On Friday, yet another poll on the Middle East was released. They seem to come in a very steady stream, and once you identify the questions, the results are almost entirely predictable.
But Shibley Telhami, the Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, regularly produces polls that are always worth looking at. Unlike most surveys of American views on US policy in the Middle East, Telhami tends to dig deep as opposed to simply establishing general opinions. The poll he released Dec. 5 includes some very interesting developments and reminders as to why things still aren’t changing—in the region or in Washington.
The most stunning development Telhami reported is that support among US citizens for a single-state in Israel and the Occupied Territories—where all would have full and equal rights—increased a whopping ten percentage points in the past year. The 34% who support that outcome now rivals the 39% who support two states, and it represents a jump of ten percentage points from a year ago.
What does this tell us? Most of the leading advocates for a one-state solution have based their advocacy on the idea that a single, secular and democratic state with equal rights for all represents the fairest, most just solution for all parties; that the two-state solution could not possibly fully address the grievances of Palestinian refugees; and that two states would leave most of the best land in the former area of pre-1948 Palestine in Israeli hands. (Two-state advocates have generally argued that partitioning the land was the fairest way to maintain security for Jews, who needed a state, and allow the Palestinians an opportunity to build an independent state of their own.)
Did a whole bunch of two-state advocates suddenly decide that the one-staters were right all along and that the single, democratic state was the more just option? This seems unlikely, especially since the two-state solution has been, and still is seen as the pragmatic choice.
No, that shift is the result of the despair that the collapse of the Oslo process has produced. Those shifting opinions are also coming from a realization that Israel is lurching ever rightward, making a two-state solution less likely in the near term, while settlements expand and make it increasingly difficult to conceive, much less achieve, two states in the longer term.
Of course, a one-state solution was never seen as a viable option among US citizens, much less in Washington. But now it has nearly as much popular support as two states, even while the discourse on Capitol Hill has not changed a bit. One reason for the split between the public and its representatives is included in this poll.
When asked whether the United States should favor one side or the other in the conflict, 64% said the US should favor neither, 31% said the US should favor Israel, and only 4% said it should favor the Palestinians. This is fairly consistent with long-term trends; most US citizens believe their government should be acting as a neutral arbiter in the conflict or not be involved in it at all, and polls have reflected this for a very long time.
But the minuscule figure who believe we should be favoring the Palestinians, as opposed to the significant minority that support favoring Israel, goes a long way toward explaining why policy and the Washington discourse is not following, even in a small way, the national discourse and gradually shifting views among US citizens. The Palestinians are a generally disliked group—essentially seen as “the bad guys.” Even among Democrats, who, for the most part, exclude those who base their support for Israeli policies on the Bible (most of these so-called Christian Zionists are overwhelmingly Republican), only 6% favor siding with the Palestinians, as opposed to 17% who favor siding with Israel.
You’ll be hard pressed to find another issue where public opinion among those who favor some type of intervention is so lopsidedly opposed to helping the downtrodden and dispossessed. For such an entrenched policy, which has the most powerful and active foreign policy special interest lobby pushing to maintain it, this lack of sympathy for the Palestinians is a major obstacle to change, no matter how much the discourse might shift.
That discursive shift has had the effect of seriously diminishing the positive view of Israel in the United States. The Netanyahu government has contributed more than its share to that cause, of course. But so have the efforts of Palestinian activists and other pro-peace groups who have made an issue of Israeli rejectionism and the flaws in US policy.
But none of that has changed the view of the Palestinian cause in the United States. As Telhami’s poll and a long line of polls preceding it imply, most in the US believe that Palestinians’ rights should be respected in the abstract, but Palestinians are still seen as the less sympathetic combatant in this conflict. And Israel’s diminishing image hasn’t changed that.
Nor is there sufficient support for punitive actions against Israel for settlement construction. Sixty-one percent of respondents in this poll said the US should do nothing or just stick to making statements against settlement construction. With a mere 39% supporting more concrete action, Congress will feel very safe in continuing its absolute opposition to any pressure on Israel to desist from this practice.
