via USIP
Iran has mixed feelings and conflicting interests in the Syrian crisis. Tehran has a strategic interest in opposing chemical weapons due to its own horrific experience during the 1980-1988 war with Iraq. For years, President Saddam Hussein’s military used chemical weapons that killed thousands of Iranian soldiers. So [...]]]>
via USIP
Iran has mixed feelings and conflicting interests in the Syrian crisis. Tehran has a strategic interest in opposing chemical weapons due to its own horrific experience during the 1980-1988 war with Iraq. For years, President Saddam Hussein’s military used chemical weapons that killed thousands of Iranian soldiers. So Iran actually shares interests with the United States, European nations and the Arab League in opposing any use of chemical weapons.
But the Islamic Republic also has compelling reasons to continue supporting Damascus. The Syrian regime is Iran’s closest ally in the Middle East and the geographic link to its Hezbollah partners in Lebanon. As a result, Tehran vehemently opposes U.S. intervention or any action that might change the military balance against President Bashar Assad.
The Iran-Syria alliance is more than a marriage of convenience. Tehran and Damascus have common geopolitical, security, and economic interests. Syria was one of only two Arab nations (the other being Libya) to support Iran’s fight against Saddam Hussein, and it was an important conduit for weapons to an isolated Iran. Furthermore, Hafez Assad, Bashar’s father, allowed Iran to help create Hezbollah, the Shiite political movement in Lebanon. Its militia, trained by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, has been an effective tool against Syria’s archenemy, Israel.
Relations between Tehran and Damascus have been rocky at times. Hafez Assad clashed with Hezbollah in Lebanon and was wary of too much Iranian involvement in his neighborhood. But his death in 2000 reinvigorated the Iran-Syria alliance. Bashar Assad has been much more enthusiastic about Iranian support, especially since Hezbollah’s “victorious” 2006 conflict with Israel.
In the last decade, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards have trained, equipped, and at times even directed Syria’s security and military forces. Hundreds of thousands of Iranian pilgrims and tourists visited Syria before its civil war, and Iranian companies made significant investments in the Syrian economy.
Fundamentalist figures within the Guards view Syria as the “front line” of Iranian resistance against Israel and the United States. Without Syria, Iran would not be able to supply Hezbollah effectively, limiting its ability to help its ally in the event of a war with Israel. Hezbollah wields thousands of rockets able to strike Israel, providing Iran deterrence against Israel — especially if Tel Aviv chose to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. A weakened Hezbollah would directly impact Iran’s national security. Syria’s loss could also tip the balance in Iran’s rivalry with Saudi Arabia, making the Wahhabi kingdom one of the most influential powers in the Middle East.
In the run up to a U.S. decision on military action against Syria, Iranian leaders appeared divided.
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and hardline lawmakers reacted with alarm to possible U.S. strikes against the Assad regime. And Revolutionary Guards commanders threatened to retaliate against U.S. interests. The hardliners clearly viewed the Assad regime as an asset worth defending as of September 2013.
But President Hassan Rouhani, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani adopted a more critical line on Syria. “We believe that the government in Syria has made grave mistakes that have, unfortunately, paved the way for the situation in the country to be abused,” Zarif told a local publication in September 2013.
Rafsanjani, still an influential political figure, reportedly said that the Syrian government gassed its own people. This was a clear breach of official Iranian policy, which has blamed the predominantly Sunni rebels. Rafsanjani’s words suggested that he viewed unconditional support for Assad as a losing strategy. His remark also earned a rebuke from Khamenei, who warned Iranian officials against crossing the “principles and red lines” of the Islamic Republic. Khamenei’s message may have been intended for Rouhani’s government, which is closely aligned with Rafsanjani and seems to increasingly view the Syrian regime as a liability.
Regardless, a significant section of Iran’s political elite could be amenable to engaging the United States on Syria. Both sides have a common interest: preventing Sunni extremists from coming to power in Damascus. Iran and the United States also prefer a negotiated settlement over military intervention to solve the crisis. Tehran might need to be included in a settlement given its influence in Syria. Negotiating with Iran on Syria could ultimately help America’s greater goal of a diplomatic breakthrough, not only on Syria but Tehran’s nuclear program as well.
