by Mitchell Plitnick
In an article published in The Hill, Mike Coogan reports that some of the key legislation that emerged from the American Israel Public Affairs Committee’s (AIPAC) 2013 annual policy conference is running into significant difficulties in Congress. The bills, which Lara Friedman only half-jokingly called [...]]]>
by Mitchell Plitnick
In an article published in The Hill, Mike Coogan reports that some of the key legislation that emerged from the American Israel Public Affairs Committee’s (AIPAC) 2013 annual policy conference is running into significant difficulties in Congress. The bills, which Lara Friedman only half-jokingly called the “Israel Best Ally With Benefits” bills, have not gained close to the overwhelming support that AIPAC has come to expect from Congress.
Indeed, more than five weeks after the United States-Israel Strategic Partnership Act of 2013 was introduced in the Senate, it has gathered only 18 co-sponsors. That’s a shockingly low total for a focal point of AIPAC lobbying. It has done better in the House of Representatives, with 171 co-sponsors, but given the more hawkish nature of the House, even that’s not a success by AIPAC’s standards.
While one shouldn’t make too much of this, it certainly seems like AIPAC reached a little too far with this bill. The main issue is a portion of the bill which, in the Senate version, would grant a US visa exemption for Israeli citizens without requiring a reciprocal arrangement from Israel. The US has visa exemption arrangements with 37 other countries, but all of them reciprocate.
Ron Kampeas quotes a staffer from a leading pro-Israel lawmaker in the US House of Representatives as saying that “It’s stunning that you would give a green light to another country to violate the civil liberties of Americans traveling abroad.”
The US concern is particularly profound after a Palestinian-American, who taught English at the Friends’ School in Ramallah, was barred by Israel in January from returning to her West Bank job after a trip to Jordan, despite having a visa that allowed her to leave and re-enter Israeli-controlled territory. Israel, undoubtedly, is concerned that a reciprocal agreement would compromise its ability to bar not only Palestinian-Americans, but also pro-Palestinian activists, from entering the country.
The House version of the bill does not exempt Israel from reciprocity, but merely calls on the Secretary of State to report to Congress on the extent of Israel’s compliance with the reciprocity requirement and “…what additional steps, if any, are required in order for Israel to qualify for inclusion in such program.” That may be one reason the House bill has done better.
The bill includes other troublesome aspects. Friedman points out that the Senate bill includes shockingly weak language in support of a two-state solution: “…language that disconnects the issue from U.S. national security interests and in doing so creates a formulation that inconsistent with the actual foreign policy of the Obama Administration or ANY previous administration.”
Even so, it remains surprising that a bill that emerged as a focal point from an AIPAC policy conference would have this much trouble. Coogan thinks this is a sign that AIPAC’s grip on Congress might be weakening.
It certainly adds to a sense that AIPAC might have reached a tipping point. Equally telling is what Coogan says about how AIPAC brought this bill to the Hill: “Numerous public reports and off-the-record accounts from legislators and staff signaled that the brazenness and late release of the Israel lobby’s legislative demands blindsided both individual members and various committees. Provisions appeared tone deaf and legally problematic, even among Israel’s strongest supporters.”
I haven’t been able to locate those “numerous public reports,” but my own sense from talking to people on Capitol Hill and other informed colleagues is that there is indeed some tension there. That’s on top of congressional bristling at AIPAC’s efforts to exempt aid to Israel from the sequestration cuts. Dylan Williams of J Street told The Forward that the possibility that AIPAC might try to lobby for exempting aid to Israel from the sequester “…seems a little tone deaf,” and that some Hill staffers were “surprised that some groups — that people from AIPAC — were asking for this.”
Does all this mean AIPAC is losing its grip? Probably not, but as members of Congress grow less enthusiastic about complying with AIPAC’s demands, the possibility that more politicians will test the widely-held but unproven maxim that opposing AIPAC is electoral suicide arises. That could make things very interesting.
]]>The F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is a black hole in the federal budget into which hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars have been sucked and billions more seem destined to vanish.
The most recent reminder came in an April 1 UPI article about the retirement [...]]]>
The F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is a black hole in the federal budget into which hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars have been sucked and billions more seem destined to vanish.
The most recent reminder came in an April 1 UPI article about the retirement of Executive Vice President and JSF General Manager Tom Burbage from Lockheed Martin:
After spending 12 years fronting the Lockheed Martin F-35 program, Burbage retired Monday on an optimistic note but still far from clear about the aircraft’s ultimate cost and delivery schedule.
Burbage was named head of the F-35 program less than three weeks after the company beat Boeing to develop the aircraft. Then valued at $220 billion, the contract aims to build thousands of F-35 for the U.S. military and hundreds more for international partners…”The fundamental airplane is going to be there,” Burbage told reporters, Defense News said. “It’s going to be late, it’s going to be more expensive than we thought to do the development, but it’s still going to be there, which I think that’s the ultimate metric.”
