by Henry Precht
The starting point for understanding Egypt’s August 14th massacre is Black Friday — September 8, 1978 — during the Iranian Revolution.
On that day, 35 years ago, the Shah’s troops killed an untold number of demonstrators in Jaleh Square in south Tehran. Martial law had been declared the day [...]]]>
by Henry Precht
The starting point for understanding Egypt’s August 14th massacre is Black Friday — September 8, 1978 — during the Iranian Revolution.
On that day, 35 years ago, the Shah’s troops killed an untold number of demonstrators in Jaleh Square in south Tehran. Martial law had been declared the day before, but Iranians opposed to the Shah weren’t aware and filed into the square to be confronted by gunfire from soldiers. The government said that fewer than a hundred were killed; the opposition claimed over 1,000. The latter figure was believed by most Iranians.
The same calculus is true of the August 14 shootings in Cairo: the government reports some hundreds killed; its opponents claim thousands have been gunned down.
Few outsiders understood after Black Friday that a turning point had been reached in Ayatollah Khomeini’s struggle against the Shah. It was downhill for the ruler from then on. The Shah was at war with his people, it can be seen in retrospect; there was no way that he could prevail. The Carter Administration, like most outsiders, failed to grasp that. Focused on talks between Israelis and Egyptians at Camp David, the president, together with his Middle Eastern guests, issued a statement of support for the Shah and hope for his “liberalizing” promises.
Something of the same — support [for a return to democracy] and hope [for nonviolence] was President Barack Obama’s message after August 14. He recognizes that Egypt is sharply divided, the Muslim Brotherhood has close to a popular majority, the military have the guns and the US is distrusted and often despised by both sides. Treading carefully, he cancelled next month’s joint military exercise — perhaps aware that visiting American troops might be in danger of deadly attacks by extremists. But he left on the table for now the next tranche of military aid (over $1 billion) — perhaps aware that cancellation would be deeply offensive to nationalists and the blocked contract for F-16 aircraft a burden on the US budget.
Unwisely, he didn’t go far enough.
If Obama is to be true to American values, he should avoid hurting the Egyptian people, but support their aspirations for democracy and dignity. That means no sanctions against the country as a whole or the military as an institution. It does not mean that individual Egyptians responsible for the killings should be immune from US sanctions.
The president should ban any official US contact with General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, his appointed president, prime minister, minister of the interior and any other officials who can be deemed guilty of authorizing violence after the coup and in the subsequent crackdown. The president should call on them to withdraw in favor of a small and politically balanced committee formed by resigned vice president Mohamed ElBaradei (no friend of the US). This committee, in turn, Obama would suggest, would select three individuals — one from the Muslim Brotherhood, one from the military ranks and one distinguished, independent Egyptian — to form a governing triumvirate. Each of the three would be acceptable to the other political elements.
The US would try to enlist other outside powers — EU members, Turkey, Russia and the Arab League — in backing some such scheme. Together they would demand an end to violence by all parties and the release of political prisoners. President Mohamed Morsi, after a very brief return to office, would resign for the good of Egypt — encouraged by the US and other outsiders and, with luck, by some of his MB colleagues. The constitution and parliament would be restored pre-coup. In effect, August 14 would represent a reversal of the coup rather than the beginning of a civil war.
If a plan of reasonable compromise is not worked out very soon, the threat of prolonged sectarian and civil strife is very real. A point of no return is approaching. Every death on the streets creates new martyrs willing to sacrifice themselves. Think Lebanon, Iraq and Syria. Think Iran in 1978.
Photo Credit: Mohamed Azazy
]]>Many Americans, shocked by the appalling casualties from the crackdown ordered by Armed Forces Commander Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, understandably have reacted by calling for a cut-off of US aid to Egypt. Yet, doing so probably would be ineffective, further reducing Washington’s already limited influence [...]]]>
Many Americans, shocked by the appalling casualties from the crackdown ordered by Armed Forces Commander Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, understandably have reacted by calling for a cut-off of US aid to Egypt. Yet, doing so probably would be ineffective, further reducing Washington’s already limited influence over the Egyptian military. And since there are no genuine “good guys” amidst the confrontation between the Egyptian military and the Muslim Brotherhood, the options are less clear than simply meting out one-sided punitive measures. The dynamics of the situation on the ground in Egypt mostly will determine the outcome, but still the US must join with the rest of the international community in trying to convince the Egyptian military that attempts to violently quell pro-Morsi supporters are self-defeating.
