by Wayne White
Libya’s chaos and violence may seem like a continuum of painful replays. However, as the situation festers, the risk of extremist elements gaining a more dangerous foothold and broader freedom of action increases. Indeed, since the beginning of this year, militant Islamists have gained ground overall, undermining what little governance remains. Making matters worse, a Libyan Supreme Court decision has gone against the newly elected and relatively secular government.
Debating whether Libya is a failed state is academic even though the country has resembled one for the past six months. Even a senior Libyan official admitted back in August that most “factors at the moment are conducive to a failed state.” Unfortunately, Libya’s problems won’t be contained. Militant extremists and terrorists thriving amidst this mess will spread violence even farther beyond the country’s practically non-existent borders than they have already.
House of Cards
Most recognizable forms of authority in Libya have steadily imploded this year with the explosion of greater violence in the country’s two largest cities (Tripoli and Benghazi), the flight of foreign workers and embassies amidst kidnappings and murders, and the disarray affecting all manners of central governance (though its writ was already limited). In fact, Libya never evolved beyond the dominance of militias that refused to disarm following the struggle against Muammar al-Qadhafi.
Shaky stability in the capital city of Tripoli until mid-2014 depended on a wary balance of power between two powerful militias employed by Libya’s parliament, the General National Council (GNC). The Islamist militia comes from Libya’s third largest city of Misrata, while the other secular nationalist militia is from the tough Zintan mountain region south of Tripoli. The Misrata militia (now “Libya Dawn”) was linked to Islamist members, and the Zintani forces to its secular caucus. At the time, the GNC had a modest Islamist majority.
But the election in June of a secular majority permanent House of Representatives (HOR) triggered the collapse of the militia power balance. The larger Libya Dawn secured the upper hand over the Zintanis, seizing Tripoli. Libya Dawn reconvened mainly the Islamists from the GNC, proclaiming the body the true Libyan government.
The HOR fled east, taking refuge near the Egyptian border in the small city of Tobruk. Ex-General Khalifa Haftar’s effort since spring 2014 to crush extremists like the al-Qaeda affiliated Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL) had experienced mixed results. Then, after solid gains against ASL forces in Benghazi in October, the beleaguered HOR embraced Haftar as acting on behalf of the newly elected parliament.
But the Libyan Supreme Court declared the internationally recognized HOR unconstitutional on November 6, arguing that the committee that prepared the election law for the June poll, which elected the HOR, violated Libya’s provisional constitution. The court remains, however, in Tripoli under Islamist occupation and originally was not asked to address the legality of the HOR, making its ruling questionable. Moreover, even if there were some inconsistencies involving election procedure, they pale against Libya Dawn’s violent seizure of Tripoli and revival of a rump GNC that no longer has any legal mandate whatsoever. The most recent election, quite an achievement under the circumstances, at least reflected voters’ preferences.
A map featuring Libya’s major cities and border states.
Consequently, despite urgings from some quarters that the HOR be abandoned, the UN and most foreign governments have not done so. As of Nov. 17, Turkey and Chad appeared to be the only exceptions. Embracing the court decision, the rump GNC has offered a national dialogue, something that would have been of value prior to Libya’s descent into far greater chaos in 2014. Earlier this year, when there was more to work with, I had discussed the advantages of such a meeting being held at a neutral venue abroad and being overseen by the UN along with the governments that backed the anti-Qadhafi struggle in 2011.
Of course, Libya has only spiraled further downwards since then. But because both governments share the need for revenue, Libyan exports still rebounded to more than 800,000 barrels per day (BPD) in September (although still only 1/3 of capacity). Following the court decision, however, Libya Dawn sought to control the country’s oil, seizing the 300,000 BPD western El-Sharara field. But Sharara was shut down, with Zintani forces blocking the pipeline to its northern export terminal of Zawiya. Then a security guard strike over unpaid wages closed Tobruk’s Hariga export terminal last weekend. These closures have driven exports down to barely 500,000 BPD.
Whether emanating from a now more aggressive Libya Dawn or the beleaguered ASL (most likely the latter), a number of bombings have also hit HOR-controlled locales in eastern Libya. One went off in the town of Shahat during a meeting there between HOR Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni and UN Libyan Envoy Bernadino Leon On Nov. 10. Several car bombings occurred two days later. One hit a busy street in front of the Tobruk hotel housing the HOR; another hit the airport used by al-Thinni near the town of Bayda. A third bomb blew up in Benghazi (where fighting between the forces of Haftar and the ASL has intensified again).
The fighting in Benghazi became so intense that Leon arranged a 12-hour humanitarian ceasefire on Nov. 19 so the Red Crescent could evacuate civilians and casualties from affected areas. The UN Security Council meanwhile blacklisted ASL branches in both Benghazi and Derna.
Located between Benghazi and Tobruk, Derna has been an extremist hotbed since the 1990s. Youthful demonstrators there declared their allegiance to the so-called Islamic State’s (ISIS or IS) “Caliph” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in late October. With Haftar’s air assets sorely limited, Egypt probably took aim at jihadi targets there with airstrikes on Nov. 12, despite Egyptian denials. Egyptian airstrikes have previously hit Tripoli and Benghazi. Fighter-bombers from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have also staged through Egypt against Benghazi’s extremists.
Spillover Effect
Libya remains a vast arsenal of weapons, ammunition and explosives. The Sinai-based Beit al-Maqdis, which has sworn allegiance to IS, continues to receive Libyan munitions despite Egyptian countermeasures. The Jihadi group killed 33 Egyptian soldiers on Oct. 24. It struck again on Nov. 13, killing five soldiers and police. Near the northern end of the Suez Canal, militants or their smugglers had fired on an Egyptian Navy patrol boat wounding 5 sailors a day earlier, with eight others still missing. Sinai jihadists also released a lengthy video on Nov. 14 showcasing their suicide bombing that killed the soldiers in October, with participants shouting: “good news to al-Baghdadi!” The violence appears to be continuing unabated, with a likely Beit al-Maqdis bombing having hit a police checkpoint in a Cairo suburb just yesterday.
Libya also continues to export violence in various other directions. Four Tunisian soldiers were killed and 11 wounded in a Nov. 5 bus bombing. Much of the residual violence in Tunisia meanwhile stems from the cross-border infiltration of munitions from ASL. Malian jihadists, using Libya as an arsenal and for sanctuary, attacked a border village in Niger on Nov. 19, killing nine Nigerien security personnel.
With the West’s attention absorbed by IS, the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, Israeli/Palestinian affairs, and more, Libya has been woefully neglected. Yet the longer the country’s problems fester, the worse they will get. Indeed, even more IS-inspired connections with Libyan and associated jihadists surely will emerge in this chaotic environment. Simply watching Libya’s meltdown has achieved nothing.
