENA. ADL, however, as you can see below, rejects this notion.
Now, of course, many of the respondents who said Israeli actions gave them a negative impression of Jews were already anti-Semitic (as defined by the ADL Index), in which case the cause and effect are very difficult to disentangle. In addition, it’s worth noting that the vast majority of respondents have no personal connection to Israeli actions and depend on other sources, notably mass media, for their understanding of those actions. On the other hand, however, it seems safe to say that Israel’s actions — at least as reported by those same mass media — do not help the cause of eliminating anti-Semitism around the world, and especially in its own neighborhood where, in fact, Israeli actions have been felt most directly.
I asked ADL to comment on these observations, and their director of international affairs, Michael Salberg, was kind enough to send me the following reaction, which should also be taken into consideration.
Based on our experience in dealing with the very difficult question of overlap between expressions of anti-Israel sentiment and anti-Semitism, we know that often, though not in every case, the two can be closely connected. This is especially so in the Middle East, but also in European society and elsewhere.
Our pollsters have concluded there is no clear evidence in the data that anti-Israel feelings are causing anti-Jewish sentiment, or vice-versa. There are countries where anti-Israel sentiment is much more prevalent than anti-Jewish sentiment. And there are other countries where anti-Jewish sentiment is much more prevalent than anti-Israel attitudes.
In MENA there are high levels of both anti-Israel sentiment and anti-Jewish sentiment. But in other regions, things are more complicated and regression analysis does not show a strong correlation between Israel’s unfavorable rating and anti-Semitic attitudes.
It is true that people who say the actions of the State of Israel influence their opinions of Jews tend to have higher Index Scores than people who say the actions of Israel do not affect their opinion of Jews. However, in every region but MENA, the vast majority of people, 60 percent or more, say that the actions of Israel have no impact on their opinions of Jews or they don’t know:
To reinforce this point, only 35% of respondents worldwide are unfavorable toward Israel, and of those only half, 51 percent, say that the actions of Israel affect their opinions of Jews. So the worldwide Index Score of 26% is higher than the percentage who are unfavorable towards Israel and say Israel’s actions affect their opinion of Jews. We are reluctant to use or describe the data as support for links between attitudes towards Israel and anti-Semitism outside MENA. Even within MENA, ascribing cause and effect was beyond the scope of the survey.
In any event, as I noted above, this is a very rich survey of international opinion that is well worth exploring in the varying levels of detail which it offers.
]]>by Marsha B. Cohen
The results of a new survey released by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), as deplorable as they are, show that Iran is the least anti-Semitic country in the Middle East.
Not that the ADL is doing anything to point this out in their just-released report entitled, Global 100: An Index of [...]]]>
by Marsha B. Cohen
The results of a new survey released by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), as deplorable as they are, show that Iran is the least anti-Semitic country in the Middle East.
Not that the ADL is doing anything to point this out in their just-released report entitled, Global 100: An Index of Anti-Semitism. This surprising fact can only be uncovered by comparing Iranian responses with those of other Middle Eastern countries.
According to the index scores of the more than 100 countries around the world included in the survey, the most anti-Semitic place on earth is the West Bank and Gaza (93%). Iraq isn’t far behind the Palestinian territories, which are, of course, under Israeli occupation. But Iran doesn’t even make it into the survey’s worldwide top 20 anti-Semitic hotspots.
The first of the eleven statements to which respondents were asked to categorize as “probably true” or “probably false” was Jews are more loyal to Israel than to [this country/to the countries they live in]. While 56% of Iranians responded in the affirmative, in other MENA countries the percentage of respondents agreeing with this assertion were significantly higher: Saudi Arabia 71%; Lebanon 72%; Oman 76%; Egypt 78% Jordan 79%; Kuwait 80%; Qatar 80%; UAE 80%; Bahrain 81%; Yemen 81%; Iraq 83%; West Bank and Gaza 83%. (It’s too bad that Israel was not among the countries surveyed. It would be interesting to know what Israelis believe on this point.)
The other indicators of anti-Semitic attitudes were:
Jews have too much power in the business world. Iran 54%; Saudi Arabia 69%; Oman 72%; Egypt 73%; UAE 74%; Lebanon 76%; Qatar 75%; Bahrain 78%; Jordan 79%; Kuwait 79%; Yemen 82%; Iraq 84%; West Bank and Gaza 91%.