Since the early years of President Hosni Mubarak’s tenure, US aid to Egypt has declined in both real terms and as a percentage of Egypt’s annual budget. It was once as high as $3 billion; now it amounts to only $1.3 billion in military assistance. Already the Obama Administration has halted the delivery of four F-16 fighter aircraft and, yesterday, cancelled the joint US-Egyptian bi-annual “Bright Star” military exercises. Neither measure, however, will have much of an adverse impact on the Egyptian military — especially the ability of the military and police to use force to end demonstrations and sit-ins that had disrupted a return to some measure of order and normalcy.
In fact, $1.3 billion amounts to only a little over one-tenth the aid Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait have pumped into Egypt since Mr. Morsi’s ouster. Indeed, should the US take its $1.3 billion off the table, Saudi Arabia and other wealthy Gulf Arab governments (more worried about the threat from the Muslim Brotherhood than al-Sisi’s behavior) could more than compensate the Egyptian government.
Also, the policies of most US regional allies, whether in a position to materially assist Egypt’s current government or not, are hostile toward the Brotherhood. And none of these governments are themselves democratic. The sole exception in the region, in both respects, is moderate Islamist NATO-ally, Turkey.
It is difficult to gauge accurately the overall reaction of most Egyptians to the events of the past 24 hours. Within the population there is so much polarization and mistrust that many of the millions who took to the streets to push the military into taking action against President Morsi have mixed feelings. Indeed, among many Christians, liberals and relatively secular Egyptians, Muslim Brotherhood attacks upon or the torching of 20 to 30 Coptic Christian churches during August 14-15 could be more chilling than the terrible loss of life in the streets at the hands of the security forces. Even the statement made by resigning liberal vice president Mohamed ElBaradei yesterday seemed to focus almost as much on his concern that “the beneficiaries” of the military crackdown are “those who call for…terrorism and the most extreme groups” as the bloodshed itself.
Al-Sisi would have been wise to have tolerated ongoing Brotherhood demonstrations and gone about the business of arranging a return to civilian rule on schedule. Instead, the military-dominated interim government has shown imprudence, impatience and a dangerous penchant for ultimately self-destructive bouts of violent intimidation driven by its frustration over sit-ins disrupting a number of Egyptian urban centers.
There are extremist elements within the Brotherhood probably hoping to goad the military into just such bloody shows of force in order to sully the government, score points on the international scene and inflame their own ranks — as has now happened. Sensing this, French foreign minister Laurent Fabius today urged Egyptian authorities to exercise “maximum restraint” lest “extremist groups take advantage of the situation.”
By late Thursday, however, many Brotherhood demonstrators already were chanting: “End to peace,” so more violence is likely during the Brotherhood’s “Friday of Anger” today as masses of pro-Brotherhood protestors move toward and fill the planned demonstration site at Cairo’s Ramses Square. The authorities appear ready to use gunfire if there are more attacks on government buildings (quite possibly including the city’s main railway station adjacent to that square).
And with the Brotherhood now in a vengeful mood, a dangerous pattern of cyclical violence could set in. If such a situation takes hold with round after round of tit for tat violence, neither the US and the West nor the UN would likely be able to have much success in bringing matters back under control anytime soon. Hopefully, it is not already too late to avoid such a self-perpetuating scenario.
Thus it is urgent that Washington and other governments use whatever limited clout they still have with the Egyptian military to hammer home the message that lashing out only will provoke the Muslim Brotherhood to respond likewise. Convincing al-Sisi and other senior officers that they are acting against their own best interests is more important than high-profile gestures of disapproval that have far more resonance with domestic audiences back home than in the halls of government or the streets of Egypt.
Photo Credit: Credit: Khaled Moussa al-Omrani/IPS.
]]>The military’s removal of democratically elected President Mohamed Morsi poses a serious challenge to Washington’s pro-democracy agenda and its ability to influence events in Egypt and the rest of the region.