]]>by Shireen T. Hunter
In the past two weeks, relations between Tehran and Islamabad appear to have deteriorated again over border clashes and terrorist attacks in Iran’s Sistan and Baluchistan province located close to the Pakistani-Iranian border. Unlike past tensions, which were caused by the activities of the Sunni extremist Baluchi group, Jundallah, and later by some of its offshoots including Jaish ul-Adl, the current trouble, according to Pakistani officials, resulted from the killing of a Pakistani Frontier Corps member last week by Iranian border forces.
Beyond this particular incident, which has raised the temperature between the two countries, the latest efforts by Sunni militants to enter Iran has caused greater concerns than in past because, according to statements by Iranian authorities, some Pakistani sympathizers of the Islamic State (ISIS or IS) have been trying to join it by travelling through Iranian territories on their way to Iraq or Syria. Considering the fact that IS has declared its desire to attack Iran, the recent events have heightened Iranian fears.
Until recently, Iran contented itself by complaining to Pakistani authorities about the lax border security while demanding that the Pakistanis do a better job of preventing terrorist infiltration from their territory into Iran. However, after the abduction of several Iranian borders guards and the killing of one of them, some Iranian authorities warned that they may have to enter Pakistani territory in pursuit of the offenders—they have yet to do so.
This show of restraint by Iran occurred despite the fact that Jundallah, and its then-leader, Abdul Malik Rigi, who was responsible for killing hundreds of civilians and revolutionary guards through bomb attacks and abductions, had links with extremist Pakistani groups, and possibly even with Pakistani intelligence services.
For its part, Pakistan had, in the past, tried to placate Iran by saying that it did not have enough control in the border region and by promising to do a better job in the future—but without taking any real steps to prevent the infiltration of terrorists.
In response to the latest incident, however, Pakistan has reacted more strongly by summoning the Iranian ambassador to Islamabad and by publicly protesting the killing of a member of its Frontier Corps. Moreover, Pakistan has also demanded that Iran offer evidence that terrorists have infiltrated Iran form Pakistan or that they enjoy safe haven in Pakistan. Pakistani authorities have also said that Iran should not blame Pakistan for its problems in the Sistan-Baluchistan province.
Nothing New
Attacks on Iranian interests and personnel deep inside Pakistan and terrorist-operations orchestrated from within Pakistan against Iran have been occuring since at least the early 1990s, if not earlier. These attacks and the resulting tensions in turn reflect the fundamental political and cultural changes that Iran and Pakistan have undergone as well as the changing patterns in their respective international and regional alliances since the time that they were close allies in the 1950s-60s, and the early 1970s.
The earliest signs of strains in Iranian-Pakistani relations emerged during the summit meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in 1976. At that time, then-Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto—who after the separation of East Pakistan had turned to Islam as a way of consolidating the remaining state, and was also courting Arab petro-dollars—invited Muammar Gaddafi to the Summit. The shah, who had steadfastly stood by Pakistan throughout its troubles, indicated that he would not attend the summit if Gaddafi attended. Pakistan’s answer essentially was: too bad.
The trend beginning under Bhutto gathered steam under General Zia ul-Haq, who assumed power in 1978 and set upon the policies of greater Islamization of Pakistan and forging closer ties with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States, especially the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—ties that were further consolidated during the Soviet-Afghan war.
One result of these policies, and the Soviet-Afghan war, was the growing influence of Wahhabi/Salafi Islam in Pakistan, which is anti-Shia and thus detrimental to Iran. This was also accompanied by a degree of Arabization or even Saudization of Pakistan’s culture and its turning away from its traditional Mogul culture with its heavy imprint of Persian culture and language. Today, for example, the Persian poetry of Allama Muhammad Iqbal is not valued—only his work in Urdu is promoted. There have also been efforts to eliminate Persian words from day-to-day usage. Thus, for instance, many in Pakistan are now saying farewell with Allah Hafiz, instead of the traditional Khoda Hafez because Khoda is the Persian word for God. This may sound trivial, but it is symbolic of Pakistan’s cultural shift.
The Iranian revolution also strained relations with Pakistan. First, the birth of the Islamic Republic in Iran emboldened Pakistani Shias who were unhappy with Zia’s changes in the country’s legal system and the increasing discrimination against them to become more active and demand more rights. Unsurprisingly, the Pakistani elite and the Sunni majority did not view this development favorably.
Iran’s revolution also had a detrimental impact on Iranian-Pakistani cooperative relations, namely their joint friendly relations with the United States. Similarly, by causing tensions in Iran’s relations with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States with whom Pakistan shares close ties, the revolution further strained their bilateral ties. In fact, Saudi–Iranian animosity is a major cause of tension in Iranian-Pakistani relations especially under Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who is even closer to the Saudi monarchy than former PM Asif Ali Zardari. Indeed, Saudi Arabia supports Iran’s Sunni dissidents and is against increased economic cooperation between Iran and Pakistan. Saudi Arabia also reportedly gave Pakistan one billion dollars so that it would not implement the agreement for the import of Iranian gas, even though the country is desperate for energy.
Meanwhile, after the Soviet Union’s collapse and the onset of the Afghan Civil War, Iranian-Pakistani interests further diverged. For instance, in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan backed different groups and competed over pipeline routes. Even today, Pakistan wants to limit, if not block, Iran’s influence in Afghanistan. This is at least part of the reason why Pakistan and Saudi Arabia would not have allowed a member of the Northern Alliance to become Afghanistan’s president: it would have resulted in better relations between Afghanistan and Iran. In this respect the two Sunni countries also have Turkey’s support, as reflected by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s recent visit to Kabul.
The US policy of trying to destabilize Iran by encouraging internal dissent, especially under the George W. Bush administration, also emboldened Pakistan to ignore incursions from its territory into Iran and dismiss Tehran’s protests knowing full well that Iran cannot afford to engage in armed conflict with a nuclear-armed Pakistan.
In short, some of the causes of the strained Iranian-Pakistani relationship are rooted in cultural changes in Pakistan and broader regional and political shifts. However, Pakistan’s ability to ignore with impunity—or possibly even encourage—transgressions against Iran from its territory is ultimately the consequence of Iran’s adamant refusal to acknowledge the realities of regional and international politics and to correctly assess its own vulnerabilities.
Indeed, If Iran had not alienated major international actors, none of the regional countries could have treated it as they have done in the last three decades. Therefore, unless Iran changes the course of its foreign policy and its leaders put national interests—including territorial integrity and national unity—ahead of revolutionary objectives, not only Pakistan but all of its neighbors will continue to take advantage of Iran’s vulnerabilities.
]]>by Sara Vakhshouri
In the past several days—despite the conflicts affecting Iraq, Syria, Iran and Russia—oil prices have been on a downward trend, hitting their lowest number in the past four years. As of October 2014, oil prices are more than 20 percent lower than June. This trend started with Saudi Arabia reducing its crude oil prices without cutting its production—the result of a strategic shift in Saudi policy. Previously, the swing producer in the market would maintain a general higher price range. Now it has shifted to increasing market shares by offering lower prices to its customers. Iran, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Iraq also followed the kingdom’s lead and offered discounts on their crude oil in order to maintain their market share.
