by Mark N. Katz
U.S.-Russian relations have sharply deteriorated, to put it mildly, over Ukraine in recent months. There has been widespread talk about the re-emergence of a new Cold War between Washington and Moscow. Indeed, some have even argued that Moscow does not want to see American sanctions on Iran lifted because [...]]]>
by Mark N. Katz
U.S.-Russian relations have sharply deteriorated, to put it mildly, over Ukraine in recent months. There has been widespread talk about the re-emergence of a new Cold War between Washington and Moscow. Indeed, some have even argued that Moscow does not want to see American sanctions on Iran lifted because this would allow Iran to compete with Russia in exporting petroleum to the West and elsewhere. Yet Russia appears willing to cooperate with the U.S. on several issues, including the Iranian nuclear file. What could explain Moscow’s reasoning? At least four possible explanations stand out.
1) The government of President Vladimir Putin is willing to compartmentalize foreign policy issues. Dramatic disagreement with the U.S. on some issues does not preclude Moscow from cooperating with Washington on others where common interests are involved. Both the U.S. and Russia — as well as many other states — want to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, so it makes sense for Moscow to continue working with Washington in pursuit of this aim.
2.) Moscow is working toward a settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue in part to both limit and ameliorate international opposition toward Russian policy vis-à-vis Ukraine. There are quite a few governments that are far more concerned about the prospect of a nuclear Iran than about what Russia does in Ukraine. These include Israel, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and perhaps even some West European members of NATO. Moscow’s continued serious efforts toward a settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue may provide these states with a convenient rationale to avoid joining U.S.-led efforts to criticize Putin over Ukraine.
3) Moscow’s actual ability to scuttle a nuclear agreement with Iran might be limited. Washington and Tehran, of course, have never lacked reasons for disagreeing with each other in the past. But if a final agreement between the U.S. and Iran over its nuclear program is indeed attainable, neither of these states is going to back away from it at Moscow’s behest. Indeed, any Russian effort to prevent a nuclear accord reached by Iran on the one hand and America and its European partners on the other could backfire and result in Moscow looking weak and ineffective — exactly what Putin wants to avoid.
4.) Finally, Russia could make substantial profits following a final nuclear deal with Iran. While it is true that a final agreement and the reduction (if not elimination) of U.S. and international sanctions against Tehran would mean increased competition from Iran for Russia in exporting petroleum, reduced UN sanctions on Iran would allow Russian firms to invest more in the Iranian petroleum sector. Indeed, just like the Shi’a majority government that the U.S. helped bring to power in Baghdad, Tehran may actually see doing business with Russian petroleum firms as advantageous. A wealthier Iran would also be able to purchase far more nuclear reactors, weapons, and other goods from Russia than it can pay for now.
Of course, these explanations are not mutually exclusive. Moscow may continue to work toward a resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue for any or all of the reasons listed above. Moscow’s unwillingness to cooperate with Washington on Ukraine, then, does not mean that Russia will stop cooperating with America on Iran.
*Any republication of this article must be authorized with IPS consent and sourced back to the original source link at www.lobelog.com
Follow LobeLog on Twitter and like us on Facebook.
Photo: U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (center) share a laugh at the signing ceremony of the interim nuclear deal reached with Iran on Nov. 24, 2013 in Geneva, Switzerland.
by Mark N. Katz
As if the crisis in Ukraine wasn’t bad enough, the resulting tensions between Russia on the one hand and the US and most of Europe on the other will likely cause increased tension between Moscow and the West in the Middle East. Moscow can be expected to become [...]]]>
by Mark N. Katz
As if the crisis in Ukraine wasn’t bad enough, the resulting tensions between Russia on the one hand and the US and most of Europe on the other will likely cause increased tension between Moscow and the West in the Middle East. Moscow can be expected to become even more supportive of the Assad regime’s campaign against its opponents in Syria and even less willing to pressure it to pursue peace. Additionally, Moscow may be less willing to pressure Iran to make concessions in its ongoing negotiations with world powers over the nuclear issue. Russia will also try to expand its influence to other Middle Eastern countries.
However, apart from the Syrian regime, others in the Middle East may not welcome these efforts. No matter how much they disagree with Washington on various issues, America’s Arab allies do not see Russia as willing or able to underpin their security like the United States. Indeed, those concerned that the Obama administration is withdrawing from the Middle East will not be pleased about Moscow diverting Washington’s attention to European affairs. Furthermore, Russia and the Middle East compete with each other in the petroleum market. Middle Eastern gas exporters in particular will see a growing European desire to reduce dependence on Russian gas as an opportunity to increase their sales to Europe.
In Syria Moscow played on Western hopes for cooperation with Russia as a means of dissuading Washington from arming the Syrian opposition or intervening on their behalf. Now that the Ukraine crisis has shattered these hopes, the West may become less reluctant to arm the Syrian opposition and more willing to look for alternatives to the jihadist groups they want to avoid. Moscow may still succeed in helping the Assad regime recapture most (if not all) of Syria, but the cost of doing so will now go up.
Iran may also pose more of a problem for Moscow. Now that Russian ties with the West have soured over Ukraine, Moscow may prefer to see Iran remaining at odds with the West rather than improving relations. While there is certainly debate in Iran about the desirability of moving closer to the West, Russia is generally seen by Iranians as a rival and not a friend. Indeed, there are some in Iran who see the worsening of Russian-Western relations as an opportunity for Iran. Growing Western interest in seeing Iranian gas as an alternative to dependence on Russian resources could actually increase the West’s willingness to reduce its economic sanctions on Tehran.
Moscow can also be expected to seek improved ties with other Middle Eastern governments that differ with America over various issues, including its support for Israel and its half-hearted efforts to promote democratization. It is doubtful, though, that Arab governments or publics will see Moscow as much of a champion for the Palestinian cause at a time when Russian-Israeli relations have grown increasingly close. Egypt’s military-dominated government may be unhappy with President Barack Obama for suspending arms transfers over Cairo’s crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood and other internal opponents, but the Egyptian military’s threat of turning to Russia for arms may not be realistic. Egyptian armed forces would have a hard time integrating Russian weaponry into what is now a mainly US-trained and armed force structure. And like Iran, Arab gas exporters (Qatar, Algeria, and potentially Libya) all stand to benefit from European efforts to reduce dependence on Russian gas supplies.
Moreover, Moscow’s annexation of Crimea could lead to an important problem for Russia’s image among Sunnis in the Middle East and elsewhere. If the Muslim Crimean Tatar population, which largely opposed Russia’s move on their territory, is treated badly by their new rulers, concern for their plight could rise in the Muslim World. Renewed opposition activity inside Russia’s North Caucasus and other predominantly Muslim regions and the brutal response this would elicit from Moscow, combined with continued Russian support for Syria’s Alawite minority regime and Shi’a Iran, could contribute to Turks and Sunni Arabs also seeing Russia as anti-Sunni — and to their seeing the West as an essential ally against a common Russian threat.
Finally, the more absorbed the Russian leadership becomes with affairs in Ukraine and Europe in general, the more Moscow’s ability to devote attention and resources to the Middle East may actually decline. Whether Moscow will now be able to increase its influence in the Middle East, then, is very much open to doubt.
]]>