The Barack Obama administration should make it clear to Egyptian Secretary of Defence [...]]]>
The military’s removal of democratically elected President Mohamed Morsi poses a serious challenge to Washington’s pro-democracy agenda and its ability to influence events in Egypt and the rest of the region.
The Barack Obama administration should make it clear to Egyptian Secretary of Defence Abdel Fattah al-Sisi the coup cannot stand, and Egypt’s unsteady march toward democracy should continue.
Although senior religious and opposition leaders were present on the stage, General al-Sisi’s military action to depose Morsi, suspend the constitution, and appoint an acting president was a major blow to the January 2011 revolution.
Toppling Morsi by the military in the name of national security makes a mockery of the principles of freedom, justice, and the rule of law for which millions demonstrated 30 months ago.
It is deeply disturbing that many within the Egyptian opposition who fought against the Mubarak regime are now welcoming the military’s intervention.
Long gas lines, high unemployment, exorbitant food prices, and pervasive corruption might explain people’s anger, but do the millions of protesters who called for Morsi’s head expect the post-Morsi government to solve these problems within a year or two? What will the new civilian government do about the military’s massive control of the economy and their opaque “black box” budget?
Al-Sisi’s brazen “in your face” action speaks volumes of perceived, and some say actual, U.S. impotence in the region. His temerity was largely driven by Washington’s timidity to prevent a coup or to denounce it after it happened.
Because of U.S. strategic interests in the region, its ongoing concerns about Syria, Iran, and the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement, and Egypt’s pivotal role in the region, Washington cannot abandon Cairo. The Egyptian military, however, must be made to understand this is a two-way street.
It’s time for U.S. policymakers to act boldly and decisively in support of democratic transitions and in opposition to reprehensible human rights violations across the region. They should stand firm against Arab militaries’ ever-present temptation to usurp the political process in Egypt and elsewhere.
Morsi inherited a dictatorial, military top-heavy, corrupt regime and a stalled economy. Several groups and centres of power in Egyptian society – including the military, the police, remnants of the old regime, secularists, and radical Salafis – opposed his election and refused to be governed by a Muslim Brotherhood man. They were bent on defeating him and brought out millions in the streets to do just that.
Ironically, this is not dissimilar to how some U.S. politicians have felt about President Obama’s election. Those who were bent on defeating President Obama have used the courts, state legislatures, the Republican controlled Congress, and the ballot box to advance their agenda.
Egyptian oppositionists, by contrast, have gone to the streets despite their seeming initial acceptance of the results of the election.
Yet, incompetence, insensitivity toward minorities and other groups that do not share the Muslim Brotherhood ideology, reticence to consult with his cabinet, and an inability to revive the economy marred Morsi’s one-year tenure.
When he came to office, Morsi promised to be president of all of Egypt. He failed to deliver. As a majority in the parliament, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood showed no inclination to form alliances with other parties and groups.
While he halted the downward spiral of the economy and successfully sought international loans, the daily life of the average Egyptian has gotten much worse. In the past year, Egyptians have suffered from a lack of personal security and high unemployment.
Egyptian women under the new regime have been subjected to widespread personal attacks, sexual abuse, and humiliation. Morsi and his government failed to combat the pervasive terror against women meaningfully and convincingly.
Lawlessness and joblessness are rampant. Thuggery and fear have replaced civility and hope.
Let’s be clear. These conditions and Morsi’s demise resulted from the failure of a particular Islamic party in power and a particular leader. They do not signal the defeat of Arab democracy or a failure of political Islam.
Rachid Ghannouchi and al-Nahda, by contrast, have successfully created an inclusive, tolerant, and workable political governing model in Tunisia.
Washington should actively encourage the Egyptian military to take several immediate steps. First, urge the newly appointed Acting President Adly Mansour to form a national unity government and set a date certain for parliamentary and presidential elections within six months.
Second, in light of President Obama’s recent statements, urge the military to free Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood and other top leaders, who have been detained in the past few days. These leaders should not be tried on trumped-up charges or for political vendettas.
