by Robert E. Hunter
Following the US-Russian agreement, the Syrian government’s chemical weapons must now be destroyed. To do this without putting UN employees at impossible risk, the Syrian civil war must also stop. To do that requires a plan by the Obama administration and others. To do that requires a realistic [...]]]>
by Robert E. Hunter
Following the US-Russian agreement, the Syrian government’s chemical weapons must now be destroyed. To do this without putting UN employees at impossible risk, the Syrian civil war must also stop. To do that requires a plan by the Obama administration and others. To do that requires a realistic goal — not just “victory” for the rebels — but which ones?
At best, last week’s diplomacy puts the Obama administration back at Square One before the major chemical weapons attacks on August 21. Still, there are differences. Firstly, the threat of force, strongly put forth by the president in his dramatic speech to the nation last Tuesday, is in fact off the table. For this to be otherwise would require some triggering mechanism of Syrian government “non-compliance,” and Russia would have to concur. It would also return President Obama to the dilemma of trying to get Congressional and public approval for US military force. Two non-starters.
In fact, the debate on the use of force is mostly about US domestic politics. The president should draw upon the famous quotation misattributed to Vermont Senator George Aiken during the Vietnam War: “Declare victory and get out.”
Secondly, the US can no longer ignore what has been happening in Syria and must ramp up its diplomatic efforts.
Thirdly, Russia is now directly involved in Middle East diplomacy. Getting it to “butt out” now is also a non-starter. Maybe President Vladimir Putin will see advantages in genuinely working toward a broader settlement in Syria and elsewhere in the region. The price: Russia will henceforth be “in” and will have to be recognized as more than just a successor to the country whipped in the Cold War.
Both Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan knew how to change bad news to good in foreign policy: the former by “going to China” and making possible withdrawal from Vietnam; the latter by proposing to Mikhail Gorbachev at Reykjavik that the US and USSR get rid of all nuclear weapons, an ice-breaker that helped end the Cold War.
For Obama, “changing the subject” in Syria and the broader Middle East should include the following components:
- Stop insisting that the possible use of force against Syria “remains on the table.” It has no further value and just keeps alive the debate over US “credibility.”
- Recognize that the Syrian government will not negotiate when the outcome is predetermined (the departure of President Bashar al-Assad). If President Obama can’t for domestic political reasons back off from this second “red line,” at least the Alawite community needs cast-iron assurances that it will not be butchered following a deal and can continue to play a major political role.
- Pursue a peace process relentlessly as an honest broker, with all other interested outside countries, co-chaired with Russia and under UN auspices.
- Tell US Arab allies whose citizens export Islamist fundamentalism or fund weapons for terrorists in Syria and elsewhere to “cut it out.”
- Help restrain the wider Sunni-Shia civil war in the region, in part through demonstrating that the US will remain strategically engaged, while acting as an honest broker.
- Take advantage of Iran’s new presidency to propose direct US-Iranian talks and pursue a nuclear agenda that has a serious chance of success, as opposed to past US demands that Iran give us what we want as a precondition. Recognize publicly that we respect Iran’s legitimate security interests, as we rightly demand that Tehran reciprocate.
- Explore possible compatible interests with Iran in Afghanistan, Iraq, freedom of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, an Incidents at Sea Agreement (as the US and Soviet Union did in 1972) – and perhaps even over Syria.
- Engage the Europeans more fully in both political and economic developments in the Middle East and North Africa, as part of a new Transatlantic Bargain.
- Start shifting the US focus in the region from military to political and economic tools of power and influence. Put substance behind the spirit of Obama’s 2009 Cairo speech that did so much for US standing with the region’s people.
- Propose a long-term security framework for the Middle East, in which all countries can take part; all will oppose terrorism (including its inspiration), all will respect the legitimate security interests of its neighbors, and all will search for confidence-building measures.
- Engage all interested states (including Iran, Russia, China, Pakistan, and India) in developing a framework for Afghanistan after 2014.
- Recognize that Israeli-Palestinian negotiations can only succeed when Israel’s security concerns (Egypt, Syria, and Iran) are addressed and the blockade of Gaza ends.
Other steps may be needed, but all elements in the Middle East must be considered together. The US must exercise leadership. It must primarily work for regional security, political and economic development, be the security provider of last resort, honor its commitments, act as an honest broker, and prove itself worthy of trust.
]]>By Robert Hunter
Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has written at length (Washington Post, November 18th – Job One Abroad: Iran) on Iran’s progress toward a military nuclear capability and, in brief, on what to do about it. His suggestion is for “a creative diplomacy, allied to [...]]]>
By Robert Hunter
Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has written at length (Washington Post, November 18th – Job One Abroad: Iran) on Iran’s progress toward a military nuclear capability and, in brief, on what to do about it. His suggestion is for “a creative diplomacy, allied to a determined strategy.” But precisely what?
Historic parallels are always imprecise. But 40 years ago, the United States was in confrontation with the Soviet Union, in the midst of history’s most complex and potentially deadly arms race.
Yet the US government, matched by the Soviet Union, found ways to prevent a collective falling-off of the cliff of nuclear cataclysm.