All of this helps explain why, despite Israel’s reduced appeal in the United States and despite the increasing popularity of a solution that protects democracy rather than Israel’s Jewish character, nothing has changed in Washington. But if the mood among the US public continues in this direction, could that change?
It could, over time, especially considering the profound partisan differences in how Democrats and Republicans view the conflict. That should be a clarion call for those who still want to see a two-state solution emerge. Right now, Israel is pursuing various permutations of a single-state solution, but one where institutionalized discrimination privileging Jews over Arabs is strengthened. The Israeli right can push this agenda in the vacuum created by the apparent death of the two-state solution.
Yet the notion of two states need not die. The Oslo process was flawed from the very beginning. It was born out of documents and agreements that never explicitly stated that a Palestinian state next to Israel was a goal, nor did they offer any sort of human rights guidelines, let alone guarantees. Efforts in Oslo to restrict violence were horribly lopsided, with a laser-like focus on Palestinian violence while virtually ignoring the violence of the occupation itself, as well as that of many of the Jewish settlers. And while the very structure of the occupation provided both Israel and the United States with methods of coercion and pressure against the Palestinians, nothing of the kind was regularly exerted against Israel when it failed to fulfill the letter or spirit of agreements.
Oslo and the two-state solution became synonymous and, as a result, when the process failed, many came to believe that it was the very notion of two states that was fatally flawed. The despair leads more and more to abandon the two-state concept entirely. But that need not be.
It is entirely possible that one state is a better solution, or that Israeli settlement expansion through the West Bank and East Jerusalem already have too much momentum and have gobbled up too much land for a viable two-state solution to be possible. But the failure of Oslo, in and of itself, tells us nothing about whether a two state scenario could work. A two-state model—that includes basic standards of human rights and equal rights (political, civil and national) for all people between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, including Gaza, and includes penalties for both sides for failures of compliance based on a broad but clear, internationally agreed upon vision of the final agreement—could still work.
Undoubtedly, support for a single, secular and democratic state is growing. As people of good will continue to work to resolve this long, bloody and vexing conflict, it is an idea that needs to be considered. It is increasingly popular and based on notions of fairness, and stands against myopic nationalism and ethnocentrism. But it shouldn’t be the only option. A two-state vision, one very different from Oslo, should accompany it. In addition to the conditions I mentioned above, it should also include agreements of cooperation on commerce, economics, resources (especially water) and security. It should not mean Palestine would be de-militarized and eternally vulnerable, enjoying only partial sovereignty. Instead, security for both states would be ensured, and prosperity for both states would be promoted, by interdependency, based on treaties and agreements.
Both two-state and one-state scenarios have weaknesses and inherent flaws that can doom them. Given the hopelessness with which Israelis, Palestinians and all who care about the issue are facing now, we need to avoid throwing the baby out with the bathwater. While those who believe in such scenarios work to promote their one-state visions, two-state supporters need to immediately re-align their vision and reset the two-state idea. What’s needed in Israel and Palestine is not stubborn ideology, but a willingness to accept the best idea for moving forward. And the way to start doing that is by opening minds to new possibilities rising out of the inevitable failure of the process that laid exclusive claim to “peace” for twenty years.
Photo: The Shuafat refugee camp can be seen across the separation wall from the Pisgat Ze’ev Israeli settlement. Credit: Jillian Kestler-D’Amours/IPS.
]]>by Jim Lobe
Sixty-one percent of the American public prefers a deal permitting Iran to continue limited uranium enrichment and imposing intrusive inspections on its nuclear facilities in exchange for some sanctions relief, according to a unique new survey released here Tuesday.
In contrast to previous polling on attitudes toward Iran’s nuclear program, the survey, conducted [...]]]>
by Jim Lobe
Sixty-one percent of the American public prefers a deal permitting Iran to continue limited uranium enrichment and imposing intrusive inspections on its nuclear facilities in exchange for some sanctions relief, according to a unique new survey released here Tuesday.
