by Henry Precht

The starting point for understanding Egypt’s August 14th massacre is Black Friday — September 8, 1978 — during the Iranian Revolution.

On that day, 35 years ago, the Shah’s troops killed an untold number of demonstrators in Jaleh Square in south Tehran. Martial law had been declared the day [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Henry Precht

The starting point for understanding Egypt’s August 14th massacre is Black Friday — September 8, 1978 — during the Iranian Revolution.

On that day, 35 years ago, the Shah’s troops killed an untold number of demonstrators in Jaleh Square in south Tehran. Martial law had been declared the day before, but Iranians opposed to the Shah weren’t aware and filed into the square to be confronted by gunfire from soldiers. The government said that fewer than a hundred were killed; the opposition claimed over 1,000. The latter figure was believed by most Iranians.

The same calculus is true of the August 14 shootings in Cairo: the government reports some hundreds killed; its opponents claim thousands have been gunned down.

Few outsiders understood after Black Friday that a turning point had been reached in Ayatollah Khomeini’s struggle against the Shah. It was downhill for the ruler from then on. The Shah was at war with his people, it can be seen in retrospect; there was no way that he could prevail. The Carter Administration, like most outsiders, failed to grasp that. Focused on talks between Israelis and Egyptians at Camp David, the president, together with his Middle Eastern guests, issued a statement of support for the Shah and hope for his “liberalizing” promises.

Something of the same — support [for a return to democracy] and hope [for nonviolence] was President Barack Obama’s message after August 14. He recognizes that Egypt is sharply divided, the Muslim Brotherhood has close to a popular majority, the military have the guns and the US is distrusted and often despised by both sides. Treading carefully, he cancelled next month’s joint military exercise — perhaps aware that visiting American troops might be in danger of deadly attacks by extremists. But he left on the table for now the next tranche of military aid (over $1 billion) — perhaps aware that cancellation would be deeply offensive to nationalists and the blocked contract for F-16 aircraft a burden on the US budget.

Unwisely, he didn’t go far enough.

If Obama is to be true to American values, he should avoid hurting the Egyptian people, but support their aspirations for democracy and dignity. That means no sanctions against the country as a whole or the military as an institution. It does not mean that individual Egyptians responsible for the killings should be immune from US sanctions.

The president should ban any official US contact with General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, his appointed president, prime minister, minister of the interior and any other officials who can be deemed guilty of authorizing violence after the coup and in the subsequent crackdown. The president should call on them to withdraw in favor of a small and politically balanced committee formed by resigned vice president Mohamed ElBaradei (no friend of the US). This committee, in turn, Obama would suggest, would select three individuals — one from the Muslim Brotherhood, one from the military ranks and one distinguished, independent Egyptian — to form a governing triumvirate. Each of the three would be acceptable to the other political elements.

The US would try to enlist other outside powers — EU members, Turkey, Russia and the Arab League — in backing some such scheme. Together they would demand an end to violence by all parties and the release of political prisoners. President Mohamed Morsi, after a very brief return to office, would resign for the good of Egypt — encouraged by the US and other outsiders and, with luck, by some of his MB colleagues. The constitution and parliament would be restored pre-coup. In effect, August 14 would represent a reversal of the coup rather than the beginning of a civil war.

If a plan of reasonable compromise is not worked out very soon, the threat of prolonged sectarian and civil strife is very real. A point of no return is approaching. Every death on the streets creates new martyrs willing to sacrifice themselves. Think Lebanon, Iraq and Syria. Think Iran in 1978.

Photo Credit: Mohamed Azazy

A new report from Iran’s hawkish Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) suggests the Iranians may be more open to achieving a peaceful resolution to the dispute over their controversial nuclear program than ever before. ”With Obama’s reelection Tuesday, there is guarded hope in Tehran and Washington that a solution agreeable to [...]]]> via Lobe Log

A new report from Iran’s hawkish Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) suggests the Iranians may be more open to achieving a peaceful resolution to the dispute over their controversial nuclear program than ever before. ”With Obama’s reelection Tuesday, there is guarded hope in Tehran and Washington that a solution agreeable to all parties in the nuclear standoff might finally be possible”, writes Jason Rezaian in the Washington Post:

The findings in the report suggest that the ministry has a pragmatic understanding of the challenges the country faces, the cost it is paying for continuing uranium enrichment at current levels, the threat of Israeli aggression and, perhaps most important, a way out of the stalemate.