1972 was notable for several developments, including the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which provides no precedent in today’s standoff with Iran. But a less-remembered diplomatic agreement does: the Incidents at Sea Agreement, whereby the two superpowers agreed on means to prevent a possible collision or other confrontation at sea from escalating to something far worse. Today, the parallel is in the Persian Gulf and more particularly, the Strait of Hormuz. All countries, including the US and Iran, have a vital interest in the free flow of commerce, especially oil commerce. All have an interest in reducing risks of unintended escalation. The risks are exacerbated by the heavy presence of US warships in the Gulf, although the plethora of US military power elsewhere in the region is surely sufficient to show resolve both to Teheran and to Gulf Arab states. The reported Iranian effort to shoot down a US drone last month could have escalated, had steady US nerves not prevailed.
As far as one knows, nothing akin to the Incidents at Sea Agreement has been proposed to Teheran, nor has its complementary interest of stability in Afghanistan, or its cooperative role in countering piracy in the Arabian Sea, been formally embraced.
More broadly, by 1972 the US was fully committed to direct, bilateral talks with Moscow, which it still abjures, today, with Teheran, and has done for decades. Further, at the beginning of 1973, NATO and the Warsaw Pact began talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), which recognized the risks of potential conventional force instabilities in a heavily-armed region — a good parallel with the vast overarming of all parties in the narrow confines, short-distances, and high performance weapons of the Persian Gulf region. That year the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) was also convened, resulting two years later in the Helsinki Final Act. Arguably, this agreement made a significant contribution to the eventual hollowing out of the Soviet empires (especially in Eastern Europe) and an end to the Cold War.
Collectively, this diplomacy became known as detente, one of the great successes of US diplomacy in the last half century.
All these efforts were premised on growing awareness, at a time of mutual hostility and risks of war that neither side could hope to escape unscathed, that each had to understand the other’s fears and take a major measure of responsibility for the other’s security. That was the essence of mutual deterrence (Mutual Assured Destruction). Obviously, even a nuclear-weapons-armed Iran would be no match for either the United States or Israel, each with its nuclear arsenal, but there would still be a form of mutual deterrence: in the sense that even a single Iranian nuclear weapon could threaten Israel’s very existence. Hence, pledges by both US presidential candidates to do whatever is needed to keep Iran from crossing a so-far imprecise “red line.”
Yet the United State has never been ready clearly to say that, even if Iran were to do everything that we want of it, we will recognize its legitimate security interests, much less offer it guarantees against attack, as the last Bush administration did with North Korea. Henry Kissinger sees that recognition not as something to be declared up front, as in the Cold War, but only after Iran “accepts enforceable verification.” Elementary strategy analysis and a vast history of statecraft argue that that course cannot succeed.
Kissinger is surely right that “Iran [needs to show] willingness to conduct itself as a nation-state, rather than a revolutionary religious cause.” And maybe Teheran would not respond positively, whatever we do. But in trying to move Iran in that direction and toward ending nuclear risks in the Middle East, there is clear precedent from the Cold War: intelligent US diplomacy, then crafted and led in major part by the National Security Advisor and later Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger.
- Robert Hunter, former US ambassador to NATO, was director of Middle East Affairs on the NSC Staff in the Carter Administration and in 2011-12 was Director of Transatlantic Security Studies at the National Defense University.
]]>By Wayne White
An excellent October 18 article, “The Myth of ‘Surgical Strikes’ on Iran“, by David Isenberg highlighted many of the conclusions of a sobering study by industrialist Khosrow Semnani on the potentially steep human cost of even a relatively selective attack against Iran’s diverse nuclear infrastructure. Semnani maintains that if the most important facilities [...]]]>By Wayne White
An excellent October 18 article, “The Myth of ‘Surgical Strikes’ on Iran“, by David Isenberg highlighted many of the conclusions of a sobering study by industrialist Khosrow Semnani on the potentially steep human cost of even a relatively selective attack against Iran’s diverse nuclear infrastructure. Semnani maintains that if the most important facilities are hit during work shifts, on site casualties could be as high as 10,000. Additionally, since a few of the most important Iranian nuclear installations are located near population centers, toxic nuclear materials unleashed by the attacks could possibly inflict an even higher number of casualties on civilians. Yet, Semnani focused most of his attention on the the casualties stemming from attacks focused on just one critical slice of the nuclear sector, with less detailed references to other targets (which he notes could involve a grand total of “400″) that might be struck in an especially robust air campaign against Iran. Indeed, if the US in particular decided to carry out such attacks, some detail on the potential — in fact likely — impact far beyond Iran’s most high-profile nuclear facilities and their immediate surroundings needs to be added to this picture to gain a full appreciation of the extent of potential Iranian casualties.Yet, as opposed to the relatively limited scope of any Israeli attack dictated by the extreme range involved and the smaller aerial strike package that could be deployed (in terms of extending casualties beyond those outlined in the article and Semnani’s study, both nuclear and civilian), many expect that any US attack on Iran’s nuclear capabilities would be far more comprehensive. Specifically, the US would be able to muster a much larger force of aircraft (and cruise missiles) with which to operate, and at far closer range. In order to clear paths to the targets cited, I am among those observers who anticipate in such a scenario waves of parallel US strikes against Iranian military communications, land-based anti-ship missile sites, any Iranian naval forces that could pose a potential threat to US warships operating offshore (as well as the Strait of Hormuz more generally), Iranian air force aircraft and bases, as well as Iranian anti-aircraft defenses. Finally, there might also be an attempt to take out as much of Iran’s ballistic missile testing, manufacturing, storage, and basing assets as possible. After all, Iran’s ambitious missile program relates directly to Iran’s ability to retaliate and might be associated with any eventual Iranian intent to weaponize and deliver nuclear weapons.