– Alireza Nader is a senior international policy analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation.
*Read Alireza Nader’s chapter on the Revolutionary Guards in “The Iran Primer”
Photo Credits: Bashar Assad and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei via Leader.ir, Syria graphic via Khamenei.ir Facebook
]]>by Jasmin Ramsey
Related to my earlier post on surprising statements from what’s believed to be Iranian president Hassan Rouhani’s English Twitter account is Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif’s condemnation of foreign military intervention Syria, which Omid Memarian suggests I should have emphasized more. The Iranian Student News [...]]]>
by Jasmin Ramsey
Related to my earlier post on surprising statements from what’s believed to be Iranian president Hassan Rouhani’s English Twitter account is Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif’s condemnation of foreign military intervention Syria, which Omid Memarian suggests I should have emphasized more. The Iranian Student News Agency reports that during a telephone call with his German counterpart, Zarif welcomed the completion of the UN’s inspection of sites where chemical weapons were allegedly used, advised against making hasty decisions on the issue and strongly condemned any outside military force in Syria, saying that it would only make the situation worse.
But my question persists: why has Rouhani not made these statements himself as of yet? It could very well be that when push comes to shove, he will. LobeLog contributor Wayne White tells me that “quite possibly Rouhani simply wanted his government to be on the record as reiterating Iran’s opposition to chemical weapons use while at the same time planning not to accept that his Syrian ally used them and preparing to condemn anyone using force against the Assad regime for doing so.” But Rouhani’s chosen words on his English Twitter account could also be, as Suzanne Maloney noted to me, indicative of a “a more moderate course on Iran’s foreign policy and even on the sensitive issue of Syria”. This may be the case even if he submits to pressure for him to take a harsher stance.
And here’s another interesting angle to this story. The perceptive Laura Rozen reports that the visit of the UN’s Under Secretary for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman to Tehran at this time is a sign of intensifying UN diplomacy on Syria:
Feltman, in his meetings in Iran, discussed “the worsening situation on the ground in Syria, including the U.N.’s grave concerns about the potential use of chemical weapons and how the U.N. can work together with Iran and other states to end the bloodshed and suffering of the Syrian people,” [UN spokesman Farhan] Haq said.
“Unclear as yet is if, in exchange for Iran not overreacting to any U.S. action in Syria, the U.S. will acquiesce to Iran attending Geneva2, or indeed, given Feltman’s reported discussions in Iran, whether it had already done so. Both Russia and the UN’s [Lakhdar] Brahimi have repeatedly stated that Iran should be able to attend,” writes Rozen.
Adding to my fascination with all this is the fact Omani Sultan Qaboos bin Said al-Said was also in Tehran this week. As this Economist editorial notes, the sultan has a history of serving as a messenger between Iran and the US and could be one on Syria:
Al-Hayat, a pan-Arab newspaper, quoted sources in Iran as saying that the trip was “not normal and does not fall under normal protocol”. Bahar, a publication linked to Iran’s newly-empowered reformist bloc, reported that the sultan was visiting as a precursor to future talks between America and Iran to negotiate a deal on greater nuclear transparency in exchange for sanctions relief. Fararu, a reformist-leaning website, has suggested that a new back channel might be established between the two countries, to pave the way for discussions over Iran’s disputed nuclear programme as well as the crisis in Syria.
Photo: Iranian FM Javad Zarifi meets with UN political affairs chief Jeffrey Feltman in Tehran. Credit: Mona Hoobehfekr
]]>by Jasmin Ramsey
*This post has been updated.
Jim refuses to join Twitter, but today Iran’s president Hassan Rouhani provided him with another reason to reconsider:
Iran gives notice to international community to use all its might to prevent use of chemical weapons anywhere in the world, esp. in #Syria
— [...]]]>
by Jasmin Ramsey
*This post has been updated.
