by Shireen T. Hunter
The beleaguered Prime Minister of Iraq, Nouri al-Maliki, is the latest in the long list of the West’s favorite political leaders turned into pariahs. The conventional wisdom now is that Maliki’s flaws and wrong policies, especially his alienation of the Sunnis and dictatorial style of governance, are at [...]]]>
by Shireen T. Hunter
The beleaguered Prime Minister of Iraq, Nouri al-Maliki, is the latest in the long list of the West’s favorite political leaders turned into pariahs. The conventional wisdom now is that Maliki’s flaws and wrong policies, especially his alienation of the Sunnis and dictatorial style of governance, are at the root of Iraq’s problems, including its latest troubles with extremist Islamic militants.
Clearly, Maliki has not been a successful prime minister. Yet have his very real and assumed flaws been the only, or even the main, cause of Iraq’s problems today? Could a different person have done a better job? Or have the real culprits been structural problems, Iraq’s long and more recent history, and the policies of regional and international actors? A further question: are the grievances of Iraq’s Sunnis solely attributable to the Shias’ desire to monopolize power? What about the Sunnis’ inability to come to terms with any type of government in which the Shias have a real rather than ceremonial function?
These questions are by no means posed to minimize or underestimate the impact of the current leadership’s mismanagement and mistakes, or the corrosive influence of dissension within Shia ranks among the supporters of Maliki, the Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, and Ammar al-Hakim, the head of the Islamic Council of Iraq. But if viewed impartially, the weight of evidence shows that other factors have played more substantial roles in causing Iraq’s previous problems and the latest crisis than Maliki’s incompetence and dictatorial tendencies.
The most significant factor behind Iraq’s problems has been the inability of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs and its Sunni neighbors to come to terms with a government in which the Shias, by virtue of their considerable majority in Iraq’s population, hold the leading role. This inability was displayed early on, when Iraq’s Sunnis refused to take part in Iraq’s first parliamentary elections, and resorted to insurgency almost immediately after the US invasion and fall of Saddam Hussein. All along, the goal of Iraqi Sunnis has been to prove that the Shias are not capable of governing Iraq. Indeed, Iraq’s Sunni deputy prime minister, Osama al Najafi, recently verbalized this view. The Sunnis see political leadership and governance to be their birthright and resent the Shia interlopers.
The Sunnis’ psychological difficulty in accepting a mostly Shia government is understandable. After ruling the country for centuries, both under the Ottomans and after independence, and after oppressing the Shias and viewing them as heretics and dregs of society, the Sunnis find Shia rule to sit heavily on them. It is thus difficult to imagine what any Shia prime minister could have done — or could now do — to satisfy the Sunnis. For example, during the early years after Saddam’s fall, once they had realized their mistake of abstaining from politics, the Sunnis made unreasonable demands as the price of cooperation, such as taking the defense portfolio. Yet considering what the Shias had suffered under Saddam, there was no possibility that they could agree.
Iraq’s Sunni Arabs have not been alone in undermining the authority of the country’s Shia leadership. Masood Barzani, who dreams of an independent Kurdistan, has also done what he can to undermine the authority of the government in Baghdad, by essentially running his own economic, oil, and foreign policies. A factor in Barzani’s attitude has been his anti-Iran sentiments, which go back to the troubles that his father, Mulla Mustafa Barzani, had with the Shah.
Iraq’s Sunni neighbors, notably Saudi Arabia and Turkey, but also Qatar, also cannot countenance a Shia government in Baghdad. In addition to the anti-Shia impact of the Wahhabi creed that is dominant in Saudi Arabia and among the Qatari leadership, this Sunni animosity has derived from the perception that a Shia government in Iraq would change the balance of regional power in Iran’s favor. Yet Maliki is the least pro-Iranian of Iraq’s Shia leaders, with the possible exception of the now-notorious Ahmad Chalabi. During Saddam’s time, Maliki belonged to the Dawa party, a rival of Iraq’s Islamic Revolutionary Council that was supported by Iran, and he spent more time in Syria than in Iran. This is one reason why the US preferred Maliki to personalities like Ibrahim Jafari.
