by Peter Jenkins
What a pity that Mr. Netanyahu’s interviewer on CBS’s “Face the Nation”, Bob Schieffer, chose to throw Israel’s Prime Minister a succession of softballs (the cricketing equivalents are called “dollies”).
It would have been refreshing if Mr. Schieffer had asked the PM how he squared his [...]]]>
by Peter Jenkins
What a pity that Mr. Netanyahu’s interviewer on CBS’s “Face the Nation”, Bob Schieffer, chose to throw Israel’s Prime Minister a succession of softballs (the cricketing equivalents are called “dollies”).
It would have been refreshing if Mr. Schieffer had asked the PM how he squared his certainty about Iran’s nuclear intentions with the assessments that the US intelligence community has produced; queried the PM’s assertion that producing fissile material is nine tenths of the challenge of making a nuclear weapon capable of threatening Israel; reminded the PM of the numerous occasions he has claimed time to be running out for Iran diplomacy; and confronted the PM with what Saudi Prince Turki bin Faisal, a prominent spokesman for an Arab state that has coexisted peacefully with Israel, said to an interviewer from Spiegel last month:
SPIEGEL: What do you think would happen if Israel were to carry out a pre-emptive attack to prevent Tehran from building the bomb?
Prince Turki: Iran would retaliate against everybody — with its missiles, with suicide bombers, with agents. And we would be the first victims. Imagine if a nuclear installation is destroyed in Iran and there is fallout on our side of the border. The Iranian people would coalesce around their government. In short, it would be total mayhem.
An even more interesting question would have been this: “Prime Minister, have developments over the last two years ever prompted you to re-visit the decision taken by one of your predecessors, in 1992, to demonise Iran, in order to preserve the strategic value of Israel to the US?”
I doubt Mr. Schieffer would have got much of an answer. Yet it would be fascinating to know whether Israel is starting to reconsider the premise of the anti-Iranian course on which it embarked 21 years ago, with ever-greater consequences for US attitudes to Iran, especially in Congress.
According to Trita Parsi, the author of Treacherous Alliance: the Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran and the US, that course was premised on a change in the way Israeli leaders viewed their neighbourhood.
Since the time of Ben-Gurion, Israel had sought friendly ties with “the periphery” (Iran and Turkey) in order to counter-balance the threat posed by “the vicinity” (the Arab states surrounding Israel plus Iraq).
In 1992 it dawned on a new Israeli government that the defeat of Iraq in the first Gulf War, the dismantlement of Iraqi WMD programs, Egyptian passivity and the launching of the Madrid peace process had defused the Arab threat and opened up possibilities for Israeli economic penetration of Arab neighbours.
But “Israel would have no future in the new order unless it could find a rationale for Washington to continue the strategic relationship” writes Parsi, who goes on to quote an expert on Israeli foreign policy: “There’s no doubt that when the prospects for peace with the inner circle emerged [the depiction of Iran as a threat] started”.
Iran was the obvious choice because of the torrent of revolutionary, anti-imperialist and anti-Israeli rhetoric that had flowed out of Tehran since 1979, and because Iran might one day seek to rival Israeli influence in the Arab states.
Writes Parsi: “Swiftly a campaign was organised to convince the US and Europe that Iran was a global threat.”
“The charges were based not on an existing Iranian threat but on the anticipation of a future Iranian threat,” he states.
What followed is becoming history.
Now the question is whether Israel still feels as sanguine about its Arab “vicinity”, and whether it continues to want Iran to provide the rationale for its strategic relationship with the US.
One might suppose that Israel could dispense with Iran as a rationale now that the US and Europe have such need of Israel as a still point of democratic stability in a maelstrom of Arab unrest.
Can one also suppose that Israel might see value in encouraging the US and Europe to cooperate with Iran to restore stability to the Arab “vicinity”?
The point is not that Syria, Iraq and Egypt are in any condition to threaten Israel militarily. Of course they are not. The point is that instability is intrinsically unpredictable.
