Robert Wright points out why a first-term President Mitt Romney would be more susceptible to hardline pressure on Iran than a second-term President Barack Obama:
Second-term presidents think legacy, and nothing says legacy like peacefully and enduringly solving a problem that’s been depicted as apocalyptic. So expect Obama to pursue serious negotiations [...]]]>
Robert Wright points out why a first-term President Mitt Romney would be more susceptible to hardline pressure on Iran than a second-term President Barack Obama:
]]>Second-term presidents think legacy, and nothing says legacy like peacefully and enduringly solving a problem that’s been depicted as apocalyptic. So expect Obama to pursue serious negotiations with Iran (which he hasn’t really done yet) if he wins the election. And he’ll be able to pursue them liberated from concerns about re-election, which means he can largely ignore blowback from Bibi Netanyahu, AIPAC, and other elements of the Israel lobby. That sort of freedom is important if he wants to bargain seriously with Iran.
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Any first-term president who hopes for re-election (that is, any first-term president) is mindful of lobbies, whether the sugar lobby, the Cuba lobby, or the Israel lobby. So any new president would likely have a harder time peacefully solving the Iran problem than a second-term President Obama. But for Romney this disadvantage is compounded by two factors.
Author and senior editor at the Atlantic Robert Wright has a knack for highlighting important Iran policy-related statements made by leading U.S. politicians. Here he is clearing up any confusion about Mitt Romney’s “red line” on Iran when compared to that of President Obama after Peter Baker of the [...]]]>
Author and senior editor at the Atlantic Robert Wright has a knack for highlighting important Iran policy-related statements made by leading U.S. politicians. Here he is clearing up any confusion about Mitt Romney’s “red line” on Iran when compared to that of President Obama after Peter Baker of the New York Times wrote that they aren’t that different. (Of course, as Paul Pillar has noted, the President’s red line isn’t exactly something to gloat about since it practically commits the U.S. to a disastrous war that would be far worse than living with a nuclear-armed Iran if the Islamic Republic did indeed make the decision to take the plunge):
]]>Some people are trying to find signs of moderation in Romney’s reference to his “fervent hope” that “diplomatic and economic measures” will succeed. But the fact is that by making the mushy-to-the-point-of-useless term “capability” the red line (or red blur), he has empowered Israel to say at any point, “Sorry, but diplomatic and economic measures have failed; the bombs were dropped this morning.”
I agree with Peter Baker that there aren’t many clear differences between Obama and Romney on foreign policy. But now we do have at least one: Romney says Israel can bomb Iran any time it wants and America will be happy to inherit the blowback. Obama doesn’t say that. I’d call that a difference of doctrinal proportions.
Journalist Noam Sheizaf, writing on +972, asks, “Would the incoming Israeli Chief of Staff favor an attack on Iran?”
Last spring, Gantz said that “there is no question regarding our moral right to act [againt Iran]“ [Heb]. Yet according to Ynet’s defense analyst Ron Ben-Yishay, much like the departing Gabi Ashkenazi, Gantz belongs to the “skeptics” camp, and would like to avoid IDF military action against the Iranian nuclear facilities. Unlike Ashkenazi, Gantz is not expected to oppose such an action if the political leadership decides to carry it out.
Sheizaf adds an update:
UPDATE: Haaretz’s Amir Oren also estimate that Benni Gantz opposes a military strike on Iran. “Gantz is part of the level-headed camp, led by Gabi Ashkenazi,” writes Oren . Oren names other senior IDF generals that hold the same views, and concludes that the “pro-active” line on Iran, led by Netanyahu and Barack, is “disintegrating.”
While Netanyahu and Barack have attempted to portray the military and political leadership as sharing a deep fear of the Iranian nuclear program and a willingness to act militarily against Iranian nuclear facilities, cracks are appearing in that supposedly united front. Information such as that passed along by Noam Sheizaf is useful in understanding what the “true” Israeli position is on Iran’s nuclear program. It also should call into question Jeffrey Goldberg’s reporting from last fall, which portrayed Israeli political and military leadership as willing to “go it alone” in a unilateral attack against Iran. Who exactly were Goldberg’s anonymous sources and how were they selected?
