This is the second in a series of primers on the fast-moving situation in Ukraine, and covers events from March 2 through March 9. For more background on the situation, please see part 1.

Summary of Recent Events

This week saw sporadic military activity on the Crimean peninsula, in [...]]]> by Derek Davison

This is the second in a series of primers on the fast-moving situation in Ukraine, and covers events from March 2 through March 9. For more background on the situation, please see part 1.

Summary of Recent Events

This week saw sporadic military activity on the Crimean peninsula, in particular a reported attack by pro-Russian gunmen on a Ukrainian air force base in Sevastopol that ended when the gunmen retreated. Diplomatic efforts seem to have stalled, as Russia refused to speak directly with the new Ukrainian government, which it regards as illegitimate, and threatened that any sanctions against Russia would “boomerang” against the United States. The week’s biggest development was that Crimea’s parliament has voted to begin the process of seceding from Ukraine and joining Russia, a vote that the governments of Ukraine, the United States, and the European Union all termed “illegal.”

Secession movement

On March 6 the Crimean parliament voted to secede from Ukraine and become part of Russia, pending the approval of the Russian government and the results of a referendum now scheduled for March 16. Although Russian President Vladimir Putin had said earlier in the week that he “did not foresee” Russia annexing Crimea, the leaders of both houses of Russia’s parliament publicly welcomed the Crimean assembly’s vote and pledged to honor the wishes of the Crimean people as expressed in the referendum. The draft referendum, which Kyiv Post revealed, offers two options: “joining Crimea with the Russian Federation” or “restoration of 1992 Crimean Constitution” (which declared Crimean independence, then was amended to declare its autonomy within Ukraine).

Ukraine’s interim Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk criticized the Crimean vote as “illegitimate,” and its interim President, Oleksandr V. Turchynov, termed the vote “a farce.” Leaders of Crimea’s sizable Tatar minority also expressed opposition to the vote. Their sentiments were echoed by American and European leaders. US President Barack Obama characterized the vote as illegal under both the Ukrainian constitution and international law, and the EU envoy to Ukraine, Jan Tombinski, argued that a referendum on secession that was restricted to Crimea would violate Ukrainian law.

Attack on Ukrainian base, questions about the Russian forces

On Monday Ukrainian military sources reported that the commander of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, based in Sevastopol, had given Ukrainian forces in Crimea until early Tuesday morning to surrender or face an attack. Russian officials denied that any such ultimatum had been issued, and the deadline passed without incident. On Friday, however, armed pro-Russian forces stormed a Ukrainian air force base in Sevastopol and occupied parts of it for several hours as they demanded the surrender of the Ukrainian soldiers inside. When the Ukrainian soldiers refused to surrender, the gunmen withdrew; thus far, both Ukrainian and Russian forces have not fired on one another. Russia continued to deny that the pro-Russian forces in Crimea were Russian military, insisting that they are local “self-defense units,” but considerable evidence has been found suggesting that they are, in fact, Russian military forces. The Ukrainian border guard service contended that roughly 30,000 Russian troops are now on the peninsula, and photographs allegedly taken near the southern Ukrainian city of Chonhar appear to show a freshly dug minefield along the approach from the Ukrainian mainland to Crimea. Deputy Crimean Prime Minister Rustam Temirgaliev stated that Russian troops are the only legal soldiers in Crimea, suggesting that Ukrainian soldiers still on their bases are considered illegal by the Crimean government. On Saturday, March 8, a bus carrying international observers from the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) attempted to enter Crimea, but it turned back at the northern Crimean city of Armyansk when “warning shots” were fired at it.

Diplomacy sputters amid looming threat of sanctions from both sides

President Vladimir Putin gave a press conference on Tuesday that appeared to “hit pause” on the Crimea situation, though this characterization was obviously premature given events later in the week. Putin described the events that forced Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych from office as “an anti-constitutional coup” and claimed that Russian intervention was necessary to safeguard the ethnic Russians who are concentrated in Crimea and in major cities in the eastern part of Ukraine, though he reiterated the official Russian position that there has not been an invasion. US Secretary of State John Kerry traveled to Kiev to offer the interim government $1 billion in loan guarantees, and while there he, in remarks that were echoed by Obama, accused Putin of “hiding behind falsehoods” to justify Russia’s actions, and called on him to return Russian forces to their barracks. Kerry failed in his efforts to arrange a meeting between Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and his Ukrainian counterpart, with Lavrov refusing to recognize the legitimacy of the Kiev government, but on Saturday one of Russia’s deputy foreign ministers did meet with the Ukrainian ambassador to Russia in Moscow.