Out of the “War on Terror”
The 9/11 attacks prompted the Pentagon in 2001 to push for a substantial increase of approximately $20 billion or more in its 2003 budget. Military officials expressed confidence that support for the “war on terror” would translate into recognition of the need to revitalize and rebuild the US armed services. Although Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had hoped to reduce the size of the US armed forces and cut back on big-ticket items, the Pentagon’s comptroller, Under Secretary of Defense Dov Zakheim, argued that spending had to go up because the military would need to build tanks, warships and tactical fighter jets. The already projected budget deficit with which the first year of the Bush administration had managed to eradicate the budget surplus of the Clinton presidency, and the cost of the war in Afghanistan (initially estimated to be $1 billion a month), was being funded through supplemental congressional allocations which weren’t even in the budget.
Six weeks after 9/11, the New York Times reported that the Pentagon had awarded “the largest military contract in American history to Lockheed Martin to build a new generation of supersonic stealth fighter jets for the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corp.” Describing the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter as “more Chevrolet than Porsche,” the Times noted that according to the over $200 billion contract, Lockheed would build “more than 3,000 of the relatively low-cost aircraft over the next two decades.”
Costs, Congress and the Pentagon
The price tag for these “relatively low cost aircraft” has now skyrocketed to $400 billion, according to Time Magazine. The Pentagon admits the overall cost of the F-35 program will reach at least $1.4 trillion dollars over the next 5 decades.
The F-35 has been plagued by problems caused by the contradictory and unprecedented demands made of a single aircraft. In a Foreign Policy article from last year headlined as “The Jet That Ate the Pentagon,” Center for Defense Information analyst Winslow Wheeler, a long time F-35 skeptic, wrote “A review of the F-35′s cost, schedule, and performance — three essential measures of any Pentagon program — shows the problems are fundamental and still growing.”
Asked how far behind schedule the F-35 program was, Lockheed’s Burbage referred to a restructuring of the program in 2010, adding, “I would argue the program post-2010 is not the program pre-2010, modified slightly. It’s really a new program.” That’s apparently enough to justify over a decade of development and the hundreds of billions of dollars that have already been expended on the “old” JSF.
So why aren’t the cheerleaders of fiscal austerity in our deficit-driven Congress demanding an immediate halt to this exorbitant project whose cost has skyrocketed while the problems with it have multiplied?
One actually has, Congressmen Ron Paul, who dared to use the F-word in a Texas Straight Talk commentary on March 3 about the sequester. It has received zero attention outside his fan base:
…the entire $1.2 trillion dollars that the sequester is supposed to save could be realized by cutting one unneeded, wasteful boondoggle: the $1.5 trillion F-35 fighter program. The F-35, billed as the next generation all-purpose military fighter and bomber, has been an unmitigated disaster. Its performances in recent tests have been so bad that the Pentagon has been forced to dumb-down the criteria. It is overweight, overpriced, and unwieldy. It is also an anachronism: we no longer face the real prospect of air-to-air combat in this era of 4th generation warfare. The World War II mid-air dogfight era is long over.
What’s most remarkable about this astute, candid and scathing criticism of the F-35 program is that Paul is from Texas. At least a quarter of Texas Congress members are strong supporters of the F-35, since a major portion of the work is being done in Ft. Worth. Rep. Kay Granger (R-TX), the organizer and fairy godmother of the 48-member Joint Strike Fighter Caucus in the House, declared in a 2011 speech to Lockheed Martin that the JSF was sacrosanct budget-wise and “absolutely, absolutely essential to our national defense.” Not surprisingly, Granger and her JSF caucus receive twice as much in campaign contributions as other members of Congress, according to the Dallas Morning News, with Granger topping the list.
Texas Sen. John Cornyn is also among the staunchest defenders of the F-35 in the Senate. This explains in part Cornyn’s vehement opposition — and that of Texas junior Senator Ted Cruz — to the nomination of Chuck Hagel as Secretary of Defense. Before and during his nomination hearings, Hagel made no effort to hide his doubts about whether the F-35 was worth what it was costing the Pentagon, soaking up limited resources with no apparent end in sight. The alternative nominees for Secretary of Defense proposed by Hagel’s critics were supportive of the F-35
Ashton Carter, who heads acquisition for the Pentagon, certified to House Armed Services Committee Chair Ike Skelton in June 2010 that the development of the F-35 was “essential to national security”; that there were no acceptable alternatives to the F-35 that would provide “acceptable” capability at a lower cost; that the Pentagon’s Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation considered the F-35′s cost to be “reasonable”; and that the JSF was of a higher priority than other Pentagon programs that might have to be cut in order to fund it.
Michele Flournoy, the Former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy between 2009-2012, whose name was also floated and cheered by Hagel’s opponents, co-authored a report by the Center for New American Security (which she co-founded), that recommended the Navy reduce the number of F-35Cs it planned to purchase by half and the Air Force cut its acquisitions of the JSF by about a third. The savings would then be applied to other acquisitions. It did not, however, call for scrapping the F-35.
The Israeli Tie-In and Sequester Silence
Which leads us to another under-reported aspect of congressional support for the F-35 that explains why Ron Paul is unique in his loud criticism of the program and certain pro-F-35 senators keep diverting media attention to Hagel’s alleged antagonism toward Israel during televised confirmation hearings. One of the justifications used by Lockheed and its partners for the problem-prone JSF is that its stratospheric cost will be offset by sales to US allies including Canada, Japan and, oh yes, Israel.