Although the statement refers to Israel as the “Zionist regime,” it is otherwise devoid of the ideological tone that characterizes most ministry reports and that has been the Iranian norm for decades. Instead, the arguments in the 1,200-word report reflect many of the views agreed on by international advocates of a negotiated solution, namely that the potential destruction caused by strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities would set back the program by only a few years at most and that diplomacy is a preferred way forward.

But according to Ali Vaez, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group, the Post may be reading too much into the report. ”While Iran’s MOIS report provides a sober analysis of the current standoff, it doesn’t imply a different approach from the strategy Iran has been pursuing during the past decade. All one needs to do is to read the conclusion,” he said.

The conclusion reveals that Iran’s leaders do not fear an attack on their nuclear program because of their belief in the supremacy of Iran’s attack deterrent and self-defense capabilities. It says that war can be avoided through diplomacy or “military preparedness”.

Meanwhile, the Obama administration is reportedly likely to engage the Iranian government in direct negotiations in what would be a last-ditch diplomatic effort to head off a military strike on its nuclear facilities in the coming months.

But as Iran scholar Farideh Farhi points out, the key to moving the diplomatic process forward and avoiding a military conflict is flexibility on both sides:

Unless Khamenei and company are given a way out of the mess they have taken Iran into (with some help from the US and company), chances are that we are heading into a war in the same way we headed to war in Iraq. A recent Foreign Affairs article by Ralf Ekeus, the former executive chairman of the UN special Commission on Iraq, and Malfrid-Braut hegghammer, is a good primer on how this could happen.

The reality is that the current sanctions regime does not constitute a stable situation. First, the instability (and instability is different from regime change as we are sadly learning in Syria) it might beget is a constant force for policy re-evaluation on all sides (other members of the P5+1 included). Second, maintaining sanctions require vigilance while egging on the sanctioned regime to become more risk-taking in trying to get around them. This is a formula for war and it will happen if a real effort at compromise is not made. Inflexibility will beget inflexibility.

via The Majalla

Recently, the Canadian government severed ties with Iran, citing threats to its diplomats in Tehran. While Israel has hailed the decision as a “clarion call to action”, few Canadian diplomats are convinced.

It is not too often that I find myself nodding in agreement with the rhetoric [...]]]> By Bryan Gibson

via The Majalla

Recently, the Canadian government severed ties with Iran, citing threats to its diplomats in Tehran. While Israel has hailed the decision as a “clarion call to action”, few Canadian diplomats are convinced.

It is not too often that I find myself nodding in agreement with the rhetoric being spouted by Iran’s Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Salehi. But on Monday, when Salehi decried Canada’s surprise decision on 7 September to sever diplomatic relations with Iran, describing Prime Minister Steven Harper’s government as “neo-conservative extremist[s]”, I could not agree more. Canada’s abrupt decision to sever relations with Iran has left myself and many others scratching their heads, asking why?
The Canadian government’s rationale for severing of relations with Iran was contained in a statement released by Canada’s Foreign Minister, John Baird, last Friday. It offers the following explanation for severing ties: “The Iranian regime is providing increasing military assistance to the [Syrian] regime; it refuses to comply with UN resolutions pertaining to its nuclear program; it routinely threatens the existence of Israel and engages in racist anti-Semitic rhetoric and incitement to genocide; it is among the world’s worst violators of human rights; and it shelters and materially supports terrorist groups”.

This statement is a bit confusing. While it is fair to criticize Iran for its support for Bashar al-Assad, its failure to adhere to UN resolutions on its nuclear program, its support for Hizbollah and Hamas, and its poor human rights record, I fail to see how Canada’s foreign policy has anything to do Iran’s rhetorical jousting with Israel. Even the Obama administration is trying to distance itself from Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s hysterical rhetoric about Iran. And since when has Iran incited anyone to commit genocide? There is simply no factual basis for this claim and underscores just how out of touch with reality the Harper government really is.