In contrast to previous polling on attitudes toward Iran’s nuclear program, the survey, conducted by the Program for Public Consultation and the Center for International & Security Studies at the University of Maryland between June 18 and July 7, also found no significant differences between self-identified Republicans and Democrats on the issue.
The poll, which was released as negotiations between Iran and six world powers intensified in Vienna in advance of the July 20 deadline for an agreement, was distinct in the level of detail provided to the respondents before they ultimately had to choose between “a) making a deal that allows Iran to enrich but only to a low level, provides more intrusive inspections and gradually lifts some sanctions; [and] b) not continuing the current negotiations, imposing more sanctions, and pressing Iran to agree to end all uranium enrichment.”
As noted by George Perkovich, who heads the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the survey methodology “modeled a rational thought process” much more rational than that which can normally be found in the US government. “Most members of Congress don’t spend much time on this except when they meet with someone who’s writing a check,” he said at the survey’s release.
Nonetheless, he and Suzanne Maloney, an Iran specialist at the Brookings Institution, agreed that the survey’s findings suggests that, if indeed a deal is reached with Iran, the Obama administration will be in a good position to sell it.
This “Citizen Cabinet” method simulated the policy-making process: respondents were given briefings on the subject and arguments — both for and against — the two options before they were asked to make a final recommendation.
The briefings and arguments were vetted in advance by independent experts and Congressional staffers from both sides of the aisle, according to Steven Kull, the Program’s director, to ensure as much accuracy and balance as possible within the US political context. You can judge this for yourself by examining the study and its methodology (beginning on p. 5). More than one staffer, Kull said Tuesday at a press briefing, commented that the respondents “are going to know more than their Member (of Congress) knows” after reviewing the material.
“At this point, the public doesn’t have a clear idea,” said Kull. “[This survey] tells us what would happen if we had a bigger debate,…and people had more information.”
All of the briefing materials were provided to respondents via the Internet, and access was arranged for those who lacked it. According to Kull, only 16 out of the 748 randomly selected respondents did not complete the exercise, which also required participants to assess each of the arguments separately for their persuasiveness before making a final policy choice. I won’t bore you with further details about the methodology, but here are the main findings:
Still, it’s worth noting that the numbers who prefer a deal over increased sanctions are not so very different from those taken last November when the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) was being negotiated between the P5+1 (the US, UK, France, China, and Russia plus Germany) and Iran in Geneva. Sixty-four percent of respondents in an ABC News/Washington Post poll conducted a week before the Geneva accord said they supported “an agreement in which the United States and other countries would lift some of their economic sanctions against Iran, in exchange for Iran restricting its nuclear program in a way that makes it harder to produce nuclear weapons.” Thirty percent were opposed.
A second poll taken by CNN on the eve of the agreement found 56 percent of respondents in favor of “an interim deal that would ease some …economic sanctions and in exchange require Iran to accept major restrictions on its nuclear program but not end it completely and submit to greater international inspection of its nuclear facilities.” Thirty-nine percent opposed. In that poll, however, there was a much more significant gap between Republican and Democratic respondents than that found in the survey released Tuesday. While 66% of Democrats supported such a deal in the CNN poll; only 45% of Republicans did.
In addition to the questions about a possible nuclear deal, the new survey asked respondents a number of other pertinent questions after they completed the briefings and made their final recommendations on the nuclear negotiations:
On possible confidence-building bilateral measures, the survey found that:
In responding to the individual arguments made in the survey for and against a deal with Iran, Republicans generally tended to be somewhat more hawkish than Democrats, although independents tended to be substantially more so. More significant partisan differences appeared in their opinions about Iran’s government: 40% of Republicans said they held a “very unfavorable view” of Tehran, compared to 24% of Democrats and 27% of Republicans. Perhaps the most striking difference emerged on the questions regarding the compatibility of the Islamic world and the West: while 62% of Republicans said they considered conflict between the two inevitable, only 33% of Democrats agreed with that view.