Sanctions both by and against Russia were already being imposed by week’s end. On Thursday, President Obama ordered the imposition of sanctions against “individuals and entities” that were involved in Russia’s move into Crimea, which followed an earlier decision to suspend all US military cooperation with Russia. European Union leaders suspended talks with Russia on economic and travel issues but did not yet appear to be prepared to go any further. European leaders expressed concern that a Russian response could damage economies across Europe, and Lavrov warned that sanctions could “boomerang” against the United States and Europe. Russia announced that it was considering pulling out of arms control treaties with the US and the OSCE in response to American actions. More urgently, the Russian firm Gazprom hinted Friday that it may suspend gas shipments to Ukraine (and thus, potentially, through Ukraine and on to the rest of Europe) due to Kiev’s outstanding debt, which Gazprom estimates to be $1.89 billion.

Questions over legitimacy

Earlier this week Obama stressed that “[a]ny discussion about the future of Ukraine must include the legitimate government of Ukraine,” but the standoff is being driven in part by a disagreement over what the “legitimate” government of Ukraine actually is. Russia still recognizes Viktor Yanukovych as the legitimate president of Ukraine, and claims that Yanukovych asked for Russian military assistance when he was ousted. The United States, on the other hand, has recognized the interim government in Kiev and says that Yanukovych’s actions in office “undermined” his claim to authority despite the fact that he was a democratically-elected leader. Russia’s continued refusal to deal directly with Kiev is couched in terms of the new government’s illegitimacy, at least in Russia’s view. Aid from the United States and from Europe is being offered to help stabilize the government in Kiev.

Russia is not staying silent as the US appears to be positioning itself for an attack on the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria. Defending its last key ally in the region, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov warned the West against intervention. Western nations [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Mitchell Plitnick

Russia is not staying silent as the US appears to be positioning itself for an attack on the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria. Defending its last key ally in the region, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov warned the West against intervention. Western nations should avoid repeating “past mistakes,” said Lavrov.

More importantly, Lavrov illustrates just how broken and vaporous the system of “international law” is when it comes to conflict and protecting civilians. “The use of force without the approval of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is a very grave violation of international law,” he said. And there is no question that he is correct.

An intervention in Syria requires the approval of the Security Council in order to be comply with international law. Such authorizations are, quite naturally, exceedingly rare. Not only does it require a majority vote in the Council, but, more importantly, all five permanent members of the Council (the US, Russia, China, Great Britain and France) must also agree. Any one of those countries can exercise its right to veto any resolution before the Council.

The idea, in 1945, made some sense. In the post-World War II era, there was still some question as to whether the US and USSR would perhaps build on their wartime alliance and find a way to work together, but it seemed unlikely. An incentive to maintain some sense of order in the world by working together on such matters and being able to block one-sided moves might have seemed sensible. It’s even worked out that way from time to time. But for the most part, it’s been a recipe for paralysis and a means to prevent action on matters of global concern, rather than to promote it.

The most obvious example of this is the matter on which there has been, by far, more Security Council vetoes than any other: Israel’s occupation of territories captured in the 1967 war. From 1946-1971, the USSR was the overwhelming leader in Security Council vetoes; no other country was even close. These were, of course, mostly Cold War-related resolutions that directly or indirectly took aim at Soviet actions and policies in various parts of the world. Since then, the overwhelming leader has been the United States, with the clear majority of those vetoes being made on behalf of Israel, protecting its occupation and concomitant violence and settlement expansion.

