Shibley Telhami, the Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, has just released a major new poll of US public opinion on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which Mitchell Plitnick will analyze on this site in the next few days.
The survey also contains some very interesting data that suggest Islamic State (ISIS or IS) is now seen as a significantly greater threat to the United States than Iran. The data and Telhami’s analysis appear in a blog post entitled “Linking Iran and ISIS: How American Public Opinion Shapes the Obama Administration’s Approach to the Nuclear Talks” at the Brookings website. (Telhami is a long-time fellow at Brookings, and the poll results were released there.)
Briefly, the poll, which was conducted Nov. 14-19, found that nearly six times as many of the 1008 respondents said they believed that the rise of IS in Iraq and Syria “threaten(ed) American interests the most” in the Middle East than those who named “Iranian behavior in general.” Respondents were given two other options besides those to choose from: “the violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict” and “instability in Libya.” Libya was seen as the least threatening (3%); followed by Iran (12%), Israel-Palestine (13%), and ISIS (70%). The only notable partisan difference among the respondents was that Republicans rated Iranian behaviour (15%) slightly higher than Israel-Palestine (11%) as a threat, while Democrats rated Israel-Palestine (13%) slightly higher than Iran (9%).
In some respects, these results are not surprising, particularly given the media storm touched off by the beheading of American journalist James Foley in August. A Pew poll shortly after that event showed growing concern about Islamic extremist groups like al-Qaeda and IS compared to “Iran’s nuclear program.” Thus, while Iran’s nuclear program was cited by 68% of Pew’s American respondents as a “major threat to the U.S.” in November 2013—behind Islamic extremist groups (75%), only 59% rated it a “major threat” immediately after Foley’s murder.
Still, Telhami’s results are pretty remarkable, if only because neoconservatives, Israel’s right-wing government and the Israel lobby more generally have been arguing since IS began its sweep into Iraq, and particularly since Foley’s death, that Washington should avoid any cooperation with Iran against IS, in part because Tehran ultimately poses a much greater threat.
In June, for example, John Bolton, an aggressive nationalist at the neoconservative American Enterprise Institute (AEI), insisted that Washington should ignore Iraqi appeals for help against ISIS and instead “increase …our efforts to overthrow the ayatollahs in Tehran” because “Iran is clearly the strongest, most threatening power in this conflict.”
In a New York Times op-ed in October, Israel’s Minister of Intelligence, Yuval Steinitz, appealed for Washington not to “repeat (the) mistake” it made in 2003 when it went to war in Iraq “…at the expense of blocking a greater threat: Iran’s nuclear project.”
“The Islamic Republic of Iran,” he wrote, “remains the world’s foremost threat.”
And one month later, speaking to the General Assembly of the Jewish Federations of North America shortly after Foley’s execution, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu warned against any cooperation with Iran against IS: “The Islamic State of Iran is not a partner of America; it is an enemy of America and it should be treated as an enemy,” he declared.
At least for now, it appears these arguments have not made much headway with US public opinion. Here’s Telhami:
[T]he Obama administration appears to have decided to risk appearing open to an Iranian role in fighting ISIS, as it certainly allowed the Iraqi government to coordinate such a role, and Secretary of State John Kerry described it as a good thing. There is evidence from recent polling that this may not be unwise when it comes to American public opinion. Obama assumes that nothing he is likely to do in the Iran nuclear negotiations will appease Congressional Republicans and thus his best bet is getting the American public on his side. Evidence shows the public may be moving in that direction.
The starting point is not about Iran as such; it’s all about shifting public priorities.
The survey also asked respondents which of two statements (you can read them in full on Telhami’s blog) was closest to their views—that Palestinian-Israeli violence was likely to draw more support for IS among Muslims worldwide or that it wouldn’t have any appreciable effect on IS’ support. In that case, 30% percent of all respondents agreed with the latter statement, while 64% said the former was closer to their view. Remarkably, given their leadership’s strong support for Israel’s right-wing government, Republicans (71%) were more likely than Democrats (60%) to believe that violence between Israelis and Palestinians would boost support for IS.