This raises a number of interesting points. On the one hand, the acceleration of higher energy efficiency, combined with higher energy prices, the economic crisis in Europe and lower economic growth in China have all put pressure on overall energy demand growth. On the other hand, the global energy supply has had a bullish growth mainly because of the shale oil boom in North America and Iraqi oil output. Yet the lower growth of demand and the higher rate of supply growth have both altered concerns over energy security paradigms, shifting from the security of supply to concerns about the security of demand and the profitability of oil production (in the case of unconventional oil). Keen competition among producers to maintain market share, concerns over the unconventional oil production’s profitability, and the effect of lower oil prices on oil dependent economies are all consequences of this broader change in the balance between supply and demand in global energy markets.
Stabilizing the Demand
Although it might take longer to see the real effects of lower oil prices on global oil demand growth, lower oil prices will have a positive effect on the demand side. Lower prices could particularly strengthen the demand in countries that lack fuel subsidy regimes as price fluctuations may have a more tangible effect on consumers.
Oil Dependent Economies
The economies of conventional oil producing countries (particularly OPEC producers such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq) are highly dependent on oil for around 80 percent of their national budgets. There is a close correlation between oil prices and their fiscal maneuverability. For example, Russia, Nigeria, Bahrain, Venezuela and Iran have national budgets that work under a scenario of $100 per barrel of oil. Saudi Arabia’s budget for 2014 is meanwhile based on oil at $90 per barrel, and remaining OPEC members have set their 2014 budgets according to a $70 per barrel range. The current drop in prices has the potential to negatively affect some of these countries’ economies. But on the flip side, it could also encourage them to reduce their dependency on oil revenue in the medium to long-term. Lower oil prices also reduce the gap between global market prices and local prices, decreasing the amount of subsidies these countries have to pay for domestic fuel consumption.
Unconventional Oil Production
The extraction of unconventional resources does not only require a high level of technological proficiency, it is also very costly compared to conventional production. For most of the United States’ tight oil resources to be economically developed and produced, oil prices should remain at least around $70 per barrel in the long-term. With current costs, it is expected that the overall tight oil production will drop to about 20 percent with a downturn of oil prices below $70 per barrel. If oil prices drop below the range of economically profitable production, the drilling of new wells, for maintaining production levels, will mostly stop and tight oil production will reduce significantly within a period of between three to six months. The more recent price drops have reduced the profit margin of investment in US unconventional oil resources and have reduced the gap between current global oil prices to shale oil production costs to about only $20 per barrel. This has raised concerns for investors and could affect the likelihood of their further investment in unconventional oil extraction.
Back to Iran?
As I mentioned earlier, the costs of unconventional oil extraction are much higher than conventional oil production, particularly in the Persian Gulf region. Lower profit margins due to lower oil market prices could divert investor attention and interest back to conventional oil production in the Persian Gulf. Sanctions aside, Iran could possibly benefit from this situation due to the political and security crisis in Iraq. Indeed, due to the ongoing attacks by Daesh (ISIS or ISIL) in Iraq, most international investors have left the country. Iran, with its new investment regulations, could accordingly attract foreign investors to its energy industry once again. However, lower oil prices and high competition among the major oil producers to maintain and increase market shares could increase the stakes in maintaining the limitations on Iran’s oil exports and prevent this country from increasing its production.
]]>by Daniel Wagner, Giorgio Cafiero, and Sufyan bin Uzayr*
Since the revolutions that swept across the Middle East in 2011, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) government has arrested dozens of Emirati and Egyptian nationals allegedly linked to the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Declaring the MB a threat to the UAE’s [...]]]>
by Daniel Wagner, Giorgio Cafiero, and Sufyan bin Uzayr*
Since the revolutions that swept across the Middle East in 2011, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) government has arrested dozens of Emirati and Egyptian nationals allegedly linked to the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Declaring the MB a threat to the UAE’s ruling order, social fabric, and economic prosperity, Emirati authorities have since 2011 waged a crackdown on Al-Islah (AI), a MB-influenced group. Throughout the Arab Awakening movement, Abu Dhabi has deepened partnerships with other states determined to eradicate the MB. Given that the UAE and Kuwait support Saudi Arabia’s efforts to establish the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as an MB-free zone, shared hostility toward this Sunni movement appears to unite the GCC members more effectively than fears of Shi’ite Iran.
The MB’s activity in the UAE dates back to the 1960s when scores of Egyptian MB members fled Nasser’s Egypt to take haven in the Gulf. These Egyptians were sophisticated, educated, upwardly mobile, and they gained high-ranking posts in the UAE’s public and private sectors, playing an important role in the nation’s judicial and education systems. The Egyptian MB followers influenced scores of conservative UAE nationals who founded AI, which became an official NGO in 1974.
Initially, AI was heavily involved in the UAE’s educational, religious, and social affairs. In time, however, its orientation grew increasingly political, and relations with the government grew tense. The government’s belief that AI was loyal to a transnational Islamist movement, rather than the UAE, has been a primary source of tension. Since the 1990s the state has prohibited AI members from holding public office or making calls for political reform.
The UAE maintains that AI is an armed group with 20,000 followers determined to overthrow the federation of seven emirates and establish a caliphate in the Gulf. AI claims that it rejects violence while supporting peaceful reforms in the country. Regardless of what constitutes reality, the potential for instability and the threat of ending a relatively harmonious status quo between the Gulf state’s diverse ethnic and sectarian communities have contributed to the support the government is receiving from many Emiratis who credit their rulers with maintaining stability as chaos destabilizes many Arab nations.
When Mohamed Morsi and the Egyptian MB’s newly-established political party — the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) — won the 2011/2012 elections, authorities in the UAE became deeply unsettled. Former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was a close UAE ally and the prospect of democratic revolutions spreading from Egypt into the GCC was a central concern for all Gulf monarchies.
Egypt-UAE relations were marked by tense diplomatic spats throughout Morsi’s presidency. In July 2012, Dubai’s Police Chief accused the MB of plotting to topple the government in order to seize its sovereign wealth. In October 2012, the UAE Foreign Minister alleged that the MB was “encroach[ing] upon the sovereignty and integrity of other nations.” After UAE authorities arrested 11 Egyptians in January 2013, accusing them of training local Islamists to overthrow the government, an FJP spokesperson dismissed such allegations, stating that UAE officials were conducting an “unfair campaign” against Egyptians that had “no basis whatsoever”.
The UAE viewed Morsi’s downfall as a strategic opportunity to reset the course of events since 2011. Since the coup, Abu Dhabi has not been shy in showing support for Egypt’s military-backed interim government. In October 2013, Emirati officials announced a $4.9 billion aid package to Egypt that included cash, petroleum products, and funds for clinics, education, housing, and infrastructure. This, along with aid from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, has made a significant difference in Field Marshal Abdul Fatah el-Sisi’s ability to govern effectively by delivering on some of his promises to the Egyptian people.