Goldberg wrote back in September:
I have asked a simple question: what is the percentage chance that Israel will attack the Iranian nuclear program in the near future? Not everyone would answer this question, but a consensus emerged that there is a better than 50 percent chance that Israel will launch a strike by next July. (Of course, it is in the Israeli interest to let it be known that the country is considering military action, if for no other reason than to concentrate the attention of the Obama administration. But I tested the consensus by speaking to multiple sources both in and out of government, and of different political parties. Citing the extraordinary sensitivity of the subject, most spoke only reluctantly, and on condition of anonymity. They were not part of some public-relations campaign.)
Thanks to recent reporting, we now have reason to question whether IDF and Mossad leadership (see former Mossad chief Meir Dagan’s comments on the Iranian nuclear program) have been convinced that an Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities is a feasible mission or a strategic calculation with a positive cost-benefit outcome.
]]>Two important talking points are making the rounds today.
First, The Israel Project (TIP) and the Emergency Committee for Israel’s (ECI) Noah Pollak seem to be running [...]]]>
Two important talking points are making the rounds today.
First, The Israel Project (TIP) and the Emergency Committee for Israel’s (ECI) Noah Pollak seem to be running with the strategy of highlighting the contrast between Tunisia, Lebanon, and Egypt’s instability with Israel’s stable, democratic government.
An Israel Project press release (H/T Justin Elliott) observed:
All this illustrates, perhaps more dramatically than ever before, how different Israel is from all its neighbors. As a lively, boisterous democracy, the events unfolding on Arab streets across the region would be unthinkable in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv.
TIP concludes:
There are no easy answers to Washington’s dilemma. But the overall lesson is clear. The United States needs more democratic friends in the region. Friends it can rely on. Friends like Israel.
Noah Pollak tweeted:
I hope the “realists” who think the U.S. should end its alliance w/ Israel are learning who is genuinely stable & strong in the ME.
TIP’s condemnation of authoritarian Arab leaders overlooks the fact that a number of them have been backed by the U.S., in no small part due to leaders like Mubarak being willing to make peace with Israel.
While TIP and Pollak prefer to portray the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as having played no role in shaping the region’s political landscape—such an acknowledgment might let the dreaded “linkage” argument out of the box—others, such as The Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg, are torn between a commitment to liberal democracy and their jobs as hawkish pro-Israel advocates.
At 10:51am, Goldberg decided to run with a linkage-denying argument that “these uprisings are offering proof that Israel isn’t the central Arab preoccupation.”
“Fifty years of peace has meant [the U.S.] propping up dictators for fifty years,” he observed.
He elaborated:
Is that such a bad thing? Friends of mine like Reuel Gerecht believe that Arabs, given their druthers, might choose Islamist governments, and that would be okay, because it’s part of a long-term process of gradual modernization. I’m not so sure. I support democratization, but the democratization we saw in Gaza (courtesy of, among others, Condi Rice) doesn’t seem particularly worth it.
Goldberg’s policy of playing the neoconservative Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Reuel Marc Gerecht off as an expert on Arab streets and a progressive (Gerecht jokes that his own mother thinks he writes too much about bombing Iran) is rather telling of Goldberg’s own beliefs. Even more telling is Goldberg’s torn relationship with democracy when it doesn’t go his, or Israel’s, way. His argument, it would seem, is that backing strongmen who are friendly—or at least complicit in sealing off Gaza—is more important than human rights or democracy.
By 3:50pm, Goldberg was accepting that Mubarak’s days in power could be limited but was still concerned about what role the Muslim Brotherhood might play.
I’m not downplaying the threat the Muslim Brotherhood poses, to America or to Israel. And I fear for the future of the Israel-Egypt peace treaty.
The Weekly Standard‘s Thomas Joscelyn voiced similar concerns, suggesting that Mubarak might be the lesser of two evils. He wrote:
Hosni Mubarak’s regime is no friend of freedom, even though it is certainly an ally against al Qaeda.
In all likelihood, an Egypt dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood (if that is how the turmoil plays out) would be neither.
At the end, both of the arguments we’ve seen emerge today—Israel is stable while Arab states can’t maintain stability; backing U.S./Israel-friendly dictators might just be worth it—tells us a lot about the logical contortions required by those who espouse an ideology of linkage-denial, or “reverse linkage.”
Egyptians are taking to the streets because of disgust with the failed economy, corruption, and abuses associated with Hosni Mubarak’s rule. But Mubarak’s ability to maintain a grip on power is directly related to backing from the U.S — a source of foreign aid that is in no small way connected to Egypt’s peace with Israel.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has warped the region’s political landscape and, as hinted at by Goldberg, led the U.S. to back authoritarian rulers. When the only positive thing TIP and Pollak can say about Israel’s role in the situation is that Israel is “stable,” it’s worth examining what cost Israel’s peace with its neighbors–and assistance in maintaining a siege on Gaza–has incurred on the the U.S.’s broader foreign policy interests in the Middle East.
