by Wayne White

Islamic State (IS) leader Abu Baker al-Baghdadi’s declaration of a caliphate could be too much for quite a few of his Sunni Arab Iraqi allies to swallow. Yet, capitalizing on this surprising IS move will be exceedingly difficult as long as Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki continues to slow formation [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Wayne White

Islamic State (IS) leader Abu Baker al-Baghdadi’s declaration of a caliphate could be too much for quite a few of his Sunni Arab Iraqi allies to swallow. Yet, capitalizing on this surprising IS move will be exceedingly difficult as long as Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki continues to slow formation of a new government by scrambling for ways to survive. Fortunately, IS most likely cannot seize much in the way of new territory, but the collective Iraqi political will and military heft needed to begin the daunting task of pushing IS back remains elusive.

Excessive IS Hubris

Naming al-Baghdadi “Caliph” of all Muslims by the newly branded IS at the beginning of Ramadan, a stunning act of hubris, probably expands the potential for driving wedges between IS and its Sunni Arab fellow travelers. The militant Sunni Arab Association of Muslim Scholars already has announced that IS “did not consult” with its “allies” or “their leaders,” and an “oath of allegiance” demanded by IS is “not binding on anyone.”  In Mosul, evidently regarded by IS as mostly its own exclusive conquest (not ruled in cooperation with powerful allies), IS reportedly has asked those scattered allies on the scene to turn in their arms, another likely source of resistance and pushback.

Whether Sunni Arabs angry over Maliki’s abuses can be peeled away from IS is not the only matter relevant to the announcement of a Caliphate (doubtless considered blasphemous by many Muslims, Sunni and Shi’a). The IS declaration does nothing to alter military realities on the ground: although Baghdad’s efforts to wrest a few places like Tikrit from IS have been frustrated, IS itself also largely has been stalled.

Military Frustration in Baghdad

With politics weighing heavily on Maliki’s mind, his civilian and military leaders selected mainly for loyalty (not professionalism), and amidst endemic governmental dysfunction, Maliki’s ability to oversee a military rebound is iffy. Worse still, Maliki himself is a politician without any particular feel for military matters (despite retaining the defense ministry portfolio).

So far, his forces fighting in Tikrit and ringing Baghdad appear to be a hodge-podge of army units and Shi’a militiamen (many of the latter who took up arms against Sunni Arabs, U.S. troops and Iraqi authorities in 2004-2008). West of Baghdad, a sizeable contingent of veteran Shi’a volunteers who fought alongside regime forces in the Syrian civil war have been deployed, perhaps the strongest element overall. Without far greater air and heavy-weapons support, these forces are best suited to defense, as opposed to driving back IS fanatics occupying positions that are well dug in.

According to US officials, there are a number of militant Sunni Arab “sleeper cells” in Baghdad awaiting a call to arms. Yet, with the vast majority of the capital now Shi’a, attacks by Sunni Arab combatants would trigger Shi’a violence against the city’s greatly outnumbered Sunni Arab population. One or two Sunni Arab neighborhoods might fall under militant control, and acts of violence could be widespread for a while. However, the bulk of Baghdad would remain in government hands. Sadly, an outbreak of such bloodshed ultimately could result in another wave of sectarian cleansing, replete with atrocities, further reducing Baghdad’s dwindling Sunni Arab population.

Parliamentary Stand-off and Maliki’s Deception

Iraqi leaders cannot exploit opportunities to reach out to Sunni Arab tribes, former military officers, etc. without a new government. And should Maliki lead that new government, its ability to divide its enemies would be crippled.

The Shi’a National Alliance parliamentary bloc (dominated by Maliki’s State of Law coalition) failed to select Maliki or an alternative to Maliki prior to parliament’s July 1 session. Consequently, all Kurdish and Sunni Arab members left after a break in the proceedings (joined by a few Shi’a independents).

In a televised speech the next day, Maliki expressed hope that Iraq’s travails could be overcome through “openness” and “democratic mechanisms” (both of which Maliki has undermined as prime minister). He also lamely offered amnesty to tribes currently siding with IS — a promise of the kind to which he personally turned his back in the wake of the Sunni Arab “Awakening.” In any case, most disaffected Sunni Arabs do not want amnesty: they want comprehensive change in Baghdad’s exclusionary policies toward them.

There is a desire among some in State of Law to dump Maliki. Likewise, a shift away from Grand Ayatollah Sistani’s demands for a swifter decision on a new and inclusive government is unlikely (although Sistani may use tomorrow’s Friday prayers to clarify his position). Hopefully, despite Maliki’s machinations, he will soon be history.

US Military Reaction: Mission Creep

As some observers predicted, the Obama Administration’s initial deployment has been followed by more “boots on the ground.” Clearly alarmed by Iraqi governmental gridlock, several hundred more American troops have been sent to Baghdad to bolster the defense of the US Embassy in various ways.

The fumbling performance of the Iraqi military as it struggles to rebound also probably spurred this decision. There are, of course, risks. The more American troops inserted into an Iraq in crisis (particularly in varied locations, such as the placement of some US troops at Baghdad International Airport) increases their vulnerability. The likelihood of casualties somewhere down the road is rising ominously with each successive deployment.

Waiting for That Other Shoe to Drop

The military situation could fall into a pattern of heavy skirmishing roughly along the present front lines while the Baghdad political mill grinds on. Without greater incentives to defect, most Sunni Arab tribes, ex-officers, Ba’this, and others fed up with Baghdad are not likely to abandon IS — at least for now. Thus, the composition of Iraq’s next government will define the road ahead, making this year’s post-election jousting far more important than any in the past.

Photo: U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, a State Department translator, and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in Baghdad, June 23, 2014. Credit: State Department photo/ Public Domain

by Shireen T. Hunter

The beleaguered Prime Minister of Iraq, Nouri al-Maliki, is the latest in the long list of the West’s favorite political leaders turned into pariahs. The conventional wisdom now is that Maliki’s flaws and wrong policies, especially his alienation of the Sunnis and dictatorial style of governance, are at [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Shireen T. Hunter

The beleaguered Prime Minister of Iraq, Nouri al-Maliki, is the latest in the long list of the West’s favorite political leaders turned into pariahs. The conventional wisdom now is that Maliki’s flaws and wrong policies, especially his alienation of the Sunnis and dictatorial style of governance, are at the root of Iraq’s problems, including its latest troubles with extremist Islamic militants.

Clearly, Maliki has not been a successful prime minister. Yet have his very real and assumed flaws been the only, or even the main, cause of Iraq’s problems today? Could a different person have done a better job? Or have the real culprits been structural problems, Iraq’s long and more recent history, and the policies of regional and international actors? A further question: are the grievances of Iraq’s Sunnis solely attributable to the Shias’ desire to monopolize power? What about the Sunnis’ inability to come to terms with any type of government in which the Shias have a real rather than ceremonial function?

These questions are by no means posed to minimize or underestimate the impact of the current leadership’s mismanagement and mistakes, or the corrosive influence of dissension within Shia ranks among the supporters of Maliki, the Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, and Ammar al-Hakim, the head of the Islamic Council of Iraq. But if viewed impartially, the weight of evidence shows that other factors have played more substantial roles in causing Iraq’s previous problems and the latest crisis than Maliki’s incompetence and dictatorial tendencies.