Another reason cited for the severing of ties is Iran’s “blatant disregard for the Vienna Convention and its guarantee of protection for diplomatic personnel…. Our diplomats serve Canada as civilians, and their safety is our number one priority.” Of course ensuring the safety of your diplomats is a priority, but when have our diplomats in Tehran ever been in danger?

Certainly, Ottawa has not had glowing relations with Tehran. Indeed, following Canada’s involvement in exfiltrating six American diplomats, including the U.S. Charge d’Affairs, Bruce Laingan, from Iran at the start of the Iranian hostage crisis in November 1979, Iran expelled Canadian diplomats for eight years. In 1991, Canada and Iran resumed diplomatic relations, but did not exchange ambassadors until 1996. This was all part of a policy that Canadian diplomats called “controlled engagement”, with the Liberal government of Jean Chretien believing that while some form of dialogue was necessary to express Canadian concerns over Iran’s deplorable human rights record, its nuclear program, and its opposition to the peace process. It also allowed Canadian diplomats to be on the ground. But Canadian-Iranian relations underwent a chill in 2003 when a Canadian photojournalist, Zahra Kazemi, was arrested and beaten to death while in custody. While Canada described the death as “state-sanctioned murder” and recalled its ambassador from Iran, it still maintained its embassy in Tehran, albeit with a small staff. It was not until 2007, when Tehran kicked out Canada’s ambassador, John Mundy, in retaliation for Ottawa’s rejection of two of its nominees for ambassador. Since then, Canada has maintained a small diplomatic team in Tehran. This sequence of events suggests that even though Canada and Iran have had a tumultuous relationship since reestablishing relations in 1988, through thick and thin, Canadian policymakers have consistently felt it wise to maintain the embassy in Tehran.

Part of the reason for this stems from the depth of Canada’s cultural ties to Iran. Next to the US, Canada has the largest expatriate Iranian community, with some 120,000 Canadians of Iranian ancestry and 400,000 Iranians living in Canada. But the severing of ties also makes it incredibly difficult for Canadians to travel to Iran and for those already inside Iran to receive consular services.

Now, imagine yourself under arrest in Iran, accused of spying for your country, and having been sentenced to death, when suddenly your country abandons you, leaving you with no help and no ties to your homeland or family. This is exactly the scenario of what has just happened to two Canadians, Hamid Ghassemi-Shall and Saeed Malekpour. Worse yet, the Harper government’s actions could potentially put these two at great risk, as the Iran’s leaders assess their retaliatory options. While Harper pledged that his government will continued “to aid our citizens [in Iran] in co-operation with our partners and allies in the democratic world,” that is simply not enough. The Harper government has recklessly abandoned two of its citizens.

On Saturday, I wrote a letter to the editor at the Globe and Mail, Canada’s leading national newspaper, to condemn the Harper government’s move. In my letter, I argued that Canada’s decision was based the Harper government’s “narrow-minded ideology and not a realpolitik calculation of national interests. Indeed, if it were the latter, Canadian diplomats would be allowed to continue observing and reporting on the internal dynamics of this incredibly important country.”

Since having my letter published, at least three former Canadian ambassadors, two of which were ambassador to Iran, have publicly questioned the Harper government’s move.

Writing in February after Harper made the bold claim that Iran would have “no hesitation” about using nuclear weapons, Canada’s last full ambassador to Iran, John Mundy, who was expelled in 2007, expressed his concern about the direction Canada’s Iran policy was taking. “This is the first time in decades that a Canadian prime minister, Liberal or Conservative, appears to be advocating approaches that reduce diplomatic opportunities for peace during an international crisis.” After the news broke on Friday, Mundy described the move as “a grave step” and warned that it cannot “easily be reversed.”

Former Canadian ambassador to Iran, Kenneth Taylor, who famously played a role in the “Canadian Caper”, which saw Canadian officials help the CIA smuggle six American diplomats that had escaped the US embassy in 1979 during the Iranian hostage crisis, is also disturbed by the government’s decision. “I really can’t see the rationale of this move,” Taylor told Canada’s CTV News on Friday. “It’s a very bold stroke to sever diplomatic relations and close the embassy within five days.” And if Iran posed a threat to Canada, Taylor argued, it was actually more important to have officials on the ground who can “size up the situation and report from the spot” than the opposite.

