by Wayne White
Alongside the wave of Syrian Kurdish refugees into Turkey this month is an equally unsettling story: alarming gains by the Islamic State in an offensive against a potential ally. Syria’s Kurds carved out their own regional bastion extending west from their main base in the extreme northeast corner of Syria. For two years they have fiercely defended their lands against the Islamic State and other extremists, employing many thousands of veteran Kurdish fighters.
Yet due to these fighters’ ties with the militant leftist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)—a designated terrorist organization in the United States and Turkey—and an alliance of convenience of sorts with the Assad regime, the US and the Islamic State’s (ISIS or ISIL) other foes have held them at arm’s length. Stemming from all this could be severe damage to, and possibly the eventual loss of one of the most effective contingents of indigenous anti-ISIL boots on the ground in Syria.
The Syrian Kurdish World
Comprising roughly 9 percent of the Syrian population, Syrian Kurds mostly inhabit the country’s extreme northeast al-Hasakah Governorate wedged between Iraq and Turkey, plus large swathes of real estate across northern Syria extending westward. Since 1970, the Kurds have had profound differences with the authoritarian Assad regime, toward which their leading parties pose a threat. So the PKK and other Kurdish parties seeking independence or greater autonomy were banned and suppressed.
Still, given Syria’s adversarial relationship with Turkey, Damascus turned a turned a blind eye toward (or was unable to prevent) PKK operations against Turkish targets during various periods, especially between 1980-99. With or without central government approval, many PKK elements have also been sheltered in Kurdish northwestern Iran and northern Iraq (the latter resulting in numerous Turkish anti-PKK air strikes in Iraqi Kurdistan over the past 20 years).
Despite past differences, Syrian Kurds opted not to attack Syrian forces and maintained a rather distant relationship with Damascus. Since Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria have had an uneasy relationship with non-Kurdish rulers and local communities for a very long time, Syrian Kurds were wary of Sunni Arab Syrian rebels. That fear grew with the increasing Muslim militancy of large numbers of rebels. So, for over two years, markedly secular Kurds, mostly alone, successfully fought off first the al-Nusra Front and then ISIL.
Although limited passenger flights from Damascus (along with a few scattered aerial deliveries of supplies and ammunition) have occurred, the regime and the Kurds remain wary of each other.
In mid-2012, a number of Syrian Kurdish militias formed an interim administration for an autonomous region, the Kurdish Supreme Committee (KSC). The unity initiative was taken despite opposition from the rival PKK-allied Syrian Democratic Union Party (PYD) but with reluctant agreement from Damascus, which pulled most Syrian troops out of Syria’s Kurdish region, and released over 600 Kurdish political prisoners.
After clashes between KSC forces and the PYD’s robust militia, an accord was reached for joint rule. Despite the Assad regime’s tentative cooperation, both the KSC and PYD are well aware that if Damascus ever regains its pre-rebellion sway across Syria, it almost certainly would try to repose central control over Hasakah and other Kurdish areas.
Prospects and Barriers
Displeasing Damascus, but with the ISIL threat clearly growing, PYD-affiliated units farther to the west partnered on Sept. 10 with several Free Syrian Army (FSA) brigades in a coordinated effort called the “Joint Operations Room.”
In addition, since June, a contingent of Syrian Kurdish combat veterans was rushed over to Iraqi Kurdistan to bolster the sagging Kurdish defenses. A large number of crack PYD militiamen also participated in cutting an escape corridor through ISIL defenses to save Iraq’s besieged Yazidis on Sinjar Mountain.
Turkey naturally holds Syria’s Kurds in low regard for harboring the PKK (and related groups), which is why Turkey initially refused to allow large numbers of Syrian Kurds fleeing ISIL to take refuge across the border (until Sept. 19 after 3 days of balking). The Turks also have been wary of the many hundreds of young Kurdish males heading into Syria to bolster desperate Syrian Kurdish forces trying to hold back ISIL. Turkish security forces have even blocked quite a few who are now camped out along the border.