Since the inception of the JSF program, Israel made it known that it not only wanted to purchase the F-35, but be part of its development too. Israeli participation in discussions was briefly suspended in 2005 to reflect US disapproval of Israel selling advanced military technology to China, although Washington made it clear that this would not ultimately affect the sale of F-35s, which Israel hoped would begin arriving in 2012. By 2009, it was clear that the F-35s could not be delivered until 2014.
Much of the debate in Israeli military circles over whether and when Israel should attack Iran has explicitly or implicitly hinged on the JSF, with those advocating restraint arguing that Israel should wait until it has the enhanced military capabilities of the F-35 before striking. When Israel signed an agreement in October 2010 to purchase a squadron of F-35 fighters which would be received in 2015 and 2017, Israel’s Ambassador to the US Michael Oren strongly hinted that an impending confrontation with Iran was the primary reason for the agreement. “It will be capable of sneaking in, penetrating defenses and pulling additional forces after it,” enthused Amir Oren in Haaretz, making the case for restraint until the F-35s were delivered. “The armed, in-flight refueling, flying computer will be the aircraft of the next war. And that is another reason to postpone the date.”
In July 2012, just prior to Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta’s visit to Israel, the Pentagon also reached an agreement with Lockheed Martin to integrate Israeli electronic warfare equipment and Israeli-unique systems into the JSF. Israeli technology is a design component of the F-35′s augmented reality helmet, the cost of which is estimated at between $1-$2 million each. The Israeli Air Force is counting on the F-35 to maintain its qualitative edge, still eagerly anticipating and preparing for the delivery of its squadron.
There is a significant overlap among members of the House and Senate from both parties who have been most supportive of the F-35 (many of whom are also ironically “deficit hawks”) and those from both parties who claim they are Israel’s staunchest and most unwavering defenders. Not all “pro-Israel” members of Congress approve of the F-35, however. Arizona Sen. John McCain has expressed serious reservations, calling the program a “scandal” and a “tragedy” in 2011. Nonetheless, it’s Ron Paul — perceived as so anti-Israel that he alone among the contenders for the Republican presidential nomination was not invited to make his case to the Republican Jewish Coalition in 2012 — who can speak bluntly about killing the F-35 in ways that others won’t. In contrast, John Cornyn complained to AIPAC’s Policy Conference in March, “I’m so disappointed that our delivery of F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft keeps getting delayed. The F-35s are remarkably sophisticated planes that will dramatically enhance Israel’s security.” (At least one Jewish news organization interpreted this as a swipe against the Obama administration.)
The problems with the F-35 aren’t going away. Two months ago, the Pentagon called for all F-35s to be grounded when a crack on a turbine blade in the Pratt and Whitney jet engine was discovered during a routine inspection of a test aircraft in California. Despite the promises of retiring Lockheed EVP Burbage about how the F-35 will eventually ”be there,” Pierre Sprey predicts the Pentagon will “kill the program after 500 airplanes.”
In the meantime, don’t count on hearing this F-word anytime soon during all the squawking about the sequester.
Photo: The US Navy variant of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the F-35C.
]]>by Marsha B. Cohen
Americans will soon get to see their taxpayer dollars at work when Israel’s Iron Dome anti-rocket system, funded largely by the US, is deployed during President Obama’s Israel visit.
Unless the inauguration of Pope Francis I causes an abrupt change in his itinerary , Obama will land in [...]]]>
by Marsha B. Cohen
Americans will soon get to see their taxpayer dollars at work when Israel’s Iron Dome anti-rocket system, funded largely by the US, is deployed during President Obama’s Israel visit.
Unless the inauguration of Pope Francis I causes an abrupt change in his itinerary , Obama will land in Israel on Wednesday, March 20. Immediately after an official welcoming ceremony at Ben Gurion Airport, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Shimon Peres will show him an Iron Dome battery, set up at the airport so the President won’t have to travel to a site where the mobile anti-rocket system is being deployed.
The Iron Dome system may well be the quintessential metaphor for US-Israel relations in general, and for Obama’s relationship with Netanyahu in particular, the love child of a sometimes steamy, often frosty and increasingly strained affaire de coeur between defense spending and domestic politics. According to outgoing Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, Israel has already received $270 million towards the construction of Iron Dome and — despite the hand-wringing and wrangling over budget cuts in Congress — is slated to receive another $680 million, nearly a billion dollars on top of Israel’s usual $3 billion in annual US military assistance. These figures are corroborated by a Congressional Research Report published last March, which points out that Israel receives 60% of all American Foreign Military financing.
JINSA (the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs) waxes rhapsodic about Iron Dome’s “affordability and effectiveness,” a claim that would make some of the system’s staunchest defenders blanch and its critics guffaw. Each interception costs $100,000 — two interceptors at $50,000 apiece targeting every incoming rocket that appears headed for a populated area of Israel — hardly “cost effective.” The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) also uncritically enthuses that “the Iron Dome missile defense system is now hailed as a groundbreaking innovation, an example of the technological prowess of Israel, and an embodiment of the unique relationship between the Jewish state and the United States.”