In other words, not only could a US assault (much as outlined in 2006 by the US military in its briefings of the Bush Administration, including potentially several thousand missions by combat aircraft) extend far beyond anything any reasonable individual could possibly regard as ”surgical,” the overall attack probably would more closely resemble a flat-out war. And, naturally, in the context of such a considerably more dire scenario, those attempting to estimate potential casualties (nuclear industry workers, civilians, as well as Iranian military personnel) would be advised to hike them up quite a bit higher.
- Wayne White is a Policy Expert with Washington’s Middle East Policy Council. He was formerly the Deputy Director of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research’s Office of Analysis for the Near East and South Asia (INR/NESA) and senior regional analyst. Find his author archive here.
Back in January, academic Matthew Kroenig claimed the United States could militarily strike Iran without causing havoc and catastrophe in the region. His arguments were widely criticized and supported by the usual suspects. Jamie Fly, the neoconservative executive director of the Foreign Policy Initiative, disagreed with Kroenig, but only because [...]]]>
Back in January, academic Matthew Kroenig claimed the United States could militarily strike Iran without causing havoc and catastrophe in the region. His arguments were widely criticized and supported by the usual suspects. Jamie Fly, the neoconservative executive director of the Foreign Policy Initiative, disagreed with Kroenig, but only because Kroenig did not go far enough. Then in May the two penned an op-ed arguing that President Obama had offered Iran too many carrots. This was just days before the talks almost collapsed after the only “relief” the Western-led negotiating team offered Iran was spare parts for aircraft that have suffered tremendously under sanctions. What would assist the negotiation process, according to Fly and Kroenig? More threats of military force, of course.
Although using the military option on Iran hasn’t exactly taken off as a preferred choice here in Washington, Kroenig and like-minded folks working at prominent platforms like the Wall Street Journal continue to beat their drums. That’s likely one reason why the Council on Foreign Relations hosted a debate moderated by Foreign Affairs editor Gideon Rose between Kroenig and Trita Parsi, a prominent US-Iran relations analyst and president of the National Iranian American Council. The entire debate is worth listening to, but in a nutshell, Kroenig reiterates the arguments from his article: out of the 3 potential outcomes with Iran — successful diplomacy, nuclear containment and military conflict, the third is most likely and planning should begin even while the US continues its diplomatic track with Iran. Israel isn’t equipped to do the job, so the US should carry out “limited” strikes and only respond devastatingly if Iran retaliates with more than wimper by, for example, closing the Strait of Hormuz.
Parsi accordingly points out several flaws in Kroenig’s argument: an Iranian nuclear weapon is neither inevitable nor imminent, diplomacy has neither failed nor been whole-heartedly utilized and the experience of the Iraq War, which took the lives of 5,000 Americans and hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, shows that a war with Iran is hardly going to be quick and relatively painless as Kroenig suggests. Parsi adds that as with the lead-up to the Iraq War, proponents of the military option with Iran are not from the military or intelligence communities. In fact, neoconservative hawks regularly contest the validity of intelligence and military assessments, which is ironic to say the least. Parsi also notes that as former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has repeatedly emphasized, bombing a country is the best way to convince it that it needs a nuclear deterrent to ward of future attacks…
]]>Shadow banks may control about 25 to 30 percent of the word’s financial system. They may be about 50 percent of all banking assets in the world. I say may in both of those sentences because it is hard to tell how big this financial sector is. The United States may [...]]]>
Shadow banks may control about 25 to 30 percent of the word’s financial system. They may be about 50 percent of all banking assets in the world. I say may in both of those sentences because it is hard to tell how big this financial sector is. The United States may make up about 40 to 50 percent of all shadow banking. However, shadow banking is spread throughout the world.
Shadow banks are not as regulated as regular banks. They also go about gathering capital for lending in a different way than regular banks. They often securitize assets such as commercial and residential mortgages, corporate bonds, consumer loan packages, and the like. Shadow banks also find other assets and derivatives of those assets to back up their securitized debt instruments. Many use US Treasury bills and other sovereign debt (the debt instruments of many nations and their equivalent of Treasury bills, for example) to act as risk mitigation and collateral in the “loan” making process.
Shadow banks also rely on something called the repurchase (repo) markets to liquefy debt and other assets in the short run – even though most of these assets are long run ones, like mortgages and long term bonds. Simply put, repos are a way to quickly pay off short term debts and also to get some of the debt off the books of the shadow banks either overnight or even for longer periods.
Ok, this is all very complicated. Frankly, for the shadow banks that complexity has protected them over the years. It has also led to some very big crashes because the people who should have understood what was going on did not. That includes many governments and even some of the leadership of the shadow banks themselves.
So what we have is a large massive part of the world financial system basing its capital on sliced and diced assets with sometimes questionable risk calculations and even sometimes questionable valuations of the assets. How much might it be? How does $40 trillion dollars sound?