This is exactly the position of Canada’s former ambassador to Spain, Daniel Moglat, who wrote in the Globe and Mail: “Canadian embassies, like the one just closed in Iran, exist to serve a number of purposes. One purpose is to speak for Canada, and to listen. When you close an embassy, you are closing your ears, shutting your eyes and covering your mouth.”

More recently, Mundy followed up his February Op-Ed with a new piece, published on Monday in the Globe and Mail, which argues: “Canada’s action reduces our presence on the ground in Iran to zero. We will no longer have the ability to communicate directly with Iran’s government in Iran. We will no longer have Canadian diplomats following political developments within the country and using their local contacts and knowledge to assess how Iranian policy towards the outside world might evolve. A new presidential election to replace President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is scheduled for 2013 and we won’t be there to talk to the various actors and pass back to other interested governments, particularly the United States, our assessment of the candidates. Lastly and very significantly, our diplomats will no longer be able to protect the rights of Canadian citizens in Iran.”

Taken together, it is hard not to make the following conclusions: the Canadian government’s decision to sever ties with Iran is based entirely on ideology, does not advance Canada’s national interests in any form, is completely reckless, and endangers the lives of its citizens, the very people it must protect at all costs. And for what? Beyond improving Canada’s image with Israel’s hardline leadership, which is equally reckless in its pursuit of war with Iran, not a single net benefit is to be gained by this fiasco. As I concluded in my letter, “In this time of growing uncertainty, we need people on the ground, lest we follow the same path the Americans took in 2003. This decision is perhaps one of the most ill-conceived ideas in modern history. At least when the Americans and British cut ties, they had good reason.”

- Bryan R. Gibson is a PhD candidate in International History at the London School of Economics and author of “Covert Relationship: American Foreign Policy, Intelligence and the Iran Iraq War”. He specializes in US foreign policy toward the Middle East, with particular emphasis on the Iran, Iraq, and the Kurds.

On 20 August Al-Monitor published a perceptive article about the upcoming Iranian three-year presidency of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM). The authors were Abbas Maleki, who was a deputy foreign minister of Iran for many years, and Kaveh Afrasiabi. One of the authors’ points was that any nuclear “missteps” by [...]]]> via Lobe Log

On 20 August Al-Monitor published a perceptive article about the upcoming Iranian three-year presidency of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM). The authors were Abbas Maleki, who was a deputy foreign minister of Iran for many years, and Kaveh Afrasiabi. One of the authors’ points was that any nuclear “missteps” by Iran would be seen by many of Iran’s NAM partners as a betrayal of trust. This is a shrewd observation.

I was serving in Vienna in 2003 when Iran’s nuclear safeguards violations over several years were reported to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) board of governors. NAM countries, with few exceptions, were not amused. They felt that Iran had let their side down.

This may surprise Western readers who are used to hearing it implied that the NAM is feckless and irresponsible (because it refuses to toe Washington’s line). But that image of the NAM can be misleading. In my experience, most NAM members take seriously their responsibilities as parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and value the moral high ground that compliance with the Treaty’s provisions confers.

Why? Not least because that moral high ground can be used to condemn some of the practices of the three western nuclear weapon states (NWS), which the NAM see as a bad lot: dragging their feet on nuclear disarmament; denying the non-nuclear weapon states the nuclear fuel cycle technology to which the NPT appears to entitle them, provided they place all their nuclear material under safeguards and refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons; and turning a blind eye to the nuclear threat posed by the greatest rogue state (to NAM eyes) in the Middle East: Israel.

So Iran’s three-year leadership of the movement is likely to be two-edged. Should any fresh Iranian non-compliance with its NPT safeguards obligations come to light during this period, the odds are that NAM members will once more put Iran under pressure to correct the failures and come back into compliance with its NPT obligations.