The hagiographic account of Iron Dome on AIPAC’s website is however both incomplete and seriously flawed:
The idea for Iron Dome arose after Israel’s 2006 war with Hizballah, in which more than 4,000 rockets were launched into the country’s north. As rocket fire from Gaza targeting southern Israeli communities also intensified, it became clear that a system was needed to defend against short-range rockets and missiles.
Not exactly. Last November, the Wall Street Journal offered a much more detailed account of Iron Dome’s origin. Brig. Gen. Daniel Gold, the director of the Defense Ministry’s Research and Development department, had gone ahead and decided on the development of Iron Dome, calling for proposals from defense companies for anti-rocket systems in August 2004 — two years before the Second Lebanon War. He did so without any authorization from Israel’s political leadership. It was not until after the 2006 “Second Lebanon War” between Israel and Hizballah that Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Ehud Barak — under withering criticism for allowing Israeli civilians in non-border regions to come under rocket and missile attacks — backed Iron Dome, giving the project $200 million in December 2007. The rocket attacks during and since the 2008 invasion of Gaza (“Operation Cast Lead”) increased demand for a rocket interception system. The system went into operation in March 2011, shooting down its first rocket on April 7 and reportedly taking out 8 more rockets in the next three days.
According to AIPAC, by April 2011 “an Iron Dome battery was fielded outside the southern city of Beersheba and shot down its first rocket fired from Gaza. Since then the system has achieved an 85-percent interception rate and is constantly improving, as its developers enhance its accuracy and expand its range.”
Last week, Reuven Pedatzur, a highly respected Israeli security analyst who has been a sharp critic of the Iron Dome project since 2008 when he pointed out that billions had been squandered on the program, cited studies by missile defense experts that suggest Iron Dome’s successful interception rate may well be 5% or less — far below the 84% success rate cited by the Israeli Defense Forces and other defenders of the program. Pedatzur cites research done by three rocket scientists: Professor Theodore Postol, a world-renowned scientist and expert in missile defense and two other rocket scientists, Dr. Mordechai Shefer, formerly of Rafael, and a scientist he refers to only as “D.”, who recently worked for Raytheon, the manufacturer of the Patriot missiles. After investigating the performance of Iron Dome during Operation Pillar of Defense this past November, all three concluded that “Iron Dome’s rate of success did not come close to the figure of 84% as reported by the IDF”:
According to the three scientists, who conducted their research separately by analyzing dozens of videos filmed during the operation, most of the explosions which look as if they were successful interceptions, are actually just the self-destruction of the Iron Dome’s own missiles. The scientists point out that in every case the explosions, seen as balls of fire during the day and clouds of smoke at night, were round and symmetrical. In the case of successful interceptions, in which the incoming missile’s warhead is destroyed, there should have been another ball of fire or cloud of smoke. They also uncovered a strange phenomenon whereby the Iron Dome’s missiles followed identical trajectories, and self-destructed at precisely the same time. In some of the videos, it appears that the Iron Dome’s missiles made a very sharp turn shortly before self-destruction. That cannot be, say the scientists, as there is no way that the missile defense system could “remember” that it needs to turn in the direction of the incoming Grad missile a quarter-second before it self-destructs.
Pedatzur also noted that these scientists discovered 3,200 civilian damage reports that were filed for destruction caused by incoming rockets. Could the 58 rockets that the IDF admits were not intercepted by Iron Dome have caused so much damage? Compared with the damage from rockets during the Second Lebanon War before Iron Dome was deployed, Pedatzur considers that unlikely. Furthermore, Israeli police reports counted 109 cases of rockets falling in populated areas, twice as many as the number claimed by the IDF. Pedatzur compares the exaggerated success rate of Iron Dome to the initial 96% interception rate claimed for the Patriot missile system during the aftermath of the Gulf War. Professor Postol later found the Patriot success rate to have been zero.
Nonetheless, AIPAC has even bigger dreams for the future of Iron Dome: “Now that the Iron Dome has proven itself, Washington will have the ability to use it in its own defense efforts against short-range rocket threats in the Persian Gulf and South Korea.”
The real challenge — and achievement — of Iron Dome has been getting the US to pay for the anti-rocket system. The WSJ‘s Charles Levinson and Adam Entous report that Israel’s Defense Ministry approached the George W. Bush administration with a request for hundreds of millions of dollars for the system, only to receive a cold reception at the Pentagon. Experts voiced doubts about the system’s effectiveness and argued that even if it worked, such a system would be too expensive. (Most Israeli military and defense officials were also dubious.) A team of US military engineers sent to Israel by the Defense Department to meet with the Iron Dome system’s developers were unconvinced by the technology and skeptical about the prospects for its performance. They recommended that Israel adopt the American-made Phalanx system being used in Iraq.
In 2008, US Senator and presidential candidate Barack Obama visited Sderot, a town near the Gaza Strip that came under severe rocket attacks during Operation Cast Lead and whose residents were constantly running for cover from incoming Qassam rockets. Obama won the election and took office as President and shortly thereafter an Iron Dome prototype successfully intercepted an incoming rocket during its first field test. Colin Kahl, appointed by Obama to overseeing US military policy in the Middle East at the Pentagon, decided to reconsider the Iron Dome’s merits — military and political.