The most significant factor behind Iraq’s problems has been the inability of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs and its Sunni neighbors to come to terms with a government in which the Shias, by virtue of their considerable majority in Iraq’s population, hold the leading role. This inability was displayed early on, when Iraq’s Sunnis refused to take part in Iraq’s first parliamentary elections, and resorted to insurgency almost immediately after the US invasion and fall of Saddam Hussein. All along, the goal of Iraqi Sunnis has been to prove that the Shias are not capable of governing Iraq. Indeed, Iraq’s Sunni deputy prime minister, Osama al Najafi, recently verbalized this view. The Sunnis see political leadership and governance to be their birthright and resent the Shia interlopers.

The Sunnis’ psychological difficulty in accepting a mostly Shia government is understandable. After ruling the country for centuries, both under the Ottomans and after independence, and after oppressing the Shias and viewing them as heretics and dregs of society, the Sunnis find Shia rule to sit heavily on them. It is thus difficult to imagine what any Shia prime minister could have done — or could now do — to satisfy the Sunnis. For example, during the early years after Saddam’s fall, once they had realized their mistake of abstaining from politics, the Sunnis made unreasonable demands as the price of cooperation, such as taking the defense portfolio. Yet considering what the Shias had suffered under Saddam, there was no possibility that they could agree.

Iraq’s Sunni Arabs have not been alone in undermining the authority of the country’s Shia leadership. Masood Barzani, who dreams of an independent Kurdistan, has also done what he can to undermine the authority of the government in Baghdad, by essentially running his own economic, oil, and foreign policies. A factor in Barzani’s attitude has been his anti-Iran sentiments, which go back to the troubles that his father, Mulla Mustafa Barzani, had with the Shah.

Iraq’s Sunni neighbors, notably Saudi Arabia and Turkey, but also Qatar, also cannot countenance a Shia government in Baghdad. In addition to the anti-Shia impact of the Wahhabi creed that is dominant in Saudi Arabia and among the Qatari leadership, this Sunni animosity has derived from the perception that a Shia government in Iraq would change the balance of regional power in Iran’s favor. Yet Maliki is the least pro-Iranian of Iraq’s Shia leaders, with the possible exception of the now-notorious Ahmad Chalabi. During Saddam’s time, Maliki belonged to the Dawa party, a rival of Iraq’s Islamic Revolutionary Council that was supported by Iran, and he spent more time in Syria than in Iran. This is one reason why the US preferred Maliki to personalities like Ibrahim Jafari.

Moreover, Maliki tried to reach out to Turkey and to other Arab states, including Saudi Arabia. But Turkey snubbed him and supported his rival, Tariq al-Hashimi. The Arab states have also shunned him. Under these circumstances, Maliki had no choice but to move closer to Iran. Yet the idea that he has thus become an Iranian pawn is a myth with no foundation in reality. Even now, Iraq has not reestablished the Algiers Agreement of 1975 that regularized Iraqi-Iranian border disputes, an agreement which, before attacking Kuwait in 1990, Saddam had accepted. Iraq has not signed a peace treaty with Iran and competes with it in courting clients for oil exports. Iraq also has more extensive trade relations with Turkey than with Iran.

In short, by exaggerating the sectarian factor, Iraq’s Sunni neighbors have exacerbated Shia fears and made it more difficult for them to pursue a more inclusive policy vis-à-vis the Sunnis. Further, most killings in Iraq have been in Shia areas, undertaken by Sunni extremists of various kinds who are funded by Sunni governments in the region. The plight of the Shias has also not been limited to Iraq. Similar mistreatment in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan has gone unnoticed by the West, while the exclusion of Iraq’s Sunnis from leadership posts in Baghdad has been blown out of proportion. Western and especially US dislike of Iran has been a major cause for the disregarding of mass killings and assassination of Shias.

America’s conflicting policy objectives in the region have also led it to pursue policies in Iraq that have contributed to current US dilemmas. The most glaring example was the US courting of Sunni insurgents and tribal leaders, both of which were thus emboldened to commit acts such as attacking the Shia shrines in Samara in 2006 and frightening the Shias that America would again betray them as it did at the end of the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Wanting to isolate Iran and perhaps to bring about regime change there, the US has also done virtually nothing to reign in the Saudis and others, including Turkey and Qatar, to prevent them from funding Sunni insurgents. Instead, Washington has blamed Iraqi unrest solely on Iranian meddling. Even today, there is no acknowledgement by the United States that the Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL or ISIS) cannot achieve what it has been doing without outside help.

At an even more fundamental level, America’s efforts to achieve too many contradictory and incompatible goals have been at the root of Iraq’s crisis. To date, it has proved to be difficult — indeed impossible — to eliminate Saddam but produce a stable Iraq; to isolate Iran and possibly change its regime; to get rid of Assad in Syria without exacerbating its civil war; to forge a Sunni-Israeli alliance against Shia Iran; and to convince other Shias throughout the region to continue playing second fiddle to the Sunnis.

To summarize, Nouri al-Maliki is certainly flawed and has made many mistakes. But the real culprits have been Iraq’s considerable fault lines, contradictory policies pursued by the West, and the predatory approach of Iraq’s neighbors. Thus even if Maliki is removed from office, Iraq’s situation will not improve unless these fault lines are dealt with and the policies pursued by outside states in Iraq are remedied. Rather, the situation will get much worse because the Shias are most unlikely to once again accept living under a regime that can be characterized as “Saddamism without Saddam” or, worse, what they would consider a Salafi-Takfiri government that considers them heathens deserving death.

This article was first published by LobeLog and was reprinted here with permission.

Photo: President Barack Obama greets Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in the Oval Office of the White House on July 22, 2009. Credit: White House/Pete Souza

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The United States withdrew from Iraq in 2012 after nine years of a brutal occupation marked by the imprisonment of over 60,000 people, the death of hundreds of thousands, the torture of prisoners, and the destruction of the country’s infrastructure. The United States also [...]]]> by Adil E. Shamoo*

The United States withdrew from Iraq in 2012 after nine years of a brutal occupation marked by the imprisonment of over 60,000 people, the death of hundreds of thousands, the torture of prisoners, and the destruction of the country’s infrastructure. The United States also left behind  a system of governance based on ethnicity and sectarianism.

According to the recent parliamentary election results, Nouri al-Maliki’s bloc won 92 out of 328 seats — which passes for a strong plurality in Iraq’s fractious political system. He is nearly guaranteed a third term as a prime minister.

This was the first election since U.S. troops left Iraq and the third election since the removal of Saddam Hussein. Terrorist attacks have continued in Iraq up to the recent elections. Over the last year, approximately 1,000 civilians have died each month from the violence, much of it generated by foreign terrorists coming from Syria through Turkey and led by al-Qaeda linked forces such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

Despite the violence, the election was relatively free. Still, the recent election results have not resolved any of the underlying conflicts in the country.

Domestic challenges to Maliki

After the elections of 2010, Dawa Party head Nouri al-Maliki‘s Shia-backed coalition brokered a deal with other groups to win a second term for al-Maliki as prime minister. The central government under al-Maliki continued to enjoy the support of the oil-rich eastern and southern regions, which are Shia bastions. But al-Maliki accuses the Sunni Gulf states and Saudi Arabia of funding terrorist organizations in Iraq.

The Sunni provinces, chiefly Anbar province in the west and Nineveh in the northwest, remain a source of discontent and a fertile ground for terrorism. ISIS challenges the central government’s control of these regions and effectively holds the city of Fallujah. They have reached areas surrounding Baghdad and attacked one of its Shia universities. Al-Maliki’s government has proven willing to fight terrorists with brutal force, if necessary. However, the terrorists retain support in Fallujah and the surrounding area because of the broader anti-government sentiment in the region.