Jim refuses to join Twitter, but today Iran’s president Hassan Rouhani provided him with another reason to reconsider:
Iran gives notice to international community to use all its might to prevent use of chemical weapons anywhere in the world, esp. in #Syria
— Hassan Rouhani (@HassanRouhani) August 27, 2013
An Iranian official criticizing the use of chemical weapons, which Iraq’s Saddam Hussein used (with US assistance) to kill hundreds or even thousands of Iranians during the bloody Iran-Iraq war, is nothing new. What’s shocking is that Iran’s president seems to be endorsing force to prevent chemical weapons-use at a time when the US is positioning itself to strike Iran’s only regional ally, Syria. And as Golnaz Esfandiari reminds us, he made a similar statement on Saturday.
Iran expert Suzanne Maloney tells me that while we shouldn’t interpret too much from one statement, Rouhani’s words could indicate a “remarkable shift in the official posture of the Iranian government on the role of the international community” and “even on the sensitive issue of Syria” — but let’s backtrack for a moment.
For starters, it doesn’t appear like Rouhani tweeted this message by his mistake. Look at the tweets preceding it:
Iran suffered chemical weapons attacks by Iraqi forces during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war 2/2
— Hassan Rouhani (@HassanRouhani) August 27, 2013
We completely & strongly condemn use of chemical weapons in #Syria because Islamic Republic of Iran is itself victim of chemical weapons 1/2
— Hassan Rouhani (@HassanRouhani) August 27, 2013
And consider his most recent tweet as of now, which appeared one hour after his “notice” to the international community:
In response to questions abt other accounts in @HassanRouhani‘s name; this is the only English-language Twitter account.
— Hassan Rouhani (@HassanRouhani) August 27, 2013
Nothing has since been removed, revised, or added to Rouhani’s English Twitter account. His Persian account doesn’t feature these tweets.
What’s even more fascinating about all this is that at least according to news reports, Iran’s position on intervention in Syria has been what it was when the disgraced Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was president: don’t do it. State-run and semi-official Iranian news sites are dominated with statements from Iranian officials warning against an outside military attack.
Rouhani also refrained from naming Syria’s rebels as the aggressors when he acknowledged chemical weapons-use in Syria on Saturday — the same day that Iran announced Syria would allow weapons inspectors into the site of the alleged attack. Iran’s foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif did reportedly blame the rebels, which he called “terrorists”, for using the weapons in “escalating the crisis”, so why did Rouhani hold back?
While cautioning against reading too much into all this so soon, Maloney, a former State Department policy advisor, told me on the phone that all this made her recall Hashemi Rafsanjani’s first term when he “managed to persuade the leadership of the Islamic Republic to remain neutral to the UN-backed international military campaign to evict Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.”
She continued, “This is obviously very different because of the alliance of Iran and Syria and if so, would be an even more dramatic gesture, but it appears that Rouhani is trying to track a more moderate course on Iran’s foreign policy and even on the sensitive issue of Syria.”
“The conventional wisdom is that Rouhani would not have enough wiggle room on Syria, that he would be forced to accede to a hardline position that Iran’s security forces advocate — whether or not the revelation of alleged chemical weapons usage alters that or if Rouhani is taking this opportunity to signal a different approach than what we’ve seen from Tehran over the years, we’ll have to see,” said Maloney, who can also be found on Twitter (I’m nudging Jim).
Maloney added that whatever was discussed in the conversation between Zarif and UN Undersecretary Jeffrey Feltman during his surprise visit to Tehran this week could also be indicative of why Rouhani has made these unusual statements. Though we shouldn’t rush to conclusions, Rouhani’s words are not “terribly subtle,” she said.
(Interestingly, while serving as US ambassador to Lebanon when its Prime Minister Rafic Harriri was killed, Feltman accused the Assads of being behind the assassination.)
There have been varying interpretations among analysts here about how Iran would respond to intervention in Syria, ranging from: it will almost certainly have a negative impact on the nuclear negotiations to, Iran has too much to lose on that front to sacrifice its own interests for its ally.
