via IPS News
As the five-day registration period for presidential candidates began here Tuesday, the question of whether Iran’s upcoming election will represent the will of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei or the people of Iran is uppermost on many people’s minds, including those of the potential candidates.
In the [...]]]>
via IPS News
As the five-day registration period for presidential candidates began here Tuesday, the question of whether Iran’s upcoming election will represent the will of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei or the people of Iran is uppermost on many people’s minds, including those of the potential candidates.
In the crowded field of former and current officials who have declared their intent to run, many have already made a point of declaring their total allegiance to the Leader’s dictates. For instance, the repeat presidential candidate, conservative Mohsen Rezaee, promised on Apr. 1 that his administration will be “the most coordinated administration” with the Leader ever.
Even some reformists, who are known to be critics of the Leader, have called for the candidacy of someone who will not provoke Khamenei’s opposition or sensitivities.
But this is not a position taken by many other reformist individuals or groups. Since mid-March many individuals and groups, through public letters and meetings, have called upon Khatami to become a candidate. Their call is premised on Khatami’s popularity and the belief in the continued attractiveness of his ideas and conduct as president.
Similar calls have been made for former president and current chair of the Expediency Council Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani to run. Neither of the past presidents has committed himself, and both have said that they will not run unless the leader agrees to their candidacy. Their argument has been that, without such a nod, the political environment will just become too contentious and tension-ridden.
In Rafsanjani’s words, “if Ayatollah Khamenei does not agree with my candidacy, the result will be counterproductive…If there’s a situation where there is a difference between me and the leadership of the state, all of us will suffer.”
In fact, mere talk of runs by Khatami and Hashemi Rafsanjani has led to overwrought accusations on the part of hardliners.
Hossein Shariatmadari, the intractable editor of the hardline Kayhan Daily, called Khatami “corrupt on earth” and a “supporter of sedition,” a reference to his backing of former presidential candidates Mir Hossein Mussavi and Mehdi Karrubi who remain under house arrest due to the protests that followed the 2009 presidential election.
According to Shariatmadari, “supporters of sedition… will undoubtedly be disqualified.”
The hardline minister of intelligence, in turn, went after Rafsanjani, calling him “the source of sedition.” His language was so harsh that it elicited a response from several members of Parliament who scolded the minister for his overt political involvement and accusations against someone who continues to serve as the chair of the Leader’s own advisory council.
No one doubts that these attacks are intended to intimidate the two former presidents. Whether Khamenei himself is behind them is also a subject of much speculation. After all, Shariatmadari is appointed by Khamenei, while the minister of intelligence, Mohsen Heydari, was protected from being fired by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad through Khamenei’s personal intervention.
Even more fundamental is the question of whether the upcoming election will once again turn into an arena of confrontation between the presumed desired candidate of the Leader and the one chosen by society, as many believe was the case in the 2009 election when Ahmadinejad was swiftly declared the winner.
While the protests have long since ended, many voters continue to believe that there was extensive fraud in 2009. Furthermore, given his ardent support for Ahmadinejad’s re-election, many hold Khamenei responsible for the downward economic spiral the country has faced and their own economic woes.
In the words of a 73-year-old taxi driver, “I used to believe in Khamenei, but when I saw that he wants everything for himself and is ready to take the country into ruin in order to insist that he made the right choice, I no longer support him. Every day I curse him for the sake of the youth in this country.”
Talk about potential runs by Khatami and Rafsanjani had created hope that Khamenei might have finally seen the mistake he made in 2009 and become willing to entertain honest competition among a whole slew of candidates representing the diverse sentiments of society.
But the harsh attacks by Shariatmadari and Moslehi have again created doubts about the potential for a fair election and Khamenei’s calculations.
According to a well-known novelist who spoke to IPS on condition of anonymity, “Khameni wants us to back down and acknowledge his leadership as a principle of the constitution but when we back down, he wants more. When we say we accept the constitution, his supporters say it is not enough to accept his constitutional role; you have to completely give in to his leadership.