Third, urge the Egyptian military to allow the acting president a free hand to establish civilian rule and for the military to return to the barracks.
Fourth, urge the acting president to proceed with national reconciliation by including representatives from all political parties and civil society organisations. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Freedom and Justice party, of course, should be included.
These steps do not necessarily guarantee saving Egypt from total collapse or preventing a possible civil war. They do offer, however, a civilian-managed “roadmap,” that could be embraced by all Egyptians.
Washington should be clear: Al-Sisi should know the era of military dictatorship in the Arab world has run its course. Such excuses as “foreign armed groups,” “Shia terrorism,” and now “Muslim Brotherhood plots” to justify a military takeover are stale and no longer believable.
If al-Sisi and his generals doubt that, let them take another look at Tahrir Square.
Photo U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton meets with Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi in New York, New York on September 24, 2012.
]]>via IPS News
It’s no wonder that Egypt has floundered in its efforts to create a more democratic system from the ruins of the Mubarak regime.
A sweeping new history of Middle Eastern political activists shows that the search for justice has deep roots in the region but has often been thwarted [...]]]>
via IPS News
It’s no wonder that Egypt has floundered in its efforts to create a more democratic system from the ruins of the Mubarak regime.
A sweeping new history of Middle Eastern political activists shows that the search for justice has deep roots in the region but has often been thwarted by the intervention of foreign powers.
The Arab Spring revolts of 2011 were “both improbable and long in the making,” writes Elizabeth Thompson in her book, “Justice Interrupted: The Struggle for Constitutional Government in the Middle East.”
The young people who massed in Tahrir Square and overturned the U.S.-backed Mubarak dictatorship were the heirs of Col. Ahmad Urabi, whose peasant army was crushed in 1882 by British troops. The beneficiaries of 2011 so far, however, are the heirs of Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, whose concept of “justice” appears to restrict the rights of women, religious minorities and secular groups.
On Tuesday, President Mohamed Morsi’s own legal adviser resigned to protest a law that would force the retirement of more than 3,000 judges – Mubarak appointees that have sought to blunt the rising influence of Islamist politicians such as Morsi. The United States, while criticising human rights abuses under the new regime, appears to be placing a higher priority on Egypt maintaining its peace treaty with Israel.
If, as President Barack Obama likes to say – quoting Martin Luther King – “the arc of history bends toward justice” – in the Middle East, that arc has been exceedingly long.
The breakup of the Ottoman Empire after World War I interrupted movements for constitutional government and tainted liberalism by association with Western colonialism. Military autocrats, nationalists and Islamic groups took their place.
Thompson, a professor of Middle Eastern history at the University of Virginia, structures her book by compiling mini-biographies of strivers for justice beginning with an early Ottoman bureaucrat, Mustafa Ali, who wrote a critique of corruption in Egypt, and ending with Wael Ghonim.
Ghonim, a Google executive, created a Facebook page devoted to a young Egyptian beaten to death in 2010 by police that attracted 300,000 followers – many of whom later gathered in Tahrir Square.
Others profiled in the book include Halide Edib, known as Turkey’s “Joan of Arc,” who first supported, then opposed Kemal Ataturk’s dictatorship; Yusuf Salman Yusuf or “Comrade Fahd,” whose Iraqi Communist Party was the largest and most inclusive political movement in modern Iraqi history; and Ali Shariati, the Iranian Islamic Socialist whose ideals were hijacked by the clerical regime after the 1979 revolution.
At a book launch Tuesday at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Thompson was asked by IPS if her book was largely a “history of losers” and whether there was any way to break the dismal cycle of one step forward, two steps back toward effective, representative government in the Middle East.
She compared recent revolts in the region to the 1848 revolutions in Europe that failed at the time but were key precursors of democratic movements to follow.
“You have to think long term,” she said. The optimistic interpretation of the Arab Spring is that it has led to “a fundamental shift in the political culture that will bear fruit decades later.”
She conceded that the current picture in Egypt is not a happy one.
Women, who in 2011 figured prominently in the overthrow of Mubarak, are now afraid to go to Tahrir Square for fear of being molested by thugs. Morsi, the president who hails from the Muslim Brotherhood, “is in a defensive posture,” Thompson said, “playing to the Salafist right.” Meanwhile, “the poor and the Copts are losing out.”