Indeed, in recent years, the problem has gotten so bad that most resolutions regarding Israel-Palestine have been withdrawn in advance, knowing the US will veto as a matter of course. The matter reached its ultimate absurdity in 2011, when the Obama administration vetoed a UNSC resolution that stated nothing at all that was not already official US policy. But the veto was expected and required. The fact that it was such a moderate resolution raised fears among AIPAC and its various fellow travellers in the Israel lobby, and there was a lot of public pressure on Obama to veto. But there’s no reason to think he wouldn’t have done so anyway.

Politics and power, not international law, govern international matters. The fact is that legality will have no bearing on the US decision to attack Syria or refrain from taking action. The decision will be based on strategy and politics.

The system of international law is irreparably broken. Ultimately, any system of law depends entirely on the ability of the judicial body to enact penalties and sanctions on lawbreakers. Such penalties don’t exist for the United States, nor for Russia or China or the other members of the Security Council. Britain and France are more compliant with international law than the others, but this is due not to fear of censure but because their own situations (including widespread European support for abiding by international law, as well as the experience of the two World Wars and the end of colonialism, the latter having removed a lot of European disincentives toward international law) push them in that direction.

Indeed, it is worth asking this question: if one believes that intervention in Syria is needed to stop what is already a humanitarian disaster from getting much worse, should international law be ignored in doing so? It seems inescapable that the answer to that question is yes, and one is then left with only the question of whether military intervention will help or hurt the millions of Syrians in the crossfire.

But at what point can we claim with reasonable certainty that the moral imperative trumps the law? Particularly in a hypothetical world where the law actually matters, where should that line be drawn? In point of fact, few people are so naïve as to believe that military intervention ever occurs for purely humanitarian reasons. It is generally done in order to pursue the invading country’s interests, and if some humanitarian good is done on the way, well that is just fine. And most of the time, the humanitarian interests are only a cover for other goals; the situation is often oversimplified so the public will support the intervention, which is sometimes vastly distorted.

In this instance, it is Russia warning the United States against violating international law, but the US has played the same game on many occasions — the 2003 push for a UN imprimatur for the invasion of Iraq being perhaps the most prominent and revolting instance.

The alternative to a world governed by international law is a world where might makes right. That is, indeed, the world in which we live. The point here is not that international law should be done away with. On the contrary, it must be strengthened exponentially. A legal system that can enjoy at least some insulation from the whims of politics, both domestic and international, is crucial, and the International Criminal Court and International Court of Justice have at least some of that. But more importantly, there must be a mechanism where even the most powerful country can be held accountable for violating the law.

Such a system will never be perfect, of course. Even in the realm of domestic law, we regularly see differences in how it is applied and defied by the rich and the poor. But even the wealthiest individuals have to at least consider their actions when breaking the law. Some system where powerful actors are treated the same as everyone else must be put into place. The answer to how that can be achieved is for better minds than mine, but asking the question is the first step.

Other aspects need revision or at least revisiting as well. Sovereignty is a crucial principle, without a doubt, but it is also used by tyrants to shield themselves from, for example, reprisals under international human rights law. The debate over intervening in Syria following alleged chemical weapons use by the Syrian government is inherently related to the current system of international law, which is broken far beyond the point of having any effectiveness. In many ways, it is an obstacle. It needs to be rebuilt, before more Syrias confront us.

via IPS News

The surprise accord reached by the U.S. and Russia in Moscow Tuesday to try to convene an international conference to resolve the two-year-old civil war in Syria as soon as the end of this month has been greeted with equal measures of hope and scepticism.

If nothing [...]]]> by Jim Lobe 

via IPS News

The surprise accord reached by the U.S. and Russia in Moscow Tuesday to try to convene an international conference to resolve the two-year-old civil war in Syria as soon as the end of this month has been greeted with equal measures of hope and scepticism.

If nothing else, the agreement apparently persuaded at least one key party, the UN-Arab League envoy for Syria, veteran Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi, to put off his previously reported intention to resign in the very near future.

“This is the first hopeful news concerning that unhappy country in a very long time,” he said in a statement issued by his office Wednesday. “The statements made in Moscow constitute a very significant first step forward. It is nevertheless only a first step,” he added.