“When we say we will participate in the election, they say we must recant our actions in 2009. But he himself is not willing to take any responsibility or acknowledge mistakes for the mess Ahmadinejad has created in the country.”
Reformists are no longer the only critics. A prominent conservative who wished to remain anonymous told IPS that he considers Khamenei a failed leader who has tried to become like the founder of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.
This conservative politician believes that Khamenei has never understood the two main differences he has with Khomeini. “First of all Khomeini was a charismatic leader who had an organic relationship with the society while Khamenei has an organisational relationship,” he said.
“Secondly, Khomeini was clever enough to accommodate popular sentiment even if they were against his own wishes while Khamenei obstinately and vindictively stands against them.”
Many citizens who participated in the 2009 election and continue to think that their vote was “stolen” will not vote in the Jun. 14 election. But everyone will be watching to see whether Khamenei will again insist on having his wish become the choice of the country.
]]>Iran’s June 14 presidential election, only about a month and a half away, will get ample attention — and more than a dose of speculation — from everyone interested in the big picture items: whether there will be an actual choice of candidates, whether the result will have an [...]]]>
Iran’s June 14 presidential election, only about a month and a half away, will get ample attention — and more than a dose of speculation — from everyone interested in the big picture items: whether there will be an actual choice of candidates, whether the result will have an impact on the way the nuclear file will be approached, whether Mahmoud Ahmadinejad will go out quietly, and so on. But smaller, parallel events are fascinating because they reveal the kind of dilemmas the country’s political class faces as it tries to manage the strange institutional hybrid that it oversees.
Let’s take the case of the Guardian Council, which is in charge of vetting candidates for the presidency. This body of six clerics appointed by Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and 6 lay jurists suggested by the Judiciary head (himself appointed by the Leader) and approved by the Majles, effectively has complete leeway in deciding who can run and considers its task to be a closed affair. It doesn’t explain the reasoning behind why a particular candidate is disqualified because it doesn’t have to. As such, it’s justifiably accused of disqualifying candidates with points of view that differ from those held by its current conservative members.
This year, however, the Council may face a dilemma in vetting candidates simply because of the large number of conservative candidates who will likely apply. I would love to be a fly on the wall and listen to the reasoning behind choosing one candidate over another when they are essentially clones of each other. This was less of a problem in previous elections because there weren’t that many candidates with some sort of name recognition.
To be sure, a large number of candidates registering and even running is not new. In the Islamic Republic’s first election — when there was no vetting mechanism — 96 candidates ran. Frontrunner Abolhassan Bani Sadr won in the first round before he was booted out of office and the country in a year and a half.
In the 2005 election, the last time there was no sitting president running for reelection, the number of registered candidates topped one thousand! The Guardian Council disqualified all but 6, presumably because the overwhelming majority of them did not meet the constitutional requirement of being among the “political and religious elite” endowed with “managerial capability and prudence”; “a good past-record”; “trustworthiness and piety”; and a “convinced belief in the fundamental principles of the Islamic Republic.” Later, upon the Leader’s prodding, the Council re-qualified two Reformist candidates it had rejected. One candidate eventually dropped out and the contest among the seven candidates went to a second round among the top two candidates — a first in the Islamic Republic. In the 2001 election, ten candidates were qualified out of over 800 registrants, but a popular president, Mohammad Khatami, was re-elected overwhelmingly in the first round.
The large number of past government officials announcing their intent to run makes this election a bit different. The competition is promising as many as 20 conservative or centrist registrants with some sort of ministerial or parliamentary background, hence qualifying them as among the elite or prominent personalities, and few political reasons for disqualifications. The parliament did try to bring some order to this unwieldy process by introducing age limits and educational requirements to the eligibility criteria. But the Guardian Council, in wanting to maintain full control over the qualification process, declared the parliamentary legislation unconstitutional.
