Despite escalating tensions and anti-government demonstrations, the Venezuelan government has not addressed any human rights issues regardless of the rising death toll and captive political prisoners, a panel of experts stressed Monday.

Issues such as humanitarian rights, economic policies and governance problems were discussed at the Americas Society/ Council [...]]]> From the IPS United Nations Niewsbriefs

Despite escalating tensions and anti-government demonstrations, the Venezuelan government has not addressed any human rights issues regardless of the rising death toll and captive political prisoners, a panel of experts stressed Monday.

Issues such as humanitarian rights, economic policies and governance problems were discussed at the Americas Society/ Council of the Americas panel discussion “What’s Next for Venezuela?”.

The panel agreed that the country faces many challenges such as insecurity, rising inflation and lack of staple products, and that the Venezuelan government has been unable to make any swift negotiations, decisions or changes to curb the crisis.

Many of the protests, which began in January, have ended in violent clashes where the death toll has risen to 28, over a thousand arrests have been made and political prisoners have become an issue.

Students and relatives of protesters recently killed in Venezuela march in Caracas on Feb. 22. Credit: Estrella Gutiérrez/IPS

Although students sparking these demonstrations are bringing attention to humanitarian issues, the government has not responded to their cause, the experts said.

“This has been one of (President Nicolas) Maduro’s most serious mistakes. If you look at the demands of the students, the first is the human rights issues of political prisoners. This has become more central as the protests went on,” said Javier Corrales, professor of Political Science at Amherst College.

In February, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called for the protection of human rights of all Venezuelans, and urged authorities to listen to the protesters’ demands.

The Geneva-based U.N. Human Rights Council also drew attention to the unnecessary use of force and violence against protesters and journalists. However, the Maduro government has not made any serious efforts to investigate human rights abuses.

Accountability for the lack of action has been drawn towards the poor decision making process within the government and the apparent absence of political knowledge.

“The decision making process has been hijacked internally. For them to survive they need to solve the decision making process. So far politics is not in its toolkit. So the first reaction we see is repression and censorship,” said Luisa Palacios, head of Latin America Macro and Energy Research.

The panel referred to the arrest of opposition leader Leópoldo Lopez as part of President Nicolás Maduro’s government’s failure in decision-making.

“They don’t really know how to play politics,”Palaciios said, pointing out a flawed decision-making process that commits the mistake of putting Leópoldo in jail, making a martyr out of a political prisoner.

Palacios also emphasised that international involvement is very important in solving the crisis. She said that the Venezuelan government would not understand the consequences or the point of view of human rights unless it becomes an international issue.

“International involvement will make this a much safer process as we go along. If Venezuelans are left to their devices I remain concerned due to the lack of the government’s political tools.”

Corrales stated that the U.N’s response to the instability and unrest has been far more forceful and remarkable than usual as the U.N’s involvement in Latin American affairs is usually quite low.

He made a comparison to the protests in Brazil and Chile where the governments were able to make immediate negotiations, changes in cabinet and new programmes despite larger demonstrations.

“In Chile, only one person died during two-and-a-half years of protests. The protests were massive, perhaps more massive than in Venezuela. The international community complained about the police force in Chile and only one student died and there were about 1,800 arrests,” Corrales said.

Since Maduro took office in April 2013, he has been accused of following former President Hugo Chávez’s failed policies.

Jassmyn Goh is a trainee at the IPS United Nations bureau in New York City. 

by Wayne White

The arrest of many senior Muslim Brotherhood (MB) leaders and the banning of the organization are the latest blows in what appears to be a relentless campaign by General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s government to deny the Brotherhood any future role in Egyptian politics. The MB’s continued defiance has driven [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Wayne White

The arrest of many senior Muslim Brotherhood (MB) leaders and the banning of the organization are the latest blows in what appears to be a relentless campaign by General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s government to deny the Brotherhood any future role in Egyptian politics. The MB’s continued defiance has driven the military to bear down even harder, but the new regime can do little to divest the Brotherhood of its popular base. Also of concern are various moves that smack of a calculated effort to return to Mubarak-style military rule, this time centered upon el-Sisi. Meanwhile, despite generous Arab Gulf financial support, a deeply troubled economy, poor governance, and repression will most likely cause many Egyptians to become weary of the new regime as events play out.

President Obama stated in his September 24 UN General Assembly address that future US support for Egypt “will depend upon Egypt’s progress in pursuing a democratic path.” Yet, despite several sharply negative developments along those lines over the past two weeks, Obama so far has resisted cutting off US military assistance. Key administration officials believe all such aid should be suspended except for a portion related to bolstering security in Sinai, and such a recommendation reportedly has been with the President since August. Reluctance to crack down on the new Egyptian regime on the part of not only Washington, but the West more broadly, probably has emboldened el-Sisi.