Having raised the hackles of Israel’s newly installed Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, by calling for a settlement freeze and prioritizing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, Obama wanted to set things right with Israel. “Top Obama administration advisers saw supporting Iron Dome as a chance to shore up U.S.-Israel security relations and balance some of the political strains,” according to Levinson and Entous. In September, Kahl dispatched a team of missile-defense experts to reconsider Iron Dome. The team presented its findings to Obama a month later: “the team declared Iron Dome a success, and in many respects, superior to Phalanx. Tests showed it was hitting 80% of the targets, up from the low teens in the earlier U.S. assessment.”
In 2009, the US agreed to provide $204 million for the Iron Dome system’s development. The National Jewish Democratic Council pointed to Iron Dome as one of the means by which Obama had restored Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge — eroded during the Bush years. An additional $680 million over three years was allocated for the purchase of additional batteries in May 2012, during talks between Barak and US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta. Barak met with Obama’s new Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel earlier this month, during which time Hagel was said to have pledged continued US support for Iron Dome. Israel eventually hopes to triple the number of Iron Dome batteries deployed in defense of military as well as civilian targets.
If Obama had favored funding an Iron Dome program for any other country, you can be sure that Republicans would be shrieking about the administration’s increasing of the deficit by borrowing funds to expend close to a billion US taxpayer dollars on a system with a success rate that been grossly exaggerated. Furthermore, as Walter Pincus of the Washington Post has pointed out, the US government has no rights to the Iron’s Dome’s technology, which is owned by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd., an Israeli government-owned, for-profit company.
Consider all this next week when you see Netanyahu and Peres showing off the Iron Dome to President Obama.
Photo: The Iron Dome CRAM launcher near the Israeli town of Sderot. Credit: Natan Flayer.
]]>by Henry Precht
Two US service members were killed and at least eight others injured Monday in an insider attack at a Special Forces site in Afghanistan. The Taliban asserted responsibility. This incident would seem to nullify President Hamid Karzai’s earlier charge that US and Taliban forces were colluding [...]]]>
by Henry Precht
Two US service members were killed and at least eight others injured Monday in an insider attack at a Special Forces site in Afghanistan. The Taliban asserted responsibility. This incident would seem to nullify President Hamid Karzai’s earlier charge that US and Taliban forces were colluding to bring down his government.
The incident — and Karzai’s outburst — certainly did nothing to alter President Barak Obama’s determination to close out our war against al Qaeda and their former hosts and rulers of Afghanistan, the Taliban. By December 2014, the White House has said, our combat operations will have withdrawn and the Afghan government will be more or less on its own. How is this end game to be managed? Perhaps speaking for himself, the top general for the region, Gen. James N. Mattis, told Congress last week that 20,000 troops should remain after 2014.
I asked two experts separately for their views. One served in Afghanistan in the 1960s as a political counselor and the other returned last year from a lengthy assignment that included a period as deputy ambassador.
Here’s what the old timer had to say:
By December 2014 we will have done about all that can be accomplished with regard to (1) al Qaeda (the reason we went into Afghanistan in 2001) and (2) the Taliban insurgency — without the full support of Pakistan. That country’s tribal belt along the Afghan border provides rest and training for both of our adversaries. Our forces, particularly the Marines in Kandahar Province, have badly injured the Taliban and drone attacks have decimated al Qaeda’s leadership which has largely refocused its activities in the Yemen and East and North Africa. The remaining task for our forces is strictly training of the Afghan army and other security forces. Before that can be a reality, however, the Afghan government will have to give American troops (perhaps up to 10,000) legal immunity under a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that the Loya Jirga (a national assembly) must pass. Inevitably, our presence has started to rankle many Afghans, some of whom view us as another occupation force like so many in their history. The Loya Jirga’s debate and vote will be a fateful decision on how we are now perceived by the Afghan people, how confident they are that they alone can successfully contend with the Taliban and handle all the conflicts and rivalries in what is still a very traditional and tribal society.
Turning to the new boy:
The number of our troops who remain should be governed by their missions (and by the SOFA we manage to negotiate with the Afghan government). I see two missions for the post-2014 US military presence: training the Afghan National Army and counterterrorism (going after al Qaeda remnants.)
As the most recent casualty figures reflect, the Afghan Army has taken over the great bulk of the fighting. But they will still need our training, mentoring and assistance in several “high end,” “enabler” areas as the US military likes to call them: medical response, search and rescue, intelligence and its exploitation, logistics, high end equipment maintenance, their fledgling air force and — most important — civilian casualty avoidance. (We have learned a lot in this area.) The Brits, Italians, Germans, Lithuanians and others all have niche expertise to apply to this project, but we have to lead and coordinate with the Afghan government.
Numbers? I’m not a military expert, but would guess that somewhere between 10 and 20,000 will be necessary. They should be based in a few regional centers around the country for economies of effort and Afghan public perceptions.
Civilian complementarity: It’s absolutely essential that we NOT cut back to the bone our USG civilian programs in development, good governance and justice and exchanges as our military presence substantially declines. Even with all the nation’s corruption and poor governance, much social and economic progress, as well as human rights advances especially for Afghan women, has been made these past 12 years. As we have learned in other trouble spots: “there’s no security without development and no development without security.” A leaner but still robust US civilian presence and programs will do much to reassure very anxious Afghans, some of whom are still fence-sitters. Afghans have long memories, and while Afghanistan has changed much since the Soviet withdrawal, some draw parallels. Perceptions matter.