Since 1991, with the help from the United States, the Kurds have meanwhile maintained a semi-autonomous region in the north. The Kurds have a respectful and watchful relationship with Turkey in the north and Iran in the east. The Kurds’ relationship with Iraq’s central government is more contentious, as Erbil struggles to get more land and more oil under its control. The disputes even have an international dimension. The Kurds, for instance, have attempted to export oil directly to Turkey. But the government in Baghdad insists that the deals require central government approval, and Turkey would rather keep a good relationship with Baghdad. Despite the challenges of running a semi-autonomous government, the Kurdish region is thriving relative to the rest of Iraq.

Al-Maliki’s flaws

Al-Maliki has autocratic tendencies. He tends to label all of his opponents as terrorists. Instead of working with elected officials, he ignores the parliament and concentrates the levers of powers in his own hands. Corruption, graft, and favoritism have returned in force. Iraqis are leaving the country in droves, especially minorities such as Christians.

The enemies of Iraq continue to hope that the country will plunge into a civil war and fragment into three regions — Shia in the east and south, Sunni in the west and north, and the Kurds in the north. Such fragmentation is unlikely for Iraqis, who despite their infighting tend to identify with Iraq as a whole. If Iraq is divided, the Sunnis will be out of oil. The Kurds, because of opposition from Turkey and Iran, understand it is the wrong time in history to declare an independent country. (With their own large Kurdish minorities, neither Turkey nor Iran wants an independent Kurdish state on their borders.) And the Shia are Iraqis first and want to govern Iraq as whole.

Iraqi political leaders from all the factions can resolve the country’s problems if they place the interests of Iraq ahead of their personal, factional, and sectarian interests. This is a tall order. Al-Maliki has had his chance to lead Iraq. He has failed for many reasons, some of them beyond his control.

Nevertheless, al-Maliki now has a chance to put together a new team at the helm. The primary challenge facing this new government is to resolve the political divide between Sunnis and Shia created and exacerbated by the occupiers. Governance must be shared with the elected officials in parliament. The new team must come to terms with the Kurds, and the Kurds must be reasonable in accommodating the historical burden of present-day Iraq. Finally, the new team must stamp out corruption and graft.

Iraq must be given a respite to repair and rebuild the country for all of its citizens. The political leaders of Iraq must eradicate the post-occupation remnants of ethnic and sectarian animosity and control the bloody violence that is plunging the country into a new civil war.

This could be Iraq’s last chance.

– Adil E. Shamoo is an associate fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies, a senior analyst for Foreign Policy In Focus, and the author of Equal Worth — When Humanity Will Have Peace. He can be reached by email.

*This article was first published by Foreign Policy in Focus and was reprinted here with permission.

Photo: Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki listens to an opening speech during the Sarafiya bridge opening in Kadhimiya, Iraq on May 27, 2008. Credit: U.S. Air Force photo/Staff Sgt. Jessica J. Wilkes

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by Wayne White

Since 2005, Iraqis have voted in four parliamentary elections yearning for decisive positive change. In three of those elections, popular hope for more effective governance and a decline in violence were dashed with governments consumed by their ambitions and flawed policies. Indeed, elections often have seemed less important than [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Wayne White

Since 2005, Iraqis have voted in four parliamentary elections yearning for decisive positive change. In three of those elections, popular hope for more effective governance and a decline in violence were dashed with governments consumed by their ambitions and flawed policies. Indeed, elections often have seemed less important than the evolving situation on the ground. If current Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki succeeds, as expected, in securing a third term after last week’s election, more disappointment probably lies ahead.

Through the premierships of Iyad al-Alawi, Ibrahim al-Jafaari, and Maliki, Iraq’s senior leadership has included a large percentage of former exile opposition leaders along with prominent members of two long-standing Kurdish parties-cum-militias. This relative lack of turnover in terms of fresh political faces at the top has magnified the shortcomings of this narrow grouping.

The 2004 transition and a missed opportunity

Prior to the first election, a non-electoral political milestone giving Iraq its first post-occupation government triggered similar hope. In June 2004, the US-run Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) under J. Paul Bremer passed formal sovereignty to an Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) with Iyad Allawi as interim prime Minister. With the Sunni Arab insurgency raging at the time, many Iraqis hoped this step away from American control would weaken the insurgency.

At that time, high expectations also were palpable within the Bush administration. Yet, as the head of the State Department’s Iraq intelligence team, I warned such optimism was unfounded. In fact, the new Iraqi political line-up differed little from the Shi’a and Kurdish-dominated Iraqi Governing Council that had worked with Bremer. Such hopes were dashed as the insurgency raged on ever more ferociously.

One big opportunity did present itself in 2004. Many leading Sunni Arab tribal leaders and insurgent commanders sought a ceasefire with American forces (by far their premier foe). Although promising to cease attacks against US and Iraqi targets and cooperate with US forces in countering a burgeoning al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), these leaders refused to recognize the IIG.  Allawi, pressured by Washington, agreed to meet with the group. However, the IIG rejected the offer (despite otherwise being unable to end the insurgency).

Ironically, just over two years later, with ethno-sectarian violence soaring out of control, the US (despite opposition from another Iraqi prime minister) accepted the same deal unilaterally. Thus, the so-called Sunni Arab “Awakening” would be born, reducing violence substantially, but too late to save the tens of thousands who died during two intervening years of bloody fighting.

The first 2005 Iraqi Election

The next political way station toward what was hoped would be a measure of normalcy was the January 2005 election of an Iraqi National Assembly to name a prime minister and oversee the preparation of a permanent constitution. Iraqi voters went to the polls amidst an intense wave of hope.

Overall turnout was high, but polling in Sunni Arab areas was nil as most boycotted the vote. The bulk of employment in such areas had involved the military or Saddam Hussein-era government bureaucracy — disbanded by Bremer. Over a million Sunni Arabs had been members of the ruling Ba’th Party; Bremer banned such individuals from future employment. Unemployment was high and disaffection from the new Shi’a/Kurdish order intense. Seeing no real stake in the elections, many Sunni Arabs continued to support the insurgency.

Shortly after the election, the Bush administration requested that the heads of all major US intelligence agencies, plus British civilian and military intelligence arms, meet at CIA, along with one expert each, to sort out the bottom line. It clearly hoped for good news. Instead, I led off for the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence & Research, pointing out the grim, unchanged dynamic on the ground.  All present agreed.

As the Intelligence Community believed, in terms of fundamentals driving violence, the election had changed nothing. Once elected, the new National Assembly took two months to agree on a Prime Minister (Ibrahim al-Jaafari). Even though the constitution was completed later that year, setting the stage for the first election of a permanent parliament, insurgent and AQI terrorist violence continued unabated.

The second 2005 parliamentary vote

As with the election at the beginning of the year, the December 2005 vote for the Council of Representatives (COR) brought forth another wave of hope.

Still, the constitutional referendum preceding it had underscored the glaring sectarian divide that fueled the insurgency. In the Sunni Arab majority governorates of Salah ad Din, al-Anbar, and Ninawa, the constitution was opposed by 82%, 97% and 55% of voters (a rough reflection of the percentages of Sunni Arabs in those jurisdictions).

The results of the December parliamentary election showed far higher Sunni Arab participation, but were accompanied by Sunni Arab and secular Shi’a anger over allegations of fraud favoring Shi’a religious parties.  The field of political lists was little changed from January. This time around, six months of bickering ensued before Nuri al-Maliki emerged as a compromise prime minister in April 2006.

