by Wayne White
The remorseless death toll and Assad regime gains in Syria have generated intense criticism in Washington of US policy toward the country. Other observers have also taken up this meme, often claiming the regime would have fallen long ago had the US and West intervened militarily or even just [...]]]>
by Wayne White
The remorseless death toll and Assad regime gains in Syria have generated intense criticism in Washington of US policy toward the country. Other observers have also taken up this meme, often claiming the regime would have fallen long ago had the US and West intervened militarily or even just armed the Syrian rebels. Robust US/NATO military action may well have overthrown the regime, but too many recent critics have forgotten the political obstacles (and flawed assumptions) that undermined such choices during the war’s first 18 months. And now, despite widespread appeals, a substantial improvement in humanitarian aid and a political solution are also elusive, at least in the near-term.
Humanitarian crisis
The situation in Syria is appalling and “extremely challenging,” said UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon on March 26, almost one month after a UN Security Council resolution called for swift and unlimited humanitarian access to Syrians in need. But the regime demands “convoluted” ministerial approvals for aid deliveries, most of which are not honored by low-level officials on the scene. Among the many millions of desperate Syrians still inside the country, rebels are to blame for besieging some, but the government is blockading over triple that number.
The large northern city of Aleppo seems to be bearing the brunt of the regime’s indiscriminate wrath against civilians. Human Rights Watch reported on March 24 that satellite imagery suggested no fewer than 340 massive government “barrel bombs” were dropped on rebel-held areas of Aleppo between early November 2013 and late February.
A March 26 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing involving senior State Department officials accordingly featured blistering bi-partisan criticism of US policy toward Syria. The administration’s failure to do more to address the crisis was characterized as “delusional” by senior committee Republican Senator Bob Corker, accusing the White House of having “sat by and watched genocide taking place.”
However, consider the Congressional reaction to the prospect of robust US military involvement in NATO’s Libyan no-fly zone and interdiction campaign back in 2011. That intensely negative reaction set the tone for what the administration thought possible regarding Syria during the most critical early phase in the opposition effort against the regime.
Libyan precedent
On June 3, 2011 a House of Representatives resolution offered by Speaker John Boehner called upon the administration to withdraw US forces from all NATO operations over and around Libya — a far less demanding and financially taxing task than taking on Syria’s formidable military. Ten days later, another House resolution prohibited the use of any funds for Libyan operations. Both resolutions passed with over 130 Republican and 110 Democratic votes. Later that month, a Senate resolution sponsored by Senator Bob Corker required formal congressional approval for any further US participation in the Libya mission.
This was not surprising at the time, with highly politicized budgetary issues at the forefront of the American domestic debate. Additionally, the US was withdrawing from Iraq, and the notion of major new military commitments was highly unpopular within both parties on Capitol Hill as well as the electorate. There was also resistance among the Pentagon’s military brass for a new undertaking involving a prolonged military effort. So, for well over 2 years in official Washington those favoring bold US involvement in Syria, like Senator John McCain, remained fairly isolated voices.
Advantage regime
Meanwhile, a series of regime reverses from 2011 to early 2012 convinced many observers that Assad was losing his struggle to survive. A decent body of opinion back then judged the rebels capable of bringing down the regime themselves in the not too distant future.
Yet, the fundamental drivers determining why the rebels have not prevailed or attracted large-scale US and Western arms shipments revolve around the rebels themselves.
First and foremost has been a problem I underscored in October 2012: “major Syrian army units have not chosen to defect en masse.” Clearly, not only Syria’s terrified Alawite and Christian minorities, but also a substantial minority of Syria’s Sunni Arab community have remained loyal to the regime. This has given Damascus a sufficient base from which to rebound militarily as well as to regain the initiative. In fact, Bashar al-Assad recently felt confident enough to make a few public appearances to kick-off his bid for re-election this summer.
Another serious drawback has been a lack of opposition unity in the exile leadership, rebel combatant groups in the field, or between the two. The exile leadership has been in constant turmoil, and the rebels inside Syria are comprised of hundreds of localized units frequently not cooperating — or aligned — with each other. In recent months, heavy fighting between secular and more moderate Islamist rebels on the one hand and extremist combatants on the other has sapped rebel strength — a gift to the regime.
