As the Egyptian revolution against Mubarak celebrates its third anniversary, the military junta under General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi is resurrecting dictatorship under the veneer of “constitutional” legitimacy and on the pretense of fighting “terrorism.”
Syria is still ablaze. Yemen has yet to sever the tentacles of the Saleh regime, and [...]]]>
As the Egyptian revolution against Mubarak celebrates its third anniversary, the military junta under General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi is resurrecting dictatorship under the veneer of “constitutional” legitimacy and on the pretense of fighting “terrorism.”
Syria is still ablaze. Yemen has yet to sever the tentacles of the Saleh regime, and Libya remains in the chaotic throes of tribal fissures and militia violence. Tunisia is the only “Arab Spring” country that is transitioning to democracy wisely and pragmatically.
The uprisings in the past three years have rattled Arab dictators and forced Washington to reassess its relations with the region. Arab autocrats have fought the uprisings and resisted all efforts to redesign the decades-old social contract with their people. Four fell.
Those who are still in power continue to inflict destruction on their countries and repress their citizens.
Yet, some policymakers, talking heads, and academics in Washington and other Western capitals are myopically advocating reconciling with existing regimes, including the Syrian tyrant. Self-proclaimed regional experts are advising these policymakers that Gulf monarchies, for example, are stable and secure and should be embraced.
Likewise, some of these experts are calling on Washington to engage the Egyptian military junta because, they argue, Egypt is the centerpiece of American policy and interests in the region. They maintain these interests should trump American values, which were trumpeted by President Barack Obama in his initial support of the anti-Mubarak revolt.
This “expert” advice reflects a shortsighted, shallow knowledge of the region and is devoid of any strategic analysis of future relations between Arab peoples and their rulers. If followed, it would harm long-term US interests in the region.
Let us remember that three years ago, many of these experts missed the Arab Spring all together, as was pointed out in the 2011 Stimson Institute’s Seismic Shift report.
Many academics and journalists paid scant attention to endemic grievances in Arab societies and focused instead on the “deep state” narrative, which they bought from the regimes’ hook, line, and sinker.
A few distinguished American journalists, such as the late Anthony Shadid of the New York Times, were aware of what was boiling below the surface in places like Egypt despite the glossy mask of stability that Mubarak and his fellow autocrats presented to the outside world.
It is unfortunately understandable that some policymakers and academics are leaning toward accepting this narrative now because they are becoming disgusted with the bloody tumult across the region and the rise of radicalism and terrorism.
Some academics similarly are trumpeting the “stability” narrative, especially in the Gulf. These “access academics” — who forego serious analysis of regimes’ repressive policies in order to be allowed into those countries and meet with officials — are repeating the same analysis they offered before the revolutions of 2011.
In the Gulf monarchies, as the British academic Christopher Davidson of Durham University has pointed out in his book After the Sheiks, the absence of legitimacy, continued repression, and sectarianism will hasten the collapse of these tribal regimes.
Professor Davidson maintains some academics, retired generals and sitting and former diplomats are peddling the “stability” fiction for potential access and economic gain.
Promising business deals, lucrative post-retirement jobs, country visits, and Gulf investment in European and American university buildings are even influencing the type of research, analysis, and academic conferences that are being conducted on the present and future of Gulf monarchies.
Fortunately, some scholars such as Toby Matthiesen of Cambridge University are seriously assessing the long-term destructive nature of bloody sectarianism across the region, which for the most part is being pushed by regimes.
Several factors are driving this pernicious phenomenon. First, although dictators fell, most of the old regimes remained intact. The re-emergence of the Mubarak-era dictatorship under General Sisi is the most vivid example.
The military junta’s harsh sentencing of Ahmad Maher, Ahmad Duma, and Muhammad Adel–key activists in the January 2011 revolution–and the espionage charges against two of Egypt’s most prominent intellectuals, Emad Shahin and Amr Hamzawy, signal that the deep security state is alive and well in Egypt.
The military’s harsh crackdown against all opposition–secular and Islamist–belies its claim that Egypt is on the road to democracy.
The recent branding of the Muslim Brotherhood as a “terrorist” organization moves Egypt away from political reconciliation, the new “constitution” notwithstanding. In fact, the recently ratified document enshrines the power of the military as an institution impervious to any form of accountability.
The politically motivated capital crime charges against the deposed President Morsi and other Muslim Brotherhood leaders underpin the vengeful anti-democratic policies of General Sisi.