Between two elections: 2005-2010

In February 2006, with the bombing of a revered Shi’a mosque shrine, violence spiked massively. Shi’a militias like firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s “Mahdi Army” retaliated against Sunni Arabs, especially in Baghdad. “Sectarian cleansing” of much of the capital raged out of control; over a million Sunni Arabs fled westward for safety. This maelstrom also heavily damaged Iraq’s Christian community.

In late 2006, a desperate Bush administration finally decided to accept the deal in which Sunni Arab insurgents would cease attacks on US forces and fight alongside US Army and Marine units against AQI.  Although by mid-2007, tens of thousands of insurgents had switched sides, Maliki & his mainly Shi’a supporters opposed the deal. Only in late 2008, under sustained US pressure and following considerable success involving Sunni Arab “Awakening” cadres, did Maliki reluctantly accept the arrangement, albeit only partially.

Also in 2008, with Sunni Arab resistance much reduced, Maliki, with US assistance, was able to address rampaging Shi’a militias — especially those controlled by Sadr. Badly beaten in southern Iraq and Baghdad, Sadr agreed to disarm most of his forces. During 2006-2008, however, the majority of the Sunni Arab population had been driven from the capital. By that point, many Sunni Arabs once hostile toward US forces had come to view US troops as their only reliable protection from Shi’a militias and rogue elements of the Iraqi security forces.

Nonetheless, according to the 2008 US-Iraqi Status of Forces Agreement, US troops withdrew to their bases in June 2009. At that point, insurgent, AQI and militia violence was the lowest since the 2003 invasion.

The 2010 parliamentary campaign and vote

In the lead-up to the March 2010 vote, Maliki seized upon the polarizing de-Ba’thification issue to firm up his electoral support within his Shi’a base. In the run-up to these elections, US Embassy cables from early 2010 say Maliki “directed the removal” of large numbers of “some of the highest quality personnel” from Iraq’s security organizations over links to the Ba’th Party as part of his “political gamesmanship.”

Almost 500 Sunni Arab (many secular or liberal) parliamentary candidates were also disqualified by an “Independent High Election Commission” stacked with Shi’a. Even Kurdish Iraqi President Jalal Talabani urged Maliki not to be “unjust” to candidates.  However, few of the bans were reversed.

Sunni Arabs still voted hoping a new alliance under the secular Iyad Allawi might unseat Maliki. Even with the deck stacked in favor of Shi’a religious parties, Sunni Arab participation was far higher than in 2005, and Allawi scored well. Nonetheless, after 8 months of maneuvering, Maliki again was named prime minister in late 2010.

Years of retrenchment

Back in business, Maliki redoubled his efforts to amass personal power and marginalize the Sunni Arab community. He placed some crack Iraqi army units and police elements under his own control. He also employed unofficial security forces for extra-judicial skullduggery. This included attacks against local Sunni Arab leaders and the detention of prisoners in private holding pens.

Meanwhile, he hounded more Sunni Arabs out of key positions in government. In late 2011, for example, Maliki’s government charged Sunni Arab Iraqi Vice-President Tariq al-Hashimi with involvement in terrorism from “confessions” exacted from arrested bodyguards. Al-Hashimi fled to Iraqi Kurdistan in December 2011.

Maliki also dumped some of his commitments on Sunni Arab “Awakening” cadres (known as “Sahwas”). Promises to integrate them into Iraq’s security forces were only partly fulfilled. He even turned loosely trusted police units — and anonymous gunmen — against Sahwa leaders in some localities.

Since the US opposed this behavior, Maliki and his government dealt the US out of the Iraqi equation.  Although a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) was concluded in late 2008 to keep a limited US troop presence in Iraq beyond the December 2011 withdrawal, Maliki’s government ultimately ruled out the retention of US bases in Iraq. Soon after, Maliki also rejected judicial immunity for any US troops and military advisors left behind. Thus the Obama administration had little choice but to withdraw completely (clearly Maliki’s goal: to free himself from American oversight).

Maliki’s face-offs with his Kurdish coalition allies led to the Kurdish refusal to turn over Tariq al-Hashimi. Disputes over oil export agreements and territory as well as the Kurdish Regional Government’s (KRG) concern over Maliki’s growing personal power also darkened the period between the 2010 and 2014 elections (despite Maliki’s agreement with the Kurds to do the opposite to secure their support for his candidacy in 2010).

Meanwhile, violence on the part of a rebounding AQI had been rising. This culminated in January 2014 with the seizure of the Sunni Arab city of Fallujah by elements of the extremist Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and local tribesmen. With Sunni Arab anger rising across northwestern Iraq because of grievances against Maliki, ISIL, like AQI, found a more favorable reception.

The 2014 election

Maliki has positioned himself to secure another term.  Blaming his opponents for rising violence, Maliki made his familiar appeal for renewed unity after last month’s parliamentary election. With his reputation for sectarianism and duplicity, there is little chance he will change his spots. One could be more definitive in the negative, but Maliki’s inability to restore government control over Fallujah after 3 months of trying might force him to make at least some concessions to Iraq’s Sunni Arab community to weaken ISIL.

Plus ca change; plus ce le meme chose

For nearly 10 years since the transfer of sovereignty, Iraq has failed to evolve substantially toward an inclusive democracy, reduced sectarian tensions, a more diverse ruling elite, greater rule of law, and effective governance. Also, under Maliki there has been a drift toward authoritarianism.

In addition to the serious deficiencies described above, the Iraqi government remains largely dysfunctional in almost every sense: endemically corrupt, judicially partial, administratively inept, and non-transparent. Despite the day-to-day impact of such poor governance, it is somewhat surprising that many Iraqis have not become far more cynical toward their elections.

President Barack Obama recently praised “the Iraqi people” for voting again in their pursuit of a peaceful, unified and prosperous future. Perhaps the most baleful impact of Maliki’s sustained engagement in sectarian politics has been how it has prevented Iraq’s population from finding more common ground upon which to base a more coherent “Iraqi” popular identity, instead of one that is exclusively Shi’a, Kurdish, Sunni Arab, Turcoman, or Christian.

Photo: Guarded by a barbed wire fence, Iraqis line up to vote in the 2005 parliamentary election. Credit: American Forces Press Service

by Robert E. Hunter

For three years, the Syrian civil war has continued unabated; and for three years, the so-called “international community” has achieved almost nothing — other than to head off the war’s escalation over the use of chemical weapons following President Barack Obama’s ill-considered drawing of a so-called red line [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Robert E. Hunter

For three years, the Syrian civil war has continued unabated; and for three years, the so-called “international community” has achieved almost nothing — other than to head off the war’s escalation over the use of chemical weapons following President Barack Obama’s ill-considered drawing of a so-called red line against such use.

Another try begins tomorrow in Geneva. But this meeting, dubbed “Geneva II” in reference to the last attempt in 2012, is already star-crossed. Late last week UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon invited Iran to take part. This was a reasonable, indeed necessary step, given that Iran is deeply engaged in all the relevant issues and could well be in a position to scotch any agreement.

Then, yesterday, the Secretary General rescinded the invitation. The reason — or pretext — for doing so?  That Iran was unwilling to accept a key component of Geneva I: in effect providing for the departure from power of Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad. The actual formulation: “The establishment of a transitional governing body which would exercise full executive powers.” In the interpretation by Assad’s opponents, that means he has to go. That transitional body “…could include members of the present government…,” but it would be “…formed on the basis of mutual consent,” which of course would not be granted to President Assad. (This is the full text of the June 30, 2012 “Action Group for Syria Final Communique.”)