An interesting question is whether NAM members would also be ready, as in 2003, to press Iran to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing-related activities and to re-apply the IAEA’s additional protocol (providing enhanced assurances as to nuclear material remaining in non-weapons use).

On the one hand, NAM members are likely to take a second betrayal of trust by Iran even more badly than the first, given Iran’s representational role as leader of the movement, and given the frequency with which Iran has assured NAM partners that its nuclear activities are blameless and that it is the victim of a vendetta.

On the other hand, the NAM view of the three western NWS is even darker than it was in 2003. NAM members did not appreciate the 2004 Bush administration’s proposal to divide the nuclear world into “haves” and “have nots”, nor a consequent tightening of the guidelines observed by members of the nuclear suppliers group. All but India and its closest friends disliked the same US administration’s decision to make nuclear technology available to one of only three states that have refused to adhere to the NPT: India.

Many NAM members consider the sanctioning of Iran by the UN Security Council, at western NWS instigation, to have been disproportionate to Iran’s pre-2003 safeguards failures, and therefore unjust. They note only modest NWS movement towards nuclear disarmament (though the Obama administration’s record is a big improvement on the back-sliding of the Bush administration). They also deplore continuing Israeli refusal to countenance proposals for a Middle East nuclear weapon-free zone, which would complement such zones covering Latin America, Africa and much of the Asia/Pacific region.

Moreover, the battle between the West’s candidate to succeed Mohamed ElBaradei as director general of the IAEA and the NAM candidate was bitter and divisive, and won by the West’s candidate.

This is a long list. Nonetheless, my hunch is that NAM members would want to give Iran a hard time if credible evidence of current (not pre-dating 2003) non-compliance were to be laid before the IAEA board by a credible IAEA member state (not Israel, the political leadership of which is seen as unscrupulous, and possibly not the US, UK and France, none of whose reputations for integrity have prospered in recent years).

So fate may be handing the West the best opportunity in years to achieve renewed Iranian suspension and reapplication of the additional protocol. There’s a twist, though.

The trigger for NAM pressure on Iran would be credible evidence of a second Iranian betrayal of NAM trust. That same second betrayal of trust would deepen Iran’s confidence deficit with the rest of the world and would increase the number of Westerners – including me, I suspect – who would be convinced that Iran cannot be left in possession of enrichment technology, even with the best guarantees in place against diversion of nuclear material. A long-term settlement based on the NPT, at the end of a suspension during which the IAEA completes its additional protocol investigations, would probably turn out to be as elusive as ever. We still would not be out of the thickets into which the Islamic Republic’s insecurity has driven us.

Writes Barbara Slavin in her report for Al-Monitor from Tehran:

Beyond showcasing its victims and its right to nuclear energy, Iran hopes that the summit will prove that it has more friends than enemies at a time of multiplying sanctions and frequent Israeli threats to [...]]]> via Lobe Log

Writes Barbara Slavin in her report for Al-Monitor from Tehran:

Beyond showcasing its victims and its right to nuclear energy, Iran hopes that the summit will prove that it has more friends than enemies at a time of multiplying sanctions and frequent Israeli threats to attack its nuclear installations. Or, as the Tehran Times put it Monday, “the fact that Iran is hosting such a prestigious meeting has proven that the efforts of Western countries, and especially the United States, to isolate Iran are futile.”

Find more photographs here and be sure to read Farideh Farhi’s thoughts on what the NAM Summit really boils down to for Iran’s leaders as well as ordinary Iranians.

It must be considered pure fortuity for the Islamic Republic of Iran that the decision to hold the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) summit in Tehran was made three years ago in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt. Although the previous NAM summit took place shortly after Iran’s contested 2009 presidential election, it’s unlikely that anyone [...]]]> via Lobe Log

It must be considered pure fortuity for the Islamic Republic of Iran that the decision to hold the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) summit in Tehran was made three years ago in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt. Although the previous NAM summit took place shortly after Iran’s contested 2009 presidential election, it’s unlikely that anyone could have predicted the significance that the next summit would have for Iran in light of the Obama’s administration’s systematic effort to tighten the sanctions regime and the changes in the region.

