by Wayne White

Islamic State (IS) leader Abu Baker al-Baghdadi’s declaration of a caliphate could be too much for quite a few of his Sunni Arab Iraqi allies to swallow. Yet, capitalizing on this surprising IS move will be exceedingly difficult as long as Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki continues to slow formation [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Wayne White

Islamic State (IS) leader Abu Baker al-Baghdadi’s declaration of a caliphate could be too much for quite a few of his Sunni Arab Iraqi allies to swallow. Yet, capitalizing on this surprising IS move will be exceedingly difficult as long as Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki continues to slow formation of a new government by scrambling for ways to survive. Fortunately, IS most likely cannot seize much in the way of new territory, but the collective Iraqi political will and military heft needed to begin the daunting task of pushing IS back remains elusive.

Excessive IS Hubris

Naming al-Baghdadi “Caliph” of all Muslims by the newly branded IS at the beginning of Ramadan, a stunning act of hubris, probably expands the potential for driving wedges between IS and its Sunni Arab fellow travelers. The militant Sunni Arab Association of Muslim Scholars already has announced that IS “did not consult” with its “allies” or “their leaders,” and an “oath of allegiance” demanded by IS is “not binding on anyone.”  In Mosul, evidently regarded by IS as mostly its own exclusive conquest (not ruled in cooperation with powerful allies), IS reportedly has asked those scattered allies on the scene to turn in their arms, another likely source of resistance and pushback.

Whether Sunni Arabs angry over Maliki’s abuses can be peeled away from IS is not the only matter relevant to the announcement of a Caliphate (doubtless considered blasphemous by many Muslims, Sunni and Shi’a). The IS declaration does nothing to alter military realities on the ground: although Baghdad’s efforts to wrest a few places like Tikrit from IS have been frustrated, IS itself also largely has been stalled.

Military Frustration in Baghdad

With politics weighing heavily on Maliki’s mind, his civilian and military leaders selected mainly for loyalty (not professionalism), and amidst endemic governmental dysfunction, Maliki’s ability to oversee a military rebound is iffy. Worse still, Maliki himself is a politician without any particular feel for military matters (despite retaining the defense ministry portfolio).

So far, his forces fighting in Tikrit and ringing Baghdad appear to be a hodge-podge of army units and Shi’a militiamen (many of the latter who took up arms against Sunni Arabs, U.S. troops and Iraqi authorities in 2004-2008). West of Baghdad, a sizeable contingent of veteran Shi’a volunteers who fought alongside regime forces in the Syrian civil war have been deployed, perhaps the strongest element overall. Without far greater air and heavy-weapons support, these forces are best suited to defense, as opposed to driving back IS fanatics occupying positions that are well dug in.

According to US officials, there are a number of militant Sunni Arab “sleeper cells” in Baghdad awaiting a call to arms. Yet, with the vast majority of the capital now Shi’a, attacks by Sunni Arab combatants would trigger Shi’a violence against the city’s greatly outnumbered Sunni Arab population. One or two Sunni Arab neighborhoods might fall under militant control, and acts of violence could be widespread for a while. However, the bulk of Baghdad would remain in government hands. Sadly, an outbreak of such bloodshed ultimately could result in another wave of sectarian cleansing, replete with atrocities, further reducing Baghdad’s dwindling Sunni Arab population.

Parliamentary Stand-off and Maliki’s Deception

Iraqi leaders cannot exploit opportunities to reach out to Sunni Arab tribes, former military officers, etc. without a new government. And should Maliki lead that new government, its ability to divide its enemies would be crippled.

The Shi’a National Alliance parliamentary bloc (dominated by Maliki’s State of Law coalition) failed to select Maliki or an alternative to Maliki prior to parliament’s July 1 session. Consequently, all Kurdish and Sunni Arab members left after a break in the proceedings (joined by a few Shi’a independents).

In a televised speech the next day, Maliki expressed hope that Iraq’s travails could be overcome through “openness” and “democratic mechanisms” (both of which Maliki has undermined as prime minister). He also lamely offered amnesty to tribes currently siding with IS — a promise of the kind to which he personally turned his back in the wake of the Sunni Arab “Awakening.” In any case, most disaffected Sunni Arabs do not want amnesty: they want comprehensive change in Baghdad’s exclusionary policies toward them.

There is a desire among some in State of Law to dump Maliki. Likewise, a shift away from Grand Ayatollah Sistani’s demands for a swifter decision on a new and inclusive government is unlikely (although Sistani may use tomorrow’s Friday prayers to clarify his position). Hopefully, despite Maliki’s machinations, he will soon be history.

US Military Reaction: Mission Creep

As some observers predicted, the Obama Administration’s initial deployment has been followed by more “boots on the ground.” Clearly alarmed by Iraqi governmental gridlock, several hundred more American troops have been sent to Baghdad to bolster the defense of the US Embassy in various ways.

