by Henry Precht

Secretary John Kerry made an unannounced stop in Baghdad Sunday to press the Iraqis to deny permission for Iranian overflights that might be carrying arms to Syria. There was no immediate word whether the Shia-led government would agree or not. To do so would mean offending Tehran, its [...]]]> via Lobe Log

by Henry Precht

Secretary John Kerry made an unannounced stop in Baghdad Sunday to press the Iraqis to deny permission for Iranian overflights that might be carrying arms to Syria. There was no immediate word whether the Shia-led government would agree or not. To do so would mean offending Tehran, its semi-ally, and hurting the threatened Syrian regime, which it quietly supports against Sunni rebels.

Kerry’s demand, almost certainly to be quietly rejected by Baghdad, was greeted with approval by the American, strongly anti-Assad press. The Obama Administration was finally able to declare that it was “doing something meaningful” to aid the Syrian rebels and push Bashar al Assad out of Damascus. A gesture, perhaps, useful for buying time and cooling demands for the full commitment of US forces in the conflict. Even more useful in this regard were reports of CIA assistance to the rebels in transporting weapons from Saudi Arabia and Qatar to Assad’s foes. Helping rebels and blocking supplies to Assad reinforce the rhetoric of active American engagement against Damascus.

But are these prudent moves? Does the US posture on the Syrian civil war make long-term sense?

Not if Washington means what it says when it constantly urges peace and harmony for the Middle East. The US — despite denials — is aligning itself with one of its two openly castigated enemies in the region — Sunni fanaticism of the al Qaeda variety — in order to weaken the other: the Iranian clerical regime and its cousin, Hezbollah. Rather than seeking some sort of accord between regime and rebels and restraining the latter’s backers, Obama’s stated policy is to keep the pressure on Assad to yield unconditionally, whatever the cost to his nation.

This policy masks three acute dangers for America in the Middle East.

First, it prolongs the increasingly deadly conflict which has taken tens of thousands of lives, turned over a million Syrians into refugees and is rapidly destroying a diverse community that, albeit ruled by an oppressive dictatorship, was largely at peace. Sunnis, Alawites, Christians — even a handful of Jews — Kurds, wealthy businessmen and rural villagers lived their lives in greater security than their similarly diverse neighbors in Lebanon and Iraq. Syria’s social fabric is now in shreds. The regime that once collaborated with Washington against al Qaeda and brought a measure of stability to Lebanon now finds Obama has turned against it.

Of course, the Assad regime is in part responsible for the ruin of Syria. Its untempered resistance to an outsider-fueled, partly foreign-manned rebellion with a divided leadership means that the dictatorship will not survive intact when the fighting ends. Given the level of violence his forces have inflicted, Assad himself does not deserve to survive. The intensity of the conflict also means that whatever the coloration or shape of a successor regime, the newcomers will have to deal with die-hard Assad loyalists. The same would be true if Assad supporters somehow survive in whole or as a mere remnant. We saw this future prefigured in Iraq and Lebanon after their main battles were over. It is not a future that Washington would have designed or that will prosper its avowed purposes in the region. Bad choices early on mean Washington must live with terrible events later.

A second danger for the US arises from the fact that the Syrian conflict must be seen as part of the larger Sunni-Shia strife that is being waged by Saudi Arabia and its often subsidized allies in mosques and chancelleries in the Arab and Turkish worlds. This struggle is manifested in the massacres that occur with some regularity in Iraq and Pakistan, in the suppressed Shia uprising in Bahrain and in the crackdown on activists in the Arabian Peninsula. Much of this assertion of Sunni dominance is, without doubt, locally fostered. It seems highly probable, however, that Saudi and other Gulf Arab funds are the source of support — much of it openly, some of it covertly.

The US, for a variety of reasons — largely the warmth of relations with cash and oil-rich Saudi Arabia and the domestic influence of Israel – finds itself enlisted with the Sunnis in this spreading conflict. This is not the kind of entanglement Obama’s Washington could have wished for; it is the sort of thinking that the neocons have worked for.