Reportedly, pressure on the Secretary General to rescind his invitation came principally from the US and the UK. If Iran would be in Geneva, the opposition would not: ergo, no negotiations. Of course, this begs the question of cui bono: who potentially has most to gain from the talks? Since the opposition has not been winning on the ground, this was a bluff that might have been called.

But the Obama administration had to consider a further factor: parallel negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program. These are already fraught with difficulties, notably, the opposition to the interim agreement by Israel, Persian Gulf oil states, and many members of the US Congress. The timing of the Geneva fracas was also important: yesterday, both Iran and its interlocutors began to implement the Joint Plan of Action, including some relaxation of sanctions. Was it worth risking even more intense political opposition to Washington’s dealing with Iran over the latter’s nuclear program by allowing Tehran to come to Geneva? By the same token, there is also risk that the “disinvitation” will play into Iranian hard-liners’ opposition to dealing with the American Great Satan. Hopefully the administration has accurately calculated that risk.

There is a broader context. President Obama faces difficult choices in his Middle East strategy, conditioned in major part by domestic politics and pressures. He cannot at one and the same time exert pressure on the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, allow Iran to join the Syria negotiations, and pursue a nuclear agreement with Iran that includes reducing sanctions. The obvious strategic priority is boxing in the Iranian nuclear program, even if that risks postponing serious attempts to stop the killing in Syria.

Thus the Syria talks do not begin auspiciously, to say the least.

The imbroglio over Iran’s participation also reveals two other fault lines. The first derives from a requirement that Obama imposed in 2011, in addition to his red line against the use of chemical weapons — namely that Assad must go. To resolve the Syrian conflict, that condition may be necessary.  But to make it a precondition was hardly likely to encourage Assad and his government to “play ball.”

Even more, there is little willingness to understand that Assad acts not just for himself but as leader of a significant, though minority part of the Syrian population, the community of Alawites, a Shi’a sect.  Notably, at Geneva I, only Iraq represented a Shi’a perspective; and with Iran now excluded, the same is true of Geneva II. Geneva I did argue that in Syria “There is an overwhelming wish for a state that.…[0]ffers equal opportunities and chances for all…. Numerically smaller communities must be assured that their rights will be respected.” But as with so much international diplomacy, “wishful thinking” is unlikely to reassure the part of the population being asked to give up power and possibly to face savage retribution.

To be sure, the Alawite minority has dominated the rest, including the majority Sunni community; and to end the civil war, that situation has to change. But without providing solid assurances to the Alawite community (and to others), chances of a peaceful settlement are zero.

The second fault line is that Syria’s civil war is part of a broader struggle for power and preeminence throughout the region, at one critical level between Sunnis and Shi’as. The current phase in that struggle began with the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, toppling a minority Sunni regime dominating a Shi’a majority population. The Syrian civil war is in major part a “get even” effort by Sunni states led by Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Worse, there is an influx of Islamist terrorists inspired, financed and armed by people in the same Sunni states that want to redress the Sunni-Shi’a regional balance.

The US and others thus face a dilemma at Geneva. They can persevere in demanding that Assad depart as part of “transitional” arrangements, while excluding a key regional player (Iran); or they can decide that Assad can remain and run for reelection (as he has said he would do), but in elections that are structured to redress at least some legitimate grievances of the non-Alawite community (Assad would lose such an election); that solid guarantees must be put in place for all Syrian communities, if that can be done; that all relevant outsiders be engaged at Geneva; and that states permitting free rein for Al Qaeda and its ilk must finally be called to account.

This is called strategy, diplomacy, leadership, willpower, and the willingness of the Obama administration to put US national interests ahead of domestic politics.

A few days ago, Bahraini officials announced they “foiled an attempt to smuggle explosives and arms, some made in Iran and Syria, into the country by boat.”  Around the same time, the government also contended it had defused a car bomb and seized weapons in different locations in the country.

Shortly after President Obama’s startling telephone conversation with Iran’s new president, Hassan Rouhani, a Saudi Arabian journalist wrote that “The phone call between Obama and Rouhani shocked the Gulf states, Jordan, Turkey, Israel, and other countries.”  No matter which president initiated the call, he wrote, “What is important to know is what stands [...]]]> by Thomas W. Lippman

Shortly after President Obama’s startling telephone conversation with Iran’s new president, Hassan Rouhani, a Saudi Arabian journalist wrote that “The phone call between Obama and Rouhani shocked the Gulf states, Jordan, Turkey, Israel, and other countries.”  No matter which president initiated the call, he wrote, “What is important to know is what stands behind the conversation and how deep the ties are between America and Iran.”

Never mind that there are no “ties” between Washington and Tehran, let alone “deep” ones. His article reflected concern among Saudis that the United States might negotiate some wide-ranging settlement of its issues with Iran and that any such deal would automatically be detrimental to Saudi interests.

Such anxiety has surfaced in Riyadh many times over the past two decades, dating to Madeleine Albright’s unsuccessful efforts to reach out to Iran when she was secretary of state in Bill Clinton’s second term. No doubt many prominent Saudis share the journalist’s sentiment, not just in the ruling family but in the Sunni religious establishment.  In their short-sighted view, regional security is a zero-sum game: if it benefits Iran, it must be bad for Saudi Arabia. To this group, as the authors of a major RAND Corp. study noted in 2009, “the prospect of U.S.-Iranian rapprochement (or even near-term coordination on Iraq) would appear to jeopardize the privileged position Riyadh has long enjoyed in Gulf affairs.”

Since that study appeared, Saudi antipathy to Iran has only increased. Iran’s growing influence in Iraq, its all-out support for the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria and for Hezbollah in Lebanon, and its perceived instigation of civil unrest in Bahrain have exacerbated Saudi anxieties and reinforced the kingdom’s determination to keep Iran isolated and economically constrained.  At the same time, the Saudi perception that the United States abandoned Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, a longtime ally, and might do the same to them if regional circumstances changed, has led some Saudis to doubt the long-term reliability of the United States as anchor of the kingdom’s security. Their doubts were not alleviated when panelists at a Gulf security conference in Washington earlier this year projected a reversal of the regional alignment over the coming decade, with Iran emerging as more friendly to the United States and Saudi Arabia less so.

The Saudis have also been peeved about the inability of the United States to deliver on its commitment to a two-state solution that would end the Arab-Israeli conflict. That diplomatic stalemate has allowed Iran, which refuses to acknowledge Israel’s existence and openly supports Hezbollah, to present itself to the Arab world as the true champion of justice for the Palestinians,  as opposed to the Saudis, who have offered a comprehensive plan for peace with Israel.

Furthermore, the Saudis went all-in to try to engineer the ouster of Assad, believing that they were in tune with U.S. policy. Now they may be feeling exposed as the United States and Russia appear to be pursuing a different course.

And it is certainly true that many of Saudi Arabia’s leading officials, including some diplomats in the foreign ministry, harbor a deep loathing for, and suspicion of, all things Shia. A softer U.S. line on Iran would not make those Saudis more comfortable in the bilateral relationship.

Moreover, the Rouhani initiative, assuming it is genuine rather than cosmetic, coincides with a growing realization in Saudi Arabia that the United States is becoming steadily less dependent on Gulf oil. Could the Obama administration’s announced shift of strategic resources to Asia presage a reduction of U.S. commitments in the Gulf? Senior U.S. officials say no: Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said a few months ago that “You can take it to the bank” that the U.S. will maintain its posture in the Gulf for the foreseeable future.