Despite this, the Council does seem concerned. Its spokesperson Abbasali Kadkhodai said it’s in the process of developing internal guidelines regarding qualifications. Another council member, Hosseinali Amiri, said the Council is trying to clarify the exact meaning of “political elite” in terms of past experience. For instance, can a minister who has been impeached by the parliament be qualified? What level of government service is representative of sufficient managerial experience (minister? deputy minister? lower?) It’s not yet clear if any of these clarifications will be made public to set precedent for future elections.
Kadkhodai also said the Council is mulling the idea of interviewing potential candidates for their plan of action or presidency program. This is totally new and if it happens, one could call it a direct result of the “Ahmadinejad effect.” The question of whether the Council members are themselves qualified or astute enough to assess through interviews a candidate’s preparedness for running the country — it took the Iranian political class about 8 years of Ahmadinejad’s presidency to reach a consensus about his lack of competence — was not addressed by Kadkhodai.
Less new is the Council’s decision of requiring more than mere acceptance of Iran’s constitution for assessing a candidate’s commitment to the Islamic Republic. According to Kadkhodai, it’s not sufficient for a president to say that he will implement the constitution because it is the law of the land. He must also be “attached” to it and “deeply believe” in it. Kadkhodai did not elaborate on how hard it may be to figure out someone’s true beliefs and feelings in a country where pretending to be a deeply pious believer is a requirement of all government jobs. Based on this criterion, everyone is suspect.
Of course, the Guardian Council can continue to maintain the tradition of only disqualifying candidates with politics it does not approve of and qualifying everyone else with the hope that the majority will drop out in favor of candidates who are more likely to be successful. Or it can decide to live with the risk of another second run election. But as of now, it appears to be scratching its head while trying to figure out new ways to disqualify even committed believers of the Islamic Republic.
As usual, improvisation remains the name of the game in trying to manage the conflicting impulses of a system that seeks to be both Islamic and a Republic, at least in appearance.
]]>via Foreign Policy Association
With less than two months into the elections, what is your assessment of this year’s election dynamics and of the absence of key presidential contenders in the country’s faction-based political system?
In the upcoming elections, there is no sitting president running for re-election. So lack [...]]]>
via Foreign Policy Association
With less than two months into the elections, what is your assessment of this year’s election dynamics and of the absence of key presidential contenders in the country’s faction-based political system?
In the upcoming elections, there is no sitting president running for re-election. So lack of clarity regarding the leading contenders is not that unusual. In the 2005 election, the field of candidates also had not fully clarified two months before the election. Former foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati was still contemplating a run while former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani had not yet declared his intent to run (and once he did, everyone assumed he would win). This uncertainty is part and parcel of lack of political parties or groups with large social base and lack of established process for candidate selection within and among these organizations. In every election, new mechanisms and processes are invented or improvised as potential candidates jockey to establish their viability or ability to attract votes before the Guardian Council begins the process of vetting. The state of competition remains unclear for the upcoming election because of two unknowns: the so-called Nezam’s—which is usually another way of saying the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s—preferred candidate and the extent to which variety of views will be allowed on the presidential slate. These are unknowns not only to us but to the players themselves. The desire to hold at least a seemingly “clean” election and the hope to “erase the memory of 2009” all work to maintain the uncertainty about the extent to which the coming election will offer a choice, no matter how limited, on the country’s domestic and foreign policy direction, as it has been the case in the past few elections.
Do you believe there is a new cadre of reformists emerging in Iranian politics? If there is one, how genuinely reformist are they and do they have a reform platform?