Sisi’s visit to the GCC in March 2014 was rich in geopolitical context. While in the UAE, the two countries’ militaries conducted joint training exercises and the UAE-based contractor Arabtec signed a memorandum of understanding to construct approximately one million housing units across Egypt, costing $40 billion. It was understood at the time that this deal, supported by the UAE government, was another part of the Egyptian military’s effort to garner greater support for Sisi among low-income Egyptians, with presidential elections scheduled for May 2014.
Egypt’s military has for decades asserted greater power by playing an increasingly important economic role. Since the coup, Egypt’s generals have made power grabs by designating their allies to major economic posts while securing contracts for major infrastructure deals, and a lucrative Suez Canal project. As Egypt’s military is determined to seize even greater control of the national economy, the billions of dollars in aid from the UAE will aid Sisi’s efforts toward this outcome.
In March 2014, immediately after Saudi Arabia’s government declared the MB a “terrorist organization”, the UAE’s government expressed support for Riyadh’s decision, calling it a “significant step”. This declaration came in the aftermath of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE withdrawing their ambassadors from Qatar on the grounds that Doha did not implement a security pact regarding non-intervention in fellow GCC states’ affairs. Among other motivations, the move was largely intended to signal a message to Qatar about supporting the MB in Egypt and elsewhere. Doha’s relationship with MB branches has contributed to the tense state of relations between the UAE and Qatar.
Ongoing sectarian violence in Bahrain and eastern Saudi Arabia showcases how the GCC is not immune to the Arab Awakening. Although calls for political or social change in the UAE have been minimal since 2011, the potential for income disparities to fuel unrest in the UAE is a concern for the ruling order. Given that AI has functioned as a charity and social welfare organization for decades, the government believes there is potential for the group to gain influence in the UAE’s poorer emirates.
While sectarian fault lines largely define the Middle East’s geopolitical order, a “Sunni Cold War” is simultaneously influencing the regional network of alliances. On one side, the distinctly undemocratic polity in Saudi Arabia vehemently opposes Islamist political parties that promote democratic institutions. On the other, Turkey and Qatar support the spread of ‘democratic Islamism’ throughout the region.
In this struggle, the UAE has made its position abundantly clear. While Abu Dhabi will continue to use its massive natural resource wealth to attempt to neutralize its citizens’ aspirations for democratic reforms, the UAE appears determined to conduct an increasingly activist foreign policy that counters the MB throughout the region while seeking to prevent the organization from gaining any foothold in the GCC. In doing so, the UAE underscores its intention to preserve the status quo power structure in the Gulf and Egypt.
*Daniel Wagner is CEO of Country Risk Solutions and Senior Advisor with Gnarus Advisors. Giorgio Cafiero is co-founder of Gulf State Analytics (GSA). Sufyan bin Uzayr is an analyst with GSA.
]]>by Derek Davison
As talks over a comprehensive agreement on Iran’s nuclear program continue in Vienna (the next round will be April 7-9) it seems that even those neoconservatives who supported sanctions and negotiation as peaceful paths to a settlement want little from these talks beyond a justification for war. [...]]]>
by Derek Davison
As talks over a comprehensive agreement on Iran’s nuclear program continue in Vienna (the next round will be April 7-9) it seems that even those neoconservatives who supported sanctions and negotiation as peaceful paths to a settlement want little from these talks beyond a justification for war. While they are careful to couch their arguments in terms of extracting the best negotiated settlement from Iran, their standards for an acceptable comprehensive settlement are generally unreasonable at best and impossible to meet at worst.
The latter was on display a week ago when I attended the McCain Institute’s “Iran Nuclear Deal: Breakthrough or Failure?” debate. Neocon panelists Bret Stephens and Reuel Marc Gerecht repeatedly argued that nuclear monitoring and verification procedures cannot ensure that the United States will be warned if Iran violates its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. For Stephens, especially, this was not a question about the amount of resources dedicated to monitoring Iran’s nuclear program or the level of access monitors permitted in Iranian facilities; he simply argued that monitoring cannot work. There is little gray area here: if your goal is an Iran without nuclear weapons, and no amount of monitoring can ensure that they are not developing one, what is left apart from the military option? Yet, while Stephens is certainly open to the idea of war, he continues to argue that harsher sanctions can result in an Iran with no breakout capacity, which seems to leave the door open to an Iran with some kind of nuclear program. Of course, he also conveniently avoids defining what that program might look like, what those tougher sanctions ought to be, or when and how any sanctions might ever be lifted.
An example of unreasonable conditions comes from Michael Singh, managing director of the neoconservative Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) and former senior director for Middle East affairs at the National Security Council for the Bush administration. He argues in a recent piece that the P5+1 (the U.S., Britain, France, China, and Russia plus Germany) should insist that Iran retain zero enrichment capacity in a comprehensive deal, despite Iranian insistence that they will never give up enrichment. Like Stephens, Singh argues that tougher sanctions can achieve this outcome, but offers no suggestions as to what those sanctions should be and, more crucially, whether the international community could be expected to go along with them. This is an important concern, particularly at a time when tensions within the P5+1 are high over the situation in Crimea. Until now, the international unanimity that supported sanctions has been held together in part because the United States has been open to negotiations and to easing sanctions in return for Iranian concessions. If the US suddenly shifts to a more rigid position, is there any reason to believe that the P5+1 will maintain unity on Iran?
In order to make the case that Iran doesn’t “need” an enrichment program, Singh engages in questionable argumentation. He writes, for example, that Iran has no need for its own uranium enrichment capacity, because its native supply of natural uranium is so small that it will need to import enriched uranium whether it has an enrichment capability or not. But Singh must surely know that, even though Iran’s supply of domestic uranium is not enough to make their nuclear program self-sufficient, a domestic enrichment program allows Iran to import natural uranium ore, the trade of which is not subject to the same regulatory safeguards that are applied to enriched uranium. Singh also argues for a deal with Iran along the lines of the nuclear cooperation agreement reached with the UAE in 2009, in which the UAE agreed not to enrich uranium itself. But he can’t seriously argue that the UAE’s historical and geopolitical circumstances are in any way analogous to Iran’s, or that Iran’s reluctance to rely solely on foreign sources of enriched uranium doesn’t have some justification. It’s not even clear that Singh himself believes that zero enrichment is possible; in a piece written earlier this year, he argues that a zero enrichment goal should be used simply as a negotiating position. As in any other negotiation, then, the P5+1 would eventually move away from zero enrichment and toward a final compromise. Yet now, Singh seems to be repudiating the idea of any enrichment compromise, instead calling for a “zero enrichment or bust” approach to a comprehensive deal.
The question that folks like Stephens and Singh as well as their more bellicose colleagues like Bill Kristol and Max Boot need to answer is: what’s the endgame? Should the international community continue moving the goalposts, levying harsher and harsher sanctions on and making further demands in perpetuity? What purpose will that serve? Is there any realistic concession that Iran could offer that would, in their minds, be worth easing sanctions? Iran’s nuclear program has already cost it over $100 billion just in revenue lost to sanctions. If Iran is not prepared to surrender its entire program now, and it clearly is not, why should we expect that more or “tougher” sanctions would bring the Iranian government around? What happens if those tougher sanctions do have the effect of fracturing the international coalition?