That debate may be concluded in the near future, but all this brings to mind Farideh’s post from July 2012, where she took a hard look at Iran’s Syria policy. At that time, she noted that Iran seemed to be toeing the Russian line on Syria: “The Iranian government is undoubtedly aware that Syria is in a mess. But in the coming months expect Iran’s response to be more reactive than proactive despite proclamations and posturing that suggest otherwise.”
Is her conclusion, written more than a year ago, still applicable today?
Update: Iranian journalist Omid Memarian tells me that Rouhani’s comments could be focused on the rebels. In other words, perhaps Rouhani is saying that the international community should use all its “might” to stop chemical weapons use by the rebels. If that’s true, Maloney’s suggestion that Iran could be changing its stance on the international community still rings true.
Update II: Some have questioned whether the Twitter account linked to here is operated by Hassan Rouhani or his staff. I base my take on the following: 1) he has never denied that it’s his account; 2) it seems to be in line with Rouhani’s official statements and his talks and appearances etc.; 3) Twitter is prohibited in Iran, which makes public acknowledgement problematic; 4) my Iranian contacts who are usually in-the-know about these things say they can’t see any reason to doubt it.
]]>via IPS News
But what I think the American people also expect me to do as president is to think through what we do from the perspective of, what is in our long-term national interests?…Sometimes what we’ve seen is that folks will call for immediate action, jumping into stuff, [...]]]>
via IPS News
But what I think the American people also expect me to do as president is to think through what we do from the perspective of, what is in our long-term national interests?…Sometimes what we’ve seen is that folks will call for immediate action, jumping into stuff, that does not turn out well, gets us mired in very difficult situations, can result in us being drawn into very expensive, difficult, costly interventions that actually breed more resentment in the region. — President Barack Obama, CNN, Aug. 23, 2013
President Obama got it right. He was picked by U.S. voters to put the nation’s interests first – not those of any ally, any member of Congress, or the media, even if they clamour for him to “do something” yet do not take responsibility for the consequences if things go wrong, as they have for some time in the Middle East.
Today, the issue raised by U.S. media and some of America’s allies are allegations that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad used poison gas to kill or maim thousands of Syrians. The consensus among Western commentators, in and outside of the government, has been built around this proposition, and it may be right.
United Nations inspectors may be able to verify the causes and perpetrators of these deaths and injuries. Let us hope so, before the United States or other countries begin direct military action of any kind that will be crossing the Rubicon.
Perhaps U.S. intelligence knows the facts; again, let us hope so. And let us hope that we do not later discover that intelligence was distorted, as it was before the ill-fated U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the consequences of which are still damaging U.S. interests in the Middle East and eroding the region’s stability.
In addition to being unable to turn back once the United States becomes directly engaged in combat, however limited, is the difficulty of believing that Assad would have been so foolish as to use poison gas, unless Syrian command-and-control is so poor that some military officer ordered its use without Assad’s permission.
If one invokes the concept of cui bono (“to whose benefit?”), those with the most to gain if the United States acted to bring down the current Syrian government would be Syrian rebels or their supporters, including Al Qaeda and its affiliates. Such a move would increase the likelihood of even more killing and perhaps genocide against Syria’s Alawites.
But citing the possibility that we are all being misled about who used poison gas – a tactic known as a false flag – does not mean it is true. It does redouble the need for the United States to be certain about who used the gas before taking military action. Obama has gotten this right, too.
So if we become directly involved in the fighting, then what?
This question must always be asked before acting. Sometimes, such as with Pearl Harbour, Hitler’s declaring war on the United States, or pushing Iraq out of Kuwait in 1991, striking back hard for as long as it takes is clearly the right course.
Less clear of a situation was Vietnam. Ugly consequences also ensued from arming and training Osama bin Laden and his ilk to punish the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and, in one of the worst foreign policy blunders in U.S. history, from invading Iraq in 2003.
