As former top State Department intelligence specialist Wayne White points out for Lobe Log, in the absence of a tenable ceasefire agreement, the quagmire that is the Syrian civil war will likely intensify, thereby only worsening post-Assad scenarios.
“The bottom line is that a sort of Catch-22 situation is [...]]]>
As former top State Department intelligence specialist Wayne White points out for Lobe Log, in the absence of a tenable ceasefire agreement, the quagmire that is the Syrian civil war will likely intensify, thereby only worsening post-Assad scenarios.
“The bottom line is that a sort of Catch-22 situation is continuing on the diplomatic front,” wrote White last week. “[T]he side that believes it has the upper hand and will eventually prevail militarily (currently the opposition) is unlikely to accept a truce because a ceasefire would interfere with its ability to sustain intense military pressure on the other side.”
Anyone hoping for even a temporary cessation to the deadly violence would have been shattered by Bashar al-Assad’s rare speech in Damascus on Sunday, where he thanked his base for showing “the whole world that Syria is impervious to collapse and the Syrian people impervious to humiliation.” The defiant president refused to step down while claiming he was ready to talk with the opposition. But as White noted, Assad did so while urging his supporters to continue fighting against the “bunch of criminals” who oppose him.
This political gridlock makes creative diplomacy appear all the more important in bringing an end to the ongoing carnage that’s ravaging the country. Asked if the Iranians should be included in diplomatic efforts, former top CIA analyst Paul Pillar told Lobe Log that ”Any multilateral diplomatic initiative has a better chance of success if all the parties with leverage to exert are included.”
Pillar is well aware of the fact that this may be easier said than done. UN and Arab League mediator Lahkdar Brahimi remains in between a rock and a hard place — expected to please everyone while not being able to please anyone. The brutal force that the government deployed to crush what were initially peaceful protests seems to have pushed both sides beyond the point of no return. Presently, the opposition’s recent disgust with Brahimi’s choice of Russia as the venue for his recent truce initiative has been overshadowed by the regime’s accusations of Brahimi’s “bias toward sides known for conspiring against Syria and the Syrian people.”
It was in this atmosphere of hopelessness that news surfaced Wednesday of over 2,130 Syrian prisoners being released by the regime in exchange for 48 Iranians abducted during what they claimed to be a religious pilgrimage in August. (The opposition had said that the Iranians were members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, which Tehran adamantly denied.) The massive exchange again raises the question of whether Iran has a role to play in bringing an end to the Syrian crisis.
This question may be more difficult to answer now than it was when the fighting first broke out over a year ago. On the one hand, the prisoner swap supports the argument that Iran holds considerable influence over Assad’s government and could help shift events toward a “peace process”. Throughout last year, Iran tried to inject itself into diplomatic processes taking place over Syria by, for example, supporting a failed United Nations-Arab League peace plan and making is own proposal in December.
“On Syria, Iran is pursuing a dual track policy of support for the Syrian Government as it faces internal instability, while pressing Damascus to take measures to reduce tensions, open the grounds for negotiations with the opposition and find a path towards national unity and conciliation,” said Ambassador Seyed Hossein Mousavian, the former spokesperson for Iran’s nuclear negotiating team (2003 to 2005) and now a visiting scholar at Princeton University.
“Iran can play a major constructive role on the Syrian crisis,” he said.
That Iran reportedly included Syria in its five-point proposal presented during nuclear talks in Moscow last June could be an indication that it would be willing to bargain away its support for the regime — if it was provided with enough incentive. (Recall how the government of Mohammad Khatami reportedly offered to end Iran’s material support to Palestinian groups opposing Israel in a March 2003 proposal for “broad dialogue” with the US that was rejected by the Bush administration.)
On the other hand, this prisoner swap, which amounts to about 44 Syrians for every 1 Iranian, displays the extent to which Iran is tied to Assad’s repression. If the war in Syria is really about the major powers that are backing each side (Russia, Iran and China for the regime, and Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Western countries for the opposition), and since the fall of Assad would indeed be a “major blow” to the Iranians, can Tehran really be expected to help its foes?
For now, talks with Iran over its nuclear program are expected to resume shortly, even if they’re already off to a bad start. But as the fighting in Syria produces ongoing suffering while the Israeli-led campaign against Iran’s nuclear program continues to involve the potential of a costly military conflict, considering all options on the Syrian diplomatic table be more important now than ever.
“If the Iranians are excluded from a joint effort to do something helpful, they are only more likely to do something unhelpful, said Pillar, who advocates a more flexible US negotiating posture with Iran.
“Engagement with Iran over Syria also can reap secondary benefits in other areas, such as the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, by expanding channels of communication and bargaining space,” he said.
Photo: Feb. 23, 2012. A Free Syrian Army member prepares to fight with a tank whose crew defected from government forces in al-Qsair. Freedom House photo/Creative Commons/Flickr.