If Iran will not surrender its nuclear ambitions, and Iranian officials insist they will not, then is war inevitable? What do Stephens and his allies imagine that war will achieve? Is it regime change? If so, what if a war actually strengthens the Iranian government’s support among its people? After all, polling says that 96% of Iranians say that maintaining a nuclear program is worth the price being paid in sanctions, and two-thirds of them support the development of a nuclear weapon. This does not appear to be a public that will turn on its leaders over their nuclear efforts. Or is their goal an Iran whose nuclear program is destroyed and cannot be reconstituted? If so, what can military strikes do to eliminate the scientific and technical knowledge that Iran already possesses and that is more important than physical infrastructure in developing nuclear weapons? What happens after the strikes, when Iran begins to rebuild its nuclear program, but without any monitoring and with a mind toward producing a weapon, a goal that even US intelligence services say it has not directly pursued as yet?
Instead of pretending to support sanctions and talks, let’s have an open discussion about the war these commentators appear in favor of, and what they think it will achieve.
]]>by Thomas W. Lippman
The rulers of Saudi Arabia are becoming masters of a diplomatic style best described as sulking in the tent. If a country or organization is not performing in a way that suits them, they issue a petulant statement and walk away. It’s easier than constructive engagement, but far [...]]]>
by Thomas W. Lippman
The rulers of Saudi Arabia are becoming masters of a diplomatic style best described as sulking in the tent. If a country or organization is not performing in a way that suits them, they issue a petulant statement and walk away. It’s easier than constructive engagement, but far less effective, as the Saudis are — or ought to be — learning.
A longstanding example is their refusal to do business with the government of Nouri al-Maliki in Iraq. Riyadh backed a rival candidate in Iraq’s election, and never accepted the outcome. The Saudis have no embassy in Iraq — two years ago they appointed an ambassador for the first time in 20 years but he was officially “nonresident,” living outside the country — and minimal economic investment. The result is that they forfeited the field of influence in Baghdad to the country they consider the greatest threat, Iran, even as they accuse Maliki of being an agent of Iranian ambitions.
Then came the decision to turn down a seat on the United Nations Security Council, a seat the Saudis had sought for years. The Saudis said they did it to protest the Security Council’s inability to deliver an Arab-Israeli peace settlement acceptable to the Palestinians, and its inability to halt the civil war in Syria. But nobody heard that tree when it fell in the forest. If there is any evidence that the Security Council or its individual members has adopted policies more to Riyadh’s liking as a result of this theatrical but futile gesture, it has not come to light. Meanwhile, the Saudis forfeited any chance they might have had to influence the Security Council from the inside. Jordan replaced Saudi Arabia, and life went on as before.
Now the Saudis, along with Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates, have announced the withdrawal of their ambassador from neighboring Qatar. The three released a long, murky statement that basically accused Qatar of failing to implement an agreement among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members to work together to ensure their security, to refrain from interfering in each other’s internal affairs, and to halt support for “hostile media.” That was a clear reference to Al Jazeera, the popular satellite news channel financed by Qatar’s ruling family, which among other things provides a forum for the popular preacher Youssef al-Qaradawi, a vocal critic of Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
The Saudis, who support the military government that took over in Egypt last year, have made no secret of their displeasure with Qatar’s backing of the previous government, which was headed by the Muslim Brotherhood and President Mohamed Morsi. The military government in Cairo joined Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain in withdrawing its ambassador from Doha, a hollow gesture since he had already left.
On Friday, Saudi Arabia formally designated the Brotherhood, many of whose members have found refuge in Qatar as Egypt cracked down on them, a terrorist organization. The Saudis’ quarrel with the Brotherhood is not about religious issues; their problem is the popularity of the Brotherhood as a political organization, which by its nature poses a threat to the al-Saud regime.
For Saudi Arabia, the public breakdown of comity within the GCC represents a sharp policy reversal. Just three months ago, at a GCC summit meeting, Saudi Arabia was promoting the idea of a formal political union among the six members. That plan was shot down by Oman, not by Qatar, but it is highly unlikely that Qatar would have supported it had it come to a vote. Although dwarfed by Saudi Arabia in size, Qatar has been playing an outsize role in regional affairs that is often out of synch with Riyadh, in Syria as well as in Egypt, and Doha would not have welcomed the inevitable Saudi dominance of a closer, formal union.
The Saudis might ask themselves how their diplomacy over the past three years or so has advanced their objectives. They wanted a friendly government in Iraq that would resist Iranian encroachment. They wanted the U.N. Security Council to turn up the heat on Israel in favor of the Palestinians. They demanded an end to the civil war in Syria even as they supported rebels fighting to oust President Bashar al-Assad. And they espoused a political union of the GCC members. None of those goals appears within reach, nor is it apparent that Riyadh, having withdrawn from the diplomatic arena, has a Plan B for achieving any of them. Perhaps some new strategy will emerge after President Obama visits Riyadh later this month.
The GCC was not created to be a defense organization; it was created to promote political and economic solidarity among the Gulf monarchies. That objective has long been unrealistic as the members went their own way on everything from energy policy to relations with Iran. Now it appears to be entirely out of reach.
For the United States, the diplomatic spat within the GCC might seem to be a minor concern, except that Washington has been pumping advanced weapons into the member states in a longstanding effort to form an effective regional security force that would confront Iranian ambitions. Recognizing that the members would never agree on a joint military command, U.S. defense officials have promoted a policy of providing compatible equipment and communications systems that in the event of a direct threat could all function in coordination with each other and with the U.S. Central Command. Those efforts will continue, regardless of the tensions among the GCC’s leaders.
]]>by Emile Nakhleh
Yesterday’s public announcement by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain that they’re withdrawing their ambassadors from Qatar signals a serious rift within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The seismic regional changes that have occurred since the establishment of the GCC 33 years ago will likely torpedo [...]]]>
by Emile Nakhleh
Yesterday’s public announcement by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain that they’re withdrawing their ambassadors from Qatar signals a serious rift within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The seismic regional changes that have occurred since the establishment of the GCC 33 years ago will likely torpedo this tribal organization.
The stated reason for the ambassadorial recall is Qatar’s perceived support of the Muslim Brotherhood, which the three states view as a threat to their rule. Yet, the other two GCC members — Kuwait and Oman — did not support the move.
Saudi Arabia is angry at Qatar for striking an independent foreign policy course in responding to Arab upheavals in the past three years. The Saudis are lashing out probably because of their arguably waning influence in the region. For example, they failed to get a unanimous GCC support for sending troops to Bahrain to quell the anti-regime uprising in 2011.
They were equally unable to sell the call for unification of the GCC states. Only the Bahraini King supported the Saudi position, which forced them to shelf the proposal.