The fumbling performance of the Iraqi military as it struggles to rebound also probably spurred this decision. There are, of course, risks. The more American troops inserted into an Iraq in crisis (particularly in varied locations, such as the placement of some US troops at Baghdad International Airport) increases their vulnerability. The likelihood of casualties somewhere down the road is rising ominously with each successive deployment.

Waiting for That Other Shoe to Drop

The military situation could fall into a pattern of heavy skirmishing roughly along the present front lines while the Baghdad political mill grinds on. Without greater incentives to defect, most Sunni Arab tribes, ex-officers, Ba’this, and others fed up with Baghdad are not likely to abandon IS — at least for now. Thus, the composition of Iraq’s next government will define the road ahead, making this year’s post-election jousting far more important than any in the past.

Photo: U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, a State Department translator, and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in Baghdad, June 23, 2014. Credit: State Department photo/ Public Domain

by Peter Jenkins

For the last week the British government has given every sign of being in a dreadful muddle over how to react to the suspicion that chemical weapons (CW) were used in the suburbs of Damascus early on 21 August.

Two words that ought to have featured prominently in ministerial [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Peter Jenkins

For the last week the British government has given every sign of being in a dreadful muddle over how to react to the suspicion that chemical weapons (CW) were used in the suburbs of Damascus early on 21 August.

Two words that ought to have featured prominently in ministerial statements, “due process”, were entirely absent. Instead, Messrs William Hague and James Cameron spoke at times as though the UK and its Western allies were fully entitled to act as judge, jury and executioner.

I hope I won’t offend US readers if I say that Europeans half expect that sort of mentality from US leaders. We look on the US as a country in which habits formed in the Wild West in the nineteenth century resurface from time to time. But from our own European politicians, schooled by centuries of intra-European conflict, we look for more measured and cautious responses.

Reinforcing the impression of indifference to international legality, British ministers seemed hopelessly confused about how the precipitate use of force that they were advocating could be justified, and about what it was supposed to achieve.

At one moment President Bashar al-Assad had to be “punished”; at another the West had to “retaliate” for his use of CW (although so far Western nationals are not reported to be among the victims).

Some statements suggested that the West should act to uphold an international norm against the use of CW, others that the West had to act in order to protect Syria’s population from further CW attacks (although none of the military measures reportedly under consideration can come close to delivering “protection”).

Mercifully, as of 29 August, it looks as though Messrs Hague and Cameron are at last starting to come to their senses, sobered perhaps by parliamentary resistance to signing a blank cheque for a resort to force and by opinion polls suggesting that the British public is opposed to force by a margin of more than two to one.

To those of us who are familiar with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) this pantomime has been puzzling.

Syria is one of (only) seven states that have not ratified the CWC. The rational way to proceed, however, is to treat Syria, mutatis mutandis, as though it were a CWC party, since the norm enshrined in the CWC dates back to 1925 and is, effectively, a global norm, a norm that no state can reasonably reject (unlike the so-called “right to protect”, propagated by Mr. Blair and others, which is far from being universally accepted).

The relevant provisions of the CWC can be summarised as follows:

- CWC parties are entitled to request “challenge inspections” to clarify possible instances of non-compliance with the Convention’s prohibitions, and to have this inspection conducted “without delay”;

- The inspection team will produce a report which contains factual findings as well as an assessment of the cooperation extended by the inspected party;

- The inspected party has a right to comment on that report and to have its comments submitted to other parties;

- The parties shall then meet to decide whether non-compliance has occurred, and whether further action may be necessary “to redress the situation and to ensure compliance”.

Note the emphasis on giving the inspected party a right to comment before parties come to conclusions about what the inspection report implies. This could be especially important in the Syrian case if, as leaked signal intelligence implies, a Syrian army unit used CW last week against the wishes of the Syrian Ministry of Defence.

Note, too, the emphasis on redressing the situation. What matters in Syria now, if the UN inspectors report that government CW were used last week, is that the government take steps to ensure that this never happens again. Ideally, the UN Security Council (acting, so to speak, on behalf of CWC parties in this instance) can persuade the Syrian government to adhere to the CWC and destroy its CW stocks under international supervision. There will be no resistance to that outcome from Russia, Iran or China, all fervent supporters of the CWC.

Note, finally, the absence of any reference in the CWC to the “punishing” of non-compliance. That is consistent with a view that it is inappropriate for sovereign states to treat one another like common criminals (a view to which the West eagerly subscribes when the non-compliant state is Israel). Of course, if the Syrian government wishes to punish the commander(s) of any unit(s) found to have been responsible for last week’s outrage, this is another matter.

By giving priority to “due process” and “redressing the situation” Western leaders have an opportunity to set a good precedent for the handling of future challenges to global norms.