The valuation of the assets could be a real problem if there is a war with Iran that gets out of hand and leads to significant damage to oil and gas fields and facilities in the Gulf. If energy prices spike and spike again for the short run, the market could bear that. If the oil and gas prices spike and stay way up in many markets then we have a much bigger problem.
One of the mechanisms of asset destruction in the shadow banking system can be a huge increase in energy prices followed by recessions or worse in many places, including in the already fragile EU, China and the US. Other commodity and goods prices will be affected as well.
Many shadow bank assets are heavily leveraged. Does this sound familiar? Leveraged shadow bank assets took down the US and part of the world economy when the housing market went bust in 2007-2008.
Many shadow banks are heavily into derivatives and even derivatives of derivatives. If the underlying assets of the derivatives collapse due to falling economies then the derivatives collapse along with them.
It is quite possible that under some war and conflict scenarios attached to scenarios of oil and gas prices that the economic impacts of a protracted and quite damaging war with Iran could be magnified well beyond the normal way this is considered.
Shadow banking is huge. It needs to be considered in calculations about military conflict. The losses could be gigantic on the financial markets.
Some shadow banks might benefit from war if some of the sharpies in the shadow banks have already set up derivatives and options as hedges betting on a war. They cash in if the war happens.
Either way some people in the shadow banks could lose. Some could win.
The regular folks lose. The top guns in the shadow banks will drive their Ferraris. The regular people may end up selling apples.
You see, a war with Iran now would be very different than if it happened in 1979. Back then the shadow banking system was tiny. Derivative markets were tiny compared to what they are now. The leverage and risk inherent in sometimes unstable sliced and diced assets in the tens of trillions was just not there.
Is this something to think about? I surely believe so. I am going to look much more deeply into this situation and hope to have more to write about it to clarify and educate, hopefully before possibly catastrophic events take place.
Policy conclusion: take great care and do your homework on the realities of the risks within the world economy before stepping off the cliff toward a potentially very costly war.
To read more about shadow banking try:
]]>Iran watchers are no doubt aware that recently Iran’s “Shabake-ye Khabar” news network of the Islamic Republic’s official “Seda va Sima” television and radio network, conducted an internet poll regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.
Respondents were asked whether Iran should cease uranium enrichment in exchange for sanctions relief. [...]]]>
Iran watchers are no doubt aware that recently Iran’s “Shabake-ye Khabar” news network of the Islamic Republic’s official “Seda va Sima” television and radio network, conducted an internet poll regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.
Respondents were asked whether Iran should cease uranium enrichment in exchange for sanctions relief. 58% of respondents called for the cessation of uranium enrichment in exchange for sanctions relief. A screen shot can be found here.
In a screen shot posted on Radio Free Liberty in any article by Golnaz Esfandiari, the percentage against nuclear enrichment exceeds 60%. No doubt due to the respective sites taking their screen shots at different times. According to Ms. Esfandiari, Radio Free Liberty took the screen shot shortly before the poll’s removal.
As the news site realised its bungle, and the story was picked up by international outlets, it replaced the nuclear internet poll, with another one, asking respondents whether they would support the Majles plan to close the Strait of Hormuz in response to the EU oil embargo. 89% of respondents stated that they were against the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Here’s the relevant screen shot.
After this second gaff, the network steered clear of the nuclear issue and sanctions altogether and instead posted a poll relating to Iranian football.
This wasn’t a scientific opinion poll, and according to the news site about 2,000 people participated. Iranian state media later and rather bizarrely accused BBC Persian service of hacking their site and doctoring the opinion poll. BBC Persian firmly rejected this charge.
That being said, I would not be surprised if many Iranians are questioning the wisdom of the current nuclear policy. Many are under immense pressure because of the currency crisis, rampant inflation and many other economic ailments, all exacerbated by economic and financial sanctions.
In Iran there has not been a genuine, frank and open discussion of the nuclear file and the costs involved with the government’s programme in the face of several UNSC resolutions and extreme pressure from the US and its European allies. If a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis were placed before Iranians in the public area, it would be most interesting to see and hear what they might conclude. That being said, we very rarely, if ever, see foreign, national security and nuclear energy policy considered in accordance with Iranian public opinion. Another debate for another time, no doubt.
–Eskandar Sadeghi-Boroujerdi is an Iran researcher at the Oxford Research Group and a third year doctoral candidate at the University of Oxford. He has published widely on Iran. His latest with Paul Ingram and Gabrielle Rifkind is “Iran’s Nuclear Impasse: Breaking the Deadlock”. Follow him on twitter: @essikhan
]]>George Santayana wisely said: “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” Oblivious to history and its lessons, the United States and its Western allies are repeating their actions from the 1950’s–that of imposing an oil embargo on Iran. The US-led alliance has forgotten [...]]]>
George Santayana wisely said: “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” Oblivious to history and its lessons, the United States and its Western allies are repeating their actions from the 1950’s–that of imposing an oil embargo on Iran. The US-led alliance has forgotten the past.
Iran remembers.