Analysts here, however, said that even with Tuesday’s accord, getting the two principal parties to the table would be extremely difficult under current circumstances.

“The more you learn about Syria, the more you realise how intractable the conflict is, and thus the more attractive a political solution appears to be,” said Joshua Landis, a Syria expert at the University of Oklahoma. “But you also realise the odds of putting one together are very long.”

The joint decision to revive the long-dormant Geneva Communique, which laid out the core elements of a political solution to the conflict war after a meeting of the U.N.-sponsored Action Group for Syria last June, was reached after deliberations between Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.

The communique called for an immediate cease-fire, the creation of a transitional government mutually agreed by representatives of both the regime of President Bashar al-Assad and his opposition, and the holding of new parliamentary and presidential elections.

But the process never got underway, in part because of the opposition’s demand – tacitly and sometimes explicitly backed by Washington — that Assad step down as a pre-condition for any negotiation and Moscow’s firm rejection of that position.

But the administration of President Barack Obama appears to have narrowed its difference on that score with Moscow.

At the time, many U.S. analysts, particularly those on the hawkish side of the spectrum, believed that the balance of power on the ground was moving in the opposition’s direction, and that it was simply a matter of time – months, if not weeks — until the regime crumbled.

But after months of bloody stalemate, it appears that the government’s forces have recently regained the initiative by systematically retaking control of strategically located towns and cities.

“If that’s true, the administration may have assessments to that effect in hand and feels it’s worth a try to see if the opposition can be compelled to engage while it still holds a reasonably strong hand,” according to Wayne White, a former top Mideast analyst in the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Indeed, Kerry appears to have accepted Moscow’s position that Assad does not have to step down in order for negotiations to get underway.

“(I)t’s impossible for me as an individual to understand how Syria could possibly be governed in the future by the man who has committed the things we know that have taken place,” he said during a press conference with Lavrov after the meeting.

“But…I’m not going to decide that tonight, and I’m not going to decide that in the end, because the Geneva Communique says that the transitional government has to be chosen by mutual consent by the parties …the current regime and the opposition.”

For his part, Lavrov, without mentioning Assad by name, said he was “not interested in the fate of certain persons”.

While Damascus remained silent Wednesday about the prospects for a negotiation, some opposition leaders rejected the initiative, while others expressed deep scepticism.

“Syrians: be careful of squandering your revolution in international conference halls,” warned Moaz al-Khatib, a former leader of the Arab League-recognised National Opposition Coalition (NOC).

At the same time, Col. Qassim Saadeddine, a spokesman for the rebel Supreme Military Council (SMC), the U.S. backed group through which Washington is currently funnelling intelligence and “non-lethal” military aid to fighters in the field, told Reuters that he didn’t believe “there is a political solution left for Syria. …We will not sit with the regime for dialogue.”

Whether that was the opposition’s final word remains to be seen, according to analysts here who noted that Amb. Robert Ford, who accompanied Kerry in Moscow, was on his way to Istanbul to talk with opposition representatives, apparently in hopes of bringing them around to a more positive response.

U.S. officials said they were hoping that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey, the rebels’ main regional backers, would also cooperate in helping to persuade opposition figures to come to the table.

Two weeks ago, Obama hosted Qatar’s emir, Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, at the White House, when he reportedly stressed the importance of a political solution in Syria and called on his guest to cease providing military assistance to the more-radical Islamist factions in the opposition. He will also be meeting here with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the most important regional player, later this month to more closely align the two countries’ parties.

All of this comes amidst growing pressure here on Obama to escalate U.S. intervention in the crisis, particularly in the wake of still-unconfirmed reports that Assad’s forces have used chemical weapons against rebel forces and growing fears that the war’s continuation threatens to destabilise neighbouring countries, particularly Lebanon and Iraq, as well as Jordan which is finding it increasingly difficult to cope with the more than 500,000 Syrian refugees who have flooded into the country.

Support is building in Congress for legislation calling on Obama to provide lethal military aid and training to the rebels, an option that the administration has said it is actively considering on its own if the chemical weapons charges are confirmed.