I am not sure what you mean by genuinely reformist. But there is no doubt that there continues to be a whole array of groups in Iran that think in order for the Islamic Republic to function properly and achieve its revolutionary ideals of independence and freedom, it has to move in the direction of political and social reform. To be sure, some think these reforms have to be more structural or deeper than others. Meanwhile, the conservative establishment, by securitizing the political environment, has so far argued that these folks want to reform the Islamic Republic out of existence. In other words, by reacting as severely as it has, the Iranian deep state –-whose shape remains rather unknown for those who study Iran—has effectively rejected any type of structural reform at this time in no uncertain terms. If anything, it has become more entrenched and reactionary. What we see in the reformist circles in Iran is an adjustment to this reality. Clearly, some reformists are disheartened by this reality and are announcing the death of the possibility of reform within the existing constitutional and political framework. But I would say that the conversations surrounding the upcoming elections – both presidential and municipal – suggest a decision has been made not to abandon the electoral process as a means to both claim some political power as well as pursue gradual change. The way it looks so far, even if the reformists are not able to put forth –or are prevented from putting forth –a strong presidential candidate, they will be actively present in the municipal elections particularly in large cities such as Tehran. They will also be engaged in serious conversation regarding whether to support a centrist candidate in case of the absence of a popular reformist candidate.
With the current dynamics of the post-Arab Spring—the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, the crumbling of the Syrian state, the Turkish-Israeli rapprochement with possible cooperation between the two states on Syria, and the Saudi-Qatari efforts to undermine Iranian interests—do you think Iran is gradually facing a strategic crisis?
The strategic jockeying that is occurring in the region is not a static or linear dynamic with one side losing and the other side winning, particularly since the side that is presumably working to engineer Iran’s strategic decline consists of many actors with different types of relationship with Iran as well as with each other. Egyptian internal dynamics remain highly volatile and as evidenced in the Syria tragedy, the outcome is no longer in anyone’s control. The dystopia created so far is as much a headache – if not more – for Israel and Turkey as for Iran. The disintegration of Syria and reinvigoration of Jihadist forces may count as a “loss” for Iran but raises real and unpredictable security concerns for the neighboring countries of Israel, Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon with no guarantees that even the Persian Gulf countries feeding the insurgency – i.e. Saudi Arabia and Qatar – will not be bitten back. Furthermore, let us not forget that the strategic relationship between Iran and Syria was solidified in opposition to a very different Iraq and may not be as important for Iran given the drastic changes in Iraq. Iran’s strength in the region, although no doubt impacted by its alliances, is better defined by its geography as a crossroad and its resources, both material and human. No other country in the region matches it. In the next decade, Iran’s strategic vulnerability remains its domestic politics. The key question remains whether the country’s contending leadership can develop rules of the game that underwrites relatively peaceful transition of power and allows for forces excluded from the political process, which have nevertheless amassed quite a bit of social power, to have a say in the direction of the country.
Nearly thirty five years since the revolution, the Iranian women remain barred from running for president. Is this a reflection of the state’s ideological conflict with the presence of Iranian women in key decision-making posts?
The silver lining in the refusal of the Guardian Council to explain the reason for the disqualification of candidates is that it has never come out and said that the women who have been disqualified for all the past elections were so because they were women. So while I do not see a viable female candidacy at this point, it is significant that the guardians of Islamism in Iran have not chosen to set up an ideological barrier on this issue; at least not yet.
If sanctions against Iran were further tightened without resulting in achieving any concrete policy objectives for Washington, how, in your view, Washington and Tehran would respond to such measures respectively?
Tehran’s approach to the escalating sanctions regime has followed a pattern. It becomes most active in trying to prevent the impending sanctions. But, once they are imposed, its efforts shift to adapting to and undercutting the sanctions as well as pushing its nuclear program a bit forward in order to remind everyone that the sanctions regime is not changing Iran’s calculations. Under these circumstances, after the imposition of every set of sanctions, the initiative is moved back to Washington. So far Washington has been very successful in instituting an escalating sanctions regime and making sure that Tehran does not rest easy and remains in a constant state of adjustment to new sanctions. But it is not clear how long this dynamic can continue without risking war. Volatility and potential risks are very much hidden in the current dynamics in which containment is declared not an option despite the repeated “all options are on the table” mantra while military attack remains on the menu. Under these circumstances, sanctions are not an alternative but a path to war no matter how uneasy and displeased the American society and military establishment remains about the prospect.
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