It has long been clear that the Syrian conflict is not just about Syria. It is also about the balance between Sunni and Shia aspirations throughout the core of the Middle East. Iran, a Shia state, started the ball rolling with its 1979 Islamic revolution. Several U.S. administrations contained the virus of sectarianism, but invading Iraq and toppling its minority Sunni regime got the ball rolling again.
Now Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey are bent on toppling the minority Alawite – a mystical offshoot of Shi’ism – regime in Syria. Even if they succeed, the region’s internecine warfare won’t stop there.
From the U.S. perspective, the regional situation is a mess, and the tipping point that would make things much worse could be direct military intervention in Syria.
It is too late for Obama to take back his ill-considered statement about the use of poison gas being a “red line” in Syria when he was not prepared to go for broke in toppling Assad. It is too late as well for him to reconsider his call for Assad to go, which further stoked the fears of the Alawites that they could be slaughtered.
It is also late for him to tell Gulf Arabs to stop fostering the spread of Islamist fundamentalism of the worst sort throughout the region, from Egypt to Pakistan to Afghanistan, where American troops have died as a result.
It is also late, but let us hope not too late, for a U.S.-led full-court press on the political-diplomatic front to set the terms for a reasonably viable post-Assad Syria rather than sliding into war and unleashing potentially terrible uncertainties. Let us recall what happened in Afghanistan after we stayed on after deposing the Taliban, and in Iraq after 2003. Neither place is in much better shape, if at all, even after the loss of thousands of U.S. lives and trillions in U.S. treasure.
And it is also late, but hopefully not too late, for the Obama administration to engage in strategic thinking about the Middle East; to see the region from North Africa to Southwest Asia as “all of a piece,” and to craft an overall policy towards critical US interests throughout the area.
This week, President Obama should heed the clear wake-up call, resist the call to do something militarily in Syria, and place his bet on vigorous and unrelenting diplomacy for a viable post-Assad Syria and reassertion of U.S. leadership throughout the region.
]]>by Wayne White
A sampling of the May 5 American Sunday talk shows demonstrated graphically the intense pressure mounting on the White House to move forward with potentially risky military options aimed at hastening the end of the crisis in Syria.
Embedded in much of the criticism of (or impatience with) [...]]]>
by Wayne White
A sampling of the May 5 American Sunday talk shows demonstrated graphically the intense pressure mounting on the White House to move forward with potentially risky military options aimed at hastening the end of the crisis in Syria.
Embedded in much of the criticism of (or impatience with) current US policy since last month’s accusations of Syrian chemical weapons (CW) use has been a misreading of the “red line” established by President Obama last August, flawed connectivity between the objective of Israel’s most recent air strikes vs. US concerns, and minimizing the unpredictability of the future course of the complex maelstrom in Syria.
One figure stands out among those pushing for robust US military action: Senator John McCain. On a talk show yesterday, Sen. McCain declared that the President’s CW red line on Syria “was apparently written in disappearing ink” (one of the harshest comments related to the red line to date). McCain and many others of varied political views essentially have been pushing the president to take strong action in response to two or, at most, three (as yet not fully confirmed) instances of CW use by the regime.
In fact, the President’s red line of August 2012 was defined as follows: “when we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized, that would change my calculus.” [emphasis mine]
By that definition, it would appear the administration’s critics, not the White House, have been attempting to reshape the original red line from a rather high bar to a considerably lower one.
Other canards circulating since Israel’s weekend airstrikes in the Damascus area have been assertions that they should increase pressure on Washington to act and to discredit comments by US Joint Chiefs Chairman General Martin Dempsey and other experts that Syria’s robust air defenses pose a far more serious challenge than did Libya’s.
Sen. McCain appeared dismissive of Gen. Dempsey’s remarks, commenting: “The Israelis seem to be able to penetrate” them “fairly easily.” Yet, there is quite a difference between a few isolated air strikes not very far into Syria and the establishment of a comprehensive no-fly zone or a far more ambitious prolonged campaign of rolling air strikes deep inside Syrian airspace.