The Saudis have also disagreed with Qatar’s position on Iran and Syria. As the largest and most powerful member of the GCC, Saudi Arabia resents Qatar’s larger than life posture in the region and internationally. Riyadh’s rulers are wary of Doha’s pro-active search for modernity, Western education, and political and ideological pragmatism. Qatar’s satellite news station Al Jazeera has been a thorn in the Saudi and Bahraini side.
The GCC came into being May 26, 1981 for the sole purpose of preserving the tribal, Sunni and hereditary family rule in the Gulf Arab states and countering perceived rising threats.
At the time those threats included the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Islamic revolution in Iran, the Iraq-Iran war, and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Ruling Sheikhs and Emirs viewed the rising wave of terrorism in the region as coming from Iran and its Shia supporters across the Gulf and beyond.
The establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan forced Gulf rulers to turn to Sunni Islam, including the Muslim Brotherhood, for protection against the “atheist” Soviet Union in Afghanistan and the “Safavi, Persian menace.”
They preached and bankrolled Salafi Sunni jihad against both perceived enemies. By recasting the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) as the current enemy, these rulers are being seen as hypocritical and shortsighted. They are also playing a dangerous game.
Bahrain, for example, has promoted a Sunni Islamic ideology at home that is well grounded in the MB as a line of defense against the Shia opposition. Over the years, some Bahraini political and business Sunni leaders have established close relations with the MB, regionally and internationally, according to media reports.
The Saudis and the Bahrainis are also financing Sunni Salafi jihad in Syria against the Assad regime. Earlier they supported similar groups in Iraq against the Shia power structure. In fact, in the past two years, several radical Sunni activists from Bahrain went to Syria to wage jihad against Assad, presumably with the approval of the Bahraini authorities.
The Saudi, UAE and Bahraini anger at Qatar is yet another manifestation of the tensions that have simmered for years within the GCC. While they recognized growing threats to their rule in the early 1980s, they disagreed even then on how to respond to those threats.
The Al Khalifa regime, especially, finds itself in a dilemma: Supporting the Egyptian military junta against the MB, and at the same time relying on pro-MB activists to fight the Shia opposition and Iran, which they blame for the unrest in Bahrain.
Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait, on the other hand, are pursuing active political and economic relations with Tehran based on pragmatism and mutual economic interests.
Despite their annual summitry and the public rhetoric of Gulf unity, GCC rulers in the past thirty years have pursued their respective national interests separately with barely a nod to the organization. On very few occasions they acted collectively under the umbrella of the GCC security agreement.
The May 1981 GCC agreement stressed the importance of cooperation in education, manpower training, and economic diversification. But the GCC has been unable to transcend security and establish regional cooperative working arrangements in other areas.
GCC states shied away from economic complimentarity, as envisioned in the original agreement, and established separate airlines, banking systems, investment corporations, and media enterprises. Although they cling to authoritarian hereditary family rule, Kuwait has established a pseudo-democracy. Bahrain had a brush with representative democracy in the early 1970s but scuttled the experiment shortly thereafter. Each state devised a political system that is commensurate with its perceived cultural and demographic particularities regardless of their commitment to the GCC.
When I was doing research for my book on the GCC in the mid-1980s, I asked a successful Arab Gulf businessman what he thought of the GCC. He responded colloquially with one word, “Hatchi” meaning “just talk.”
A real gap exists in the minds of Gulf citizens between the rhetoric of the GCC as a collective organization and its social and economic accomplishments. While the member states have advanced in their individual pursuits, the GCC seems to be withering as an organization.
American and Western policymakers regularly cite the GCC in their public statements, but in reality they deal with member countries as separate states with little consideration of the organization.
Although Qatar is being accused of promoting the Muslim Brotherhood, especially providing a home for the televangelist preacher-scholar Yusif al-Qaradawi and his family enterprises, the tensions between Qatar and Saudi Arabia are much deeper than al-Qaradawi and Al Jazeera, which carries his programs.
Instead of blaming Qatar and recalling their ambassadors, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain should address their poor human rights record at home and respond to their peoples’ demands for genuine reform and social justice.
]]>by Mitchell Plitnick
When is a coup not a coup? When calling it that carries repercussions that make a bad situation worse.
US President Barack Obama is struggling with recent events in Egypt. Once again he’s presented with a situation in the Middle East where he has few good options but is [...]]]>
by Mitchell Plitnick
When is a coup not a coup? When calling it that carries repercussions that make a bad situation worse.
US President Barack Obama is struggling with recent events in Egypt. Once again he’s presented with a situation in the Middle East where he has few good options but is still facing expectations based on a long history of US influence over events — an influence that is no longer situated in reality.
In contrast to the revolution that deposed Hosni Mubarak two years ago, the ouster of Mohammed Morsi raises some profound questions, not only for foreign powers, but for Egyptians themselves. There is no doubt that Morsi brought a lot of this on himself. He neglected the major issue for almost all Egyptians, the economy; he shamelessly tried to grab dictatorial powers; he did not follow through on his campaign promises to include the widest spectrum of Egyptians in his government; and, when confronted with all of this, he remained obstinate.
All of that led to the June 30 demonstrations, organized by young Egyptians of the grassroots Tamarod (Rebel) movement, which included both the liberal and Salafist camps. That is a wide spectrum of Egyptians demanding Morsi to resign. The military — the power that controlled Egypt until Mubarak’s fall — stepped in very quickly and gave Morsi two days to respond before removing him from the presidency. It is not unreasonable to say that the military action was hasty. It certainly was likely, from the onset, to split Egypt between Mulsim Brotherhood supporters (even if they agreed that Morsi had bungled the job and needed to go, an opinion that was far from rare among those who opposed the military action) and those supporting the military’s action.
The military removed a sitting and democratically elected president; that’s a coup, and everyone knows it. Whether or not it should be officially dubbed as such, with all the accompanying policy ramifications, is a different matter. For the radical neoconservative, Elliott Abrams, US aid to Egypt should be cut off, as US law demands when a coup occurs. In this, Abrams stands against the desires of the Israeli government as well as the Obama administration. But he does not stand alone.
Democratic Senator Carl Levin and Republican Senator John McCain are also calling for the suspension of aid to Egypt. The concern, which they share with Abrams, is that the Egyptian military needs a stern warning in order to move with all deliberate speed toward restoring a civilian government. Elections are the key.
By contrast, many other members of Congress from both parties are supporting Obama in his determination not to cut funds for Egypt. The reasoning here is that the Egyptian economy is already reeling badly and cutting off US aid would not only exacerbate that situation, it also removes what leverage we might have in pushing the SCAF (Supreme Council of the Armed Forces) toward relinquishing power.
Both bits of thinking are misguided. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have already moved to bolster their position in Egypt by pledging $8 billion to help Egypt weather its economic crisis. The gift is being given for reasons beyond promoting Egyptian stability. The Saudi/UAE rivalry with Qatar took a strong pro-Saudi turn with the deposition of Morsi. Qatar had backed him, as they had backed the Muslim Brotherhood and the rise of that brand of Islamism throughout the region. But even before this, the succession of power in Qatar was already leading to Qatari adventurism’s end in the region. The Saudi/UAE support is meant to push that process along and cement Egypt against a Brotherhood revival.