However, the Egyptian press has never been so free and Middle Easterners in general are more exposed to information than at any time in their history, she said. “People are not sealed off like they were in Syria in 1989” when state-run media omitted news that the Berlin Wall had fallen, she said.
Still, time and again in the last 150 years, the desire for security and independence from foreign powers has trumped liberal conceptions of human rights.
Thompson’s book contains many tantalising “What ifs” often linked to foreign machinations.
What if France had permitted Syria to retain an independent constitutional monarchy under King Feisal after World War I? French troops instead occupied the country under an internationally blessed mandate that lasted until after World War II.
What if Akram al-Hourani, leader of the Arab Socialist Party in Syria after independence, had not agreed to union with Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt in 1958? Nasser proceeded to outlaw Syrian political parties and in 1963, the Baath party staged a coup and installed a regime that is fighting for its existence today.
The book also sheds light on important figures such as the Palestinian Salah Khalaf, Yasser Arafat’s number two who was known as Abu Iyad. Assassinated in 1991 by the rejectionist Abu Nidal faction, Iyad had made the transition from terrorist mastermind to supporter of the two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. Arafat, who used to rely on Khalaf’s advice, might have steered his movement more wisely in his later years if he had not lost Abu Iyad as well as PLO military commander, Abu Jihad, who was killed by Israelis in 1988.
If, as Thompson concludes, the Arab Spring “has reprised the struggle interrupted by the World Wars and the Cold War,” it is a struggle that is still far from being won.
Photo: Protests across Egypt have not brought a right to information. Credit: Khaled Moussa al-Omrani.
]]>As the Arab Spring turns two, job creation offers the key promise of success in post-autocratic societies. While other important lessons could be gleaned from the unprecedented Arab upheavals, economic growth is the most shining one. Unless Washington and other Western capitals understand the criticality of the economic factor and assist [...]]]>
As the Arab Spring turns two, job creation offers the key promise of success in post-autocratic societies. While other important lessons could be gleaned from the unprecedented Arab upheavals, economic growth is the most shining one. Unless Washington and other Western capitals understand the criticality of the economic factor and assist in fostering an entrepreneurial environment in these societies, the lofty promise of the Arab Spring will quickly dissipate.
Job creation and economic growth are the litmus test of the success or failure of the Arab Spring. The economies of Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, and Libya have not rebounded from the upheavals of 2011. The new governments remain bogged down in domestic political tumult and endless debates over the role of Islam in governance. They have yet to provide a hospitable environment for entrepreneurship and innovative start-up initiatives.
Democratic governance will not succeed until the new governments are able to provide jobs to their young job seekers. Arab societies will prosper when the youthful generation, men and women, believe they can attain a hopeful economic future. Political dignity cannot be sustained if the economy remains anemic with high unemployment rates among youth.
Last year the World Economic Forum judged the Middle East North Africa region would need to create 75 million jobs in the next decade just to keep employment with current levels. The private sector, not government, is the primary engine that could attain such an ambitious goal.
New enterprises will not grow if archaic statist laws in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen remain inhospitable to free market enterprises and continue to shackle potential investors. Young entrepreneurs who are willing to take risks in harnessing innovative technologies to start new businesses must have the freedom to explore regional and international avenues in search of capital for their projects without oppressive state interference in their activities and foreign connections.
According to the World Bank, job creation opportunities exist in many fields including transportation, restaurants, health care services, energy and water, commerce, care giving and childcare, printing and publishing, and consumer goods manufacturing.
The good news is that the failure rate of new start-ups in Arab countries in the past half-decade has been relatively small. What is particularly encouraging is that women now own and manage numerous enterprises in the region, ranging from traditional textiles to manufacturing. Maintaining this trend requires a new relationship between the state and the citizenry. Government accountability, transparency, and freedom to do business should underpin the new social contract as post-autocratic societies transition to democracy and private enterprise.