Despite flagrant human rights violations and sham trials, the Obama administration is tragically maintaining its military aid to the Egyptian military.
Furthermore, the US State Department has withdrawn the name of Robert Ford as Ambassador Designate to Egypt from consideration in response to objections from the Egyptian military, according to media reports.
Second, the authoritarian regimes that are still in power are employing comprehensive hard and soft power tools, violently and viciously, in order to keep their rule. Bashar al-Assad has rendered his country a wasteland, killing over a hundred and thirty thousand Syrians and forcing millions to become refugees in an attempt to defeat the opposition.
Much like Egypt’s Sisi, he is feverishly trying to convince Washington and other Western capitals that he is the most effective force against terrorism and (Saudi) Wahhabi extremism. His foreign minister has repeatedly stated that if Western leaders hope to keep Salafi jihadists from overrunning Syria, Assad is their man.
It would be tragic if Washington falls for this ruse. It was Assad who worked closely with radical Salafis first in Iraq and then in Syria. He had hoped Salafis would discredit the moderate, secular opposition–a self-fulfilling prophecy he is happy to see come to pass.
Third, as these regimes fail to defeat their popular revolts and reject meaningful dialogue with the opposition, radical elements and Salafi jihadists begin to fill the power vacuum in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere. The ensuing stalemate is already producing more turbulence, anemic economies, debilitating uncertainty, and diminishing personal security.
No winner will emerge in the foreseeable future, which hopefully would force Washington to make hard choices. Simply put, these choices involve drawing a morally palatable balance between values and interests. If Washington hopes to be on the right side of history, interests should never be allowed to trump values of good governance, certainly not in the wake of the Arab uprisings of 2011.
]]>by Emile Nakhleh
The massive demonstrations in Egypt and the growing calls for Morsi to step down indicate his democratic “sputtering start” has ground to a halt. It is equally disconcerting that many within the opposition—secularists, liberals, Christians, women, and even Salafis—who fought against the Mubarak military regime are now welcoming the [...]]]>
by Emile Nakhleh
The massive demonstrations in Egypt and the growing calls for Morsi to step down indicate his democratic “sputtering start” has ground to a halt. It is equally disconcerting that many within the opposition—secularists, liberals, Christians, women, and even Salafis—who fought against the Mubarak military regime are now welcoming the possibility of a military intervention in Egyptian politics.
As President Barak Obama said recently, elections do not make a democracy. Military usurpation of this process, however, will not be good for Egypt. Such an act in the name of national security would take Egypt backward and would make a mockery of the principles of freedom, justice, and inclusion for which millions demonstrated thirty months ago.
President Morsi is the rightfully elected leader of Egypt and should not be thrown out of office lightly or under the threat of a military takeover. Yet, he has not governed well. Incompetence, insensitivity toward minorities and other groups that do not share the Muslim Brotherhood ideology, reticence to consult with his cabinet, and an inability to revive the economy have marred his rule.
In all fairness, he inherited a dictatorial, military top-heavy, corrupt regime, as well as an economy in steep decline. Furthermore, several groups have opposed his election and refused to be governed by a Muslim Brotherhood man. And they have worked feverishly to defeat him.
Ironically, this is not dissimilar to how some U.S. politicians have felt about President Barak Obama’s election. Those who were bent on defeating President Obama have used the courts, state legislatures, the Republican-controlled House of Representatives, the threat of a filibuster in the Senate, and the ballot box to advance their agenda.
Egyptian oppositionists, by contrast, have gone to the streets despite their seeming initial acceptance of the results of last year’s election.
Elements from the old regime, members of the top brass in the military, radical Salafis, and some influential middle-class, self-described liberals and secularists seem to have one goal in common: to undo the Morsi presidency. They have refused to cooperate with him, hoping that a failed government would lead to the dismantling of the Muslim Brotherhood’s grip on post-Mubarak Egyptian politics.
They have also accused Washington of siding with the Muslim Brotherhood and coddling Morsi. The fact is, since the “Arab Spring” the Obama administration has been willing to work with incumbent Islamic political parties as long as they are tolerant, inclusive, pragmatic, and committed to compromise and peaceful resolution of disputes.
So far, the Obama administration has taken a correct course of action in calling on the Egyptian military not to scuttle the democratic process and urging Morsi to address his people’s demands tangibly, concretely, and immediately.
When he came to office, Morsi promised to be president of all of Egypt. Unfortunately, he failed to deliver. As a majority in the parliament, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, unlike their counterpart in Tunisia, has shown no inclination to form alliances with other parties and groups.