When under the leadership of the nationalist Dr. Mossadegh, Iran opted to nationalize its oil industry, the British Royal Navy blocked Iran’s oil exports to forcefully prevent if from nationalizing its oil. In retaliation to Iran’s nationalistic ambitions, and to punish Iran for pursuing its national interests, the British instigated a worldwide boycott of Iranian oil.
In the 1950’s, Iran did not have the military might to retaliate against the oil embargo and the naval blockade was aimed at crushing the economy in order to bring about regime change. The subsequent events are described in a New York Times[i]article as a “lesson in the heavy cost that must be paid” when an oil-rich Third World nation “goes berserk with fanatical nationalism.” Iran learnt that sovereignty and nationalism necessitate tactical/military strength and determination.
Not heeding the aftermath of the 1950’s, the American-led Western allies have once again imposed an oil embargo on Iran. In retaliation, Iran has drafted a bill to stop the flow of oil through its territorial waters–the Strait of Hormuz, to countries that have imposed sanctions against it. This bill is not without merit and contrary to the previous oil embargo, it would appear that Tehran has the upper hand and the heavy cost associated with the embargo will not be borne by Iran alone.
Iran’s Legal Standing
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea stipulates that vessels can exercise the right of innocent passage and coastal states should not impede their passage. Although Iran has signed the Treaty, the Treaty was not ratified and as such it has no legal standing. However, even if one overlooks the non-binding signature, under the UNCLOS framework of international law, a coastal state can block ships from entering its territorial waters if the passage of the ships harm “peace, good order or security” of said state, as the passage of such ships would no longer be deemed “innocent”[ii].
Even if Iran simply chooses to merely delay the passage of tankers by exercising its right to inspect every oil-tanker that passes through the Strait of Hormuz, these inspections and subsequent delays would maintain or contribute to higher oil prices. While higher oil prices would benefit Iran and other oil-producing countries, they would further destabilize the European economy which is already in crisis.
The Military Option
Although US-led Western allies are flexing their muscles by sending battle ships to the Persian Gulf, Washington’s own war game exercise, the Millennium Challenge 2002 (with a price tag of $250 million), underscored its inability to defeat Iran. Oblivious to the lesson of its own making, by sending more warships to the Persian Gulf the US is inching towards a full-scale conflict. The inherent danger from a naval buildup is that unlike the Cuban Missile Crisis, the forces in the Persian Gulf are not confined to two leaders who would be able to communicate to stop a run-away situation. Nor would the consequences of such a potential conflict be limited to the region.
Given that 17 million barrels of oil a day, or 35% of the world’s seaborne oil exports go through the Strait of Hormuz, incidents in the Strait would be fatal for the world economy. While only 1.1 millions barrels per day go to the US, a significant amount of this oil is destined for Europe. One must ask why the US demands that its “European allies” act contrary to their own national interest, pay a higher price for oil by boycotting Iran’s exports and increase the risk of Iran blocking the passage of other oil-tankers destined for them.
Again, history has a straight answer. Contrary to conventional wisdom about oil producing-countries, it is the US that has used oil as a weapon. Some examples include the pressure Washington put on Britain in the 1920s to share its oil concessions in the Middle East with US companies. Post World War II, the US violated the terms of the 1928 Red Line Agreement freezing the British and the French out of the Agreement.
In 1956, the US made it clear to Britain and France that no oil would be sent to Western Europe unless the two countries agreed to a rapid withdrawal from Egypt. The US was not opposed to the overthrow of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, but President Dwight. D. Eisenhower said: “Had they done it quickly, we would have accepted it”[iii].
It is possible that the leaders of Western European countries are beholden to special interest groups such as pro-Israel lobbies, as the US is. Or they may believe that Iran will not call their bluff by ratifying the bill passed by the Majlis and that oil will be delivered unhindered. Perhaps both instances hold. Either way, they are committing financial suicide and may well suffer serious consequences before Iran’s resolve is shaken.
–Soraya Sepahpour-Ulrich is a Public Diplomacy Scholar, independent researcher and blogger with a focus on US foreign policy and the role of lobby groups.
[i]“THE IRANIAN ACCORD”, The New York Times, Aug 6,1954, cited by S. Shalom
[ii] Martin Wahlisch, The Yale Journal of International Law, March 2012, citing UNCLOS, supra note 12, , art. 19, para1, and art. 25, para1.
[iii] Stephen Shalom; The Iran-Iraq War citing Kennett Love, Suez: the Twice-Fought War, New York: McGraw Hill, 1969, p. 651
]]>By Gary Sick
Politicians and pundits are curiously schizophrenic when discussing Iran. On one hand, they are prepared to declare, as Mitt Romney did, that the “greatest threat that Israel faces, and frankly the greatest threat the world faces, is a nuclear Iran.” To deal with [...]]]>
By Gary Sick
Politicians and pundits are curiously schizophrenic when discussing Iran. On one hand, they are prepared to declare, as Mitt Romney did, that the “greatest threat that Israel faces, and frankly the greatest threat the world faces, is a nuclear Iran.” To deal with this threat, he says as president he will “restore the regular presence of aircraft carrier groups in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf region simultaneously… .increase military assistance to Israel and coordination with all of our allies in the region.” Further, he is willing to consider “blockade, bombardment, and surgical military strikes.”