Most crippling with respect to lethal Western assistance, however, was the rapid rise of al-Qaeda linked or inspired extremist rebel groups beginning in December 2011. These elements in the first half of 2012 quickly rose to prominence as the most formidable anti-regime combatants. Their dangerous militancy and atrocities against regime prisoners (as well as Syrian civilians) severely jolted the West. The fear of arms falling into their hands steered US and Western suppliers away from providing the rebels with the arms needed to stand up to the well-equipped Syrian military.
According to one report, while in Riyadh late last week President Barack Obama agreed to consider providing — or authorizing the Saudis to provide — surface-to-air missiles to moderate rebels. The White House has mulled over arming such rebels since mid-2012, but backed off repeatedly (because of the presence of rebel extremists).
Another blow to the Syrian opposition stems from a rift developing within the Arab League (previously united behind the rebels). A bitter feud between Qatar on the one hand and mainly Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the other has been highly disruptive. Consumed by their own feuding and stung by rebel defeats and disunity, the most active pro-rebel Arab governments have finally fallen out completely over which rebels to arm. In fact, for the first time since the Syrian rebellion, several Arab countries backing Syria capitalized on all this to block the Syrian opposition’s seating at the conclave as representing Syria.
All the while, one damaging constant has been in play: Moscow has been serving its own narrow interests by providing a lifeline of arms, munitions, and military spares to the Syrian regime. Russia only joined the effort to remove Syria’s chemical weapons (CW) arsenal to head off US military action and buy time so the international community would ultimately be dependent on a coherent Syrian government to turn the weapons over.
Another compelling concern driving Russian President Vladimir Putin’s desire to cooperate was to eliminate the possibility of CW being seized by rebel jihadists. There are some Chechen fighters among Syrian extremist combatants; one commanded the militant force that seized a Syrian airfield last year. The thought of Chechen jihadis smuggling Syrian CW into Russian territory is a Kremlin nightmare.
Similarly, Iran has remained steadfast in its support for its Syrian ally. Not only does Tehran continue to send munitions, Revolutionary Guard trainers and advisors, but it also helped arrange for thousands of Hezbollah militiamen to join the Assad regime’s struggle against the rebels, bolstering Syrian army infantry units decimated by combat attrition.
Meanwhile, prospects for peace in the last round of Geneva talks were nil, with the regime flushed with battlefield success, an exile opposition not fully representative of rebel fighters inside Syria, and rebel strength sapped by intense in-fighting.
Aid as a weapon
There was, nonetheless, some hope at the beginning of the December 2013 Geneva conclave related to one goal: a breakthrough on humanitarian assistance. The Assad regime knows, however, that in a fight to the finish (as this war has become), humanitarian supplies — especially food and medicine — are vital assets best denied to one’s opponents. So, as in 20th Century “world wars” replete with blockades and submarine interdiction to isolate, starve and otherwise weaken enemies, Damascus is blocking humanitarian aid to break the will and staying power of the rebels and the populations sustaining them.
As a result, much like a political settlement to end the carnage, getting humanitarian aid to the most vulnerable of the conflict’s victims inside the country will remain a daunting challenge. In the face of these grim realities, it likewise will continue to be exceedingly difficult for Washington or Western European capitals to fashion Syria policies with much hope of success.
Photo: President Barack Obama meets with Members of Congress to discuss Syria, in the Cabinet Room of the White House, Sept. 3, 2013. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)
]]>by Wayne White
Amidst rumors that Washington finally decided to provide arms at least to selected Syrian opposition fighters, Secretary of State John Kerry announced that the US would do little more than increase its non-lethal aid to the opposition. Rebel disappointment has been intense, and such limited assistance will not [...]]]>
by Wayne White
Amidst rumors that Washington finally decided to provide arms at least to selected Syrian opposition fighters, Secretary of State John Kerry announced that the US would do little more than increase its non-lethal aid to the opposition. Rebel disappointment has been intense, and such limited assistance will not have a major impact on the military effectiveness of the opposition or hasten an end to the fighting.