For now, Egypt’s foreign aid situation is relatively rosy thanks to lavish financial assistance from Arab Gulf states like the UAE, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia since Morsi’s fall. In fact, el-Sisi felt comfortable enough financially to return $2 billion to Qatar in a pointed gesture of dismay over Doha’s generous assistance to the Morsi government (the exact amount transferred to Egypt yesterday by Kuwait). In contrast, however, violence and uncertainty continue to discourage investors. With so many multi-national corporations (including Chevron, BP, General Motors, and BASF) closing operations in Egypt or taking investments elsewhere, roughly 25 percent of Cairo’s best office space is now vacant.

The Brotherhood and its popular following have done little to encourage el-Sisi & Co. to ease up. The MB’s core leadership is unlikely to abandon its disciplined focus on the establishment of Islamist rule. This ideological agenda almost certainly led to MB excesses under Morsi. Despite occasional pragmatism during Morsi’s tenure in office, for the most part the Brotherhood revealed its intent to ram home its doctrinal goals, shoving opposition aside.

Since Morsi’s ouster, the outbreak of Muslim extremist violence against army and police cadres in Sinai (and some in Egypt proper) has probably infuriated senior military commanders. Attacks on Coptic Christians, their businesses, and churches, plus reports of localized threats of more should security forces drop their guard, could sustain sufficient public outrage against the Brotherhood for el-Sisi’s government to retain substantial support for quite a while despite its own increasingly authoritarian behavior. Pro-Brotherhood students have revived anti-regime protests since the opening of the school year on the 21st, warning of a return to the days of Mubarak. Still, the Brotherhood’s own credibility has been reduced because Morsi too allied himself with the military. And, quite simply, many Egyptians at this point just yearn for the return of some semblance of stability and “normalcy” after over two years of turmoil.

Permitting Morsi to chat with his family for the first time earlier this month has been of little consolation to the Brotherhood amidst other harsh measures. Morsi apparently is still to be tried for inciting the killing of protestors as well as potential charges relating to alleged slander against judges and supposed involvement in Hamas prison attacks during the anti-Mubarak uprising back in 2011. Additionally, 18 members of the MB’s most senior “Guidance Bureau” (along with its high profile spokesman), hundreds of mid-level cadres, most of its legislators and provincial governors under Morsi, plus over half of Morsi’s planned legal defense team have been taken into custody.

And then on the 25th, two days after an Egyptian court banned “all activities” of the Brotherhood on the 23rd, security forces closed the offices of the MB’s flagship newspaper “Freedom and Justice,” confiscating equipment and furniture. State owned al-Ahram printers claimed it would continue to publish the Brotherhood’s daily (which apparently has not been produced in the building seized), but only if its length is reduced by half and its circulation cut ten-fold.

Despite el-Sisi’s July statement that he has no political ambitions, a group of professionals and former army officers initiated a petition on the 23rd urging him to run for president. A major effort to create an al-Sisi personality cult has been underway for quite some time with huge al-Sisi posters plastered everywhere, fawning TV coverage, pro-military pop songs and videos, as well as talk shows featuring discussions on whether el-Sisi should run for president (with positive conclusions). And a military spokesman did say back in early July that doing so would be possible if el-Sisi retired. Amidst all this, there have been arrests of Egyptians for spraying anti-Sisi graffiti and even a farmer for naming his donkey el-Sisi and riding it through his village.
Plans also are in motion to draft either a new constitution (or substantial amendments to the one passed hastily by Brotherhood parliamentary representatives) that seem to include doing away with the ban against Mubarak-era officials serving in public office. And the new or revised constitution will be prepared by a 50-member committee chaired by former Mubarak Foreign Minister Amr Moussa. The committee contains only two Islamists–neither from the Brotherhood.

Over the short-term, el-Sisi and the military obviously will be in the political driver’s seat. Western condemnations have been relatively restrained (probably hoping—so far in vain–for el-Sisi’s behavior to improve). And, with extremists on the rampage in Sinai, the Brotherhood also having ruled abusively, and the extremist problem growing in places like Syria, East Africa, and Iraq, many governments could view watching & waiting as the least risky option at the moment.

Farther out, however, the situation in Egypt could worsen once again. The military’s current path seems to lead back to neo-Mubarak authoritarian rule. If so, Egyptians will gradually sour on el-Sisi, as military-dominated governance entails a return to restrictions on freedoms, rampant official corruption, institutional dysfunction, and lack of transparency. Right now, the Brotherhood is reeling from the multiple blows it has suffered since July 3, and its leadership has been seriously disrupted. However, hundreds of thousands of its most fervent adherents might not remain on the sidelines under such a regime (especially after having tasted national power). So, if al-Sisi cannot be persuaded to change course, economic stagnation, various other ills, rising popular dissatisfaction, and eventually yet another major Egyptian political crisis could lie ahead.