Photo: Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, US Secretary of State John Kerry shake hands after world powers reached an interim agreement with Iran over its nuclear program on Nov. 24, 2013 in Geneva. Credit: Fabrice Coffrini/AFP/Getty Images)
]]>by Jim Lobe
It’s no secret that much of the foreign policy establishment here — most notably in recent memory, former CentCom commander Gen. David Petraeus (ret.) — consider the perception of unconditional U.S. support for Israel’s actions in the Middle East as contributing to anti-American sentiment throughout the region. This [...]]]>
by Jim Lobe
It’s no secret that much of the foreign policy establishment here — most notably in recent memory, former CentCom commander Gen. David Petraeus (ret.) — consider the perception of unconditional U.S. support for Israel’s actions in the Middle East as contributing to anti-American sentiment throughout the region. This is not just at the popular level, but at the elite level as well. In a remarkable exchange with Foreign Policy CEO David Rothkopf, even former Israeli Amb. Michael Oren admitted this was a problem, noting, “As for arousing enmity, I have no doubt that America’s alliance with Israel fans Middle Eastern outrage.”
In addition to fueling anti-Americanism, it appears that Israeli actions may also promote anti-Semitism. At least that’s what I glean from a closer look at the monumental survey on global anti-Semitism released earlier this week, which both Marsha and I covered at the time. (Please note that the ADL does not agree with that conclusion. You will see below its response to that hypothesis.) Among many other questions, the survey, which, despite numerous complaints (see here, here, and here), contains an amazing wealth of material, asked its more than 53,000 respondents in 102 countries and the Occupied Territories several questions, the answers to which deserve broader attention. The questions included:
1) Do you have a favorable or unfavorable or unfavorable opinion of Israel?
2) Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of Palestine?
3) Do actions taken by the State of Israel influence your opinions about Jews, or do they not influence your opinions about Jews? Respondents were given options of “major influence,” “minor influence,” or “do not influence.” They could also volunteer that they don’t know.
4) Would you say that the actions Israel takes generally give you a better opinion of Jews or a worse opinion of Jews? This question was asked only of those who in question 3 above said the actions of Israel influence their opinons of Jews.
Now, one of the great things about this interactive survey is that you can find out how respondents in each country and region answered these questions. (To get to specific answers, go to the global map, and press the “See More” caption just under the circle that provides the “index score.” After you press “See More,” you press “Choose a Subject” on the middle right side of the screen to see all the various topics covered by the survey. This post is based primarily on the “Attitudes Toward Israel and the Middle East” subject on that list.)
Now, at the global level — that is, for all 53,000-plus respondents — here are the results:
On question 1 about how they felt about Israel, 35% said they had a favorable opinion; 30% unfavorable, and 35% declined to rate.
On question 2, about Palestine, 36 percent were favorable; 25% unfavorable, and 38% didn’t rate.
On question 3 — whether actions by the State of Israel influenced respondents’ opinions about Jews — 16% said “major influence,” 19% “minor,” 42% said none; and 23% volunteered that they “didn’t know.”
And on question 4, for the 35% who said Israel’s actions did influence their opinions about Jews, 25% said they had a better opinion, but 57% said their opinion of Jews was worsened by Israel’s action, while another 17% volunteered that they didn’t know how they were influence.
Now, those are not insignificant numbers. According to the ADL, the 53,000-plus respondents represent nearly 4.2 billion people, which means the 35% who said that Israel’s actions influenced their opinions of Jews represent nearly 1.5 billion people. Fifty-seven percent of those 1.5 billion adults translates to 855 million people who, if we extrapolate from the survey’s methodology, are willing to tell pollsters outright that Israel’s actions make them see Jews in a more negative light; which is to say, make them anti-Jewish or more anti-Jewish than they already were.