]]>News and views relevant to US foreign policy for Sept. 15
“No Rush to War“: The editorial board of the New York Times highlights the Iran Project report – authored and endorsed by a bipartisan group of high-level national security experts – that we discussed earlier this [...]]]>
News and views relevant to US foreign policy for Sept. 15
“No Rush to War“: The editorial board of the New York Times highlights the Iran Project report – authored and endorsed by a bipartisan group of high-level national security experts – that we discussed earlier this week, adding that:
There is no reason to doubt President Obama’s oft-repeated commitment to keep Iran from having a nuclear weapon. But 70 percent of Americans oppose a unilateral strike on Iran, according to a new poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, and 59 percent said if Israel bombs Iran and ignites a war, the United States should not come to its ally’s defense.
Iran is advancing its nuclear program in defiance of the United Nations Security Council. That’s a danger to Israel, the region and all efforts to curb proliferation. But administration officials and many other experts say Iran is still a year or more away from producing an actual weapon, and, if it begins to build one, they will know in time to take retaliatory action.
The best strategy is for Israel to work with the United States and other major powers to tighten sanctions while pursuing negotiations on a deal. It is a long shot, but there is time to talk. And that’s where the focus must be.
“Leadership Rifts Hobble Syrian Rebels“: Charles Levinson of the Wall Street Journal reports on the tensions among anti-regime militias in Aleppo. While the regime’s crackdown against the militias there has been blunted somewhat, at the same time the rebels are hobbled by dearth of unity, men and material. In one camp that Levinson reported from are self-proclaimed local Islamists known as the “Tawhids,” while the other camp is led by an ex-Syrian Army colonel, who does not wholly trust the “Tawhids” because they have carried out extrajudicial killings and are a recruiting rival for his own command:
The colonel’s main tools to force loyalty are his control of weapons caches and a belief by urbanites and exiles funding the cause that Islamist peasants aren’t the proper leaders of the rebellion.
…. For commanders, arms are the way to secure the loyalty of fighters—and cadres of loyal fighters translate into political influence.
…. Similar tensions hurt rebel efforts in the battle for Aleppo’s strategic Salaheddin neighborhood, the bloodiest and most pivotal battle in the war for Aleppo so far.
The divisions among these two forces highlight the problems that proponents of arming the rebels – such as Senators John McCain (R-AZ), Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Joe Lieberman (I-CT) – face in convincing the Obama Administration to authorize arms transfers to the militias. And the Syrian Support Group, so far the only Syrian Diaspora organization authorized (by a special Treasury Department exemption) to raise private funds in the US for the militias, says it has not disbursed any of its funds due to logistical and “vetting” hurdles.
The White House has so far only approved the transfer of several millions dollars worth of non-military aid (as well as some personnel) to assist Syrian exiles in Turkey set up refugee camps and run counterpropaganda campaigns against Syria’s state-run media.
“Watching and waiting as Syria’s violence spreads“: The Washington Post’s editorial board criticizes the Obama Administration for withholding “lethal aid” to Syrian militias fighting against the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Claiming that an al Qaeda resurgence in Iraq (and Syria) and the destabilization of Turkey and Saudi Arabia will likely be the fruits of further US indecision, the editors urge Obama to “reconsider” his decision against arming the anti-Assad militias:
The United States has consequently withheld lethal aid — only to watch a deepening war in which al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups are gaining ground, while Shiite-Sunni clashes have steadily escalated in Iraq and Lebanon.
…. If the fighting continues to spread, important U.S. allies, including Saudi Arabia and Turkey, could be destabilized; both are indirectly backing Sunni fighters. The fragile political order in Iraq, bought with thousands of American lives, could collapse. Al-Qaeda could acquire new recruits and sanctuaries across the region.
The best means of preventing this, as State Department Middle East experts have been pointing out for months, is to accelerate the downfall of the Syrian regime. There are several ways of doing that, short of direct military intervention: materiel aid to the rebels is one. Now that its refusal to take that step has led to the very consequences it warned of, the administration would be wise to reconsider.
“Iraq’s Maliki says backs Syrian people’s wish for reform“: Reuters reports on the “tightrope” that the Iraqi government is walking over the Syrian conflict, caught between Iranian and American expectations as well as its own sectarian fault lines:
]]>Close to Iran himself, Maliki has taken a more muted stance on Syria. He has not joined calls for Assad to quit, much less enforce sanctions against Damascus approved by the Arab League, but has called for reforms to end one-party rule in Syria.
Ali al-Moussawi, Maliki’s media adviser, said the meeting was not the first time Baghdad government leaders had met with Syrian opposition.
“We are with the demands of the Syrian people. We confirmed to the delegation that we are with them, stand with them, but we will never dictate to them and will not interfere in their affairs,” he said.
Former Defense Secretary William Cohen said in aninterview with CNN last night that the U.S. doesn’t want to go to war in Syria, but with tensions mounting between Turkey — a NATO ally — and Syrian dictator Bashar al Assad’s embattled government over a downed Turkish plane, the [...]]]>
Former Defense Secretary William Cohen said in aninterview with CNN last night that the U.S. doesn’t want to go to war in Syria, but with tensions mounting between Turkey — a NATO ally — and Syrian dictator Bashar al Assad’s embattled government over a downed Turkish plane, the U.S.’s alliance may require it to:
COHEN: I think that [Assad] wants to be careful. Russia wants to be careful. NATO wants to be careful that we don’t see this spin out of control that suddenly there’s a war declared against Syria by NATO, which I think doesn’t have the power to declare war, but has the power to declare we’re with Turkey if Turkey should respond from a military point of view… We have to be very careful there. We want to avoid that.