Photo Credit: Mohamed Azazy

As Iran faces economic unrest, discussion is intensifying over the impact sanctions are having on Iran’s economy.

But experts doubt that the current situation portends the end of the Iranian regime or Iranian capitulation to Israeli and Western-led demands that it change its nuclear stance.

“You have now a market [...]]]> via IPS News

As Iran faces economic unrest, discussion is intensifying over the impact sanctions are having on Iran’s economy.

But experts doubt that the current situation portends the end of the Iranian regime or Iranian capitulation to Israeli and Western-led demands that it change its nuclear stance.

“You have now a market that is under a lot of tension” which has “created a big economic crisis for the government”, said Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, a professor of economics at Virginia Tech, during a meeting here Wednesday at the Wilson Center.

But Salehi-Isfahani added that there is a “lot of misunderstanding about the currency system in Iran”, noting that people are confusing it with huge devaluations that occurred in East Asian countries and Zimbabwe.

“Iran is nothing like that,” he said.

While expressing varying views about the severity of Iran’s economic problems, the Wilson Center’s panelists agreed that it’s still able to manage its ailing economy and the resulting unrest.

“Iran has a lot of experience with sanctions. In fact, what they did immediately is open up the books from the 1980s about how to deal with a currency crisis,” he said.

Demonstrators clashed with police outside Tehran’s central bazaar on Wednesday during protests about the Iranian currency’s declining value. The rial has lost an estimated 80 percent of its value against the U.S. dollar in the last year.

Ali Vaez, a senior Iran analyst at the International Crisis Group, told IPS that “the regime is likely to nip it in the bud to prevent (the protests) from snowballing.”

“Although it’s not clear if there will be more protests, one thing is certain: Iran will experience a much more securitised environment in the run-up to the 2013 presidential elections,” he said.

Iranians are also struggling with rising inflation and unemployment amid escalating U.S.-led sanctions linked to the Islamic Republic’s controversial nuclear programme.

Iran maintains that its nuclear programme is entirely peaceful but Western countries led by the U.S. claim that Iran is working towards achieving nuclear weapon-making capability.

Israel has been pushing the Barack Obama administration to move its previously stated “red line” on Iran, a nuclear weapon, to preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons capability, something which Israel claims would seriously endanger its existence and the stability of the surrounding region.

“I’ve been speaking about the need to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons for over 15 years…I speak about it now because the hour is getting late, very late,” said Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during his speech at the 67th annual U.N. General Assembly meeting last week.

Already under six rounds of sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council, Iran saw Western sanctions tighten markedly this year with an EU ban on Iranian crude oil purchases going into effect in July.

U.S. sanctions are also increasingly targeting banks that deal with Iran’s central bank, thereby seriously impeding Iran’s ability to conduct international transactions and trade.

Sanctions have not yielded tangible progress toward a diplomatic solution over Iran’s alleged nuclear ambitions, but the protests Wednesday and protests in July in the northeastern city of Nishapur over the rising price of chicken – a main food staple for the Iranian working class – indicate that segments of Iranian society will express their dissatisfaction when faced with serious pressure.

“The chicken prices got the government’s attention,” said Salehi-Isfahani, adding that the “government made a wise move in trying to stabilise the chicken market and not worry about the dollar.”

“The aim of sanctions is to raise pressure against the regime in order to solve the nuclear crisis in a peaceful manner,” Alireza Nader, a senior international policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, told IPS.

“But as we’ve seen, sanctions are also leading to major unrest in Iran and weakening the regime at home and abroad,” he said.

Bijan Khajehpour, an Iranian businessman and specialist on the Iranian economy, explained during the Wilson Center event that a number of factors have been harming Iran’s economy.

“It’s not just the sanctions…Iran’s economic developments have been undermined by sanctions, subsidy reforms, mismanagement and corruption,” he said.

“The degree of instability has reminded many citizens of the days of the Iraq-Iran war” and “public anger is reflecting itself in sporadic unrest, strikes, blogosphere protests and critical comments by artists,” he said.

But Khajehpour disagrees with reports suggesting that the Iranian economy is collapsing. “The current deterioration of the Iranian economy is less a period of economic collapse and more a period of economics adjustment,” he said.

“The citizens are suffering, but the macro economy could potentially benefit,” said Khajehpour, noting that sanctions which have impeded Iran’s ability to purchase the equipment it needs to develop key industries have forced it to produce them itself.

Khajepour added that, “The future story of Iran is in (its gas industry),” which is projected to grow over the next five years despite sanctions.