Jews have too much power in international financial markets. Iran 62%; Oman 68%; Egypt 69%; Saudi Arabia 69%; UAE 71%; Qatar 71%; Jordan 76%; Bahrain 76%; Lebanon 76%; Kuwait 77%; Yemen 78%; Iraq 85%; West Bank and Gaza 89%.
Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust. Iran 18%; Yemen 16%; Saudi Arabia 22%; Egypt 23%; Kuwait 24%; Lebanon 26%; Jordan 29%; Iraq 33%; Oman 42%; UAE 45%; Bahrain 51%; Qatar 52%; West Bank and Gaza 64%.
Jews don’t care what happens to anyone but their own kind. Iran 50%; Egypt 68%; Oman 70%; Lebanon 71%; Kuwait 73%; UAE 73%; Saudi Arabia 74%; Jordan 75%; Qatar 75%; Bahrain 75%; Iraq 76%; Yemen 80%; West Bank and Gaza 84%.
Jews have too much control over global affairs. Iran 49%; Oman 67%; Saudi Arabia 70%; Egypt 71%; Qatar 73%; UAE 73%; Bahrain 76%; Iraq 77%; Lebanon 77%; Jordan 78%; Kuwait 80%; Yemen 80%; West Bank and Gaza 88%.
Jews have too much control over the United States government: Iran 61%; Oman 67%; Saudi Arabia 70%; UAE 72%; Jordan 73%; Lebanon 73%; Qatar 73%; Egypt 74%; Bahrain 77%; Kuwait 78%; Yemen 79%; Iraq 85%; West Bank and Gaza 85%.
Jews think they are better than other people: Iran 52%; Lebanon 61%; Egypt 66%; Oman 66%; Qatar 67%; Bahrain 68%; UAE 68%; Saudi Arabia 69%; Kuwait 71%; West Bank and Gaza 72%; Jordan 73%; Yemen 76%; Iraq 80%.
Jews have too much control over the global media: Iran 55%; Bahrain 61%; Oman 65%; Egypt 69%; Saudi Arabia 69%; Qatar 70%; UAE 70%; Kuwait 72%; Lebanon 73%; Iraq 77%; Jordan 77%; Yemen 79%; West Bank and Gaza 88%.
Jews are responsible for most of the world’s wars: Iran 58%; Qatar 64%; Lebanon 65%; Oman 65%; UAE 65%; Kuwait 66%; Saudi Arabia 66%; Egypt 66%; Jordan 67%; Bahrain 71%; West Bank and Gaza 78%; Yemen 84%; Iraq 85%.
People hate Jews because of the way Jews behave: Iran 64%; Lebanon 76%; Bahrain 77%; Kuwait 80%; Egypt 81%; Oman 81%; Iraq 81%: Saudi Arabia 81%; Qatar 82%; UAE 82%; Jordan 84%; West Bank and Gaza 87%; Yemen 90%.
Iran has a complicated relationship with its Jewish community, and has a long way to go before it can be considered a safe haven for Jews, even if some Iranian Jews may disagree. Still, the ADL’s data makes it clear that Iran is not only the least anti-Semitic country in its region, it also scores far better on every one of the ADL’s eleven survey indicators by a statistically significant margin. That’s something worth thinking about.
Photo: Persian Jews celebrate the Jewish holiday of Sukkot in a Tehran synagogue last October. Credit: CNN screenshot.
]]>by Derek Davison
The Pew Research Center has conducted public opinion surveys in Ukraine (April 5-23) and Russia (April 4-20), and the results, released May 8, shed some light on the ongoing conflict between the two countries. They reveal a Ukraine that is more unified than recent events would suggest, and [...]]]>
by Derek Davison
The Pew Research Center has conducted public opinion surveys in Ukraine (April 5-23) and Russia (April 4-20), and the results, released May 8, shed some light on the ongoing conflict between the two countries. They reveal a Ukraine that is more unified than recent events would suggest, and they illuminate the domestic politics driving Russian President Vladimir Putin’s actions. At the same time, the results may offer a way for the interim government in Kiev to defuse some of the separatist tensions that have gripped cities in eastern Ukraine.
The Ukrainian results were broken down by region, with the country divided into “West,” “East,” and “Crimea” per the map below:
The headline result of Pew’s Ukrainian survey is that a large majority of Ukrainians (77%) want the country to remain united. This isn’t terribly surprising, but what is interesting is the large majority in favor of union in the eastern part of the country (70%), where Russian separatism is at its highest. Even among Russian speakers in the eastern part of Ukraine, a solid majority (58%) want to see Ukraine stay whole. In Crimea, which has already voted in favor of secession, it is no surprise that a majority (54%) of those surveyed support allowing parts of Ukraine to secede.