Those interested in this debate also should bear in mind that Israel’s narrow military objective to date of blocking Lebanon’s Hezbollah from receiving long-range Fateh-110 missiles being shipped through Syria by Iran is quite different than US and NATO concerns relating to Syria’s sprawling CW arsenal and the issue of how best to assist the Syrian rebels to hasten the fall of the Assad regime.
While even a few isolated, small-scale instances of regime CW use would be ample reason for international concern, it could be that President Bashar al-Assad and other Syrian leaders currently are not under the same amount of pressure to resort to such extreme measures as they might have been a short while ago.
For reasons not quite understood, government forces have shown some renewed vigor in taking on the rebels with the regime’s formidable array of conventional weapons. It is this disturbing development on the broader Syrian battlefield that should be the principal driver behind any consideration of better arming the rebels. Doing so, however (something I also tended to favor over a year ago), has been complicated greatly since early last year by the increased role of al-Qaeda-affiliated Muslim extremists in the fight against the Assad regime.
To make matters worse, last month the direct affiliation between many of them and al-Qaeda was made public. A May 3 Reuters article states: “Israelis believe one in ten of the rebels is a jihadi.”
Nonetheless, one thing is certain: even if their numbers are that small, extremist rebels are providing a disproportionately large number of the opposition’s most effective combat units. It also could be true that their numbers are quite a bit higher than a mere tenth of rebel combatants.
Moreover, selectively arming only “vetted” rebel groups (those less extreme) is unlikely to be as easy or as useful as those pressing for such a course seem to be claiming. First off, there is the likelihood that some groups would succeed in persuading outside powers they are more moderate than they really are. Then there is what I have termed the Catch-22 aspect that would result even if such a selective arms distribution could be achieved: many groups moderate enough to qualify for arms are not nearly as important in altering the balance of power inside Syria more in favor of the rebels than are the extremists.
Finally, there are the unintended consequences of military intervention in Syria. If the result of Muammar al-Qadhafi’s fall in Libya has been continuing instability and violence driven home to Americans by the tragic events in Benghazi last September, post-Assad Syria could prove an even nastier place. Muslim extremists (al-Qaeda itself no less) would be among the key players.
Making matters worse, seething sectarian divides — with the very real danger of Sunni vengeance resulting in further bloodletting and possibly the flight from Syria of several million Alawite and Christian refugees — threatens to stain the aftermath quite darkly.
Still, that has not stopped Sen. McCain (who so fervently backed US intervention in Libya, but now rails on about the deadly events in Benghazi despite the uncertain challenge posed by post-Qadhafi chaos), from advocating US military involvement in the even messier situation in Syria.
It is no wonder, all other reasons aside, that the Obama administration might want to think long and hard about military intervention: many pushing so hard now for the US to wade boldly into such troubled waters probably would turn on the White House in a heartbeat should ill come of any aspect of American engagement in Syria (as it likely would in one form or another). Thus are the inevitable consequences of such a risky business — the unexpected.
]]>by Robert E. Hunter
“Then we’ll have done all we can.”
“Very heartless.”
“It’s safer to be heartless than mindless. History is the triumph of the heartless over the mindless.”
Yes, [...]]]>
by Robert E. Hunter
“Then we’ll have done all we can.”
“Very heartless.”
“It’s safer to be heartless than mindless. History is the triumph of the heartless over the mindless.”
Yes, Prime Minister.
President Barack Obama, it is said, has painted himself into a corner with his repeated statements that the use of chemical weapons by the Assad government will be a “game changer” or cross a “red line.” The difficulty of definitions has produced what must have been one of the most ambiguous letters ever to be put on White House stationery. It came as a response to a demand from two US Senators about presidential policy in the event of such weapons use.
More accurately, however, the president can be said to have painted himself into a corner with Syria on two occasions, initially as early as August 2011, and repeated since, by declaring that “Assad must go.”
Of course, Assad has not gone, thus demonstrating once again the first rule of being US President: never call for something, especially in a simple declaratory sentence, if you are not prepared to follow through and make it happen.
This recitation is not meant to be an attack on the US president. It is an introduction to what has to be a genuine dilemma, indeed, a series of dilemmas, which come in several forms.