What about Pakistan? — insurgent safe haven, role in the emerging peace process involving the Taliban, the Talibanization of some parts of its territory, nuclear weapons, relationship with India — all matter tremendously, especially for Afghan prospects, but that’s a subject for another day.
There you have it, facts and informed opinions to chew on as the debate over our role in Afghanistan rumbles and rattles on in Washington. Left out of these Foreign Service judgments are any discussion about what American public opinion will tolerate and, perhaps most important, what price for continued engagement our budget will support.
Photo: President Barack Obama and President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan participate in a bilateral meeting in the Oval Office, Jan. 11, 2013. Dr. Rangin Dadfar Spanta, Afghan National Security Advisor, left, and National Security Advisor Tom Donilon, attend. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)
]]>by Mitchell Plitnick
The 2013 American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) Policy Conference wasn’t quite the same show of arrogant power that it usually is. There seems to have been a note of unusual concern among the 13,000 or so assembled activists. And those concerns echo some of [...]]]>
by Mitchell Plitnick
The 2013 American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) Policy Conference wasn’t quite the same show of arrogant power that it usually is. There seems to have been a note of unusual concern among the 13,000 or so assembled activists. And those concerns echo some of what AIPAC’s detractors have been saying for some time.
The tone was set by AIPAC’s president, Michael Kassen at the beginning of the conference. In what Ha’aretz reporter Chemi Shalev described as “… an uncharacteristic ‘adapt or die’ alarm to the American Jewish community,” Kassen warned of “the growing allure of isolationism among our new leaders”, which would include an aversion to difficult foreign policy issues…like Israel.
Kassen urged the AIPAC activists to expand the base from its overwhelmingly Jewish one, and highlighted the participation of representatives from the African-American and Latino communities in the conference. Yet, despite this outreach, The Forward’s Natan Guttman reports that “…a look at the audience made clear that AIPAC is still largely an organization made up of white Jewish activists.”
There’s more here. Orthodox Jews are disproportionately represented at AIPAC. The Orthodox community represents around 15% of all US Jews. Support among non-orthodox Jews has been dwindling in a hurry, and despite intense efforts by AIPAC to reach out to younger Jews, the crowd is heavily skewed toward grey hair. Guttman also reports that an AIPAC official he spoke to rejected the idea that AIPAC had lost many liberal Jews to the more dovish pro-Israel group J Street by saying that “…if anything, liberal activists are turning away from the issue of Israel altogether and are not seeking a different kind of political approach.”
What AIPAC seems to be facing is the fact that its base, while very active and willing to mobilize considerable wealth as well as time and energy to support the AIPAC agenda, is aging and increasingly out of touch with most Americans. This is something commentators like myself, MJ Rosenberg and groups like Jewish Voice for Peace have been contending for quite some time. And this is only the tip of the iceberg of AIPAC’s problems.
As reported by Adam Horowitz, a recent NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll showed American support for Israel as opposed to the Palestinians (who got 13%) at 45%, that 55% of Americans believe the United States should treat Israel and the Palestinians as equals, and 69% do not believe Israel and the Palestinians can reach a peace agreement. This demonstrates what the authors of the famed book The Israel Lobby, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, have repeatedly stated: Americans do support Israel, but do not believe it should hold a place any more special than other US allies.
None of this is lost on AIPAC, and it was reflected, to some extent, in Kassen’s statements about Congress, where he expressed concern that many younger Congress members have a “different association” with Israel. But it doesn’t end there. The battle over Chuck Hagel’s confirmation as Secretary of Defense is also casting a shadow on AIPAC, perhaps with some permanent ramifications.
Although AIPAC wisely stayed out of the fight, that didn’t prevent the entire episode from becoming a shining example of just how strong an impact the pro-Israel lobby has on Congress. It seeped deeply into popular culture, with prominent comedian and talk show host Bill Maher openly declaring that “Based on every statement I’ve heard from every Republican in the last two years, the Israelis are controlling our government.” And Saturday Night Live may have decided not to air a skit lampooning the extent to which the Senators questioning Hagel were beholden to the Israel Lobby, but it found a bright new life on YouTube.
The more extreme groups that took on Hagel are heavily tilted toward the Republican Party, and they, in the 2012 election, tried very hard to win Jewish votes for the GOP by portraying it as the “only pro-Israel party.” They failed mostly because very few Jews actually vote based on Israel. But that polarization is undermining one of AIPAC’s major strengths, its bipartisan reach, by alienating more and more liberals and Democrats in general from Israel advocacy.
Finally, many reports from across the political spectrum have noted that AIPAC’s conference this year had a rather thin agenda. The focus was on Iran, and to a lesser extent, trying to protect aid to Israel from both the current sequester and future budget cuts. These are responsive issues — reactions to perceived threats. The conference offered scant vision of a better future for Israel, as it completely ignored the Palestinians. To some extent, one might ascribe this to Israel presently being in a state of flux without a new governing coalition. But it actually is more reflective of Israel’s own lack of interest in peace these days. And the idea of simply managing the conflict is a tough message to sell.