Moreover, Maliki tried to reach out to Turkey and to other Arab states, including Saudi Arabia. But Turkey snubbed him and supported his rival, Tariq al-Hashimi. The Arab states have also shunned him. Under these circumstances, Maliki had no choice but to move closer to Iran. Yet the idea that he has thus become an Iranian pawn is a myth with no foundation in reality. Even now, Iraq has not reestablished the Algiers Agreement of 1975 that regularized Iraqi-Iranian border disputes, an agreement which, before attacking Kuwait in 1990, Saddam had accepted. Iraq has not signed a peace treaty with Iran and competes with it in courting clients for oil exports. Iraq also has more extensive trade relations with Turkey than with Iran.
In short, by exaggerating the sectarian factor, Iraq’s Sunni neighbors have exacerbated Shia fears and made it more difficult for them to pursue a more inclusive policy vis-à-vis the Sunnis. Further, most killings in Iraq have been in Shia areas, undertaken by Sunni extremists of various kinds who are funded by Sunni governments in the region. The plight of the Shias has also not been limited to Iraq. Similar mistreatment in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan has gone unnoticed by the West, while the exclusion of Iraq’s Sunnis from leadership posts in Baghdad has been blown out of proportion. Western and especially US dislike of Iran has been a major cause for the disregarding of mass killings and assassination of Shias.
America’s conflicting policy objectives in the region have also led it to pursue policies in Iraq that have contributed to current US dilemmas. The most glaring example was the US courting of Sunni insurgents and tribal leaders, both of which were thus emboldened to commit acts such as attacking the Shia shrines in Samara in 2006 and frightening the Shias that America would again betray them as it did at the end of the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Wanting to isolate Iran and perhaps to bring about regime change there, the US has also done virtually nothing to reign in the Saudis and others, including Turkey and Qatar, to prevent them from funding Sunni insurgents. Instead, Washington has blamed Iraqi unrest solely on Iranian meddling. Even today, there is no acknowledgement by the United States that the Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL or ISIS) cannot achieve what it has been doing without outside help.
At an even more fundamental level, America’s efforts to achieve too many contradictory and incompatible goals have been at the root of Iraq’s crisis. To date, it has proved to be difficult — indeed impossible — to eliminate Saddam but produce a stable Iraq; to isolate Iran and possibly change its regime; to get rid of Assad in Syria without exacerbating its civil war; to forge a Sunni-Israeli alliance against Shia Iran; and to convince other Shias throughout the region to continue playing second fiddle to the Sunnis.
To summarize, Nouri al-Maliki is certainly flawed and has made many mistakes. But the real culprits have been Iraq’s considerable fault lines, contradictory policies pursued by the West, and the predatory approach of Iraq’s neighbors. Thus even if Maliki is removed from office, Iraq’s situation will not improve unless these fault lines are dealt with and the policies pursued by outside states in Iraq are remedied. Rather, the situation will get much worse because the Shias are most unlikely to once again accept living under a regime that can be characterized as “Saddamism without Saddam” or, worse, what they would consider a Salafi-Takfiri government that considers them heathens deserving death.
This article was first published by LobeLog and was reprinted here with permission.
Photo: President Barack Obama greets Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in the Oval Office of the White House on July 22, 2009. Credit: White House/Pete Souza
]]>by Wayne White
Since 2005, Iraqis have voted in four parliamentary elections yearning for decisive positive change. In three of those elections, popular hope for more effective governance and a decline in violence were dashed with governments consumed by their ambitions and flawed policies. Indeed, elections often have seemed less important than [...]]]>
by Wayne White
Since 2005, Iraqis have voted in four parliamentary elections yearning for decisive positive change. In three of those elections, popular hope for more effective governance and a decline in violence were dashed with governments consumed by their ambitions and flawed policies. Indeed, elections often have seemed less important than the evolving situation on the ground. If current Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki succeeds, as expected, in securing a third term after last week’s election, more disappointment probably lies ahead.