Some future twist in the unfolding drama of the Arab Spring could transform Israel’s strategic prospects. And meanwhile the risk of chemical weapons falling into the hands of anti-Israeli terrorists is greater than it has ever been.
The fiction that Iran is a global threat no longer serves Israel well. How long will it take the Israelis, intelligent as they are, to realise that?
]]>The Guardian is reporting that a ”reformulated” proposal including “limited sanctions relief” will be launched by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (p5+1) after the US presidential election.
Earlier this week Al-Monitor reported along the same lines and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made
The Guardian is reporting that a ”reformulated” proposal including “limited sanctions relief” will be launched by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (p5+1) after the US presidential election.
Earlier this week Al-Monitor reported along the same lines and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made similar general comments. But according to Reza Marashi, a former Iran-desk State Department staffer, we’ll have to wait and see if the comments result in substantial changes on the part of the negotiating powers.
“The rhetoric we’re hearing from these unnamed U.S. and EU officials is positive, and it should be both praised and reinforced,” Marashi told Lobe Log. “But as we’ve learned over the past four years, actions speak louder than words for officials in Washington, Brussels and Tehran.”
Marashi noted that Western officials had already recognized the need for offering Iran a deal that it could sell at home “but domestic political realities forced the U.S. to move the goalposts.” If there is to be any real progress, it will happen after the US presidential election on November 6th. According to Marashi, “until then both sides recognize the need for better PR. We’re already seeing this on Iran’s end with Foreign Minister Salehi.”
“Both sides are spending political capital to shape the narrative in case talks fail, rather than spending the necessary political capital to ensure talks succeed,” he said.
Ever since negotiations resumed and began heading downhill this year, analysts have been saying that a successful deal requires sanctions relief to also be on the table. In July, former top CIA analyst Paul Pillar explained why the “Nothing-But-Pressure Fallacy” is doomed to fail if an acceptable deal for both sides is the objective:
…And the story of stasis in the nuclear talks is also pretty simple. The Iranians have made it clear they are willing to make the key concession about no longer enriching uranium at the level that has raised fears about a “break-out” capability in return for sanctions relief. But the P5+1 have failed to identify what would bring such relief, instead offering only the tidbit of airplane parts and the vaguest of suggestions that they might consider some sort of relief in the future. The Iranians are thus left to believe that heavy pressure, including sanctions, will continue no matter what they do at the negotiating table, and that means no incentive to make more concessions.
But success from the declared US perspective (that is, verifiable moves from Iran showing that it will not build a nuclear weapon) also depends on what kind of, as well as how much sanctions relief is offered (consider George Perkovich’s comment at the end of Chris McGreal’s report); Iranian acceptance of the notion that the US will not seek regime change once Iran makes serious concessions; what Iran is willing and able to do to prove good and true intentions; and who is running the show in Iran and the US when the new deal is offered.
Regarding the last two points: sources say that this SPIEGEL interview with Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi where he implies that Iran could halt 20% enrichment (a major p5+1 requirement) in exchange for a guaranteed fuel supply echoes previous statements that Iranian officials have been making for quite some time. Iran-watchers have also been speculating that the country’s hardline leaders will not allow Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to achieve any diplomatic successes while he is in office and any deal is therefore only possible following his exit in June 2013.
Meanwhile, Jim reports for IPS News that earlier this week Republican Sen. Lindsay Graham said he is working on a new Congressional resolution which he hopes to pass in any lame-duck session after the Nov. 6 elections that would promise Israel U.S. support, including military assistance, if it attacks Iran. And after the new Congress convenes in January, Sen. Graham suggested he would push yet another resolution that would give the president – whether the incumbent, Obama, or his Republican challenger, Mitt Romney – broad authority to take military action if sanctions don’t curb Iran’s nuclear programme.
Not to mention the fact that while Iran’s economy and people continue to struggle under the weight of sanctions, the US and EU are piling more on, making the Iranian hope of an end to sanctions and the domestic suffocation at home, seem like a far away dream.
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