“The additional gas capacity will generate the potential of investments in gas-based industries with export potential,” said Khajehpour.

Suzanne Maloney, another panelist and Iran analyst at the Brookings Institute, said it’s “incredible and tragic” that “Iran’s economic horizons are more limited today than the last 50 years.

“There are huge constraints on Iran’s growth and development and that presents tremendous political vulnerabilities,” she said.

“Sanctions are working, but we’re not getting anywhere on the nuclear programme and that cannot be lost on anyone,” she said.

Michael Singh, the managing director of the Washington Institute, echoed the consensus among a number of well-known neoconservative analysts Wednesday by writing that more aggressive pressure and punitive measures are needed to change Iran’s nuclear calculus.

“Rather than hoping that giving current sanctions “time to work” will force Iran back to the negotiating table, the United States and our allies should add further pressure to the regime and the elites who comprise it, including through additional targeted economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, bolstering the credibility of our military threat to the regime, and support for the Iranian opposition,” he wrote in an op-ed for Foreign Policy.

According to Trita Parsi, the president of the National Iranian American Council, more pressure alone will not bring about favourable results. “I don’t find it likely that the regime will capitulate due to the sanctions as long as sanctions relief is not part of the mix,” he said.

“The possibility that sanctions will lead to general regime change exists, but the question is what type of regime change would the devastation of the Iranian economy generate?” Parsi asked.

Commentary magazine’s Jonathan Tobin warns the Obama Administration that it should not chalk up Iranian hyperinflation (the rial fell to 35,000:1 against the US dollar this week) and the outbreak of bazaar protests over the situation as a sign of success in forcing the Islamic Republic to abandon its [...]]]> via Lobe Log

Commentary magazine’s Jonathan Tobin warns the Obama Administration that it should not chalk up Iranian hyperinflation (the rial fell to 35,000:1 against the US dollar this week) and the outbreak of bazaar protests over the situation as a sign of success in forcing the Islamic Republic to abandon its nuclear program. While the Obama Administration was quick to cite the foreign exchange collapse as proof that its policy of sanctions is forcing Iran to negotiate, Tobin suggests that further punitive economic measures should be taken (against the energy sector, increasingly dominated by the IRGC) and that the US should adopt a clear “red line” regarding the use of force against Iran:

There are things that can be done to heighten the Islamists’ problems in Iran. Sanctions must be increased and more stringently enforced. After all, though ordinary Iranians are suffering, the amount of oil income flowing into the country is still enough to support the needs of the government, the military and the nuclear program.

Just as important would be the demonstration of Western resolve that has been lacking in recent years. In 2009, President Obama’s relative silence about the violence in Tehran discouraged protesters and assured the ayatollahs that they had nothing to fear from the United States. That set the stage for the last three years of failed diplomacy because Iran’s leaders have never believed that the president meant what he said about preventing them from going nuclear.

If Washington continues to soft pedal its Iran policy and places its hopes on domestic unrest producing a change in policy, the only result will be to perpetuate the current stalemate. Like Assad, the ayatollahs have no plans to give up power.

Michael Rubin also wrote in Commentary that while “Iranians are not fools: they recognize the result of the regime’s gross economic mismanagement”, the damage to the rial is not going to force Iran to make greater compromises because “IRGC veterans” are running the show.

The US Treasury Department asserts that the sanctions against the IRGC are effective, yet according to some reports, the IRGC has found ways to use them to its advantage and to the disadvantage of traditional merchants like those who went out onto the streets today.

The Iranian rial has been in free fall for the last few days. Inflation has been ramping up for the last few months as the rial has lost more than 50 percent of its value over the last year. Unemployment is up to maybe 25 percent plus, and quite a [...]]]> via Lobe Log

The Iranian rial has been in free fall for the last few days. Inflation has been ramping up for the last few months as the rial has lost more than 50 percent of its value over the last year. Unemployment is up to maybe 25 percent plus, and quite a bit higher in some of the poorer parts of the country.

Iran’s oil exports have been slammed by sanctions. Even with Iran’s attempts to sneak some out in various ways, such as registering tankers in Mongolia of all places; the sanctions hunters found out about that one fairly quickly and shut it down with some diplomatic moves in Ulan Baator.

Then there is the purchase of 2 million barrels of stranded oil in Sid Krir in Egypt that the Egyptian government wants to purchase. US-Egyptian relations are not exactly the best these days and President Morsi visited Tehran recently. He might have embarrassed his host by mentioning his views on Syria, but he still went. Egypt also looks like it might be working towards improving relations with Iran. Turkey may be buying some oil from Iran with gold or other barter methods. Other states may be setting grain and goods for oil barter arrangements.