So despite the recent unrest caused by pro-Russian militias in eastern Ukrainian cities like Donetsk, Luhansk, and Slovyansk, only a small minority of Ukrainians in that part of the country want the right to secede — 18% overall, and only 27% of Russian speakers. However, the survey also points to the challenges facing Kiev as it attempts to bring the region back under control. Two-thirds (67%) of Ukrainians in the east say that the government in Kiev has had a “bad influence” on the current situation, compared to only 28% in the west, and 66% in the east say that the Kiev government does not respect “personal freedoms.” Some sign of competent, stable leadership from Kiev could go a long way toward easing the concerns of eastern Ukrainians. Kiev could also take steps to try to ease ethnic tensions, which 73% of Ukrainians (evenly distributed throughout the country) identify as a very or moderately big problem.
One way to ease those tensions could be by protecting regional languages other than Ukrainian; 54% of Ukrainians believe that Russian and Ukrainian should both be official languages (compared with 41% who believe that Ukrainian should be the only official language), with 73% in the east (86% of Russian speakers) supporting that idea but only 30% in the west. A compromise policy that allows regional governments to raise other languages to official status, while making Ukrainian the only official national language, could satisfy separatist concerns without raising significant apprehension in the west, and there are signs that the interim government is pursuing such a compromise. Steps must also be taken to curb the influence of neo-fascist organizations like Right Sector, which 65% of Ukrainians agree is having a negative impact on Ukrainian affairs.
It must be noted, however, that Pew’s survey was conducted before the most recent spate of violence in eastern Ukraine, in particular before last week’s clashes in Odessa in which dozens of pro-Russian sympathizers were killed by pro-Ukrainian protesters. Kiev must take steps to prevent additional violence, which will only further alienate eastern Ukrainians and reduce the chances for reconciliation.
The Ukrainian survey also points out the damage that Russia’s reputation has suffered in Ukraine. When asked about the impact that Russia is having on Ukrainian affairs, 67% say “bad” versus 22% who say “good.” Compare that figure to the results for the European Union (45% good, 33% bad) and the United States (tied at 38%) and it is clear how much Ukrainians as a whole have soured on their Russian neighbors. Even in the supposedly pro-Russian east, 58% of those surveyed (and a plurality of 44% of Russian speakers) agreed that Russia was having a “bad” impact on Ukrainian affairs.
In contrast, Pew’s survey of Russian citizens reveals a populace that is firmly behind President Vladimir Putin’s actions with respect to Ukraine and believes Russian expansion, as in the case of Crimea, is justified. When asked if “there are parts of neighboring countries that really belong to Russia,” 61% of Russians surveyed either completely or mostly agree with that sentiment, compared to only 28% who mostly or completely disagree. The percentage of Russians who are confident in Putin’s ability to handle international affairs is higher (83%) than it has been at any time in the past six years (as far back as the report’s data goes). A plurality of Russians (43%) agree that “Putin’s handling of the situation in Ukraine has led people in other countries to have a more favorable opinion of Russia,” and 55% agree with the statement: “It is a great misfortune that the Soviet Union no longer exists,” though that percentage has been relatively consistent since Pew began asking that question five years ago.
Pew’s findings illustrate that domestic Russian politics are a key driver behind Putin’s actions with respect to Crimea and eastern Ukraine, though the sharp decline in Russia’s prestige in Ukraine may help to explain why Putin seems to have adopted a more conciliatory tone in recent days.
Putin has very little to lose domestically, and much to gain, by adopting a more energetic stance with regards to the internal politics of Russia’s neighbors. At the same time, Pew’s Ukrainian survey strongly suggests that there is an opening for the government in Kiev, perhaps under the influence of its EU and US allies, to take steps — preventing further violence, protecting minority languages, and eliminating the pernicious influence of far-right groups — that will ease the concerns of eastern Ukrainians, who at this point remain largely opposed to any secession effort.