Thirdly, there is the significant byproduct of this sectarian division that has trapped the US: a deep-seated and abiding hostility towards Iran. Saudi Arabia and Israel are determined that Iran will not rise to a position that will threaten their implicitly shared hegemony in the region. It wouldn’t take Iran’s unveiling of an actual nuclear weapon to do that; home grown nuclear power (with the implicit ability to weaponize) would give Tehran prestige that would cast a shadow over Riyadh and Jerusalem. Intolerable for them –- and for Washington’s ambitions.

Worse, the continuing pressure on Tehran and its resistance could bring open warfare led by Israel and the US. Thus, the end of the track of the Syrian war could be a conflict that will work severe damage for American interests far beyond the Middle East.

We can only hope that Obama and his team will find the vision to foresee the unintended wreck that may lie ahead. To be sure, there will be tough congressional and media criticism and active opposition against any American move to relieve the pressure on Assad and join the Russians in promoting compromise between the two sides. The Administration can argue that the overthrow of Assad will mean al Qaeda rule in Damascus, but many will reject that argument. There are no easy choices: ending Syria’s war will mean applying strong pressure on Saudi Arabia and Turkey to cease and desist. It will be messy, but a negotiated truce will slow down the killing and end the drift towards a major war.

The ultimate stakes for regional stability are too high and the continued suffering of the Syria people too great for America to allow the war to continue and probably escalate. The President will have to show uncustomary political courage. We can only hope he will.

Official White House photo by Pete Souza. 

It’s not easy for a European observer of US politics to understand why the US Congress seems so much more concerned by Iran’s nuclear activities than by those of North Korea (the DPRK). Congressional pressure on the White House to put a stop to Iranian activities seems never-ending and Congressional majorities [...]]]> via Lobe Log

It’s not easy for a European observer of US politics to understand why the US Congress seems so much more concerned by Iran’s nuclear activities than by those of North Korea (the DPRK). Congressional pressure on the White House to put a stop to Iranian activities seems never-ending and Congressional majorities for anti-Iranian resolutions are staggering. In comparison, when did Congress last pass a resolution requiring the administration to take action against the DPRK?

On the face of it, this makes little sense. To a European, North Korea looks to be a greater and more actual threat to US interests than Iran.

North Korea is sitting atop enough plutonium for perhaps a dozen nuclear weapons. Two underground nuclear tests have shown that the North Koreans are able to put together nuclear devices, though experts surmise that these are still somewhat rudimentary.

North Korea has also acquired the capacity to enrich uranium. Western experts have seen a relatively small enrichment plant at the main DPRK nuclear research centre. There has been speculation that there exists a larger plant deep within the mountains in the North of the country.

Iran has no plutonium. Iran possesses enough low-enriched uranium for half a dozen nuclear weapons but has so far shown no sign of wanting to enrich this material to the 90% level required for weapons. The Iranians are not suspected of having conducted nuclear tests; they may not be capable of assembling a workable nuclear explosive device.

North Korea expelled the inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at the end of 2002, and has only allowed them back in for a brief period since. Over the last ten years no state has received as many IAEA inspections as Iran, whose two enrichment plants were declared to the IAEA before they started to operate.

North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in early 2003, having failed to correct the nuclear safeguards non-compliance declared by the IAEA in 1993. Iran corrected its pre-2004 safeguards failures within two years of their discovery; it expressed regret over these transgressions; and ever since it has affirmed the fullest of commitments to the NPT, to which it became a party fifteen years before the DPRK.

North Korea’s nuclear weapons are viewed as a threat by two of the US’s most valuable allies: Japan and South Korea (the ROK). These two allies are crucial to the US’s defence of its strategic interests in the Western Pacific. In the event of hostilities between the US and China (heaven forefend!) Japan would offer the US vital staging facilities, akin to those the US would have enjoyed in the UK if the US needed to go to war on the European mainland.

US strategic interests in South West Asia are on the wane. The US is now self-sufficient in natural gas and imports less than 12% of the crude oil it consumes from the Gulf; it could quite easily switch to African and American suppliers if Saudi and Iraqi supplies were threatened. Over the last decade the risk of Iraqi transfers of WMDs to Al Qaeda and Al Qaeda acquisition of safe havens in the Middle East has been eliminated (albeit at a price!).