Syria’s Future
The first dilemma regards the potentiality of a positive outcome in Syria. Assad and company are engaged in the massive slaughter of their own people, which, along with those killed by the rebels, numbers more than 70,000 by a recent (likely conservative) count, plus the creation of more than a million refugees. There is meanwhile no resolution in sight of what has become a full-scale civil war.
Let us assume that Assad is killed (or decides to seek a safe haven) tomorrow. What then? It is a vast stretch of the imagination to believe that the killing would then stop.
What is happening in Syria is radically different from what happened in the so-called “Arab spring” in Tunisia, Egypt, or even Libya. This is not primarily a matter of whether a leader who stayed too long and was too repressive will go; but whether a particular minority will continue to be able to dominate the rest of the population, or, with “regime change,” whether there will be a bloody free-for-all competition for power. None of the other three regime changes were about that.
More relevant is what happened in Iraq, when the US and partners, by invading in 2003, overturned centuries of admittedly unjust domination of a majority (Shi’ite) by a minority (Sunni). Or what is happening, or rather not happening, in Bahrain, where the situation is just the reverse but has been kept in check by military power, much of which has been applied by neighboring Saudi Arabia, with the US, concerned about its base in Bahrain for the Fifth Fleet, at best “turning a blind eye.”
It’s therefore hard to see what the United States, or any combination of outsiders, could usefully do — not to help overthrow Assad and his Alawite-dominated military (that can be done) — but to help “shape” a future in Syria that won’t lead to even more bloody chaos before something approaching “stability” could ensue. Even if that were possible, it would likely take the form of a new suppression, but by the majority (Sunni) over various minorities.
Public Opinion
The second dilemma — perhaps it should be first — is related to whether the American people are ready and willing to see the US engaged in yet another Middle East war. The answer (“No”) is clear, but so far policy is not — hence the dilemma.
There should be no indulgence in the nonsense that all could be accomplished by providing more lethal arms to the rebels, imposing a no-fly zone, or using air power directly. That would be relatively sterile in today’s military taxology, but even if/when successful, it leads back to the first dilemma. And if unsuccessful, the US would then be called upon to do what, in current jargon, is called “boots on the ground” — that is, invasion. There should be no nonsense, however, about the US being able, as in Libya, to “lead from behind.” Even though the British and the French (the latter was the former mandatory power in Syria after World War I) would like to see something done, they are this time ready to hold the US coat, but not lead themselves.
To his credit, the president so far has been wary of getting more deeply engaged, presumably due to a combination of his awareness of the two dilemmas above, the second of which (US public opinion), if ignored, would surely take attention away from what he clearly sees as his legacy: repairs to the heavily-damaged US economy (and the global financial system) and his historical goal, which can be summarized in a few simple words: the promotion of equality in American society.
Regional Context
The third dilemma derives from the manner in which the conflict in Syria began. It did have domestic roots (as in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya), but it also had external causes and active agents, notably a desire by leading Sunni states (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and to a lesser degree, Turkey) to right the informal and rough regional “balance of power” between them and Shi’a states that was so heavily upset by the US invasion of Iraq. This came after the spread of the “disease” from revolutionary Shi’a Iran had both been almost entirely contained in the region and had most of its fires banked at home. Some Sunni states still fear contagion, however, notably Saudi Arabia, where oil lands are heavily concentrated in Shi’a territories (hence Riyadh’s desire to get rid of the Alawite rule in Syria).
So here it is: an already slow-rolling civil war across the region, pitting Sunnis versus Shi’as, but only in part about religion, is also about competitions for power. In this case, it’s an essentially four-cornered competition among Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel and Turkey, the first three of which have as much to do in fueling the current confrontation with Iran as does its nuclear program.
Would the overthrow of the Assad regime cause this regional civil war to intensify? Or would it lead to a new, informal balance among religious groupings that would be reasonably “stable,” whatever that means in today’s roiling Middle East? It would take a Dr. Pangloss to argue the case for stability over more competition and even less stability and predictability about the future of inter-state relations and internal developments.