This is surely met with approval in virtually all corners of Washington and Jerusalem, and, it should be added, within significant segments of Egypt. The SCAF wants the Brotherhood marginalized, as does the United States. But with the SCAF bringing this about in such a direct and draconian manner – mass arrests, heavy-handed use of force and shutting down media outlets deemed pro-Brotherhood — there is a real risk of undermining fragile hopes for stability in Egypt.
Obama is right in resisting calls to label the coup a coup. Yes, it’s playing fast and loose with both the truth and with US law, but no good is going to come out of alienating the SCAF and cooling our relationship with it. The plan the SCAF has in place is actually a pretty good one, if it plays out as written. The Western myopia that defines democracy through the ballot box will not serve well in Egypt. Before new elections, a constitution must be at least provisionally in place, lest we witness a repeat of June 30. It was this lack of structure that allowed Morsi to abuse his power and gave the Egyptian people no recourse to address that abuse but to march for his ouster.
But for even a constitutional structure to bring stability to Egypt, it will need to be as inclusive a process as possible, and that means finding a way to include the Muslim Brotherhood. Right now, the SCAF seems intent on marginalizing and radicalizing them. No doubt, the Saudis and other Gulf states are not unhappy with that state of affairs. Israel, too, is probably content with seeing the SCAF undermine not only the Brotherhood in Egypt, but pushing back the regional aspirations of the other Brotherhood branches and similar Islamist parties (not least the one in Turkey, the ruling AKP, whose own increasing lean toward Islamism could be discouraged by these events).
Less value is being placed on finding a way to reset the Egyptian revolution while not radicalizing the Brotherhood. It’s a complicated issue. The Brotherhood’s own behavior, even before June 30, indicates the comfort level they have with their familiar position of a besieged and persecuted opposition, a role they are quickly assuming once again. Right now, they’re assuming that role in isolation, but if Egypt’s economy continues to flounder, if the SCAF continues its heavy-handed approach and, most especially, if whatever government finally takes hold is deemed as inadequate as Morsi’s, they could find themselves in a popular position once again, as in 2011.
The US, and the Europeans, are in a position to influence some method of including the Brotherhood in Egypt’s future government. Indeed, the US seems to have already begun trying, though the approach was ham-handed and the Brotherhood interpreted the effort, not surprisingly, as an attempt to get them to legitimize the coup.
It is not the time for the US to try to bully Egypt or to taint whatever good relationships it has, and it still has a good one with the SCAF. But the US must recognize that a lot of its friends are holdovers from the Mubarak regime and that too much interference is very likely to backfire. A gentle and understated hand is necessary to help convince the SCAF and the currently forming technocratic government to work hard to include the Brotherhood as partners while still bringing in a government that will be very different from the one that was just toppled. That needs to be the key feature of the constitutional process. It is possible that this is what the Obama administration intends and, if so, they must stand fast against foolhardy voices like those of Levin, McCain and especially Abrams.
Photo Credit: Hossam el-Hamalawy
]]>by Robert E. Hunter
“Then we’ll have done all we can.”
“Very heartless.”
“It’s safer to be heartless than mindless. History is the triumph of the heartless over the mindless.”
Yes, [...]]]>
by Robert E. Hunter
“Then we’ll have done all we can.”
“Very heartless.”
“It’s safer to be heartless than mindless. History is the triumph of the heartless over the mindless.”
Yes, Prime Minister.
President Barack Obama, it is said, has painted himself into a corner with his repeated statements that the use of chemical weapons by the Assad government will be a “game changer” or cross a “red line.” The difficulty of definitions has produced what must have been one of the most ambiguous letters ever to be put on White House stationery. It came as a response to a demand from two US Senators about presidential policy in the event of such weapons use.
More accurately, however, the president can be said to have painted himself into a corner with Syria on two occasions, initially as early as August 2011, and repeated since, by declaring that “Assad must go.”
Of course, Assad has not gone, thus demonstrating once again the first rule of being US President: never call for something, especially in a simple declaratory sentence, if you are not prepared to follow through and make it happen.
This recitation is not meant to be an attack on the US president. It is an introduction to what has to be a genuine dilemma, indeed, a series of dilemmas, which come in several forms.
Syria’s Future
The first dilemma regards the potentiality of a positive outcome in Syria. Assad and company are engaged in the massive slaughter of their own people, which, along with those killed by the rebels, numbers more than 70,000 by a recent (likely conservative) count, plus the creation of more than a million refugees. There is meanwhile no resolution in sight of what has become a full-scale civil war.
Let us assume that Assad is killed (or decides to seek a safe haven) tomorrow. What then? It is a vast stretch of the imagination to believe that the killing would then stop.
What is happening in Syria is radically different from what happened in the so-called “Arab spring” in Tunisia, Egypt, or even Libya. This is not primarily a matter of whether a leader who stayed too long and was too repressive will go; but whether a particular minority will continue to be able to dominate the rest of the population, or, with “regime change,” whether there will be a bloody free-for-all competition for power. None of the other three regime changes were about that.
More relevant is what happened in Iraq, when the US and partners, by invading in 2003, overturned centuries of admittedly unjust domination of a majority (Shi’ite) by a minority (Sunni). Or what is happening, or rather not happening, in Bahrain, where the situation is just the reverse but has been kept in check by military power, much of which has been applied by neighboring Saudi Arabia, with the US, concerned about its base in Bahrain for the Fifth Fleet, at best “turning a blind eye.”
It’s therefore hard to see what the United States, or any combination of outsiders, could usefully do — not to help overthrow Assad and his Alawite-dominated military (that can be done) — but to help “shape” a future in Syria that won’t lead to even more bloody chaos before something approaching “stability” could ensue. Even if that were possible, it would likely take the form of a new suppression, but by the majority (Sunni) over various minorities.
Public Opinion
The second dilemma — perhaps it should be first — is related to whether the American people are ready and willing to see the US engaged in yet another Middle East war. The answer (“No”) is clear, but so far policy is not — hence the dilemma.
There should be no indulgence in the nonsense that all could be accomplished by providing more lethal arms to the rebels, imposing a no-fly zone, or using air power directly. That would be relatively sterile in today’s military taxology, but even if/when successful, it leads back to the first dilemma. And if unsuccessful, the US would then be called upon to do what, in current jargon, is called “boots on the ground” — that is, invasion. There should be no nonsense, however, about the US being able, as in Libya, to “lead from behind.” Even though the British and the French (the latter was the former mandatory power in Syria after World War I) would like to see something done, they are this time ready to hold the US coat, but not lead themselves.
To his credit, the president so far has been wary of getting more deeply engaged, presumably due to a combination of his awareness of the two dilemmas above, the second of which (US public opinion), if ignored, would surely take attention away from what he clearly sees as his legacy: repairs to the heavily-damaged US economy (and the global financial system) and his historical goal, which can be summarized in a few simple words: the promotion of equality in American society.