The entrepreneurial environment in the Arab world is currently ripe for growth and expansion. Technology, passion, and people power are driving youthful enterprises in all kinds of fields. Wael Ghoneim, the famed Egyptian Google executive who played a pivotal role in mobilizing for Tahrir Square in January 2011, said the newly acquired freedom to “imagine, dream, and innovate” was at the heart of the rising entrepreneurial spirit among the youth in the Arab world.
A fundamental challenge facing the new governments in the next five years, however, would be to dissuade bright, creative, entrepreneurial Middle Eastern youth from leaving their countries and seeking opportunities in Europe, North America, Australia, and other developed countries. A serious brain drain will be detrimental to the economies of the Arab world.
Economic resurgence offers the West numerous opportunities as well. Enterprising Arab youth have begun to explore new start-up opportunities, which require capital, investment risk taking, freedom from state control, and opportunities to travel abroad.
Western governments will be well advised to maintain a small footprint in domestic Arab economic development. Economic linkages, however, could be done through engaging credible, indigenous civil society and business organizations. Examples of these organizations include Abraaj Capital, ArabNet, and WAMDA. Young Arab entrepreneurs know very well that if they want to dream and create, they will have to connect with their counterparts in the US and other Western countries.
As we move beyond the second anniversary of the Arab Spring, Washington’s long-term relations with the region could become grounded in new concepts of stability and security that are defined by the private sector and entrepreneurial communities of interest. Policy and intelligence analysts should deepen their expertise in the domestic dynamics in new Arab societies. Relying solely on old analytic assumptions often misses the boat, as the failure to anticipate the Arab Spring has shown.
Photo: Passengers wait to board a train at Sadat Station in Cairo, Egypt. Credit: Asim Bharwani/Flickr
]]>By Gary Sick
Michelle Moghtader of CNN has collected a set of reasons why Iran is not experiencing the same kind of turmoil as are other countries in the Middle East. The commentators she quotes are expert, and their reasons are sensible.
Basically, they [...]]]>
By Gary Sick
Michelle Moghtader of CNN has collected a set of reasons why Iran is not experiencing the same kind of turmoil as are other countries in the Middle East. The commentators she quotes are expert, and their reasons are sensible.
Basically, they say, Iran has recently had a revolution and is reluctant to repeat the experience; it already had its own full-blown revolt in 2009 that was brutally suppressed, with most of its leaders still imprisoned; the Iranian leadership has been able to maintain its coherence in the face of opposition; and the regime benefits from having been in radical opposition to the West for many years; among other things.
I generally agree, but I would add that the regime has maintained absolute unity with the security forces, specifically the Revolutionary Guards and the Basij, unlike Egypt and Tunisia and Yemen where the military split away from the leadership.
Bahrain and Syria are cases of unity between leaders and the military, and they also are not collapsing at the first push. However, if popular opposition continues on a large scale (as in Syria), the military may tire of shooting their fellow citizens and begin to put some space between themselves and a murderous regime. There are some small signs that that is beginning to happen in Syria.
Wael Ghonim, the Egyptian dissident who was one of the leaders of the Tahrir Square rebellion, tells CNN that the 2009 uprising in Iran was inspiring and instructive to the Egyptian protesters. Perhaps before this is over we are going to go full circle.
Will the Iranian Green Movement, which has gone underground almost to the point of invisibility, take heart from what is happening in the rest of the Middle East and come back for a second round? That is not an impossibility, particularly since the Iranian elite is in the midst of its own internal battle for control.
Syria may be the key for Iran. Not only is it the channel for Iran to maintain its strategic political and military relationship with Hezbollah in Lebanon, but it is also a possible template for Iranian domestic turmoil. If mass popular demonstrations eventually prove able to overthrow a crypto-Shiite (Allawi) political-military dictatorship in Syria, that will inevitably play back into Iranian internal politics.
Basically, in Syria as in Iran, the rulers have no alternative to complete control. If they slip, they know they will face not only overthrow but potentially much worse. They know what happened to their defeated opponents in the 1979 revolution, and there is no reason to expect that their own treatment would be any more lenient.
As Samuel Johnson famously noted, the prospect of being hanged focuses the mind wonderfully. That is what holds together the Syrian and Iranian leadership. And that is the obstacle that must be overcome if there is to be real change.
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