The extraordinary effort put into the summit – it will include 5 days of holiday for government workers in Tehran along with 30 extra liters of rationed gasoline, perhaps as an encouragement for people to take a vacation away from the capital city – is intended to showcase Iran’s global role and offer concrete evidence that the United States-led initiative to isolate Iran has failed.

This is not my interpretation. It is a point loudly made by various officials in Iran. For instance, Ezatollah Zarghami, the head of Iran’s radio and television, called the summit “a maneuver against arrogance… giving the message that the nation of Iran can play a role in global equations irrespective of the power of global arrogance.”

The summit is being used to make a visually forceful case that it is not the “global community” that has problems with the Islamic Republic, as repeatedly asserted by US officials, but only a US-led and pressured coalition of countries. And, ironically, the Obama administration is conceding that point by identifying Tehran as a “strange and inappropriate choice” for the summit while trying to dissuade various leaders from attending the meeting.

According to Ali Saeedlou, Iran’s vice president and chair of the secretariat for the summit, 150 delegations, including from 20 international organizations, will participate. Saeedlou said Tehran is prepared to host 7,000 delegates with plans for them to visit “industrial plans, and cultural and historical venues.” India’s delegation alone will include 250 people and will be led by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.

To be sure, whether this showcasing of Iran’s non-isolation will strengthen Iran’s hand and actually have an impact in denting the escalating US-imposed sanctions regime is an entirely different matter. NAM has already issued several statements in support of Iran’s peaceful nuclear program and there is not much else that it can or will do in Tehran beyond confirming its past positions.

There is potential for a degree of unpleasantness regarding Syria, which will have representation in the summit. According to IRNA, a news agency close to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, there is even debate in Iran about whether President Bashar al-Assad should attend. But Assad’s attendance is highly unlikely and chances are that a rather bland statement calling for regional cooperation on resolving the Syrian imbroglio will satisfy the attendees. IRNA has already conceded that inclusion of support for Syria’s sovereignty as a member of NAM in the Summit’s final statement is unlikely.

Probably the most important aspect of the summit is Egyptian president Mohammad Morsi’s decision to attend. But this decision is more about Egypt’s new foreign policy direction than Iran’s non-isolation. The Egyptian president is the current secretary general of the Nonaligned Movement and had he not gone to Iran to hand over NAM’s rotating leadership, his move would have been seen as an insult to NAM as well as a continuation of Egypt’s US-dependent foreign policy under the ousted Hosni Mubarak.

And, if Egypt and Iran do eventually decide to re-establish full diplomatic relations, that decision will not be based on what happens at the summit; it will result after the time and desire for resuming diplomatic ties has finally come in both countries. In Iran, the desire and concerted effort to elevate relations with Egypt has existed since Mohammad Khatami’s presidency and the last vestiges of opposition have vanished with the political change in Egypt. Meanwhile, the exchange of ambassadors between the two countries is effectively the least expensive way for Egypt to announce its new independent foreign policy. Not having ambassadorial relations with Iran when every other Arab country including Saudi Arabia does, simply doesn’t make sense anymore and even the US must understand this.

Ambassadorial-level relations do not necessarily mean friendly relations – as the current state of Iran-Saudi relations show. And the extent to which Cairo will be willing to deepen relations with Tehran will depend on, and in all likelihood be limited by, the balance of power in Egypt’s domestic politics as well as the country’s relations with the US and other regional powers.

Still, depending on how well organized the summit turns out to be, Tehran will try to garner as much publicity as possible for a show staged essentially for an audience that resides outside of Iran.

As to the audience inside Iran, once the summit is over, it will continue to be divided and weighed down with the reality of severe economic challenges and a broken and paranoid political system that still does not know what to do with a large number of disaffected citizens and cannot offer an explanation for why a former prime minister (and his spouse) and a former speaker of the Parliament continue to be incarcerated without charge.

The good news for this audience though is the persistence of its wry sense of humor. Making fun of the five-day holiday that the government is giving Tehranis, a joke is going around that during the past weekend 30 people have drowned in the Caspian Sea and 90 people died in car crashes. The punch line? “If Israel waits, a whole bunch of us will just pass away during the summit holidays.”