At the same time, when Iran actually issues a threat, such as the recent suggestion that it would close the Strait of Hormuz if its oil exports were interrupted, pundits and analysts from all sides rushed to assure Americans that in any showdown, Iran would be no match for the U.S. military. The mismatch in forces is so one-sided, they contended with good reason, that Iran would never dare attempt such a misguided action that would bring them into conflict with the mightiest military in the world.
The implication is that Iran, if it ever acquired a nuclear weapon, would be an intolerable threat to the United States and Israel (which have a combined total of well over 8000 operational nuclear weapons), but in the meantime Iran’s leaders are afraid to confront the United States because they are out-gunned.
Without questioning the logic of this proposition, just how worried should we be about Iran? How much harm can Iran actually do to us?
This question is important since, despite all the scare talk, the United States and its allies are actually conducting their relations with Iran as if they were entirely immune to any retaliation. Such policies include the use of drones for both reconnaissance and attack; covert (or officially deniable) actions, such as the Stuxnet worm introduced into the Iranian nuclear infrastructure and/or assassinations of suspect individuals; displays of military force; and destructive unilateral sanctions.
War by Stealth
President Obama deserves admiration for the skill with which he has moved the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts off the front pages, at the same time that he was moving soldiers out of the war zones. This, it is worth remembering, was what he was elected to do.
But as he was ending the most visible part of America’s ongoing wars, he was shifting to stealth warfare: drone reconnaissance and attack, assassinations, cyber warfare, and highly specialized small unit operations. It is certainly true that these tactics are less expensive than large scale combat, and they are less likely to produce negative political responses, at least among Obama’s voting constituencies. But they rely on a perception of impunity that is misleading and ultimately dangerous.
Drones are useful to track the activities of relatively primitive opponents, specifically opponents who have no significant air defenses or technological counter-measures. Over the barren skies of Afghanistan, Waziristan and Iraq, they can operate with little fear of interception or interference.
That is not true in a country with more sophisticated defenses. Recently, a stealth drone was downed in Iran. Iran claims that it spoofed the aircraft into believing it was returning to its base, when in fact it was landing in Iran. The Iranian story is credible, though we may never know all the facts. At least two other U.S. drones had previously been downed over Iran, though they were apparently shot down, not commandeered.
Losing a drone, however embarrassing, is not as costly as losing a manned aircraft. That is the appeal. But the fact that we were flying drones over Iran suggests we thought we could do so with impunity. Did we overestimate our own technological prowess? Did we underestimate Iran’s? Either way, it should be a lesson to those who are now assuring us almost daily that a surgical strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities could be conducted with little cost and manageable repercussions.
Little noticed was the Iranian announcement that it had rolled up a CIA espionage ring in Iran. If true, this is the third time since the revolution that a major U.S. spy ring was neutralized.
Cyber Blowback?
The introduction of the Stuxnet worm into Iran’s nuclear enrichment plant at Natanz probably slowed Iran’s production of low enriched uranium for a period of time, but enrichment never really stopped and within several months it had recovered to its previous level. It was a clever ploy, apparently created by one or more national cyber warfare laboratories. Whether true or not, Iran believes it was done by Israel and the United States, and Iran’s interpretation will shape its response.
Whoever planted the Stuxnet worm (and apparently a new version called “Duqu” that has showed up in recent months), probably assumed that its originators were immune from retaliation. Is that really true?
Iran has a very highly developed cyber warfare capability of its own, with a battalion of young, skilled IT engineers. Until now, they have focused primarily on putting down the incipient revolt that followed the contested elections of 2009. In that effort, they were much more efficient than the Egyptians, or Syrians or other Middle East nations who have tried to stop use of the internet for social and political mobilization. But what happens next?
The United States and all other developed industrial states rely on computer-driven systems for their most mundane and most sensitive services, everything from waste disposal sites to dams to nuclear plants. Cyber warfare specialists are openly worried about the vulnerability of these systems to a sophisticated cyber attack. And such attacks, if well planned, leave no discernible fingerprints.
As in the case of the stealth drone, are we as invulnerable as we thought? What if a power plant in your vicinity suddenly and mysteriously exploded or ran amok? You probably would not blame your national security officials, but you might be wrong. In cyber warfare, the playing field is much more level than in conventional warfare.
Are Sanctions the Answer?
More recently, the U.S. Congress has been insisting on sanctions against Iranian banks that, in effect, make it impossible for Iran to sell its oil. That is the equivalent of a military blockade of Iran’s oil ports, arguably an act of war. And these sanctions are being imposed unilaterally, without reference to the United Nations Security Council. Members of Congress can go home to their districts and boast about how tough they can be on Iran, and in an election year that is worth a few votes. President Obama seems unwilling to buck the tide, despite his better judgment.
Iran has responded with harsh words, indicating that if Iran’s oil lifeline is cut off, others will also find their access to world oil markets imperiled. Iran does not need to close the Strait of Hormuz to make a point. Its words make it clear that an act of war by the United States will be treated as such by Iran. Even the threat of a confrontation immediately drove the price of oil above $100 per barrel, which has effects on economies struggling to recover from the recession.