Obama has previously resisted increasing Washington’s military backing for the opposition and has tried to confine U.S. aid to humanitarian assistance, more than 500 million dollars of which has been provided to date.

Re-invigorating a diplomatic process for resolving the conflict thus looks increasingly attractive to the administration, although most analysts believe prospects for any immediate progress are dim.

“The chance of a diplomatic breakthrough coming out of the projected conference is at best modest,” according to Paul Pillar, a retired CIA veteran who served as National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia.

“But it represents a more realistic hope for bringing a modicum of peace and stability to Syria in the foreseeable future than does stoking the civil war with more outside involvement in the military conflict. The fact that the United States and Russia could agree on any of this is a breakthrough of sorts,” he wrote in an email to IPS.

Landis agreed. “Whether the situation (for a successful negotiation) is ripe today is still debatable, because Assad still thinks he can win, and the opposition, with hundreds of militias, is too fragmented to negotiate,” he told IPS.

“But you have to get the international community open-minded to this kind of dialogue, and down the line, that may happen.”

Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi’s statement yesterday that the Islamic Republic is prepared to host talks between Bashar Al Assad’s government and the opposition should be regarded as an indication of Tehran’s inability to influence events in Syria. His public declaration was more like a futile public relations [...]]]> via Lobe Log

Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi’s statement yesterday that the Islamic Republic is prepared to host talks between Bashar Al Assad’s government and the opposition should be regarded as an indication of Tehran’s inability to influence events in Syria. His public declaration was more like a futile public relations effort to sell Iran’s potential as a constructive regional player than a plan offered with any hope of its acceptance.

It is worth remembering that Salehi’s words come after calls from Russia and Kofi Annan for Iran to be included in Syrian crisis resolution efforts, followed by the Obama Administration’s categorical rejection of such an inclusion. Iran is apparently part of the problem and hence cannot be part of the solution. Susan Rice, the US ambassador to the United Nations, said yesterday that Iran “is supporting, aiding and abetting the Assad regime materially and in many other ways” and that “it has shown no readiness to contribute constructively.”

Exactly why Iran is distinguished from Russia regarding the distribution of material aid to the Syrian regime is not clear. One reason for the singling out of Iran could be because it is not a member of the UN Security Council. Or, it may be that the regional and international struggle over the fate of Syria is not geared towards delinking that country from Russia but rather about breaking its alliance with Iran. Iran cannot be permitted to take part in a process wherein the intention of several participants is to weaken its regional position.

But does Iran have an independent and coherent strategy for changing the calculations of the US and regional players like Saudi Arabia and Turkey? Or, for that matter, does Iran have a strategy to deal with the deteriorating situation in Syria? Not really!

Recent statements and slight shifts from Tehran suggest that Iran is towing the Russian line. In fact, Salehi’s offer of facilitating dialogue comes just a few days after Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov once again called on the Syrian government and all of the opposition groups to embark on a dialogue.

Iran also seems to have absorbed Moscow’s interpretation of the June 30^th Geneva agreement regarding a Syrian political transition based on “mutual consent.” While for the Syrian National Council and Washington the first step of such a transition requires Assad’s departure, Tehran, like Moscow, wants Assad’s fate to be on the negotiating table. This implies that if there is a Russian decision to lean on Assad more forcefully, regardless of whether it will work or not, Tehran will follow.

Like other countries with a stake in Syria’s future, Iran is now faced with an ally that’s essentially in the throes of what will likely be a long, drawn out and worsening civil war. Various voices are warning about what could lie head. The prospect of Syria repeating the gruesome Algerian civil war of the 1990s has been raised, while for Mohammad Ali Sobhani, Iran’s former ambassador to Lebanon, the fear is more about Syria’s disintegration along the lines of the former Yugoslavia. Others worry about a spill over into and further destabilization of Iraq, particularly into the adjacent Iraqi provinces of Anbar and Ninewa. But expressions of fear do not make up for the lack of a visionary policy.

The Iranian government is undoubtedly aware that Syria is in a mess. But in the coming months expect Iran’s response to be more reactive than proactive despite proclamations and posturing that suggest otherwise.