The financial system of Iran has been hit hard with the sanctions. The closing down of Iran’s access to the SWIFT system was significant. This may have done more damage to Iran’s ability to do business internationally than many of the other sanctions combined. The sanctions focused on persons and banks are good politics, but have historically not been that effective. Closing the country from a major clearing house is like slamming a large financial door in their faces.

Indeed, Iran is in a tight spot. I would expect runs on banks to follow on to this if the government cannot stem the flow of the psychology of financial contagion that seems to be sweeping the country. The government is clearly in a panic. They are blaming the usual “outside forces” and “22 conspirators” who of course were arrested quite publicly today. Then they blamed the black market money changers in the bazaars of Tehran for the collapse. This last one makes less than no sense. The bazaaris do not exchange enough money to make this sort of a dent in the US dollar-Iranian rial exchange rate. The currency drop has a lot more to do with hyper-expansive monetary policy pushing inflation. There is clearly a sense that there are way too many rials chasing at a faster velocity the goods that are in stock and are flowing into Iran. See this article for some supporting monetary and other data.

The huge rise in the stock market of Tehran is also due to nominal reasons, as we economists would like to say in such circumstances. The money flowing into the economy via the policies of the Central Bank of Iran has pumped up not only the prices of goods, but also stocks. This huge increase in money supply has also pumped up the price of land and housing in Iran. Also driving the stock, land and housing costs is the shortage of alternative investments. Sanctions have taken a bit out of the Iranian economy on that account.

Iran’s economic policies have actually magnified, not countered, the effects of the sanctions. One of the major culprits was expanding the broad money supply by 100 percent in the last 5 years.

This said, what is happening now shows not only the results of sanctions but counterproductive economic policies and more. The current economic status of Iran also shows how the credibility of the regime is weakening.

I am certain that there are many people in Iran who are questioning the worth of the country’s nuclear program and especially the leadership’s global defiance on this issue in light of the growing resulting problems they’re facing.

Developing about 90 percent of the entire nuclear fuel cycle is very expensive. This could have been costing Iran about 10 percent or more of its GDP for many years. That is 10 percent that could have been invested in industries that produce jobs, agriculture, education, and more.

Expansive nuclear infrastructure development is not necessary given the existence of global trade in low enriched uranium for nuclear plants. It is also unnecessary given the small amount of raw uranium that exists in Iran. This is also counter-intuitive given that Iran flares off the equivalent of four nuclear power plants of 1200 MW each of natural gas.

There are many reasons why Iran’s government should focus on its economy and its people, rather than on defiant nuclear brinksmanship.

The Iranian leadership may find that their brinkmanship is about to bring their country to the brink.

Anti-Western protests across the Arab Islamic world denouncing the anti-Islam video, reportedly produced in the United States, is a serious test for the new democratic governments in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, and elsewhere.

It is time for the new Arab democracies to explain to their peoples publicly and forcefully that [...]]]> via IPS News

Anti-Western protests across the Arab Islamic world denouncing the anti-Islam video, reportedly produced in the United States, is a serious test for the new democratic governments in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, and elsewhere.

It is time for the new Arab democracies to explain to their peoples publicly and forcefully that individual actions in Western countries, no matter how offensive, do not reflect the policies of Western societies or their governments.

Western societies are diverse and complex and like Muslim societies should not be held responsible for the acts of one or more extremists, even if such acts are insulting to religion or the holy text.

Budding Arab democracies are producing diverse new leaders, ideologies, and centres of power, which their former dictators had stifled for decades. If Arab democracy hopes to succeed, it should not be a welcoming place for the narrow-minded, exclusivist Salafi ideology, which preaches hate and intolerance. Arab governments must act decisively to curb the rising tide of radical Salafism in their midst.

At least four factors are driving ongoing mass protests across the region. First, the newfound sense of democracy and empowerment, which former dictators kept under a tight lid, gives people the freedom to hit the streets whenever they see the urge to express their views on an issue. Once they get used to the idea of freedom of assembly, Arab publics would be less inclined to leave their jobs and hit the streets regardless of the cause.

Second, pervasive anti-Americanism, which has carried over from the (George W.) Bush to the (Barack) Obama administration because of perceived anti-Islamic policies, has been an undercurrent in the latest demonstrations.

Third, radical Salafis, who oppose what they call man-made democracy and peaceful relations with the West, have used the protests to undermine the nascent democratic experiment in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, and stir up anti-Western feelings in the Arab “street”. Salafi so-called jihadists have also been trying to hijack the anti-Assad revolution in Syria and paint it with the brush of extremism.

Finally, Al-Qaeda and its franchise groups in Yemen, North Africa, Iraq, and elsewhere have tried to use street protests to mask their terrorist plots against Arab regimes and Western personnel and interests in the region.