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by Jim Lobe
Just 11 days before the annual policy conference of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the embattled organization got some more bad news, this time in the form of a Gallup poll suggesting that nearly ten years of effort in demonizing Iran in the U.S. public mind [...]]]>
by Jim Lobe
Just 11 days before the annual policy conference of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the embattled organization got some more bad news, this time in the form of a Gallup poll suggesting that nearly ten years of effort in demonizing Iran in the U.S. public mind may be going down the drain. As Gallup noted in the lede on its analysis of the poll, “Half as many Americans view Iran as the United States’ greatest enemy today as did two years ago.”
Indeed, for the first time since 2006, according to the survey of of more than 1,000 U.S. adults, Iran is no longer considered by the U.S. public to be “the United States’ greatest enemy today.” The relative threat posed by Iran has fallen quite dramatically in just the last two years, the survey found. In 2012, an all-time high of 32 percent of respondents identified Iran as Washington’s greatest foe, significantly higher than the 22 percent who named China. Beijing has now replaced Tehran as the most frequently mentioned greatest threat.” Twenty percent of all respondents cited China, while only 16 percent — or half the percentage of respondents compared to just two years ago — named Iran (which was tied with North Korea).
This is a significant setback for the Israel lobby and AIPAC, which has made Iran the centerpiece of its lobbying activities for the past decade and more, and it should add to the consternation that many of its biggest donors (as well as members) must feel in the wake of its serial defeats on Chuck Hagel, Syria, and, most importantly, on getting new sanctions legislation against Iran last month. As its former top lobbyist, Douglas Bloomfield told me three weeks ago,
Like the old cliche about real estate, ‘Location, location, location,’ for [AIPAC], it’s been ‘Iran, Iran, Iran. Israel and the peace process is in a distant second place.
Now, of course, just as one swallow does not a summer make, one poll can’t be seen as showing a definite trend. But, as you can see from Gallup’s 2001-2014 tracking graph below, the decline in threat perception since 2012 has been remarkably sharp compared, for example, to China’s showing, which has been relatively stable. And the difference between the two nations — 20 percent versus 16 percent — is within the 4-percent margin of error. Still, the fact (brutal as it is for AIPAC) remains: Iran, while still very unpopular (only 12 percent of respondents have a favorable image of it, second in unfavorability only to North Korea), is no longer seen by an important percentage of the population as Washington’s “greatest enemy.”
Moreover, as noted by Gallup’s analysis, “[g]roups that were the most likely to view Iran as the top enemy, such as men, older Americans, and college graduates, tend to show the greatest declines” in seeing Iran as Public Enemy Number One. Younger respondents (aged 18 to 34 years) were least likely to see Iran as the greatest enemy; only nine percent, compared to 21 and 20 percent for China and North Korea, respectively. As for party affiliation, a plurality of Republicans — the party most influenced by neoconservative ideology — still see Iran as the most threatening (20 percent, versus China’s 19 percent); while 23 percent of independents named China as the greatest enemy compared to 16 percent who selected Iran. Among Democrats, 24 percent cited North Korea; only half that percentage named Iran.
Clearly, President Hassan Rouhani and his Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, who dominated U.S. news coverage of Iran during their New York visit in September, as well as progress in negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, have made a big difference, thus vindicating Benjamin Netanyahu’s (and AIPAC’s) worst fears. No doubt growing tensions between China and its neighbors have also drawn attention away from Iran (which should help, in a somewhat perverse way, Obama’s efforts to “pivot” foreign policy resources more toward Asia), although, as noted above, concern about China has remained relatively stable over the 13 years and actually declined slightly compared to 2012.
Of course, this could also turn around in a flash given the right catalyst. A breakdown in the talks, an incident at sea, or some other unanticipated event could persuade the public that all of the rhetoric about how Iran poses the greatest threat imaginable to the United States and its allies — likely to be amplified at the Washington Convention Center, where AIPAC holds its conference early next month — could propel Tehran back up to the top of the enemies list. But, for now, it’s clear that Netanyahu, who is expected to continue — if not escalate — his aggressive denunciations against the nuclear deal and U.S.-Iranian detente when he comes here to keynote the AIPAC conference, faces a tougher challenge in persuading the American public that Iran poses the greatest threat to U.S. security than at any time since he became Prime Minister. For more on Bibi’s challenges here, read J.J. Goldberg’s editorial in the latest Forward entitled, “Benjamin Netanyahu Tells AIPAC to Put Its Head in a Noose: Pushing American Jews to Take Unpopular Stand on Iran.”
Photo: US Secretary of State John Kerry, EU Foreign Policy Chief Catherine Ashton and Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif’s meeting on the sidelines of the UNGA on Sept. 26, 2013.
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