Regional Context
The third dilemma derives from the manner in which the conflict in Syria began. It did have domestic roots (as in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya), but it also had external causes and active agents, notably a desire by leading Sunni states (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and to a lesser degree, Turkey) to right the informal and rough regional “balance of power” between them and Shi’a states that was so heavily upset by the US invasion of Iraq. This came after the spread of the “disease” from revolutionary Shi’a Iran had both been almost entirely contained in the region and had most of its fires banked at home. Some Sunni states still fear contagion, however, notably Saudi Arabia, where oil lands are heavily concentrated in Shi’a territories (hence Riyadh’s desire to get rid of the Alawite rule in Syria).
So here it is: an already slow-rolling civil war across the region, pitting Sunnis versus Shi’as, but only in part about religion, is also about competitions for power. In this case, it’s an essentially four-cornered competition among Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel and Turkey, the first three of which have as much to do in fueling the current confrontation with Iran as does its nuclear program.
Would the overthrow of the Assad regime cause this regional civil war to intensify? Or would it lead to a new, informal balance among religious groupings that would be reasonably “stable,” whatever that means in today’s roiling Middle East? It would take a Dr. Pangloss to argue the case for stability over more competition and even less stability and predictability about the future of inter-state relations and internal developments.
Non-governmental Actors
Dilemma number four flows from the above. As the civil war has continued and intensified, Sunni Islamist militants, including elements of al-Qaeda, Wahhabis and Salafists, have increasingly become engaged. That should be no surprise. These groups batten on conflict, especially a conflict with intense emotion and deep-seated religious inspiration. Thus even with Assad gone — perhaps by magic wand tomorrow — would the outcome of the civil war be ruled by a Sunni strongman, pacifying the country by force? Or solidification of another base for continuing terrorist operations by some of our and our allies’ worst enemies?
Israel’s Circumstances
One argument for getting rid of Assad and his Alawite-dominated regime is that this would help deprive the Lebanese Hezbollah of its rear base, which provides political support and a supply route for Iran as it seeks to counter pressure from the US and Israel. But at what (potential) price would Iran be thus incommoded?
Since 1974, Israel existed uneasily but still reasonably comfortably with Assad père et fils, as both countries learned to live with one another. Their mutual frontier along the Golan Heights was so stable that Israel could even invade Lebanon (twice) and attack a Syrian nuclear reactor without a military response. Now that modus vivendi is very much in jeopardy.
Indeed, for many months after the Syrian civil war started, Israel was clearly at least ambivalent about whether Assad’s departure was in Israel’s best interest. It now seems to have passed that point, but even that is not entirely clear.
What should be clear, however, is that if Assad goes and there is an intensifying civil war, with “free play” for Islamist radicals of the worst stripe — the kind that have inspired and in many cases conducted the killing of Americans in Afghanistan — the US will be called upon to be even more robust in support of Israel’s security.
Would that mean US forces on the Golan Heights? Israel has never wanted this direct military engagement from the US, but the need for extra commitments to Israel’s security would be very likely. Furthermore, the argument that Iran would be the big loser from Assad’s departure might even be turned on its head. The balance in Tehran could be tipped toward those who argue that Iran should get nuclear weapons in order to deter a burgeoning list of enemies.
Strategy
Then a final dilemma: the US desire to “pivot” to Asia. But at least some refocusing of policy and military assets will not be as easily done as has been hoped with the end of the Iraq War, the winding down of the Afghanistan War and the efforts to keep Iran from crossing either US or Israeli red lines on its nuclear program.
With Syria and its interlocking dilemmas, plus other continuing challenges in the region, the US will not be able to rid itself of a major security role in the Middle East anytime soon, even if it (rightly) promotes an international approach to even some of these dilemmas, no matter how much oil and gas is eventually produced in the continental US.
It is probably — but not certainly — too late to find some means whereby Assad could stay in power but with genuine power-sharing that would radically reduce the prominence of the Alawites without leaving them to be victimized as they have victimized other Syrians for so long. Of course, power-sharing efforts almost always fail in mechanical approaches to foreign policy, so perhaps that was never a real option, a triumph of Western “hope over experience.”
So what is to be done at this juncture of “no good options?” The best to be hoped for now is for President Obama to keep his nerve (backed by the US military leadership) and continue resisting attempts to drag the US even more deeply into Syria. At the same time, the US must avoid the temptation to perceive another looming chance to experiment with “nation building”; Iraq and Afghanistan should have inoculated us against that.
As a cardinal principle, the US should internationalize whatever is done — by the United Nations, NATO, the European Union and Arab League — and not regard Syria as a test of US “leadership,” as asserted in the aforementioned White House letter (“strengthen our leadership of the international community.”) It should put out the word in very clear terms to other states in the region to stop meddling in Syria, and in particular, to rein-in their nationals who are engaged in spreading Islamist militancy in Syria (and elsewhere), with both ideas and arms.
Finally, the US needs to begin seeing the region as a whole, not as a series of bits and pieces, loosely connected to one another, with Washington attempting only “to put out fires” here and there, while pretending that the whole region is not potentially ablaze. The president has to recruit for his administration the very best people to think strategically and this time plan ahead. They must understand that the US has to create consistent and coherent policies for the entire region that have some chance of success for the long haul.
]]>Duss also takes note of another great point from Sadjadpour: [...]]]>
Duss also takes note of another great point from Sadjadpour: Just as neoconservative Iran hawks can’t have it both ways — boosting the Green movement and calling for bombing Iran — those Arab leaders who call for a U.S. attack on Iran probably don’t care a whit about democracy in Iran either. (And why should they? Their countries aren’t exactly democracies nor do they care what their own citizens/subjects think).
In fact, a democratic Iran would probably be bad news for these Gulf dictatorships.
Sadjadpour (emphasis by Duss):
The WikiLeaks revelations make clear that Arab officials believe Iran to be inherently dishonest and dangerous. The feeling is probably mutual. But they hide perhaps a more interesting issue, namely what type of Iranian government would actually best serve Gulf Arab interests.
President Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad and the Islamic Republic may be loathed, but equally the advent of a more progressive, democratic Iran would enable Tehran to emerge from its largely self-inflicted isolation and begin to realise its enormous potential. In the zero-sum game of Middle Eastern politics, a democratic Iran would pose huge challenges to Persian Gulf sheikhdoms.
The irony that someone like Benjamin Wienthal, who’s at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, doesn’t recognize this in his National Review post says something about how the hawkish agenda drives neoconservatives — and not utopian notions of freedom and democracy.
Weinthal writes:
While Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, and Oman have long privately conveyed such warnings to diplomats, they never had the courage to flex their muscles in public.
Right! And that’s because these are dictatorships, and these Arab leaders are wildly out of step with their publics.
Neoconservatives, being neoconservatives, will gather allies in their campaign for war with Iran wherever they can find them.
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