As Arab democracy takes root, governments must educate their citizens on the nature of Western democracies and the freedoms of speech, expression, and association that are the hallmark of democratic societies anywhere in the world.

Anti-religious vitriol and hate speech against Jews, Muslims, Christians, Buddhists, or Sikhs in the United States, for example, are usually renounced by most of the faithful. But they are begrudgingly tolerated, even by American Muslims, as part of the cultural and political mosaic of life in the United States.

For years, my analysts and I briefed senior policymakers that the Muslim world is diverse and complex and that only a small minority of them are extremists and terrorists. We judged vast majorities of the 1.6 billion Muslims are mainstreamers and reject the terrorist narrative, which Osama Bin Ladin and Al-Qaeida have advocated in the name of Islam.

We assessed that in the service of our national interest, our leaders should not paint the entire Muslim world with a broad brush of terrorism. Presidents Bush and Obama, for the most part, accepted the analysis and acted on it. They frequently stated the war on Al-Qaeida and global terrorism was not a war against Islam and that the West and the Muslim world share many common values.

By the same token, violent demonstrations and wanton destruction by volatile groups, many of whom have not even seen the offensive You Tube video, could lead some in the West to view the entire Muslim world as a place short on rational discourse and long on mob frenzy.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton denounced the anti-Islam amateurish video in the strongest terms. She emphasised the U.S. government and people have nothing to do with it and abhor its content and message.

While not much open source information is available on the tragic death of Ambassador Chris Stevens in Benghazi, the orchestration of the attack and weapons used reflect Al-Qaeda’s mode of operations. The terror organisation’s affiliated or franchise groups have executed similar operations in the region.

What is most tragic about the ambassador’s untimely death was his genuine commitment, in word and in deed, to engaging in a serious dialogue with Muslims.

He believed that Americans and Muslims shared many values, including love of family and a commitment to fairness and justice. Unfortunately, radical elements in those demonstrations whether Salafis or Al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorists, oppose dialogue and view the non-Muslim West as “infidels”.

Most mainstream Muslims do not share this view and in fact welcome economic, political, and cultural relations with Western countries, including with the United States. Thousands of Muslim students are studying in colleges and universities in the United States, Australia, Canada, and Western Europe.

Radical Salafi leaders and preachers who have condoned, encouraged, and participated in violence and destruction in the recent demonstrations should be held accountable by their governments for the deaths, injuries, and property destruction that have occurred. Because of their tyrannical ideology and actions, these radical Salafi leaders and activists have lost the right to take part in the democratic transition.

Millions of Arabs marched in the streets last year denouncing the repression of their regimes. Fallen dictators used fear and torture to deny their people the most basic human and civil rights. They kidnapped, jailed, and killed pro-democracy writers, poets, filmmakers, comedians, and bloggers despite the peacefulness of their demands.

Radical Salafis must not be allowed to hijack the newly won democratic rights.

The new social media, which helped spread the message of hope and optimism during the heady days of the Arab Spring, unfortunately has a downside. The “Innocence of Islam” video is the latest symbol of that side.

- Emile Nakhleh is former director of the Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program at CIA and author of ‘A Necessary Engagement: Reinventing America’s Relations with the Muslim World’.

This week’s decision by the Bahraini court of appeals to uphold the prison terms against Bahraini opposition activists is a travesty of justice and an indication that Bahraini repression continues unabated.

Bahraini officials, when confronted with angry world reaction to the court’s decision, cynically hid behind the claim they would [...]]]> via IPS News

This week’s decision by the Bahraini court of appeals to uphold the prison terms against Bahraini opposition activists is a travesty of justice and an indication that Bahraini repression continues unabated.

Bahraini officials, when confronted with angry world reaction to the court’s decision, cynically hid behind the claim they would not interfere in the proceedings of their “independent judiciary”.

Despite the threat to U.S. national interests and the security of U.S. citizens in Bahrain and elsewhere in the Gulf, Washington remains oblivious to the ruling family’s violent crackdown against peaceful protesters in the name of fighting “foreign elements”. Pro-democracy Bahrainis are wondering what we are waiting for.

Because of our muted reaction to what’s happening in Bahrain, the ruling family and their Saudi benefactors have not taken seriously Western support for democratic transitions in the Middle East.

The United States and Britain maintain deep economic and security relations with these states but also enjoy strong leverage, including the U.S. Navy’s Bahrain-based Fifth Fleet, which they must revisit in the face of continued egregious violations of basic human rights by some of these regimes. Bahraini civil rights organisations and activists are expecting the United States to use its leverage to end regime repression.

Despite their pro-Western stance, there is nothing exceptional about the autocratic Gulf Arab regimes. And they should no longer be given a pass on the importance of democratic reform.