The main reason why Iran’s putative threat to close the Strait of Hormuz was dismissed is because Iran also relies on the Strait to export its own oil. But if Iran’s oil revenue – fifty percent of its budget – is cut off, they would have little to lose by striking out at those they hold responsible, including passage through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran cannot defeat the U.S. Navy, but the swarms of cruise missiles they could fire both from shore and from their fleet of speedboats could create havoc, as could the flood of mines they could put into the fast-moving waters of the Strait.
If pressed to the wall and facing collapse of its economy, Iran might reasonably try to make life as miserable as possible for those it holds responsible, including the loading facilities and refineries of the U.S. Arab allies across the Gulf from Iran. Iran’s cruise missiles can be used at targets other than ships.
Iran would eventually lose this battle, but the rest of the world would have paid a very high price. A prolonged period of oil prices above $200 and the uncertainty about when normal supplies could be resumed would do real damage to the fragile and recovering economies of Europe and the United States.
I’m sure the members of Congress who are trying to outdo each other in anti-Iran bravado spent little time worrying whether they and their constituents might be harmed in various ways by an Iran that sees itself under attack. Some openly welcome the idea of a third Middle East war, whatever the consequences.
Slouching Toward War
These are the same illusions of righteousness and impunity that preceded the U.S. invasion of Iraq. As General Zinni memorably noted, if you like Iraq and Afghanistan, you’re going to love Iran. Those who suggest that a U.S. military confrontation with Iran would be surgical, limited, and one-sided are many of the same people who eight years ago assured you that the invasion of Iraq would be a cakewalk.
Remember that Iran has been developing a nuclear enrichment capability for more than twenty years – more than thirty if we include our nuclear cooperation with the shah – all the while as members of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. They almost certainly experimented with development of a nuclear weapon during the days of Saddam Hussein, but according to U.S. intelligence and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) those experiments stopped with the fall of Saddam in 2003. The latest IAEA report, based on the observations of their own inspectors at key Iranian sites, found no evidence that Iran is diverting nuclear material to build a bomb.
The alarms that some are sounding as they openly try to push the United States into another truly catastrophic war in the Middle East are based on the fact that Iran MIGHT choose at some point in the future to build a bomb. Advocates of war try to transform that into a certainty that Iran WILL build a bomb and then use it, probably against Israel. That fear of a suspected nuclear capability as a rationale for going to war should by now sound familiar to most Americans. It is exactly the same argument that got us into Iraq.
An impeccable array of U.S. and Israeli security officials have spoken openly of the absolute folly of going to war with Iran and have warned against exaggerating either the threat or Iran’s intentions. Those voices include the top military leaders and intelligence officials in both the United States and Israel.
After a decade of war and trillion dollar deficits, the United States should be well aware that such adventures can do us real harm. An important set of experienced voices continue to call for a return to negotiations. Iran says it is willing. We risk greatly and unnecessarily if we ignore the chance.
]]>It’s the holidays and unfortunately not all the hawks took a break from agitating [...]]]>
It’s the holidays and unfortunately not all the hawks took a break from agitating for confrontation with Iran. Here’s to giving all we’ve got in the New Year to working for peaceful means of conflict resolution.
*This week’s essential reading is “Hawks who learned Nothing” in Salon. Matthew Duss of the Center for American Progress reminds us that many of the same people who pushed for war with Iraq are calling for escalation with Iran.
Mainstream Media and Pundits:
Wall Street Journal: The hawkish editorial board says yet again that war is the answer (emphasis is mine):
The Hormuz threat is another opportunity to set boundaries on Iran’s rogue behavior. Washington, along with London, Paris and Riyadh, should say plainly that any attempt to close or disrupt traffic through the strait would be considered an act of war that would be met with a military response…
The article ends by echoing Bush-era preemptive war rhetoric:
Would the U.S. dare resist Iranian aggression if it meant putting American forces at risk of a nuclear reprisal? Better to act now to stop Iran before we have to answer that terrible question.
The WSJ’s logic with respect to Iran’s behavior is curious. Iran is accused of being irrational and having a “tantrum” but it’s unlikely that it would close the Strait or threaten to do so without feeling seriously threatened itself. It’s worth keeping in mind that Iran has had more than 30 years to block this vital supply route and has never done so.
Washington Post: Jennifer Rubin (who almost always quotes the hawkish Foundation for Defense of Democracies when writing about Iran) does three things in this blog post. First she criticizes Leon Panetta for making “a mess of things” by expressing U.S. reservations about going to war with Iran. Then she asserts that there is only two options with Iran: punitive sanctions or war. Finally she repeats an argument regularly touted by pro-Israel hawks: the U.S. needs to save Israel from itself by preemptively going to war with Iran:
Ironic, isn’t it, that Obama should find himself in the same predicament as his predecessor: Preemptively strike a rogue regime or run the risk of regional and global catastrophe? There is one big difference, however. In Obama’s case, the Israelis will act if we don’t. And the margin for error, the degree of risk Israel is willing to incur, is much smaller than for us. Its existence and the entire Zioinist concept of a safe refuge for Jews is at stake.
Rubin also says “it’s impossible to know with certainty what the Iranians are up to” and yet she continues to make the case for confrontation. Like Iran’s authoritarian adjudicators, Rubin seems to be using guilty until proven innocent logic.