While he halted the downward spiral of the economy and successfully sought international loans, the daily life of the average Egyptian has worsened. In the past year, Egyptians have suffered from a lack of personal security and high unemployment.
Egyptian women under the new regime have been subjected to widespread personal attacks, sexual abuse, and humiliation. Morsi and his government have failed to combat the pervasive terror against women meaningfully and convincingly.
Lawlessness and joblessness are rampant. Thuggery and fear have replaced civility and hope.
Under Mubarak, state security agencies, the police, and the military were always ready to terrorize the opposition into submission. People were afraid, and the regime governed by fear.
People are no longer afraid and are willing to head to the streets to express their grievances.
In an IPS op-ed three months ago, I argued that in order to put Egypt on the right track, President Morsi should take several important steps immediately, including replacing the current constitution with one that is committed to tolerance, diversity, and social and political inclusion. But he failed to do so, and the situation deteriorated.
To save Egypt from total collapse and to prevent a possible civil war, Morsi should take a series of immediate actions. First, address the nation forcefully, clearly, and convincingly about the steps he intends to take.
Second, dissolve the government and appoint a new interim one that would represent all segments of the Egyptian people—gender, ideology, and religious affiliation.
Third, call for a national parliamentary election to be held within three months. That election should be much more simplified than the previous one. Parties would be allowed to offer slates of candidates for people to vote on. All political parties could compete in these elections; the party that garners a majority or a large plurality would be charged with forming a national coalition government.
Fourth, hold a presidential election no later than six months after the convening of the new parliament. Fifth, organize and lead a national conference of leaders representing the different segments of Egyptian society for the purpose of developing a comprehensive economic recovery, directed primarily at youth unemployment.
It might be too late for the opposition to be mollified by these actions or for the military to resist the temptation to take over the country. But the alternative of continued violence, instability, lawlessness, and joblessness will be catastrophic for the country. The U.S. and its European allies, together with international financial institutions, should work diligently to prevent Egypt’s descent into chaos.
Photo Credit: Cam McGrath/IPS
]]>by Henry Precht
I spent six years of my Foreign Service career in Egypt during the 1960s and early 80s and got to know the country fairly well. Over recent weeks I have been trying to make sense of the wintery Arab Spring that has descended.
In my last assignment, when [...]]]>
by Henry Precht
I spent six years of my Foreign Service career in Egypt during the 1960s and early 80s and got to know the country fairly well. Over recent weeks I have been trying to make sense of the wintery Arab Spring that has descended.
In my last assignment, when as number two in the Cairo embassy I used to brief congressmen and other visiting VIPs, my opening pitch went like this: “All the world, they say, is composed of a mixture of four elements: earth, air, fire and water. Everything, that is, except Egypt. Egypt is made up of four different elements: People, ideology, oil and water. The tragedy of Egypt is that it has too much of the first two and too little of the second two.”
Still true, especially when you mix religion with ideology.
If I were still in the same business today, I would say, “The people’s chosen leader Mohamed Morsi and chosen party the Moslem Brotherhood, are hard pressed from two sides: Radical Islamic Salafis on the right and secular liberals (including old regime remnants) on the left. Each of them is trying to bring Morsi down so that they may inherit power. Such egotism hasn’t been exhibited in Egypt since Pharaoh Akhenaten. They appear willing to destroy Egypt in order to destroy Morsi.
That isn’t all Morsi has to worry about. Trying to pull him down from the lower depths are the football thugs, an anarchic force that has been building for years. They are Egypt’s answer to the civil war militias of Lebanon, the komitehs of revolutionary Iran and the rebels of Libya and Syria — young men without hope who can only express themselves with violence. I suspect they are hired or sometimes joined by the other three groups – Salafis, MB and seculars.
“If that wasn’t enough to make Cleopatra leave for Rome, there is on top of all this strife the weight of a dismal economy, pressing down on the regime and its opponents. Peace and ordinary life cannot be achieved in Egypt until the economy re-starts. And the economy cannot regain life until there is a measure of peace and harmony.
“I haven’t mentioned the ‘foreign hand’ of alleged outside manipulation of events that has always made an appearance and received the blame when there is trouble. So far, it seems not to be a prominent factor, but don’t give up on it. In the minds of conspiracy theorists, Israel, the US and the rich Persian Gulf states may be glimpsed waiting off stage in the shadows.