Of course, as you might expect, this is most pronounced in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, the only area in which there is a strong and consistent correlation between anti-Semitism and anti-Israeli sentiment, according to the ADL. Only nine percent of respondents there have a favourable opinion of Israel; 84% are unfavourable, while, conversely, 84% are favourable to Palestine; only 11% unfavorable. And 58% percent of respondents in the region said Israel’s actions exert either a major (46%) or minor (12%) influence on their view of Jews, which is significantly higher than any other region. Finally, of that 58%, nearly nine out of ten (89%) say that influence is negative.
On to Western Europe, where 46% of respondents said they have a favorable opinion of Israel, 26% unfavorable, and 28% declined to answer. Remarkably, sentiment about Palestine was very similar: 48% favorable; 24% unfavorable; 28% declined to answer. On the question of whether actions taken by Israel influenced respondents’ views about Jews, a not insignificant total of 40% said they did, 18% in a major way, 22% in a minor way, and 52% of respondents said Israeli behavior had no influence on their opinion of Jews. Of that 40% who said they were influenced, however, 64% said it affected their opinions of Jews for the worse, while only 16% said they had a more positive view. These findings must surely be of concern to Bibi Netanyahu who, of course, knows very well that Western Europe is Israel’s biggest trading partner by far and that the Boycott Divest Sanctions (BDS) movement appears to be gaining momentum.
In Eastern Europe — despite the fact that the ADL survey found it to be the second-most anti-Semitic region after MENA — more than six in ten respondents (61%) said they had a favorable opinion of the country, compared to only 46% who said the same about Palestine. Just over a third of respondents (34%) said Israeli actions influenced their opinions about Jews (14% major influence, 23% minor). Of that 34%, 55% said Israeli actions gave them a worse opinion of Jews; 21% said Israeli actions gave them a better opinion.
Sixty-one percent of respondents in the Americas, which is treated by ADL as one region, also hold a favorable opinion of Israel (73% in the U.S.), while only 40% have a similar view of Palestine (45% in the U.S.). Only one in four respondents (16% in the U.S.) said they believed Israeli actions influenced their opinion of Jews, equally split between major and minor. Of those, 35% said Israeli actions gave them a better opinion of Jews, while 45% said they gave them a worse opinion. In the U.S. those percentages were roughly reversed — 46% better versus 36% worse. In fact, the U.S. was just about the only country outside of sub-Saharan Africa where Israel’s actions gave respondents a better impression of Jews than a worse one. In Canada, for example, of the 21% of respondents who said Israel’s behavior influenced their opinion of Jews, 69% said they were affected negatively. Even in Oceania (Australia and New Zealand), where two-thirds of respondents reported having a favorable opinion of Israel (and 60%, remarkably, a favorable opinion of Palestine), of the 23% of respondents who said Israeli actions influenced their opinions about Jews, 71% said those opinions were affected negatively.
In Asia (which included Caucasian states like Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, as well as India, China and Japan), opinions about both Israel and Palestine were roughly evenly split — 26% favorable, 30% unfavorable and 28% favorable, 25% unfavorable, respectively. About one third of respondents (34%) said Israeli actions influenced their opinions about Jews (13% major, 21% minor). Of those, 54% said their attitudes were affected negatively; 27% positively.
Finally, in sub-Saharan Africa, Israel was viewed favorably by 52% of respondents, unfavorably by 22%, while only 27% felt positively about Palestine compared to 39% who had an unfavorable impression. A total of 35% of respondents reported that Israel’s actions influenced their views about Jews, evenly split between major and minor. Of that percentage, slightly more respondents said Israeli actions gave them a better impression (44%) than a worse one (42%).
So it’s quite clear that MENA is very much the outlier (although, given its proximity to Israel, it’s quite a pertinent one) on the question of to what extent Israeli actions contribute to negative views of Jews in general. But of those respondents who say that Israel’s behavior influences their views of Jews, pretty solid majorities in Western Europe (64%), Eastern Europe (55%), Asia (54%) and Oceania (71%) — and a plurality in the Americas (45%) — assert that their impression of Jews is more negative. It is difficult, therefore, to escape the conclusion of some correlation between Israeli actions and the rise or intensification of anti-Semitism as a result in key regions beyond MENA. ADL, however, as you can see below, rejects this notion.