I think the shot that’s been fired is a verbal one, saying that Syria, you’re on notice. If you so much as fire one of our aircraft again, we’re going to retaliate, and it won’t be a very low level. So, I think Syria is on notice.
The United States, the other NATO countries, are saying we’re with you politically. We hope we don’t have to be involved in a war, but if war comes, it’s one nation of NATO, it’s all of us.
Watch the video:
Cohen is referring to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty which states that an attack on one NATO member is an attack on all members, and each “will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”
Turkey’s stance toward Syria’s brutal crackdown on Arab Spring demonstrations last year and, now, military assaults against civilian areas in its civil war with various rebel factions has grown more aggressive. Turkey hosts the main exiled Syrian opposition group, the Syrian National Council, and leadership of the largest rebel faction, the Free Syrian Army. According to reports,Turkey sold anti-tank missiles to the rebels, purchased with Saudia Arabian and Qatari money.
]]>Just as the fall of Kabul and Baghdad ignited a spate of jubilation and self-vindication from proponents of intervention in those countries, the fall of Tripoli has reincarnated this pattern, both from humanitarian interventionists and their U.S.-interest minded counterparts. And now that the Qaddafi regime has completely eroded, even skeptics [...]]]>
Just as the fall of Kabul and Baghdad ignited a spate of jubilation and self-vindication from proponents of intervention in those countries, the fall of Tripoli has reincarnated this pattern, both from humanitarian interventionists and their U.S.-interest minded counterparts. And now that the Qaddafi regime has completely eroded, even skeptics of the war are grudgingly offering recommendations which, they argue, will enhance the situation in Libya for the Transitional National Council (TNC) and Western interests.
Nevertheless, beneath the veneer of what is now touted as a success for the Obama administration’s approach to the Middle East, lies the severity of unanswered questions related to the future of Libya for at least the next 5-10 years.
These uncertainties, much like those which resulted after the collapse of the Iraqi Baathist enterprise or the Afghan Taliban, need to be dissected and openly addressed.
For now, the most glaring queries about the situation in Libya are as follows:
- 1) Does the TNC actually represent the rebel fighters on the ground? In other words, will the rebels, who have essentially been armed and trained by NATO advisers, remain loyal to the TNC – which, by the way, is largely made up of former officials within the Qaddafi power structure? In recent days, the Islamist strand of rebel fighters has openly called the prior assumption of a united Libyan opposition into question.
2) If, for whatever reason, the answer to the previous question is not a definitive “yes”, what then? Richard Haass of the Council on Foreign Relations, initially an opponent of the intervention, has recently come out in favor of foreign troops on the ground, ostensibly to prevent chaos. Yet if one assumes that the TNC and the rebels are united, meaning the former have functional control over the latter, Haass’’s prescription would seem redundant, unless the TNC and rebel fighters were only linked by the tentative and tactical goal of removing Qaddafi.
3) Equally important and related to the prior two, considering that small arms have now proliferated throughout Libya proper, is the question of how disarmament of the civilian fighters will be carried out. If there is no broad-ranging political understanding between the commanding rebels on the ground and the TNC, then more conflict may be looming. More probable though – assuming that an agreement between the rebels and the TNC is not reached – is a scenario where the rebels try to bypass the higher echelon of the TNC, replacing them with officials that are more representative of the fighters on the ground. What will NATO’s response be in such a circumstance?
4) It is estimated that the post-uprising sanctions upon Qaddafi’s regime left approximately $160 billions dollars of Libyan assets abroad frozen. The Atlantic has rightly stated that due to the “many layers of national and international law” Libya will have to go through a “long, tedious legal struggle” to recover those funds. However, some funds have recently been released this past week under “humanitarian grounds”, but only a pittance of the overall sum. If the real goal is to help the Libyan people’s cause, would it not make sense to place the releasing of these assets on a much faster track? While the Atlantic argued that certain aspects of international law and intrastate “red-tape” will make it difficult for Libya to obtain the frozen assets, the country’s extraordinary circumstances would render the releasing of those funds to the TNC in a much smoother and faster pace far more justifiable. So why the delay?
5) Lastly, what will happen if there is chaos? Fears of Baghdad 2.0 have always been present and if there is no political arrangement that is credible and sustainable for the population at large, the possibility for low-grade and sustained violence will be quite high. This dynamic could invite far more intervention than what has already been witnessed.
The downfall of Muammar Qaddafi has brought hope to millions who suffered under his rule, but his departure from the political scene was by no means natural. It therefore remains to be seen whether out of an inorganic situation, a new, indigenous political framework within Libya can be constructed and sustained. If it cannot, then even more questions are bound to arise.
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