Staying in power will require Bahrain’s Al Khalifas and other Gulf tribal family rulers to do more than push a vicious sectarian policy and employ slick public relations firms. Their cynical and deadly game might buy them some time, but, in the end, they will not be able to escape their peoples’ wrath.

In the absence of genuine reforms in the next three years, the Gulf’s autocratic regimes will be swept aside by their peoples. The “people power” that emerged from the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and now Syria, cannot be kept out of these tribal states. In reality, they all have been touched by peoples’ demands for dignity and justice.

While Iran might be exploiting the protest movement to discredit these regimes, the pro-democracy movement in Bahrain goes back to the 1960s and 1970s – way before the Islamic Republic came on the scene.

Even more troubling for U.S. national security are the continued efforts by Al Khalifa to whip up anti-American attitudes among Bahrain’s more rabidly anti-Shia and xenophobic Sunnis. Bahrain and some of their Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) allies perceive the growing rapprochement between the U.S. and the new Islamic democrats, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Tunisia, as a sign of tacit opposition to Gulf autocrats.

They believe the U.S will throw them under the bus if their peoples rise up against them. They also worry that if the nuclear issue in Iran is resolved, a possible U.S. rapprochement with Tehran would embolden their Shia communities in their struggle for equality and justice.

For 40 years, Prime Minister Khalifa has been the key opponent to reform in Bahrain. In recent ears, however, a new generation within the ruling family, known as the “Khawalids,” has taken up the anti-Shia, anti-reform, and anti-American cry.

They have used pro-government newspapers, blogs, and social media to vilify the Shia, the United States, and the pro-democracy movement. With tacit government encouragement, they frequently describe elements of the opposition as “diseased cells” that must be removed from society.

In the process, they have encouraged extremist Salafi and other Sunni groups to spread their message of divisiveness, sectarianism, and hate.

What Bahrain and the other Gulf sheikhdoms fail to realise is that when they encourage extremist groups to fight the “enemies” of the regime, a time will come when radical Salafi “jihadists” will turn against the regime. The Saudi experience in Afghanistan and Iraq should offer them a sobering lesson. This dangerous game does not bode well for their survival.

As domestic challenges also grow in Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom’s interest in Bahraini domestic policy will diminish. Recent estimates indicate Saudi oil exports over the next decade and a half will shrink significantly because of growing domestic needs for energy to generate power and desalinate seawater.

When this happens, Al Khalifa will have to face their people on their own.

- Emile Nakhleh is the former director of the CIA’s Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program and author of “A Necessary Engagement: Reinventing America’s Relations with the Muslim World”.

When the news was first announced last week that the two warships would pass through the canal, Israeli reaction [...]]]> The earth reportedly shook as two Iranian naval boats approached the Suez Canal on Monday morning. For the U.S., though, the building tension over the (delayed, for now) passage could result in diplomatic, not literal, earthquakes.

When the news was first announced last week that the two warships would pass through the canal, Israeli reaction appeared split. Now it seems Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has joined his foreign minister in ratcheting up the rhetoric, saying, “Israel takes a grave view of this Iranian step.”

Following closely on the U.S. veto of a UN Security Council resolution denouncing Israeli settlements, Israel’s blustering approach to the Iranian warships may provide yet another instance where the “special relationship” causes the U.S. to choose between its ally Israel, on one hand, and international law and maintaining regional influence on the other.

Egyptian approval of passage for the Iranian ships was first reported when Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman said the move amounted to a “provocation” by Iran. “The international community must understand that Israel cannot forever ignore these provocations,” he warned ominously.

Covering the comments, the Wall Street Journal pointed to fissures over Lieberman’s blustering and the quieter approach preferred Ehud Barak and the Israeli Defense Ministry.

At the time, Lieberman’s comments seemed to be made for U.S. consumption. Ethan Bronner’s New York Times piece had this nugget (my emphasis):

The first word came from Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman in an address to a group of American Jewish leaders in Jerusalem. The speech, which hinted at a possible response, was closed to reporters…

The bellicose comments led National Interest writer Jacob Heilbrunn to comment: “Israel’s foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman isn’t just a thug. He’s also a moron.” On Sunday, Netanyahu told his cabinet, “Israel takes a grave view of this Iranian step.”

A former State Department senior intelligence official called on Israel “to stand down and avoid any provocative actions.” Middle East Institute scholar Wayne White told LobeLog that Israeli “muscle-flexing” and a perception of “high-handedness” now could be harmful to U.S. (and even Israeli) interests on a wide range of issues. He mentioned the still-developing and fluid situation in Egypt, anti-regime protests in Iran itself, and uncertainty in Jordan, which is facing some unrest and, like Egypt, has a peace deal with Israel.