Through the premierships of Iyad al-Alawi, Ibrahim al-Jafaari, and Maliki, Iraq’s senior leadership has included a large percentage of former exile opposition leaders along with prominent members of two long-standing Kurdish parties-cum-militias. This relative lack of turnover in terms of fresh political faces at the top has magnified the shortcomings of this narrow grouping.
The 2004 transition and a missed opportunity
Prior to the first election, a non-electoral political milestone giving Iraq its first post-occupation government triggered similar hope. In June 2004, the US-run Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) under J. Paul Bremer passed formal sovereignty to an Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) with Iyad Allawi as interim prime Minister. With the Sunni Arab insurgency raging at the time, many Iraqis hoped this step away from American control would weaken the insurgency.
At that time, high expectations also were palpable within the Bush administration. Yet, as the head of the State Department’s Iraq intelligence team, I warned such optimism was unfounded. In fact, the new Iraqi political line-up differed little from the Shi’a and Kurdish-dominated Iraqi Governing Council that had worked with Bremer. Such hopes were dashed as the insurgency raged on ever more ferociously.
One big opportunity did present itself in 2004. Many leading Sunni Arab tribal leaders and insurgent commanders sought a ceasefire with American forces (by far their premier foe). Although promising to cease attacks against US and Iraqi targets and cooperate with US forces in countering a burgeoning al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), these leaders refused to recognize the IIG. Allawi, pressured by Washington, agreed to meet with the group. However, the IIG rejected the offer (despite otherwise being unable to end the insurgency).
Ironically, just over two years later, with ethno-sectarian violence soaring out of control, the US (despite opposition from another Iraqi prime minister) accepted the same deal unilaterally. Thus, the so-called Sunni Arab “Awakening” would be born, reducing violence substantially, but too late to save the tens of thousands who died during two intervening years of bloody fighting.
The first 2005 Iraqi Election
The next political way station toward what was hoped would be a measure of normalcy was the January 2005 election of an Iraqi National Assembly to name a prime minister and oversee the preparation of a permanent constitution. Iraqi voters went to the polls amidst an intense wave of hope.
Overall turnout was high, but polling in Sunni Arab areas was nil as most boycotted the vote. The bulk of employment in such areas had involved the military or Saddam Hussein-era government bureaucracy — disbanded by Bremer. Over a million Sunni Arabs had been members of the ruling Ba’th Party; Bremer banned such individuals from future employment. Unemployment was high and disaffection from the new Shi’a/Kurdish order intense. Seeing no real stake in the elections, many Sunni Arabs continued to support the insurgency.
Shortly after the election, the Bush administration requested that the heads of all major US intelligence agencies, plus British civilian and military intelligence arms, meet at CIA, along with one expert each, to sort out the bottom line. It clearly hoped for good news. Instead, I led off for the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence & Research, pointing out the grim, unchanged dynamic on the ground. All present agreed.
As the Intelligence Community believed, in terms of fundamentals driving violence, the election had changed nothing. Once elected, the new National Assembly took two months to agree on a Prime Minister (Ibrahim al-Jaafari). Even though the constitution was completed later that year, setting the stage for the first election of a permanent parliament, insurgent and AQI terrorist violence continued unabated.
The second 2005 parliamentary vote
As with the election at the beginning of the year, the December 2005 vote for the Council of Representatives (COR) brought forth another wave of hope.
Still, the constitutional referendum preceding it had underscored the glaring sectarian divide that fueled the insurgency. In the Sunni Arab majority governorates of Salah ad Din, al-Anbar, and Ninawa, the constitution was opposed by 82%, 97% and 55% of voters (a rough reflection of the percentages of Sunni Arabs in those jurisdictions).
The results of the December parliamentary election showed far higher Sunni Arab participation, but were accompanied by Sunni Arab and secular Shi’a anger over allegations of fraud favoring Shi’a religious parties. The field of political lists was little changed from January. This time around, six months of bickering ensued before Nuri al-Maliki emerged as a compromise prime minister in April 2006.