“How is this cycle to be broken? In the past when troubles flared and mobs ran wild, they burned a library and went home, coming by the next day to check out a book or seek a visa. We know Egyptians to be resilient, with a sense of humor, tolerant and understanding of others and ready to patch up what doesn’t work. This time, however, politics looks different — more like a football game: Winning is all-important: ‘if I don’t win, I’ve been cheated and will seek revenge until my ego is recognized.’
“The obvious answer to this tragic question is a charismatic leader – a Nasser or Khomeini who can restore order as much by force of personality as by armed strength. That person isn’t likely to be a transfigured Morsi. Is there maybe a colonel waiting in the wings?”
As the foregoing ramble makes abundantly clear, I don’t have any good answers. Nobody does. We have to rely on those qualities that have kept Egypt going for millennia to reassert themselves and put the country back on track to a better future. How long a wait? Nobody knows.
Photo credit: Jonathan Rashad
]]>When I was living in Cairo, the transition to winter was sometimes smooth. The beastly oven of summer changed slowly into a bearable fall of cool-warm. The fall moved from the cool-warm to a few weeks of cold, or at least what was cold to Egypt. These were smooth changes. It [...]]]>
When I was living in Cairo, the transition to winter was sometimes smooth. The beastly oven of summer changed slowly into a bearable fall of cool-warm. The fall moved from the cool-warm to a few weeks of cold, or at least what was cold to Egypt. These were smooth changes. It seemed so normal. We even delighted in the cold evenings when we could wear sweaters while sailing on the Nile. It felt like a novelty the first time; then it was comfortable to change with the changes and dig out our sweaters in late November.
The recent cold winds to hit Cairo and Egypt came as a shock to some. These cold winds came from the decrees of President Mohamed Morsi. He was supposed to be the protector and developer of democracy according to many. He has turned out — for many — to be quite different. He essentially grabbed the powers of the judicial, executive and the legislative branches of the baby democracy that is developing in Egypt. He stole the candy from the baby, according to many in Egypt.
Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood supporters cheered in delight. Just about everyone else felt the cold winds. They also felt that their revolution was falling prey to a manipulative, dangerous and very clever man. The person who the Brotherhood really wanted at first had the last name of Al-Shater, “the clever one”. The real clever one turns out to be the person that many called “the spare tire” — the American-educated “former” leader in the Muslim Brotherhood, Mohamed Morsi Isa El-Ayat. The last part of his name might give some in the west pause, if they are thinking.
Egypt for now is looking more like Iran in 1979 than ever before.
The liberals and intellectuals were the original igniters and leaders of the Egyptian revolution; the Muslim Brotherhood took it from them. There were discussions about inclusivity, but as the Copts, liberals, Wafd and others left, the Constitutional and other committees made no effort to reincorporate them. There was a collective crocodile sigh and the leadership went on with the committees.
The press, other media, academics, government officials and more are being packed by members of, or loyalists to, the Muslim Brotherhood. Discussions about applying a somewhat strict version of Sharia in Egypt get more heated by the day, while the opposition apparently continues to be sidelined from the game. The extremist Salafis seem to have more voice in the new Egypt than the academics or even the experienced umdas (village leaders) in some areas.
Sectarian tensions are mounting. The recently elevate Pope of the Copts has stated publicly that he rejects the mounting power of the extremists and wants his flock to be considered full members of Egyptian society. Given that the Copts make up around 8-10 percent of the country, that makes sense.
A working democracy requires inclusivity. It needs a sort of equality supported not just voting, but other civil and social rights too. It took the United States over a century to move toward greater voting and other rights for minorities. These were hard fought battles that started with the bloodiest war in American history, the Civil War, and went on into the 1960s with the various civil rights and voting acts. This process is ongoing.
Democracy is a fragile thing; extremism is its worst enemy. Al Ahram provides a translation of President Morsi’s recent decrees here:
“We have decided the following:
Article I
Reopen the investigations and prosecutions in the cases of the murder, the attempted murder and the wounding of protesters as well as the crimes of terror committed against the revolutionaries by anyone who held a political or executive position under the former regime, according to the Law of the Protection of the Revolution and other laws.
Article II:
Previous constitutional declarations, laws, and decrees made by the president since he took office on 30 June 2012, until the constitution is approved and a new People’s Assembly [lower house of parliament] is elected, are final and binding and cannot be appealed by any way or to any entity. Nor shall they be suspended or canceled and all lawsuits related to them and brought before any judicial body against these decisions are annulled.