Thus, recent reports of anxiety in Riyadh about a possible shift in relations between Washington and Tehran were predictable, and may well have some basis in fact.

But there are also Saudis who understand that a better relationship between Washington and Tehran might actually benefit the kingdom. After all, the two countries shared a strategic alignment with the United States before the Iranian revolution. In that era, Iran was far more powerful than Saudi Arabia militarily and economically, but the Saudis did not perceive it as a strategic threat, partly because it was influenced by the United States and partly because Saddam Hussein’s Iraq provided a protective buffer — a buffer that the United States dismantled with its invasion of Iraq a decade ago.

Even during the past decade, when tensions were high over Lebanon, Bahrain, Iraq and other issues, the Saudis and Iranians found ways to work cooperatively when it was in the interests of both countries. “Such calculations often take place independently of U.S. pressure or encouragement,”  the RAND report noted, adding that in past times of tension with Washington the Saudis have been more flexible, rather than less so, in their regional rivalries.

“With the ‘moderation’ discourse strengthened during the presidency of recently elected Hassan Rouhani, pragmatism will be enhanced in Iran’s regional policy,” the columnist Kayhan Barzegar, an experienced analyst of Gulf affairs, predicted in the online magazine al-Monitor after Rouhani was inaugurated. “This development will weaken the existing ‘mutual threat’ perception between Iran and Saudi Arabia that is rooted primarily in the policies of both countries in response to regional issues. Such a development will also consequently strengthen relations between the two. Iran and Saudi Arabia are not interested in an intensification of sectarian or geostrategic regional rivalries. They are well aware that such rivalries will eventually be instrumentalized and used politically, draining energy from both sides. The result will be increased instability and growth of extremist trends in their backyard. Conflict between the two also provides an opportunity for other rival actors, such as Turkey and Qatar, to play an active role in regional issues at their expense, such as happened with the Syrian crisis, which is not currently welcomed by the Iranians or the Saudis.”

In fact, there are several ways in which a lessening of tensions between Iran and the United States could actually benefit Saudi Arabia. To achieve some form of rapprochement with the United States now, Iran would be required to forgo definitively any attempt to build or acquire nuclear weapons — a development that could hardly be depicted as detrimental to Saudi interests. The United States would also press Iran to curtail the aggressive policies that have destabilized the region for years. If Iran’s leaders truly want relief from international economic sanctions, they will have to persuade the countries that imposed them that they will be good neighbors to Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states. Would that not assuage some of the security concerns that have prompted Saudi Arabia to spend tens of billions of dollars on new U.S. weapons?

If Iran were to curtail its support for Hezbollah in order to improve relations with Washington and the West, it might forfeit its position as “more Arab than the Arabs” on the issue of Israel, another development that could be to Saudi Arabia’s advantage.

And Saudi Arabia’s Gulf neighbors such as Qatar might no longer feel the need to hedge their bets by keeping some distance between themselves and Saudi Arabia and maintaining correct relations with Iran, thus facilitating Saudi Arabia’s desire to exert the regional leadership to which it feels entitled.

On a visit to South Asia when she was secretary of state, Albright chided the Pakistanis for opposing a U.S. initiative to expand economic ties with India. The initiative was not aimed at undermining Pakistan, she said, and might actually be helpful if an expanding Indian economy brought greater cross-border trade.

The Pakistanis didn’t buy it, but that did not diminish the validity of her message. It might be useful now for Obama and Secretary of State John F. Kerry to explain to the Saudis that any deal with Iran will be a long time in the making and will not damage U.S. ties with Riyadh unless the Saudis want it that way.

– Thomas W. Lippman is an adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute and author of Saudi Arabia on the Edge.

by Robert E. Hunter

With President Obama’s decision to step up arms supplies to Syrian rebels, Syria’s war has become his war. This was not part of his game-plan.

Obama did inherit a mess in the region. This included two seemingly unending wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, neither of which has much [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Robert E. Hunter

With President Obama’s decision to step up arms supplies to Syrian rebels, Syria’s war has become his war. This was not part of his game-plan.

Obama did inherit a mess in the region. This included two seemingly unending wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, neither of which has much to do with America’s long-term strategic interests. Add to that the continuing confrontation with Iran, with bipartisan insistence that the US employ all sticks and no carrots. Factor in the paralyzed Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, currently without a glimmer of hope. And top it off with domestic expectations that terrorism, however virulent abroad, will be kept away from US shores.

Obama has not done badly in meeting this set of challenges. He got us out of Iraq. He is winding down the war in Afghanistan. He has not yet had to redeem his pledge on Iran that “all options are on the table”, which could mean another Middle East war. There have been terrorist incidents — an “underwear bomber” in a plane headed for Detroit and a bomb in Times Square, plus the horrendous killings in Boston (though not linked to al-Qaeda or its ilk) — but there has been nothing approaching 9/11. And he has largely kept the Israel-Palestine problem from distracting him from more pressing business.

But Obama has paid prices and given hostages to fortune. To avoid having to honor his pledge on Iran, he depends on the good behavior of two countries: Iran (no bomb) and Israel (no preemptive attack). As outside forces draw down sharply, Afghanistan is likely, again, to revert to chaos, perhaps before Obama’s second term expires, while nuclear-armed Pakistan festers. To keep terrorism at bay while limiting risks to US “boots on the ground,” Obama has embraced the heavy use of drones and sanctioned unprecedented electronic surveillance. The former has provoked debate at home and hostility from Islamabad; the latter has raised domestic concerns about civil liberties not seen since the 1950s. And the Middle East continues to suck oxygen from other demands, notably his efforts to “pivot” US foreign policy toward Asia and the rise of China.

Now there is Syria, following the president’s felt need to redeem his pledge that the verified use of chemical weapons would somehow be a “game changer.” But his decision to supply arms to the rebels still does not convey a strategy for the immediate future; show that the US is truly committed to a particular outcome; suggest a realistic basis for negotiations, which are already premised on a predetermined result (President Bashar al-Assad must go); or indicate that the US has a sense of direction for afterwards, in Syria or the region.

Obama is beset from all sides.

Americans who believe military force should be the first choice in asserting US power criticize him for timidity and a failure of leadership, without counting costs down the road, as hammered home by Iraq and Afghanistan. Ditto for those who see Iran as the big bugaboo in the region and fear that it and Hezbollah will be the big winners if the United States does not help the rebels prevail.

Human rights activists criticize him for not toppling Assad straightaway, which Obama himself called for two years ago, as though Syria, in the middle of the world’s most volatile region, is another “Libya” — which, as far as US interests go, could be on Mars. They also ignore the notion that the likely replacement regime in Damascus would take bloody revenge on the Alawites, while the worst of the Islamist terrorists would continue to have free play and also threaten Israel. Meanwhile Britain and France egg Obama on, but so far accept no responsibility for helping to deal with the post-Assad mess.

Missing in all of this is clarity about how Syria fits in the regional picture.

It is only one facet of an expanding Sunni-Shia civil war in the Middle East, unleashed in its current phase when, by invading Iraq in 2003, the US unwittingly ended centuries of minority Sunni dominance over the majority Shias. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, and Turkey seek to redress the balance by toppling Alawite (Shia) authority in Syria. Meanwhile, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Arab states, Turkey, and Israel are playing out in Syria their competitions for regional influence. Whatever the US does there has to be only one element of a policy that makes sense for the entire Middle East.