These aren’t new problems for AIPAC, and they’re not going away any time soon. The organization itself has taken note of them, but whether or not they will be able to deal with them is an open question. AIPAC is certainly resourceful, but the simple fact is, the playing field is changing. Americans have major economic concerns, and the entire Middle East is stirring or storming. Israel’s behavior in recent years has been more brazen and the reality of its routine violations of Palestinian human rights and its permanent denial of their civil rights has reached the awareness of more Americans — Jewish and otherwise — than ever before.
The “special relationship” has always been an AIPAC-invented fiction that comes to life because of political, not popular, pressures. It has been the shaky foundation of US policy toward Israel and much of the Middle East since the end of the Cold War and the concomitant diminishment of Israel as a strategic asset to the US. In a time where the US populace is continuing to face a level of economic stress it has not witnessed since the Great Depression, the special relationship façade will be even harder to maintain. And AIPAC is nervous, because they know it.
]]>by Mitchell Plitnick
The annual Israel-Congress orgy dubbed as the AIPAC Policy Conference kicked off today. It might just as well be called the War on Iran conference — that’s sure to be the issue that dominates the proceedings. The US-Israel relationship is taking the second spot. And the Palestinians? More [...]]]>
by Mitchell Plitnick
The annual Israel-Congress orgy dubbed as the AIPAC Policy Conference kicked off today. It might just as well be called the War on Iran conference — that’s sure to be the issue that dominates the proceedings. The US-Israel relationship is taking the second spot. And the Palestinians? More than ever before, they will be invisible.
There are a few sessions at the conference that deal with Israel’s occupation of the West Bank in very general terms. But Iran will be the focus, as evidenced by related bills which AIPAC had some of its most loyal members of Congress introduce in advance of their lobbying day. Those bills work to give Israel a green light to attack Iran if it feels the need to and puts the “special relationship” between the US and Israel on paper.
Last week a Senate resolution was introduced by Senators Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Robert Menendez (D-NJ). The two senators are widely known as AIPAC favorites and have led bipartisan actions like this in the past, working with AIPAC quite closely to develop legislation favorable to the lobbying organization. The resolution states that if Israel decides to launch a pre-emptive strike on Iran to prevent Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon, this would be considered an act of self-defense and that “…the United States Government should stand with Israel and provide diplomatic, military, and economic support to the Government of Israel…”
The bill is a “sense of Congress” resolution, so it is not binding; hence the word “should” rather than “will” is used. Still, it is a very clear expression that the Senate expects and desires that President Obama provide a full range of support to Israel in the event of an Israeli attack on Iran. It certainly sends a signal to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that he will have Congress behind him if Obama tries to restrain Israel from taking such a step. While the bill’s wording clarifies that it should not be understood as a declaration of war in the event of an Israeli attack, a commitment to military support of Israel in the event of a purely Israeli decision to attack Iran could well amount to the same thing.
The timing of the bill should not be ignored. AIPAC consistently tries to get its most important legislation to the congressional floor ahead of its conference and especially its “lobbying day,” when thousands of AIPAC activists descend upon Capitol Hill, armed with its marching orders. The timing demonstrates AIPAC’s priorities, and it’s not coincidental that this bill comes on the heels of a rare moment of small hope in negotiations between the P5+1 (the US, France, England, Russia, China and Germany) and Iran.
In their recent meeting in Almaty, Kazakhstan, the P5+1 reduced some of their demands and offered some relief from sanctions in exchange for Iranian compliance. This was met with a positive response from Iran. Trita Parsi, prominent expert on Iran and the head of the National Iranian American Council, offered cautious optimism: “Though the gap between the two sides is still wide, the fact that two additional meetings were scheduled without any Iranian foot-dragging – in the midst of the Iranian holiday season mind you – may also signal increased seriousness.”
AIPAC would be unlikely to view the P5+1′s reported offer favorably, as it allows Iran to keep a certain amount of its 20% enriched uranium to fuel a research reactor and backs off a demand to close the nuclear plant at Fordow, demanding only that work there be suspended. AIPAC would surely view these moderations as risky for Israel. So, a provocative resolution was introduced in Congress. AIPAC is likely even more aware than many of its congressional allies that probably at least some in Tehran will not pick up on the nuance that this resolution is non-binding. If the resolution is interpreted by Iran as demonstrating that the US is not serious about finding a negotiated resolution to the nuclear standoff, it will surely serve as further incentive for Iran to redouble its nuclear efforts.
But AIPAC has never favored negotiations, always leaning toward militant stances, military threats and ever more devastating sanctions. More of the same can be expected at their conference, with the many members of Congress, from both parties, who will be speaking, attending and parroting the AIPAC line.
In the House of Representatives, another AIPAC-backed bill would impose still tighter sanctions on Iran. Both the Senate and House resolutions also include language that seeks to change US policy from being dedicated to preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon to preventing Iran from acquiring the capability to build such a weapon. The two thresholds are very different, and the latter is a point that Iran has probably already passed. Such a policy would provide the justification for war at any time.
AIPAC’s legislative agenda is not limited to Iran. The agenda regarding Israel strongly reflects the current situation, both in what it says and what it does not.