Article III:
The prosecutor-general is to be appointed from among the members of the judiciary by the President of the Republic for a period of four years commencing from the date of office and is subject to the general conditions of being appointed as a judge and should not be under the age of 40. This provision applies to the one currently holding the position with immediate effect.
Article IV:
The text of the article on the formation of the Constituent Assembly in the 30 March 2011 Constitutional Declaration that reads, “it shall prepare a draft of a new constitution in a period of six months from the date it was formed” is to be amended to “it shall prepare the draft of a new constitution for the country no later than eight months from the date of its formation.”
Article V:
No judicial body can dissolve the Shura Council [upper house of parliament] or the Constituent Assembly.
Article VI:
The President may take the necessary actions and measures to protect the country and the goals of the revolution.
Article VII:
This Constitutional Declaration is valid from the date of its publication in the official gazette.” (Emphasis supplied)
The paragraphs in bold and italics are the ones that are really worrying and angering so many in Egypt. They are also the ones that have sparked violence on the streets of Cairo and in many other places in Egypt. They have spurred a call for the impeachment of the President. They have instigated a strike by the judges in the country that will further paralyze a legal system that has been in various forms of paralysis for decades. That strike is also due to the firing of the chief prosecutor, who was apparently replaced by a judge with Muslim Brotherhood sympathies.
The Egyptian stock market tumbled yesterday and had to be shut down. It had a relatively feeble increase today. The cold winds seem to be keeping investors away. The sense of risk is still there. If more negative events take place, the market could fall again.
Demonstrations and counter demonstrations are being called. There will likely be more violence, more worry and anxiety amongst Egyptians and more hardening of opinions across the ever-widening political divide in this great country gone astray.
The fact that top judges have said they are planning to meet with President Morsi is a hopeful sign. Of course, after all the hard feelings, I am not sure what could come from that. The journalists union may call a strike; there were fist fights and loud yelling matches in the journalists’ union building yesterday. The organization that represents a lot of the fellahin or peasant farmers in Egypt stated its anger at Morsi’s decrees by saying the servitude of the peasants was over. The younger people are still fired up. The ULTRAs, the soccer fans for Ahly, Zamalek and others who were a major part of the disturbances and demonstrations since the early days of the revolution are also out in the streets again and looking for a fight.
The Muslim Brotherhood has called for a pro-Morsi demonstration. The anti-Morsi groups have called for other demonstrations. The offices of the Muslim Brotherhood have been attacked in many areas, including in Damanhour in Behaira Province, where one really would not expect such violence. A 15-year-old boy died in that attack.
Those thinking about investing in Egypt will likely shy away even more. Tourism will be shattered if this does not settle down soon. The winter season is the most important for tourism in Egypt. The IMF loan and some of the foreign aid packages for Egypt could also be in jeopardy. Capital flight is likely to increase. Unemployment and inflation are likely to get worse. The sense of hope in the county will likely be worsened. This is most important for the youth in the country. They have mostly very hard, impoverished and frustrating lives. They are also the demographic that could drive the country into another revolution for the poor, the unemployed and the hungry.
A cold wind indeed has come to Egypt.
One can hope that the cold winds will subside and warm a bit before the politics of Egypt freezes over into immovable camps. One can hope that there will be true dialogue and a moving forward for the country in many ways.
The revolution was the greatest event to take place in a very long time for most Egyptians. Many died and even more were injured. A post-revolution Egypt needs to be for all Egyptians, as many in the opposition have stated.
The Muslim Brotherhood should be listening and listening hard to what is going on. Winning a hair-thin election is not a mandate. There are many people in Egypt — all over Egypt — who do not like and do not trust the Muslim Brotherhood. Their time in power could be very short if they do not respond to the calls for equity, inclusiveness and great open-mindedness. Many also see the Morshid, the spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, Mohammed Badei, as the man behind many of the decisions made by President Morsi. This is proving to be very dangerous for the stability of Egypt.
Egypt is a complex country facing a very challenging future. If it cannot move towards democracy and prosperity in a more stable and efficient way, great trouble lies ahead. The cold winds of November 2012 could be warm in comparison to what’s waiting.
Sawt means voice and vote in Arabic. If positions in Egypt harden and more and more people are left behind or shoved aside, the voices of even the so-far-silent could get much louder.
- Paul Sullivan is an internationally recognized expert on security issues including energy security, water security and food security in the Middle East and North Africa. He is an economist by training and a multidisciplinary public intellectual by choice. He is an Adjunct Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University.
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