It will not be easy for Obama to get on top of his game — America’s game. He has to start by mandating the first truly rigorous assessment of US interests across the entire Middle East since the end of the Cold War. He has to demand coherent, integrated, strategic analysis and planning from his staff. He has to draw in others, including European allies and other stakeholders that can’t be ignored, notably Russia. And he has to follow one key dictum that is so often lost: what matters to the United States must come first.

by Wayne White

The Biblical quotation, “whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap” could not be more relevant to what Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s near unremitting hostility toward Iraq’s powerful Sunni Arab minority has generated: a rising drumfire of mostly Sunni Arab bombings aimed at Maliki’s Shi’a base as [...]]]> via Lobe Log

by Wayne White

The Biblical quotation, “whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap” could not be more relevant to what Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s near unremitting hostility toward Iraq’s powerful Sunni Arab minority has generated: a rising drumfire of mostly Sunni Arab bombings aimed at Maliki’s Shi’a base as well as his regime. Yet, in the face of the awful toll such bloodshed has taken in past years, Iraq’s Shi’a policymakers have remained unmoved. So, for the most part, Maliki and Co. may well continue this dangerously divisive policy, making further unrest in Iraq likely. Yet, responding with some grand offer of sectarian reconciliation might find few takers at this point.

When the US agreed to allow Sunni Arab tribesmen and former insurgents to join with American forces against al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) back in late 2006 (the so-called “Sunni Arab Awakening”), Maliki opposed the arrangement bitterly. Indeed, through late 2007, Maliki not only spurned this major initiative, he even at times attempted to attack Sunni Arab combatants working with US forces employing elements of the Iraqi Army especially trusted by him.

Initially, Sunni Arabs involved in the “Awakening” did not want to work with the Iraqi government either, only the Americans (regarding Maliki and his Shi’a allies as hostile, pro-Iranian and untrustworthy). Eventually, however, the vast bulk of the Awakening cadres agreed to serve in the Iraqi security forces in an attempt to bury the hatchet with Baghdad. Most of Iraq’s equally war-weary Sunni Arab tribal leaders came to feel likewise. This represented a strategic opportunity to initiate a process of meaningful Sunni Arab re-integration, though gradual and on terms set by Washington and the Maliki government.

The US duly extracted assurances from Maliki by 2008 (albeit with difficulty) allowing a large number of Sunni Arab fighters to obtain mostly low-level, often localized positions in the security forces. Yet, as US forces left the scene, Maliki not only backed away from the full thrust of these commitments, but began to target Awakening leaders and even some of the rank and file for extrajudicial arrest and assassination.

Thousands of former insurgent cadres remained on the government payroll for years — some even today — but lots of others left or were hounded out of their jobs (caught between the very real threat of arrest — or worse — from government authorities and bloody revenge attacks from AQI). Meanwhile, many Sunni Arab parliamentary candidates became victims of the Shi’a-controlled and highly politicized “de-Ba’thification” commission (which excluded them from running for or ever holding government office).

Quite a few of the small number of Sunni Arab officials to secure senior government rank were then accused of abetting terrorism. Ultimately, the most prominent of them all, Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, was accused in December 2011 of running an anti-Shi’a hit squad. Hashimi fled first to Iraqi Kurdistan (even Iraq’s Kurds refused to turn him over to Maliki) and then to Ankara. In this way, from 2008 through 2013 (and counting), Maliki and his Shi’a allies not only threw away an opportunity to reduce violence dramatically. They also gave AQI a new lease on life as an unknown number of disaffected Sunni Arabs apparently turned a blind eye to AQI’s activities or even gave it sanctuary once again.

For months now, Sunni Arabs also have taken to the streets, holding demonstrations throughout areas where they predominate to protest their mistreatment at the hands of the Iraqi government. Feeding seething sectarian resentment was a heavy-handed attack by government security forces late last month on a Sunni Arab protest camp in a public square near the disputed northern city of Kirkuk in which 26 died.

Making matters still worse has been the mainly Sunni Arab uprising just across the border in Syria against the minority Alawite-led Assad regime. Perhaps the only Arab government not siding with the rebels is Iraq’s (aligned instead with the Syrian regime’s only regional ally: Iran). Even more provocative has been the stream of Syrian-bound Iranian resupply flights passing over Iraq with Maliki’s permission. In response to US protests against these over-flights, Maliki has had a few flights land for inspection (doubtless a clever ruse I observed before while serving in the Intelligence Community: the country conducting military over-flights secretly informs the government needing to inspect a few for the sake of appearances which flights contain no military contraband and thus would pass inspection).

Since the Syrian rebel al-Nusra front declared its affiliation with both al-Qaeda and AQI, Maliki promised to crack down on al-Nusra’s roots in Iraq’s Sunni Arab northwest. With Sunni Arab Iraqis now so profoundly suspicious of the government in Baghdad, others sympathizing with al-Nusra, AQI or both, and still others assisting them, any major operations inside Iraq aimed at al-Nusra almost certainly would either encounter resistance or waves of even heavier AQI retaliatory bombings against government and Shi’a targets.

In fact, with fellow Sunni Arabs defiant in neighboring Syria (and many tribes and families sharing close cross-border ties), more trouble for Maliki from within Iraq’s Sunni Arab community was inevitable for a leader who has supplied them with a host of grievances since 2008. Now Maliki finds himself in a serious bind: even if the Assad regime succeeds in rebounding substantially, its control over the vast expanse of eastern Syria would remain iffy (providing Iraq’s more restive Sunni Arabs a ready sanctuary and a possible source of munitions and recruits — many of them now combat veterans of the Syrian civil war).

If, however, Maliki tries to mend his ways and promises better treatment, a fair share of the government rebuilding cash, and a lot more political representation, the offer’s credibility could be nil. Such a gesture now could look more like a temporary sop tossed out under pressure than a genuine commitment to end the longstanding policies feeding the animosity between Iraq’s Sunni Arabs and Maliki’s increasingly autocratic, pro-Iranian, Shi’a-led government.

by Robert E. Hunter

“Then we’ll have done all we can.”

“Very heartless.”

“It’s safer to be heartless than mindless. History is the triumph of the heartless over the mindless.”

                     Yes, [...]]]> via Lobe Log

by Robert E. Hunter

“Then we’ll have done all we can.”

“Very heartless.”

“It’s safer to be heartless than mindless. History is the triumph of the heartless over the mindless.”

                     Yes, Prime Minister.

President Barack Obama, it is said, has painted himself into a corner with his repeated statements that the use of chemical weapons by the Assad government will be a “game changer” or cross a “red line.” The difficulty of definitions has produced what must have been one of the most ambiguous letters ever to be put on White House stationery. It came as a response to a demand from two US Senators about presidential policy in the event of such weapons use.

More accurately, however, the president can be said to have painted himself into a corner with Syria on two occasions, initially as early as August 2011, and repeated since, by declaring that “Assad must go.”

Of course, Assad has not gone, thus demonstrating once again the first rule of being US President: never call for something, especially in a simple declaratory sentence, if you are not prepared to follow through and make it happen.

This recitation is not meant to be an attack on the US president. It is an introduction to what has to be a genuine dilemma, indeed, a series of dilemmas, which come in several forms.

Syria’s Future

The first dilemma regards the potentiality of a positive outcome in Syria. Assad and company are engaged in the massive slaughter of their own people, which, along with those killed by the rebels, numbers more than 70,000 by a recent (likely conservative) count, plus the creation of more than a million refugees. There is meanwhile no resolution in sight of what has become a full-scale civil war.

Let us assume that Assad is killed (or decides to seek a safe haven) tomorrow. What then? It is a vast stretch of the imagination to believe that the killing would then stop.