Now, of course, many of the respondents who said Israeli actions gave them a negative impression of Jews were already anti-Semitic (as defined by the ADL Index), in which case the cause and effect are very difficult to disentangle. In addition, it’s worth noting that the vast majority of respondents have no personal connection to Israeli actions and depend on other sources, notably mass media, for their understanding of those actions. On the other hand, however, it seems safe to say that Israel’s actions — at least as reported by those same mass media — do not help the cause of eliminating anti-Semitism around the world, and especially in its own neighborhood where, in fact, Israeli actions have been felt most directly.
I asked ADL to comment on these observations, and their director of international affairs, Michael Salberg, was kind enough to send me the following reaction, which should also be taken into consideration.
Based on our experience in dealing with the very difficult question of overlap between expressions of anti-Israel sentiment and anti-Semitism, we know that often, though not in every case, the two can be closely connected. This is especially so in the Middle East, but also in European society and elsewhere.
Our pollsters have concluded there is no clear evidence in the data that anti-Israel feelings are causing anti-Jewish sentiment, or vice-versa. There are countries where anti-Israel sentiment is much more prevalent than anti-Jewish sentiment. And there are other countries where anti-Jewish sentiment is much more prevalent than anti-Israel attitudes.
In MENA there are high levels of both anti-Israel sentiment and anti-Jewish sentiment. But in other regions, things are more complicated and regression analysis does not show a strong correlation between Israel’s unfavorable rating and anti-Semitic attitudes.
It is true that people who say the actions of the State of Israel influence their opinions of Jews tend to have higher Index Scores than people who say the actions of Israel do not affect their opinion of Jews. However, in every region but MENA, the vast majority of people, 60 percent or more, say that the actions of Israel have no impact on their opinions of Jews or they don’t know:
To reinforce this point, only 35% of respondents worldwide are unfavorable toward Israel, and of those only half, 51 percent, say that the actions of Israel affect their opinions of Jews. So the worldwide Index Score of 26% is higher than the percentage who are unfavorable towards Israel and say Israel’s actions affect their opinion of Jews. We are reluctant to use or describe the data as support for links between attitudes towards Israel and anti-Semitism outside MENA. Even within MENA, ascribing cause and effect was beyond the scope of the survey.
In any event, as I noted above, this is a very rich survey of international opinion that is well worth exploring in the varying levels of detail which it offers.
]]>by Marsha B. Cohen
The results of a new survey released by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), as deplorable as they are, show that Iran is the least anti-Semitic country in the Middle East.
Not that the ADL is doing anything to point this out in their just-released report entitled, Global 100: An Index of [...]]]>
by Marsha B. Cohen
The results of a new survey released by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), as deplorable as they are, show that Iran is the least anti-Semitic country in the Middle East.
Not that the ADL is doing anything to point this out in their just-released report entitled, Global 100: An Index of Anti-Semitism. This surprising fact can only be uncovered by comparing Iranian responses with those of other Middle Eastern countries.
According to the index scores of the more than 100 countries around the world included in the survey, the most anti-Semitic place on earth is the West Bank and Gaza (93%). Iraq isn’t far behind the Palestinian territories, which are, of course, under Israeli occupation. But Iran doesn’t even make it into the survey’s worldwide top 20 anti-Semitic hotspots.
The first of the eleven statements to which respondents were asked to categorize as “probably true” or “probably false” was Jews are more loyal to Israel than to [this country/to the countries they live in]. While 56% of Iranians responded in the affirmative, in other MENA countries the percentage of respondents agreeing with this assertion were significantly higher: Saudi Arabia 71%; Lebanon 72%; Oman 76%; Egypt 78% Jordan 79%; Kuwait 80%; Qatar 80%; UAE 80%; Bahrain 81%; Yemen 81%; Iraq 83%; West Bank and Gaza 83%. (It’s too bad that Israel was not among the countries surveyed. It would be interesting to know what Israelis believe on this point.)