White’s list of examples gives a taste of just how many crises the U.S. is facing in the region. With protests in several U.S.-allied countries like Egypt, Bahrain, Jordan, Tunisia, and even Iraq, the U.S. wants to keep things relatively calm. As White points out, another crisis, with Israel and the U.S. pitted against Iran and Syria (whose waters the Iranian ships are reportedly bound for), could easily inject anti-U.S. and anti-Israeli sentiments into the anti-government movements that have been sweeping the region or permit besieged autocrats to divert popular attention and agitation.

The other elephant in the room is the notion of Suez passage itself. So far, the U.S. has taken a measured tone. State Department spokesperson P.J. Crowley said on Friday: “If the ships move through the canal, we’ll evaluate what they actually do.” He said the potential issues were the ships’ cargo and destination. Crowley seemed eager to move onto a new topic, repeatedly interrupting the questioner(s).

The lack of U.S. focus on passage itself is perhaps a nod to both the Constantinople Convention (1988) governing Suez Passage and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1983, in force 1994), which allows “innocent passage” through even territorial waters. The Constantinople convention states:

The Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag.

Consequently, the High Contracting Parties agree not in any way to interfere with the free use of the Canal, in time of war as in time of peace.

One of those contracting parties is, of course, Egypt, which may not interfere or block anyone’s passage. The U.S. relies on this status quo as much, if not more, than any other country. Indeed, if the right of “innocent passage” is questioned in this case, think of all the possible ramifications for the U.S. Navy and its 11 aircraft carrier groups that span the globe, if not always to the acclaim of the natives. It’s not for nothing that the Navy has been the country’s biggest advocate for Senate ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention.

For now, it appears that the passage of the Iranian ships has been delayed, without any reason given. But if the Israelis keep pushing back against Iran, rumblings of the diplomatic sort could soon follow for the U.S. Once again, as when Israel backed ousted Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak until his last days and relentlessly pressed the Obama administration to cast his UN Security Council veto on a resolution that was entirely consistent with U.S. policy since 1967, Washington’s “special relationship” with the Jewish State could become burdensome to broader U.S. strategic interests.

Here’s Mohammed:

At least one [...]]]> Our colleague Mohammed Salih, a talented young Iraqi reporter who used to be with our D.C. bureau, writes from Iraqi Kurdistan, where a wave of small protests resulted in clashes and deaths. (For complete coverage of the globe, you can always turn to the Inter Press Service homepage.)

Here’s Mohammed:

At least one person died and dozens were injured Thursday in Iraqi Kurdistan’s second largest city as angry protestors attacked the local headquarters of one of the two ruling Kurdish parties, while an opposition building was set ablaze in the other major Kurdish city.

The violence broke out in Sulaimaniya following a rally organised by a number of civil society groups to express solidarity with protestors in Egypt and Tunisia and protest the poor state of public services and corruption in the autonomous Kurdish region.

A curfew has since been imposed in Sulaimaniya since 7 pm Thursday, and there is an unusually heavy presence of police and security forces.

Hours after the attack on the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s (KDP) building in Sulaimaniya, the local headquarters of Gorran (Change) opposition movement in Erbil, Kurdistan’s capital city, was set on fire.

[...]

Thursday’s incidents in northern Iraq broke out amid a wave of mass protests that has galvanised several Middle Eastern countries in the recent weeks, leading to the collapse of two governments in Egypt and Tunisia.

Iraqi Kurdistan has witnessed several demonstrations in the last few years where people protested corruption and mismanagement. A number of people were killed and injured during those protests as well.

The organisers of the Thursday rally in Sulaimaniya had called on the protestors to disperse after a few speeches were read out in line with the protest’s objectives. But tens of protestors continued marching toward nearby Salim Street, where a number of high-profile government and party buildings are based.

Upon arriving at the local headquarters of the KDP, the protestors started chanting slogans against Kurdish rulers. Minutes later they began throwing stones at the KDP’s building, shattering its windows.

Eyewitness accounts say panicking guards of the building started opening fire on the demonstrators. Sulaimaniya’s top health official told the local media that one person died and over 50 others were injured as a result of the shooting.

“I could hear the sound of bullets whizzing by my head. At that second I thought that I was going to die. They were shooting right into the crowd,” Karzan Kardozi, a blogger who was among the protesting crowd Thursday, told IPS. “We hid in a parking lot for about three minutes and they were still shooting.”

“There should be an inquiry,” Kardozi said. “Those who shot the people should be brought to justice or the government will further lose credibility with its people.”

There are fears that increasing tensions in Iraqi Kurdistan might lead to serious instability, especially in light of the regional events and the prospect of further protests.