What is happening in Syria is radically different from what happened in the so-called “Arab spring” in Tunisia, Egypt, or even Libya. This is not primarily a matter of whether a leader who stayed too long and was too repressive will go; but whether a particular minority will continue to be able to dominate the rest of the population, or, with “regime change,” whether there will be a bloody free-for-all competition for power. None of the other three regime changes were about that.

More relevant is what happened in Iraq, when the US and partners, by invading in 2003, overturned centuries of admittedly unjust domination of a majority (Shi’ite) by a minority (Sunni). Or what is happening, or rather not happening, in Bahrain, where the situation is just the reverse but has been kept in check by military power, much of which has been applied by neighboring Saudi Arabia, with the US, concerned about its base in Bahrain for the Fifth Fleet, at best “turning a blind eye.”

It’s therefore hard to see what the United States, or any combination of outsiders, could usefully do — not to help overthrow Assad and his Alawite-dominated military (that can be done) — but to help “shape” a future in Syria that won’t lead to even more bloody chaos before something approaching “stability” could ensue. Even if that were possible, it would likely take the form of a new suppression, but by the majority (Sunni) over various minorities.

Public Opinion 

The second dilemma — perhaps it should be first — is related to whether the American people are ready and willing to see the US engaged in yet another Middle East war. The answer (“No”) is clear, but so far policy is not — hence the dilemma.

There should be no indulgence in the nonsense that all could be accomplished by providing more lethal arms to the rebels, imposing a no-fly zone, or using air power directly. That would be relatively sterile in today’s military taxology, but even if/when successful, it leads back to the first dilemma. And if unsuccessful, the US would then be called upon to do what, in current jargon, is called “boots on the ground” — that is, invasion. There should be no nonsense, however, about the US being able, as in Libya, to “lead from behind.” Even though the British and the French (the latter was the former mandatory power in Syria after World War I) would like to see something done, they are this time ready to hold the US coat, but not lead themselves.

To his credit, the president so far has been wary of getting more deeply engaged, presumably due to a combination of his awareness of the two dilemmas above, the second of which (US public opinion), if ignored, would surely take attention away from what he clearly sees as his legacy: repairs to the heavily-damaged US economy (and the global financial system) and his historical goal, which can be summarized in a few simple words: the promotion of equality in American society.

Regional Context

The third dilemma derives from the manner in which the conflict in Syria began. It did have domestic roots (as in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya), but it also had external causes and active agents, notably a desire by leading Sunni states (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and to a lesser degree, Turkey) to right the informal and rough regional “balance of power” between them and Shi’a states that was so heavily upset by the US invasion of Iraq. This came after the spread of the “disease” from revolutionary Shi’a Iran had both been almost entirely contained in the region and had most of its fires banked at home. Some Sunni states still fear contagion, however, notably Saudi Arabia, where oil lands are heavily concentrated in Shi’a territories (hence Riyadh’s desire to get rid of the Alawite rule in Syria).

So here it is: an already slow-rolling civil war across the region, pitting Sunnis versus Shi’as, but only in part about religion, is also about competitions for power. In this case, it’s an essentially four-cornered competition among Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel and Turkey, the first three of which have as much to do in fueling the current confrontation with Iran as does its nuclear program.

Would the overthrow of the Assad regime cause this regional civil war to intensify? Or would it lead to a new, informal balance among religious groupings that would be reasonably “stable,” whatever that means in today’s roiling Middle East? It would take a Dr. Pangloss to argue the case for stability over more competition and even less stability and predictability about the future of inter-state relations and internal developments.

Non-governmental Actors

Dilemma number four flows from the above. As the civil war has continued and intensified, Sunni Islamist militants, including elements of al-Qaeda, Wahhabis and Salafists, have increasingly become engaged. That should be no surprise. These groups batten on conflict, especially a conflict with intense emotion and deep-seated religious inspiration. Thus even with Assad gone — perhaps by magic wand tomorrow — would the outcome of the civil war be ruled by a Sunni strongman, pacifying the country by force? Or solidification of another base for continuing terrorist operations by some of our and our allies’ worst enemies?

Israel’s Circumstances

One argument for getting rid of Assad and his Alawite-dominated regime is that this would help deprive the Lebanese Hezbollah of its rear base, which provides political support and a supply route for Iran as it seeks to counter pressure from the US and Israel. But at what (potential) price would Iran be thus incommoded?

Since 1974, Israel existed uneasily but still reasonably comfortably with Assad père et fils, as both countries learned to live with one another. Their mutual frontier along the Golan Heights was so stable that Israel could even invade Lebanon (twice) and attack a Syrian nuclear reactor without a military response. Now that modus vivendi is very much in jeopardy.

Indeed, for many months after the Syrian civil war started, Israel was clearly at least ambivalent about whether Assad’s departure was in Israel’s best interest. It now seems to have passed that point, but even that is not entirely clear.

What should be clear, however, is that if Assad goes and there is an intensifying civil war, with “free play” for Islamist radicals of the worst stripe — the kind that have inspired and in many cases conducted the killing of Americans in Afghanistan — the US will be called upon to be even more robust in support of Israel’s security.

Would that mean US forces on the Golan Heights? Israel has never wanted this direct military engagement from the US, but the need for extra commitments to Israel’s security would be very likely. Furthermore, the argument that Iran would be the big loser from Assad’s departure might even be turned on its head. The balance in Tehran could be tipped toward those who argue that Iran should get nuclear weapons in order to deter a burgeoning list of enemies.

Strategy

Then a final dilemma: the US desire to “pivot” to Asia. But at least some refocusing of policy and military assets will not be as easily done as has been hoped with the end of the Iraq War, the winding down of the Afghanistan War and the efforts to keep Iran from crossing either US or Israeli red lines on its nuclear program.

With Syria and its interlocking dilemmas, plus other continuing challenges in the region, the US will not be able to rid itself of a major security role in the Middle East anytime soon, even if it (rightly) promotes an international approach to even some of these dilemmas, no matter how much oil and gas is eventually produced in the continental US.

It is probably — but not certainly — too late to find some means whereby Assad could stay in power but with genuine power-sharing that would radically reduce the prominence of the Alawites without leaving them to be victimized as they have victimized other Syrians for so long. Of course, power-sharing efforts almost always fail in mechanical approaches to foreign policy, so perhaps that was never a real option, a triumph of Western “hope over experience.”

So what is to be done at this juncture of “no good options?” The best to be hoped for now is for President Obama to keep his nerve (backed by the US military leadership) and continue resisting attempts to drag the US even more deeply into Syria. At the same time, the US must avoid the temptation to perceive another looming chance to experiment with “nation building”; Iraq and Afghanistan should have inoculated us against that.

As a cardinal principle, the US should internationalize whatever is done — by the United Nations, NATO, the European Union and Arab League — and not regard Syria as a test of US “leadership,” as asserted in the aforementioned White House letter (“strengthen our leadership of the international community.”) It should put out the word in very clear terms to other states in the region to stop meddling in Syria, and in particular, to rein-in their nationals who are engaged in spreading Islamist militancy in Syria (and elsewhere), with both ideas and arms.

Finally, the US needs to begin seeing the region as a whole, not as a series of bits and pieces, loosely connected to one another, with Washington attempting only “to put out fires” here and there, while pretending that the whole region is not potentially ablaze. The president has to recruit for his administration the very best people to think strategically and this time plan ahead. They must understand that the US has to create consistent and coherent policies for the entire region that have some chance of success for the long haul.