Between two elections: 2005-2010
In February 2006, with the bombing of a revered Shi’a mosque shrine, violence spiked massively. Shi’a militias like firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s “Mahdi Army” retaliated against Sunni Arabs, especially in Baghdad. “Sectarian cleansing” of much of the capital raged out of control; over a million Sunni Arabs fled westward for safety. This maelstrom also heavily damaged Iraq’s Christian community.
In late 2006, a desperate Bush administration finally decided to accept the deal in which Sunni Arab insurgents would cease attacks on US forces and fight alongside US Army and Marine units against AQI. Although by mid-2007, tens of thousands of insurgents had switched sides, Maliki & his mainly Shi’a supporters opposed the deal. Only in late 2008, under sustained US pressure and following considerable success involving Sunni Arab “Awakening” cadres, did Maliki reluctantly accept the arrangement, albeit only partially.
Also in 2008, with Sunni Arab resistance much reduced, Maliki, with US assistance, was able to address rampaging Shi’a militias — especially those controlled by Sadr. Badly beaten in southern Iraq and Baghdad, Sadr agreed to disarm most of his forces. During 2006-2008, however, the majority of the Sunni Arab population had been driven from the capital. By that point, many Sunni Arabs once hostile toward US forces had come to view US troops as their only reliable protection from Shi’a militias and rogue elements of the Iraqi security forces.
Nonetheless, according to the 2008 US-Iraqi Status of Forces Agreement, US troops withdrew to their bases in June 2009. At that point, insurgent, AQI and militia violence was the lowest since the 2003 invasion.
The 2010 parliamentary campaign and vote
In the lead-up to the March 2010 vote, Maliki seized upon the polarizing de-Ba’thification issue to firm up his electoral support within his Shi’a base. In the run-up to these elections, US Embassy cables from early 2010 say Maliki “directed the removal” of large numbers of “some of the highest quality personnel” from Iraq’s security organizations over links to the Ba’th Party as part of his “political gamesmanship.”
Almost 500 Sunni Arab (many secular or liberal) parliamentary candidates were also disqualified by an “Independent High Election Commission” stacked with Shi’a. Even Kurdish Iraqi President Jalal Talabani urged Maliki not to be “unjust” to candidates. However, few of the bans were reversed.
Sunni Arabs still voted hoping a new alliance under the secular Iyad Allawi might unseat Maliki. Even with the deck stacked in favor of Shi’a religious parties, Sunni Arab participation was far higher than in 2005, and Allawi scored well. Nonetheless, after 8 months of maneuvering, Maliki again was named prime minister in late 2010.
Years of retrenchment
Back in business, Maliki redoubled his efforts to amass personal power and marginalize the Sunni Arab community. He placed some crack Iraqi army units and police elements under his own control. He also employed unofficial security forces for extra-judicial skullduggery. This included attacks against local Sunni Arab leaders and the detention of prisoners in private holding pens.
Meanwhile, he hounded more Sunni Arabs out of key positions in government. In late 2011, for example, Maliki’s government charged Sunni Arab Iraqi Vice-President Tariq al-Hashimi with involvement in terrorism from “confessions” exacted from arrested bodyguards. Al-Hashimi fled to Iraqi Kurdistan in December 2011.
Maliki also dumped some of his commitments on Sunni Arab “Awakening” cadres (known as “Sahwas”). Promises to integrate them into Iraq’s security forces were only partly fulfilled. He even turned loosely trusted police units — and anonymous gunmen — against Sahwa leaders in some localities.
Since the US opposed this behavior, Maliki and his government dealt the US out of the Iraqi equation. Although a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) was concluded in late 2008 to keep a limited US troop presence in Iraq beyond the December 2011 withdrawal, Maliki’s government ultimately ruled out the retention of US bases in Iraq. Soon after, Maliki also rejected judicial immunity for any US troops and military advisors left behind. Thus the Obama administration had little choice but to withdraw completely (clearly Maliki’s goal: to free himself from American oversight).