The PKK warrants its branding in the West as a terrorist group. A 2013 PKK assassination in Paris, albeit part of internecine Kurdish feuding, showed the group remains active. However, now facing an existential threat from ISIL (the main driver behind its alliance of convenience with Damascus), the entire Syrian Kurdish community of many political tendencies has one focus: defense of its homeland against a more menacing ISIL.
The US and the West have had no meaningful contacts with Syrian Kurdish forces because of past attacks by the PKK against Turkey, in Western Europe, and, most recently, Kurdish links to the Assad regime. The PYD representative in France, Khaled Eissa, told Reuters early this month, however, that there had been Western signals of changing positions. US military officers met with PYD military counterparts on Mount Sinjar last month, but conversations only concerned the Yazidi evacuation. Some of Turkey’s NATO allies, according to Eissa, were apparently trying to reassure the Turks enough to initiate meaningful contacts with Syrian Kurdish leaders.
Exploding Crisis
While diplomacy stalled, ISIL struck. Focusing on less concentrated Syrian Kurds west of Hasakah, ISIL knifed deeply into Kurdish holdings (employing heavy weapons so close to the border today that two shells fell into a Turkish vineyard). The offensive’s main objective is Kobani (Ayn al-Arab), Syria’s third largest Kurdish town, driving over 150,000 Kurds into Turkey.
Despite desperate Syrian Kurdish pleas for airstrikes by the US-led coalition against ISIL forces (particularly heavy weapons) in Kobani for some days, no air support was provided until Sept. 25 when three strikes hit that area. Reports from Kobani indicate those strikes were ineffective (hitting empty ISIL positions). So far today there apparently have been none—only strikes far to the east near Hasakah. ISIL currently appears to be squeezing Kobani from three sides.
The White House has repeatedly emphasized the need for (and shortage of) indigenous boots on the ground to capitalize on airstrikes to hold, surround, and drive back ISIL. In this instance a combative secular military force numbering in the tens of thousands has been left to fend for itself because of its tentative alliance of convenience with the Assad regime and the association of some of its cadres with terrorism (although a brand far less malignant than that of ISIL). And yet this force has come to the aid of coalition forces twice.
Well beyond the question of aiding Syria’s Kurds against ISIL, Ankara has been a disappointment. Although a longstanding NATO member, it refused to host NATO combat aircraft operating against ISIL. It had also shown little interest in making a serious effort to block the export of ISIL oil products into Turkey or the influx of foreign fighters to ISIL. Only on Sept. 25 did the Turkish army finally crack down on oil and related ISIL smuggling. Ironically, the more ISIL benefits from Turkish resistance to taking risks, the greater the tsunami of Syrian refugees descending into Turkey becomes.
]]>by Tyler Cullis
Few places deserve less optimism than Syria, where a civil war has raged unabated for more than two years. The situation on the ground continues to deteriorate at an appreciable rate, with close to 10 million people presently in need of food relief and medical assistance and 6.5 [...]]]>
by Tyler Cullis
Few places deserve less optimism than Syria, where a civil war has raged unabated for more than two years. The situation on the ground continues to deteriorate at an appreciable rate, with close to 10 million people presently in need of food relief and medical assistance and 6.5 million displaced from their homes. Even by conservative estimates, 126,000 people have fallen victim to the conflict since it began in March 2011. There is little to recommend the hopeful in Syria’s unending tragedy.
And yet for a conflict that has fallen into a kind of stasis, with neither the Syrian regime nor its opposition able to claim victory, there just might be a way forward if recent events are any suggestion. Last week, a date was finally set for the long-awaited Geneva II conference, although attendance — especially from the Syrian opposition — remains thus far unclear. The day prior, an interim deal was struck between the United States and its international partners and Iran concerning Iran’s nuclear program. The two followed so closely on the heels of one another that speculation was ripe — though empty — that the U.S.-Iran dialogue had reached as far as the Syrian conflict. Regardless, the interim deal augured well for the possibility that the U.S. extend an invitation to Iran for Geneva II and the pair compromise to realize mutual interests in ending the Syrian conflict.