Since the end of the Cold War, over twenty years ago, no single power has been capable of challenging US influence in South West Asia, whereas China is increasingly seen in the US as an emerging challenger to the US in East Asia.

When it comes to making belligerent noises, Iran’s leaders can’t hold a candle to those of North Korea. And the average alienist would surely find it easier to treat the former than the latter.

In 2011 US merchandise exports to the Far East were worth $286 billion and imports $718 billion. Comparable figures for South West Asia, including Turkey and Israel, were $71 billion and $108 billion. Far Eastern investors supply the US with a far larger percentage of external credit than do Middle Eastern investors. Far Eastern corporations are major employers and tax-payers in the United States.

All of these very basic facts must be familiar to Congressional staffers, if not to members of Congress. So how can one explain the disproportionate attention that Congress pays to Iran’s nuclear activities?

I have a theory. But I think it would be more appropriate for me to leave readers to come up with their own answers. I suspect that most will be honest enough to admit to themselves that they have a pretty shrewd idea as well.

News and views relevant to US foreign policy for Sept. 10

“The Interview: Zbigniew Brzezinski”: An interview with former US Secretary of State Zbigniew Brzezinski in the Tokyo-based publication the Diplomat includes Brzezinski’s thoughts on Iran and the Arab Spring:

Q: You have long advocated negotiating seriously with Iran, something the [...]]]> via Lobe Log

News and views relevant to US foreign policy for Sept. 10

“The Interview: Zbigniew Brzezinski”: An interview with former US Secretary of State Zbigniew Brzezinski in the Tokyo-based publication the Diplomat includes Brzezinski’s thoughts on Iran and the Arab Spring:

Q: You have long advocated negotiating seriously with Iran, something the Obama administration at least came into office intent on doing. Before talks got underway, however, street protests broke out in Tehran following the 2009 Presidential election. While the administration claimed this came as a complete shock to them, I imagine it was less so for you given that in 2007 you stated that Iran “is a country that may be confronting serious internal problems once Iranians don’t feel that the outside world, and particularly the United States, is subjecting them to a siege.” You also have personal experience with handling street demonstrations in Tehran. How did the Obama administration do in responding to the 2009 Iran protests in your opinion? What about the uprising that latter swept through much of the Arab world?

A: I do not feel that the United States had much freedom of action insofar as a response to the upheavals in Iran and more generally in the Middle East is concerned.  These processes are inherently connected with social change within the region, and especially so in regards to the phenomenon of massive political awakening of their younger populations.  The rhetoric that is used in that connection by many of the spokesmen involved in the upheavals tends to be democratic, but democracy is not necessarily the real object of mass political aspirations.  The aspirations are rooted in historical resentments, social discrimination, financial envy, and sheer frustration.  The result tends to be assertive populism which is not to be confused with imminent institutionalization of democratic processes.

“Saudi Arabia May Become Oil Importer by 2030, Citigroup Says”: A research report from Citigroup this week projected that at present domestic consumption rates, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will become a net importer of oil by 2030:

Oil and its derivatives are used for about half of the kingdom’s electricity production, which at peak rates is growing at about 8 percent a year, the bank said today in a an e-mailed report. A quarter of the country’s fuel production is used domestically, more per capita than other industrialized nations, as the cost is subsidized, according to the note.

“If Saudi Arabian oil consumption grows in line with peak power demand, the country could be a net oil importer by 2030,” Heidy Rehman, an analyst at the bank, wrote. The country already consumes all its natural-gas production and plans to develop nuclear power, which pose execution risk amid a lack of available experts, safety issues and cost overruns, Rehman said.

Last year the Guardian reported that a handful of Aramco executives had confided to US and Saudi officials that “the kingdom’s crude oil reserves may have been overstated by as much as 300bn barrels – nearly 40%” in recent years.

“France gives Syria “liberated zones” aid, mulls weapons – source”: Moving ahead of Turkey, the UK and the US, Reuters reports that France, one of the more enthusiastic voices in support of Syrian rebels — “has started helping rebel-held parts of Syria so these “liberated zones” can run themselves and is considering the possibility of supplying heavy artillery to protect them from government attacks.”