New York Times: John Vinocur’s alarmist article suggests war with Iran is just on the horizon. He quotes the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’s Mark Dubowitz who provides a quickly approaching deadline for sanctions (which he’s been aggressively pushing for) even though all success stories took years to bear results. Moreover, while analysts and Israeli officials doubt Israel’s strike capability and Israeli officials say an Iranian nuclear weapon does not pose an existential threat, Vinocur still suggests that Israel would go to war with Iran alone (by going over Iraq’s unsecured airspace!):
By some time next June, said Mr. Dubowitz, “If there’s no impact on Iranian oil revenue, then you’re at the end of the sanctions road.”
That’s 2012 ticking. The volume changes over the weekend.
With the end of 2011, the United States no longer holds responsibility for policing Iraqi airspace. Iraq has no replacement aircraft for now, and the shortest route for long-range Israeli F15Is to attack Iran’s nuclear sites will be wide open to them beginning Sunday.
Fox News: This panel discussing the Strait of Hormuz situation features Charles Krauthammer (who made last week’s posting) and Chuck Lane of the Washington Post. Their basic argument: impose a crippling embargo and more sanctions on Iran and go to war with it if it reacts by doing one of the only things it can do. Interestingly, Krauthammer admits that the Iranian government is reacting rather than acting unprovoked and is “weak”:
It’s doing it because the Obama administration is on the verge of imposing very serious sanctions on Iran which will essentially shut down at least gradually its oil exports and the Europeans are considering a boycott. That will really hurt the Iranian economy. The regime is already a weak one and worries about that, so it’s threatening.
Daily Beast/Commentary: Matthew Kroenig, the Georgetown Assistant Professor who wrote a poorly argued warmongering piece in Foreign Affairs (see responses here, here and here) finds fame with Eli Lake and Evelyn Gordon.
Past and Present U.S. Officials:
John Yoo: In case you missed it, the George W. Bush administration official who authored the infamous “torture memos” invokes Iraq war logic while pushing for war with Iran in the National Review. Writes Jim Lobe:
…his “case” for attacking Iran strikes me as extremely weak unless you believe, as his aggressive nationalist and neo-conservative colleagues do, that Washington can really do just about anything it likes and should, in any event, not be bound by silly concepts or institutions like international law or the UN Charter. Hence, his argument for ignoring the UN Security Council:
Just as national governments claim a monopoly on the use of force within their borders and in exchange offer police protection, the U.N. asks nations to give up their right to go to war and in exchange offers to police the world. But the U.N. has no armed forces of its own, has a crippled decision-making system, and lacks political legitimacy. It is contrary to both American national interests and global welfare because it subjects any intervention, no matter how justified or beneficial, to the approval of authoritarian nations.
John Bolton: George W. Bush’s UN ambassador is a favorite of Fox News and journalists soliciting a bellicose view from a former official. This week Bolton told Fox’s Jon Scott that the U.S. would crush Iran if it blocked the Strait of Hormuz while making some questionable claims:
Bolton: I’ve had many conversations with military officials here in this country over the years and it’s not bluster and it’s not boast, it’s a fact that if the Iranians tried to block the Straits of Hormuz [sic] it would be a matter of 2 or 3 days before the Straits [sic] were reopened. And the damage caused to Iran would not just be to its navy which would be on the bottom of the sea, but to a lot of land-based air and air defense mechanisms.
Scott: But if I’m in the Pentagon or if I’m advising the President and I’m presented with two scenarios, one, try to go after those hardened nuclear facilities that we know exist but that are very deep underground or potentially take out their navy in one swoop and maybe some anti-aircraft and military facilities along with it, I think I’d opt for option two.
Bolton: Well I’d opt for both options but I think it’s important to understand that those nuclear facilities that we know of at Natanz and Isfahan and Arak are not so deeply buried that they’re not very vulnerable, certainly to us, but even vulnerable to the Israelis as well and that really is what I think is most acute in Iran’s thoughts.
A check-in with Iran analyst Patrick Disney clarifies some misleading statements made by both Scott and Bolton. First, the Isfahan and Arak facilities are actually above ground. Second, Bolton seems to be exaggerating Israel’s strike capability. According to Disney:
Natanz is buried about 75 feet underground, but (as Matthew Kroenig said this week) could be destroyed with bunker buster bombs known as the Massive Ordnance Penetrator which is capable of busting through 200 feet of concrete. So the US could destroy Natanz, but there’s a real doubt about Israel’s ability to destroy it alone, even with the bunker buster bombs that the Obama administration sent in 2009.
Disney also points out Kroenig’s problematic logic in his attack Iran piece:
]]>Kroenig said multiple times this week that one of the red lines the US should have is any move by Iran to install advanced centrifuges (whether IR-2, IR-4 or some other variant) in the Fordow facility — something that strikes me as a very low standard for triggering military action. Iran already is operating advanced centrifuges at Natanz. Iran is already operating first-generation centrifuges at Fordow. It’s unclear why the introduction of advanced centrifuges into the Fordow facility would pose such a threat as to trigger military action. Not to mention…it’s kind of bizarre to say we should attack AFTER Iran puts next-generation centrifuges into Fordow, since one of the reasons we’d be concerned about them doing so is because the facility is invulnerable to attack.