Maliki’s face-offs with his Kurdish coalition allies led to the Kurdish refusal to turn over Tariq al-Hashimi. Disputes over oil export agreements and territory as well as the Kurdish Regional Government’s (KRG) concern over Maliki’s growing personal power also darkened the period between the 2010 and 2014 elections (despite Maliki’s agreement with the Kurds to do the opposite to secure their support for his candidacy in 2010).
Meanwhile, violence on the part of a rebounding AQI had been rising. This culminated in January 2014 with the seizure of the Sunni Arab city of Fallujah by elements of the extremist Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and local tribesmen. With Sunni Arab anger rising across northwestern Iraq because of grievances against Maliki, ISIL, like AQI, found a more favorable reception.
The 2014 election
Maliki has positioned himself to secure another term. Blaming his opponents for rising violence, Maliki made his familiar appeal for renewed unity after last month’s parliamentary election. With his reputation for sectarianism and duplicity, there is little chance he will change his spots. One could be more definitive in the negative, but Maliki’s inability to restore government control over Fallujah after 3 months of trying might force him to make at least some concessions to Iraq’s Sunni Arab community to weaken ISIL.
Plus ca change; plus ce le meme chose
For nearly 10 years since the transfer of sovereignty, Iraq has failed to evolve substantially toward an inclusive democracy, reduced sectarian tensions, a more diverse ruling elite, greater rule of law, and effective governance. Also, under Maliki there has been a drift toward authoritarianism.
In addition to the serious deficiencies described above, the Iraqi government remains largely dysfunctional in almost every sense: endemically corrupt, judicially partial, administratively inept, and non-transparent. Despite the day-to-day impact of such poor governance, it is somewhat surprising that many Iraqis have not become far more cynical toward their elections.
President Barack Obama recently praised “the Iraqi people” for voting again in their pursuit of a peaceful, unified and prosperous future. Perhaps the most baleful impact of Maliki’s sustained engagement in sectarian politics has been how it has prevented Iraq’s population from finding more common ground upon which to base a more coherent “Iraqi” popular identity, instead of one that is exclusively Shi’a, Kurdish, Sunni Arab, Turcoman, or Christian.
Photo: Guarded by a barbed wire fence, Iraqis line up to vote in the 2005 parliamentary election. Credit: American Forces Press Service
]]>by Wayne White
The Biblical quotation, “whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap” could not be more relevant to what Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s near unremitting hostility toward Iraq’s powerful Sunni Arab minority has generated: a rising drumfire of mostly Sunni Arab bombings aimed at Maliki’s Shi’a base as [...]]]>
by Wayne White
The Biblical quotation, “whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap” could not be more relevant to what Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s near unremitting hostility toward Iraq’s powerful Sunni Arab minority has generated: a rising drumfire of mostly Sunni Arab bombings aimed at Maliki’s Shi’a base as well as his regime. Yet, in the face of the awful toll such bloodshed has taken in past years, Iraq’s Shi’a policymakers have remained unmoved. So, for the most part, Maliki and Co. may well continue this dangerously divisive policy, making further unrest in Iraq likely. Yet, responding with some grand offer of sectarian reconciliation might find few takers at this point.
When the US agreed to allow Sunni Arab tribesmen and former insurgents to join with American forces against al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) back in late 2006 (the so-called “Sunni Arab Awakening”), Maliki opposed the arrangement bitterly. Indeed, through late 2007, Maliki not only spurned this major initiative, he even at times attempted to attack Sunni Arab combatants working with US forces employing elements of the Iraqi Army especially trusted by him.
Initially, Sunni Arabs involved in the “Awakening” did not want to work with the Iraqi government either, only the Americans (regarding Maliki and his Shi’a allies as hostile, pro-Iranian and untrustworthy). Eventually, however, the vast bulk of the Awakening cadres agreed to serve in the Iraqi security forces in an attempt to bury the hatchet with Baghdad. Most of Iraq’s equally war-weary Sunni Arab tribal leaders came to feel likewise. This represented a strategic opportunity to initiate a process of meaningful Sunni Arab re-integration, though gradual and on terms set by Washington and the Maliki government.