According to Reuters:

Paris said last week it had identified areas in the north, south and east that had escaped President Bashar al-Assad’s control, creating a chance for local communities to govern themselves without residents feeling they had to flee Syria.

“In zones where the regime has lost control, such as Tal Rifaat (40 km north of Aleppo), which has been free five months, local revolutionary councils have been set up to help the population and put in place an administration for these towns so as to avoid chaos like in Iraq when the regime pulls back,” the source said.

The source said France, which last week promised an extra 5 million euros ($6.25 million) to help Syrians, had started giving aid and money on Friday to five local authorities from three provinces – Deir al-Zor, Aleppo and Idlib. The areas are home to about 700,000 people.

Additional British and US humanitarian and communications aid has also been promised in the past few weeks. The Syrian government has complained that this aid is going to jihadist groups, the New York Times reports, also citing a report in Reuters in which the director of Doctors Without Borders claimed to have encountered many anti-Assad foreign fighters in Aleppo.

Supporters of the rebels, including unnamed US officials speaking to the Telegraph, have countered that all aid recipients have been carefully vetted for links to jihadist organizations.

“Bridging the U.S.-Israeli gap on Iran”: The Washington Post’s editorial board weighs in on the Democrat party controversy over whether or not to include language on Jerusalem in the 2012 party platform. The editors mainly focused on “the differences between Mr. Obama and Mr. Netanyahu over the urgency of considering military action against Iran.” The Post urges the administration to redress “the bizarre spectacle of senior U.S. military and diplomatic officials focusing their time and attention on trying to prevent an Israeli attack rather than an Iranian bomb” and publicly state that all options, and specifically military actions, are on the table:

Certainly there would be dangers to a more explicit presidential statement, including that the United States would start down a slippery slope toward war. But if Mr. Obama really is determined to take military action if Iran takes decisive steps toward producing a bomb, such as enriching uranium to bomb-grade levels or expelling inspectors, he would be wise to say so publicly. Doing so would improve relations with Mr. Netanyahu and deter unilateral Israeli action — and it might well convince Iran that the time has come to compromise.

The “Arab Spring” has overturned three Arab dictators and offered the possibility of democratic reforms in the Middle East and North Africa at a pace far exceeding what many observers had predicted before the beginning of demonstrations and protests in December 2010. But the rapid transitions in [...]]]> Reposted by arrangement with Think Progress

The “Arab Spring” has overturned three Arab dictators and offered the possibility of democratic reforms in the Middle East and North Africa at a pace far exceeding what many observers had predicted before the beginning of demonstrations and protests in December 2010. But the rapid transitions in the region have given way to frequent mistreatment of religious and ethnic minorities according to the State Departments annual “International Religious Freedom Report.”

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, speaking at the report’s launch yesterday, said:

In the Middle East and North Africa, the transitions to democracy have inspired the world, but they have also exposed ethnic and religious minorities to new dangers. People have been killed by their own neighbors because of their ethnicity or their faith. In other places, we’ve seen governments stand by while sectarian violence, inflamed by religious animosities, tears communities apart. Now, the people of the region have taken exciting first steps toward democracy—but if they hope to consolidate their gains, they cannot trade one form of repression for another.

In February, Coptic Christians and Muslims offered a united front in Tahrir square, demanding that Egyptian strongman Hosni Mubarak step down. But the show of unity has been short-lived, according to the report, which highlighted attacks against Copts, Egypt’s Christian minority, and condemned the Egyptian government’s failure to prosecute crimes against Copts or redress laws that discriminate against Christians.

Clinton also noted mistreatment in Iraq, where she said the “hateful, senseless” Monday attack on Shiite pilgrims had “no aim other than to undermine the fabric of a peaceful society,” and Libya, where there have been attacks on sub-Saharan African and Egyptian migrants.

While Middle East and North African countries received special attention due to the recent pro-democracy movements and the steps towards more inclusive governance in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, the “countries of particular concern” in the State Department’s report are Burma, China, Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Uzbekistan.

All of the countries “of particular concern” have been sanctioned by the U.S. except Saudi Arabia and Uzbekistan.