]]>In Haaretz, Ari Shavit, a member of the paper’s editorial board, lashes out at the former spy chief for undermining the possibility of “the military option” against Iran.
The prime minister responded with rage to the former Mossad chief’s statements. Benjamin Netanyahu thinks Dagan has sabotaged the diplomatic effort to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. But Netanyahu isn’t alone. Senior officials in the United States, Britain and France this week castigated Dagan for his utterances. The White House and Capitol Hill expressed shock and anger. Major allies of Israel saw the former Mossad chief’s briefing as incomprehensible and irresponsible.
I’m not sure who exactly in the White House “expressed shock and anger”—Dennis Ross? It would be helpful if Shavit could point to which “senior officials” in the U.K. and France “castigated” Dagan — though I suppose I could guess which members of Congress might be disappointed by Dagan’s blast of honesty.
Shavit claims that Dagan’s “utterances” may have undermined the glue that holds together the Western powers’ ability to “adopt a firm approach to Iran.”
The success [of this strategy] stemmed in part from the feeling of urgency Israel instilled in the powers. Now comes the former Israeli Mossad chief and blurs the sense of urgency. The Russians, Chinese, Germans and Italians cannot be expected to be more Catholic than the pope. Dagan hurt Israel’s allies and played into the hands of officials abroad who dismiss the Iranian danger and seek an excuse not to address it.
Is Shavit arguing that Dagan’s comments, which weren’t widely challenged on factual grounds, undermined the “sense of urgency” that Israel had instilled in the West? It sounds like Shavit is acknowledging that some factual exaggeration may have occurred when Israel made the case that Iran’s nuclear program presented an imminent existential threat. His bizarre argument seems to be that if Israeli officials fail to tow the line and exaggerate the Iranian threat, Western powers might not feel as inclined to take such a hard-line—and potentially self-destructive –approach to pressuring Tehran.
Shavit drives this point home:
[Dagan’s] statements about the grave consequences of an attack on Iran are balanced and correct. But one of the main tools to put pressure on Iran was the implied threat of an Israeli military attack. The international community has also begun to pressure Iran seriously for fear of a sudden strike by the Israel Air Force. Now Dagan has weakened the leverage. He made the Israeli threat seem unreliable and not serious. The man who was in charge of thwarting the Iranian nuclearization made the Iranians think they can continue galloping to the bomb because they are not in any real danger.
Shavit is essentially admitting that Israeli leadership might not have been as serious about a military strike as it were suggested to be by the likes of Jeffrey Goldberg. Instead, it appears to have been blackmailing the U.S. and other allies into conforming to a hard-line strategy with the threat that Israel might launch a disastrous unilateral strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. For Shavit, and perhaps Ehud Barak and Benjamin Netanyahu, it’s not just the fact that Iran might call the bluff in Israel’s threats. Israel risks losing the support of its western allies when Dagan let the truth slip out about Iran’s nuclear program.
Israeli hawks have little to fall back on after Dagan’s remarks, so Shavit concludes his column by suggesting that the spy chief’s statements might make an Israeli military strike more likely because allies may lose their will to “impose a diplomatic-economic siege on Iran.”
It will be interesting to see how the voices in the U.S. who have echoed and magnified hysteria about the “existential threat” from Iran respond to increasing uncertainty about the actual danger posed to Israel and the West.
Of course, those who have placed their professional reputations on the line by repeating Israeli talking points about the likelihood of an Israeli military strike will be more likely to repeat Shavit’s argument.
Jeffrey Goldberg, whose Atlantic cover story last September kicked off widespread speculation about the possibility a unilateral military strike by Israel, was already repeating Shavit’s argument on his blog this morning.
Goldberg, in a post titled “Has the Ex-Mossad Chief Made an Iran Attack More Likely?,” wrote:
Ari Shavit excoriates Meir Dagan, the recently-retired Mossad chief, for subverting the international coalition aligned against Iran by speaking so loudly against a military option.
He then block-quoted two paragraphs of Shavit’s column.
For those who have helped maintain the illusion of urgency and imminent danger posed by Iran’s nuclear program, Dagan’s comments must pose a serious threat.
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