This would, no doubt, require a change in the U.S.’s strategic calculus, which has thus far enacted a strict bar to Iran’s participation in the Geneva talks. But, as has long been recognized, without the Iranians at the table and without their interests adequately represented in Geneva, Iran can play spoiler to any kind of political resolution tabled there. The view in Damascus is that the Syrian regime is gaining momentum on the battlefield and can outlast the opposition, even if that means a decade or more of civil war. Without Iran’s commitment to a political transition, then, there is little end in sight.
Such a commitment is not a far-fetched idea any longer, either: Iran has good reasons to bring to a close the civil war in Syria, even if that means the removal of Bashar al-Assad. For one thing, the conflict has proved a significant drain on Iran’s own resources, as the Islamic Republic’s support for the Assad regime has required considerable expenditures in both money and manpower. While there is no clear sense as to the contribution Iran has made in terms of bodies on the ground, Iran has bankrolled a Syrian government that would have all but collapsed were it not for Iran’s financial benevolence. Further, the ongoing civil war has forced Hezbollah, Iran’s proxy, down from the mantle it once occupied in the Arab world following its July 2006 war with Israel. It is increasingly difficult to remember that, not long ago, Nasrallah, Assad, and Ahmadinejad were deemed the three most-admired world leaders in Arab public opinion. Clearly, the costs to Iran from a drawn-out conflict have been paid in blood, treasure, and reputation. Iran’s desire to staunch the bleeding should thus be obvious.
That is not to say that Iran is willing to sacrifice its interests in Syria, which are apparently deep enough to have warranted such costs in the first place. Whatever agreement is struck between the Syrian regime and its opposition will have to ensure that Iran maintains a healthy degree of influence in Damascus, or else Iran will undoubtedly favor the status quo, despite the overhead. But influence can come in many shades and certainly can be felt long after the passing of the Assad family’s reign.
In fact, by entertaining a political transition in Syria, Iran could well realize a broader set of interests. This includes the long-sought recognition that Iran is a regional power, armed with enough political influence to act as a broker between warring parties elsewhere. Should the U.S. overcome its stubborn refusal to permit Iran’s participation at Geneva II, the White House will have delivered to Iran what it has always sought: U.S. recognition that Iran cannot so easily be ignored. In doing so, however, the U.S. will turn the onus back on Iran, forcing it to live up to its promise and to deliver the political transition any deal to end the conflict requires. If Iran fails to do so, then it will have secured a narrow, perhaps fleeting victory in Syria, but lost the much larger battle for regional standing. Obviously, the pressure to deliver would be squarely on Iran’s shoulders.
Furthermore, at a time when the U.S. and Iran are speaking to each other, and the possibility exists for Iran’s reintegration into the world community after 34 years, Iran is incentivized to undertake such action as would reciprocate an American invitation to Geneva. Better than most, Iran appreciates the need to resolve the conflict in Syria. If doing so would likewise put Iran in the good graces of the U.S., then all the better, especially at such a sensitive point in the nuclear negotiations.
This all, of course, requires flexibility from the United States. As the International Crisis Group noted in a September statement, the U.S. needs to be “flexible with regards to timing and specific modalities [regarding Assad’s departure].” If Iran is willing to push Assad out, then the least the U.S. can do is accommodate the Iranians regarding the means by which the transition takes place. One possibility, entirely speculative, is that Assad depart office upon the end of his term, which, according to reforms he enacted early in the conflict, takes place next year. That would provide both the time for Geneva II participants to work out how exactly the transition will work, as well as a face-saving measure for Assad so that he can, however shamelessly, claim to be sacrificing himself to save a nation.
Is any of this, in fact, possible? That is entirely unclear. But until the U.S. includes Iran in the Geneva II process, one thing is absolutely certain: the Syrian civil war will continue on its interminable path.
– Tyler Cullis is a law graduate specializing in international law and U.S. foreign policy. Follow him onTwitter.
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