The entire Palestinian issue is being buried, and this fits well with the direction Israel itself is taking. As I explained elsewhere, whatever governing coalition Benjamin Netanyahu assembles, both it and the opposition will be dominated by parties that either outright oppose a Palestinian state or are in favor of returning to endless and fruitless negotiations. Thus AIPAC completely mutes the issue. But they are pushing legislation regarding the US-Israel relationship, an emphasis that at least partially reflects the recent battle over Chuck Hagel’s confirmation as Secretary of Defense.
AIPAC knew early on that Hagel’s confirmation was inevitable, so it dropped out of the fight almost as soon as it began. One of their great strengths is their keen ability to pick their battles. Instead they allowed the partisan Republican and extremist groups, like the Emergency Committee for Israel, to take on the Hagel nomination. Both Elliott Abrams and ECI’s founder Bill Kristol said that Hagel was “weakened” by the whole affair.
AIPAC was less than keen on Hagel because he is comparatively reluctant to go to war with Iran and because he has been outspoken about the pressure AIPAC exerts on the Hill. He also considers it his duty to serve the United States before Israel. The bills discussed above are intended to narrow the political options on Iran for the President and his new cabinet. Others are intended to legislatively solidify the special relationship between Israel and the United States which AIPAC fears might have been weakened in recent years by the attention they brought to their Israel-first advocacy.
Another bill introduced to the House would designate Israel as a “major strategic ally.” That designation is unprecedented and could mean just about anything, but it would allow Israel to enjoy some unique status in its relationship with the US. Of course, it already does, but there has never been a formal, legislative statement to that effect. The bipartisan bill is sponsored by two good friends of AIPAC, Ed Royce (R-CA) and Eliot Engel (D-NY). It broadens sanctions on Iran and designates Iran’s Revolutionary Guard as a terrorist organization.
Much of the impetus for this bill comes from the sequester and is intended to help ensure that funding for Israel is not threatened by the automatic budget cuts (and never mind that aid to US citizens might be considered by most in the US as a higher priority than aid to Israel). It also includes wording that works to separate aid to Israel from all other foreign aid, so that going forward, threats to general foreign aid would not include Israel, which is the largest recipient of such aid.
But there is also what I’d call the Hagel Factor. Knowing that they were not going to be able to stop the President from appointing the Defense Secretary he wanted, AIPAC has worked to ensure that ideas concerning them about Hagel on Iran and on the special US-Israel relationship will be blunted. Accordingly, the next three days will evolve around the imminent threat Iran poses (including at least the insinuation of a nuclear attack intended to wipe out the Jews), the importance of safeguarding the shared values between the US and Israel, and all the wonderful things Israel provides for the US. Though don’t expect too many specifics on that last point.
]]>Military contractors are in a full court press to prevent the automatic military spending cuts that will come into effect on January 2, 2013, an estimated $55 billion per year, if policymakers fail to avert a budget “sequester.” But while contractors are waving a defense industry funded report [...]]]>
Military contractors are in a full court press to prevent the automatic military spending cuts that will come into effect on January 2, 2013, an estimated $55 billion per year, if policymakers fail to avert a budget “sequester.” But while contractors are waving a defense industry funded report warning of 1 million defense industry jobs to be lost if sequestration occurs and the potential to push the U.S. into a new recession, experts are calling into question the veracity of the findings and the underlying assumptions about military spending’s benefits to the U.S. economy.
“The reality is that sequestration not only undermines our national security, it will hurt our economy and could fundamentally tear our defense industrial base,” New Hampshire Republican Sen. Kelly Ayotte (R-NH) told a Brookings Institution forum Tuesday. But skeptics warn that such dire predictions are intentionally misleading.
Center for American Progress Senior Fellow Lawrence Korb took issue with those assumption in a column last November:
It is like arguing that defense is entitled to a specific share of the federal budget or gross domestic product. The federal government should base its defense spending on the strategy it develops to deal with the threats it faces— not on how many jobs it will create or the condition of our economy.
The [defense industry funded] study, which was briefed to Congress last month, analyzed the impact of potential defense cuts on employment. This is not only inappropriate and conceptually flawed, it seems self-serving.
Military spending hawks routinely fail to acknowledge that funding domestic priorities such as education, health care and clean energy create at least 50 percent more jobs than military spending.
Korb added that sequestration cuts would more likely results in 600,000 contractor jobs lost, not one million.
And defense cuts are not an across-the-board loss for American workers. “The $55 billion wouldn’t just disappear into the ether,” said Gordon Adams, who oversaw defense budgeting for the Clinton administration. “There would be other economic benefits from borrowing $55 billion for defense.” Adams says portions of the military spending cuts will be directed elsewhere, thereby creating jobs and helping the economy in communities across the country.
Questions are being raised about defense contractor Lockheed Martin’s dire threats to cut 123,000 jobs if sequestration occurs. “The timing of it is really suspicious,” Democratic strategist Garry South told The Daily Beast, adding that Lockheed appears to be “throw[ing] itself around in the political process.”
Todd Harrison, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments finds Lockheed’s warnings highly suspicious. “Will they have to lay some people off down the road, within a few months [or] in the next year or two? Absolutely,” Harrison told NPR. “But [as for] the timing of this — are they going to have to do that starting exactly on Jan. 3? I think that’s highly suspect.”
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