The other indicators of anti-Semitic attitudes were:
Jews have too much power in the business world. Iran 54%; Saudi Arabia 69%; Oman 72%; Egypt 73%; UAE 74%; Lebanon 76%; Qatar 75%; Bahrain 78%; Jordan 79%; Kuwait 79%; Yemen 82%; Iraq 84%; West Bank and Gaza 91%.
Jews have too much power in international financial markets. Iran 62%; Oman 68%; Egypt 69%; Saudi Arabia 69%; UAE 71%; Qatar 71%; Jordan 76%; Bahrain 76%; Lebanon 76%; Kuwait 77%; Yemen 78%; Iraq 85%; West Bank and Gaza 89%.
Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust. Iran 18%; Yemen 16%; Saudi Arabia 22%; Egypt 23%; Kuwait 24%; Lebanon 26%; Jordan 29%; Iraq 33%; Oman 42%; UAE 45%; Bahrain 51%; Qatar 52%; West Bank and Gaza 64%.
Jews don’t care what happens to anyone but their own kind. Iran 50%; Egypt 68%; Oman 70%; Lebanon 71%; Kuwait 73%; UAE 73%; Saudi Arabia 74%; Jordan 75%; Qatar 75%; Bahrain 75%; Iraq 76%; Yemen 80%; West Bank and Gaza 84%.
Jews have too much control over global affairs. Iran 49%; Oman 67%; Saudi Arabia 70%; Egypt 71%; Qatar 73%; UAE 73%; Bahrain 76%; Iraq 77%; Lebanon 77%; Jordan 78%; Kuwait 80%; Yemen 80%; West Bank and Gaza 88%.
Jews have too much control over the United States government: Iran 61%; Oman 67%; Saudi Arabia 70%; UAE 72%; Jordan 73%; Lebanon 73%; Qatar 73%; Egypt 74%; Bahrain 77%; Kuwait 78%; Yemen 79%; Iraq 85%; West Bank and Gaza 85%.
Jews think they are better than other people: Iran 52%; Lebanon 61%; Egypt 66%; Oman 66%; Qatar 67%; Bahrain 68%; UAE 68%; Saudi Arabia 69%; Kuwait 71%; West Bank and Gaza 72%; Jordan 73%; Yemen 76%; Iraq 80%.
Jews have too much control over the global media: Iran 55%; Bahrain 61%; Oman 65%; Egypt 69%; Saudi Arabia 69%; Qatar 70%; UAE 70%; Kuwait 72%; Lebanon 73%; Iraq 77%; Jordan 77%; Yemen 79%; West Bank and Gaza 88%.
Jews are responsible for most of the world’s wars: Iran 58%; Qatar 64%; Lebanon 65%; Oman 65%; UAE 65%; Kuwait 66%; Saudi Arabia 66%; Egypt 66%; Jordan 67%; Bahrain 71%; West Bank and Gaza 78%; Yemen 84%; Iraq 85%.
People hate Jews because of the way Jews behave: Iran 64%; Lebanon 76%; Bahrain 77%; Kuwait 80%; Egypt 81%; Oman 81%; Iraq 81%: Saudi Arabia 81%; Qatar 82%; UAE 82%; Jordan 84%; West Bank and Gaza 87%; Yemen 90%.
Iran has a complicated relationship with its Jewish community, and has a long way to go before it can be considered a safe haven for Jews, even if some Iranian Jews may disagree. Still, the ADL’s data makes it clear that Iran is not only the least anti-Semitic country in its region, it also scores far better on every one of the ADL’s eleven survey indicators by a statistically significant margin. That’s something worth thinking about.
Photo: Persian Jews celebrate the Jewish holiday of Sukkot in a Tehran synagogue last October. Credit: CNN screenshot.
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