Last week Secretary Kerry said there would be an increase in non-lethal aid to the opposition, with rebel fighters gaining access to military rations and medical supplies. A US official clarified that this aid would only go to carefully vetted rebel groups, with Kerry emphasizing that opposition elements “sharing our values must set an example” by avoiding regime-like brutality and Islamic extremism. In defense of this limited assistance, the US Central Command’s General James Mattis told the Senate this week that the situation inside Syria is currently too complicated for the provision of lethal aid. Finally, earlier this week in a news conference in Qatar (which is believed to be providing munitions to the rebels), Kerry acknowledged that others are doing so, but with “greater guarantees” that arms and ammunition are reaching only moderate groups.
Meanwhile, the European Union upped the ante a bit more than the US by allowing its Syria sanctions to permit the supply of armored vehicles and non-lethal military equipment to opposition combatants if the aim is to protect civilians. Likewise, just yesterday the British seemed to move in step with the EU in saying the UK would provide armored vehicles, body armor and training, though still deeming this assistance as non-lethal.
In parallel to recent Western decisions related to such aid, UN Syrian peace envoy Lahkdar Brahimi, the French, the Russians and the US, have been discussing various seemingly vague notions of bringing representatives of the opposition together with those of the regime in an attempt to end the fighting. The regime now says it is willing to do so, but the rebels, overall, have held back. A pro-Assad Russia clearly views any Western aid to the rebels as disruptive in this context, but efforts aimed at some sort of negotiated solution have been going on for quite some time without any tangible progress.
Predictably, with far higher expectations of Western aid, the opposition has been appalled. In a news conference in Rome with Kerry, the embittered president of the Syrian opposition’s Syrian National Coalition, Moaz al-Khatib, said: “Many sides…focus (more) on the length of the rebel fighter’s beard than the blood of the children being killed.” A rebel commander in the battered northern city of Aleppo also said that lack of arms was the main obstacle to victory over the regime, but rebel fighters had to go on fighting without waiting for such assistance.
Ironically, had there been a decision by the US, the UK and the EU to provide arms to selected, relatively more moderate opposition combatants, even that might not have provided the rebels with a decisive military boost. After over two years of regime brutality, heavy fighting and widespread destruction, large numbers of opposition fighters have been radicalized and many extremist jihadists have entered Syria to join the fight against the Assad regime. For some time now, Muslim extremist rebel groups have been leading the fight and inflicting the most damage on the regime. So supplying moderates exclusively might do little to assist those who have become the proverbial “tip of the spear” in the uprising’s most important battles.
Even prior to this disappointment opposition leaders in exile — but especially rebel fighters and Syrian civilians supporting the uprising inside the country — had become steadily more embittered by two years of Western hand-wringing over providing military help. And no wonder: while caution and indecision has reigned in Western capitals, the death toll in Syria has reportedly reached 70,000 and the number of Syrian refugees in neighboring countries reportedly just topped one million.
Regime forces continue to fight back desperately (and with characteristic brutality) despite assaults by rebel groups in every Syrian province. And, making this violence more like the civil war it has been labeled as by many, the Assad regime still may retain the loyalty of a substantial slice of the population. Of the estimated 12-13% of the populace that is Alawite (Assad’s own community) or vaguely similar Shi’a, most back the regime. Likewise, a large majority of the 10% of Syrians who are Christian have stood by the regime in fear of Muslim extremism. Ethnic Kurds — around 8-9% of the population — have been wary of both sides, providing rebels with only limited help. And, finally, even a minority of Syria’s large Sunni Arab majority is too vested in the regime militarily, in its security services, various businesses, or like-mindedly secular to break with it in the face of a potential Islamist takeover.
So it is possible that maybe as much as 40-45% of the population either has not joined the opposition or potentially represents a pool of manpower and support for Assad’s forces. Continued support for the regime in some important quarters remains a daunting challenge for the rebels, especially since many within pro-regime constituencies are fighting hard alongside the regime because they believe — perhaps with good reason at this point — that they would suffer greatly if the rebels prevail.
The upshot of the latest decision on the part of the US and the West to hold back on precisely what rebels battling inside Syria need most (whether justified or not) is the inevitable prolongation of the mayhem that has been progressively destroying Syria.
Photo: Women walk past destoryed shops in Al Qusayr, Syria. Credit: Sam Tarling/IPS.
]]>