Non-governmental Actors
Dilemma number four flows from the above. As the civil war has continued and intensified, Sunni Islamist militants, including elements of al-Qaeda, Wahhabis and Salafists, have increasingly become engaged. That should be no surprise. These groups batten on conflict, especially a conflict with intense emotion and deep-seated religious inspiration. Thus even with Assad gone — perhaps by magic wand tomorrow — would the outcome of the civil war be ruled by a Sunni strongman, pacifying the country by force? Or solidification of another base for continuing terrorist operations by some of our and our allies’ worst enemies?
Israel’s Circumstances
One argument for getting rid of Assad and his Alawite-dominated regime is that this would help deprive the Lebanese Hezbollah of its rear base, which provides political support and a supply route for Iran as it seeks to counter pressure from the US and Israel. But at what (potential) price would Iran be thus incommoded?
Since 1974, Israel existed uneasily but still reasonably comfortably with Assad père et fils, as both countries learned to live with one another. Their mutual frontier along the Golan Heights was so stable that Israel could even invade Lebanon (twice) and attack a Syrian nuclear reactor without a military response. Now that modus vivendi is very much in jeopardy.
Indeed, for many months after the Syrian civil war started, Israel was clearly at least ambivalent about whether Assad’s departure was in Israel’s best interest. It now seems to have passed that point, but even that is not entirely clear.
What should be clear, however, is that if Assad goes and there is an intensifying civil war, with “free play” for Islamist radicals of the worst stripe — the kind that have inspired and in many cases conducted the killing of Americans in Afghanistan — the US will be called upon to be even more robust in support of Israel’s security.
Would that mean US forces on the Golan Heights? Israel has never wanted this direct military engagement from the US, but the need for extra commitments to Israel’s security would be very likely. Furthermore, the argument that Iran would be the big loser from Assad’s departure might even be turned on its head. The balance in Tehran could be tipped toward those who argue that Iran should get nuclear weapons in order to deter a burgeoning list of enemies.
Strategy
Then a final dilemma: the US desire to “pivot” to Asia. But at least some refocusing of policy and military assets will not be as easily done as has been hoped with the end of the Iraq War, the winding down of the Afghanistan War and the efforts to keep Iran from crossing either US or Israeli red lines on its nuclear program.
With Syria and its interlocking dilemmas, plus other continuing challenges in the region, the US will not be able to rid itself of a major security role in the Middle East anytime soon, even if it (rightly) promotes an international approach to even some of these dilemmas, no matter how much oil and gas is eventually produced in the continental US.
It is probably — but not certainly — too late to find some means whereby Assad could stay in power but with genuine power-sharing that would radically reduce the prominence of the Alawites without leaving them to be victimized as they have victimized other Syrians for so long. Of course, power-sharing efforts almost always fail in mechanical approaches to foreign policy, so perhaps that was never a real option, a triumph of Western “hope over experience.”
So what is to be done at this juncture of “no good options?” The best to be hoped for now is for President Obama to keep his nerve (backed by the US military leadership) and continue resisting attempts to drag the US even more deeply into Syria. At the same time, the US must avoid the temptation to perceive another looming chance to experiment with “nation building”; Iraq and Afghanistan should have inoculated us against that.
As a cardinal principle, the US should internationalize whatever is done — by the United Nations, NATO, the European Union and Arab League — and not regard Syria as a test of US “leadership,” as asserted in the aforementioned White House letter (“strengthen our leadership of the international community.”) It should put out the word in very clear terms to other states in the region to stop meddling in Syria, and in particular, to rein-in their nationals who are engaged in spreading Islamist militancy in Syria (and elsewhere), with both ideas and arms.
Finally, the US needs to begin seeing the region as a whole, not as a series of bits and pieces, loosely connected to one another, with Washington attempting only “to put out fires” here and there, while pretending that the whole region is not potentially ablaze. The president has to recruit for his administration the very best people to think strategically and this time plan ahead. They must understand that the US has to create consistent and coherent policies for the entire region that have some chance of success for the long haul.
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