The US duly extracted assurances from Maliki by 2008 (albeit with difficulty) allowing a large number of Sunni Arab fighters to obtain mostly low-level, often localized positions in the security forces. Yet, as US forces left the scene, Maliki not only backed away from the full thrust of these commitments, but began to target Awakening leaders and even some of the rank and file for extrajudicial arrest and assassination.
Thousands of former insurgent cadres remained on the government payroll for years — some even today — but lots of others left or were hounded out of their jobs (caught between the very real threat of arrest — or worse — from government authorities and bloody revenge attacks from AQI). Meanwhile, many Sunni Arab parliamentary candidates became victims of the Shi’a-controlled and highly politicized “de-Ba’thification” commission (which excluded them from running for or ever holding government office).
Quite a few of the small number of Sunni Arab officials to secure senior government rank were then accused of abetting terrorism. Ultimately, the most prominent of them all, Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, was accused in December 2011 of running an anti-Shi’a hit squad. Hashimi fled first to Iraqi Kurdistan (even Iraq’s Kurds refused to turn him over to Maliki) and then to Ankara. In this way, from 2008 through 2013 (and counting), Maliki and his Shi’a allies not only threw away an opportunity to reduce violence dramatically. They also gave AQI a new lease on life as an unknown number of disaffected Sunni Arabs apparently turned a blind eye to AQI’s activities or even gave it sanctuary once again.
For months now, Sunni Arabs also have taken to the streets, holding demonstrations throughout areas where they predominate to protest their mistreatment at the hands of the Iraqi government. Feeding seething sectarian resentment was a heavy-handed attack by government security forces late last month on a Sunni Arab protest camp in a public square near the disputed northern city of Kirkuk in which 26 died.
Making matters still worse has been the mainly Sunni Arab uprising just across the border in Syria against the minority Alawite-led Assad regime. Perhaps the only Arab government not siding with the rebels is Iraq’s (aligned instead with the Syrian regime’s only regional ally: Iran). Even more provocative has been the stream of Syrian-bound Iranian resupply flights passing over Iraq with Maliki’s permission. In response to US protests against these over-flights, Maliki has had a few flights land for inspection (doubtless a clever ruse I observed before while serving in the Intelligence Community: the country conducting military over-flights secretly informs the government needing to inspect a few for the sake of appearances which flights contain no military contraband and thus would pass inspection).
Since the Syrian rebel al-Nusra front declared its affiliation with both al-Qaeda and AQI, Maliki promised to crack down on al-Nusra’s roots in Iraq’s Sunni Arab northwest. With Sunni Arab Iraqis now so profoundly suspicious of the government in Baghdad, others sympathizing with al-Nusra, AQI or both, and still others assisting them, any major operations inside Iraq aimed at al-Nusra almost certainly would either encounter resistance or waves of even heavier AQI retaliatory bombings against government and Shi’a targets.
In fact, with fellow Sunni Arabs defiant in neighboring Syria (and many tribes and families sharing close cross-border ties), more trouble for Maliki from within Iraq’s Sunni Arab community was inevitable for a leader who has supplied them with a host of grievances since 2008. Now Maliki finds himself in a serious bind: even if the Assad regime succeeds in rebounding substantially, its control over the vast expanse of eastern Syria would remain iffy (providing Iraq’s more restive Sunni Arabs a ready sanctuary and a possible source of munitions and recruits — many of them now combat veterans of the Syrian civil war).
If, however, Maliki tries to mend his ways and promises better treatment, a fair share of the government rebuilding cash, and a lot more political representation, the offer’s credibility could be nil. Such a gesture now could look more like a temporary sop tossed out under pressure than a genuine commitment to end the longstanding policies feeding the animosity between Iraq’s Sunni Arabs and Maliki’s increasingly autocratic, pro-Iranian, Shi’a-led government.
]]>