Finally, respondents were asked to choose between four options as to which country or countries are “most directly threatened by Iran”—the US, Israel, Washington’s “Arab allies,” and “Other”. Overall, 21% of respondents named the US, and another 21% named Arab allies, while 43% opted for Israel. Twelve percent chose “Other.” The poll found little difference between Republicans and Democrats on the Iranian threat posed to the US—19% and 24%, respectively. The major difference was on the perception of the threat to Israel: 38% of Democrats said Israel was most directly threatened by Iran, compared to 54% of Republicans. (Only 31% of independents.)
]]>A successful agreement on Iran’s nuclear program could significantly enhance US leverage and influence throughout the greater Middle East, according to a new report signed by 31 former senior US officials and regional experts released here Wednesday.
The 115-page report, “Iran and Its Neighbors: Regional Implications for US Policy of a Nuclear Agreement,” argues that a nuclear accord would open the way towards cooperation between the two countries on key areas of mutual concern, including stabilising both Iraq and Afghanistan and even facilitating a political settlement to the bloody civil war in Syria.
“A comprehensive nuclear agreement would enable the United States to perceive (regional) priorities without every lens being colored by that single issue,” according to the report, the latest in a series published in the last several years by the New York-based Iran Project, which has sponsored high-level informal exchanges with Iran since it was founded in 2002.
“If the leaders of the United States and Iran are prepared to take on their domestic political opponents’ opposition to the agreement now taking shape, then their governments can turn to the broader agenda of regional issues,” concluded the report, whose signatories included former US National Security Advisers Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft, as well as more than a dozen former top-ranking diplomats.
Conversely, failure to reach an accord between Iran and the so-called P5+1 (the US, UK, France, Russia, China plus Germany) could result in “Iran’s eventual acquisition of a nuclear weapons, a greatly reduced chance of defeating major threats elsewhere in the region, and even war,” the study warned.
The report comes as negotiations over a comprehensive nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 are set to formally resume in New York Thursday, as diplomats from around the world gather for the opening of the UN General Assembly, which will be addressed by both Presidents Barack Obama and Hassan Rouhani, among other world leaders, next week.
The parties have set a Nov. 24 deadline, exactly one year after they signed a Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) in Geneva that eased some economic sanctions against Tehran in exchange for its freezing or rolling back key elements of its nuclear program.
While the two sides have reportedly agreed in principle on a number of important issues, large gaps remain, particularly with respect to proposed limits on the size of Iran’s uranium enrichment program and their duration.
The study also comes amidst what its authors called a “tectonic shift” in the Middle East triggered in major part by the military successes of the Islamic State of Syria and the Levant (IS, ISIS or ISIL), a development that has been greeted by virtually all of the region’s regimes, as well as the US—which is trying to patch together an international coalition against the Sunni extremist group—as a major threat.
“The rise of ISIS has reinforced Iran’s role in support of the government in Iraq and raises the possibility of U.S.-Iran cooperation in stabilizing Iraq even before a nuclear agreement is signed,” according to the report, which nonetheless stressed that any agreement should impose “severe restrictions on Iran’s nuclear activities… (to reduce) the risks that Iran could acquire nuclear weapons.”
Still, the thrust of the report, which includes individual essays by recognised experts on Iran’s relations with seven of its neighbours, focuses on how Washington’s interests in the region could be enhanced by “parallel and even joint U.S. and Iran actions” after an agreement is reached.
Such cooperation would most probably begin in dealing with ISIL in Iraq whose government is supported by both Washington and Tehran.
Indeed, as noted by Paul Pillar, a former top CIA Middle East analyst, both countries have recently taken a number of parallel steps in Iraq, notably by encouraging the removal of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and by taking separate military actions—US airstrikes and Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) advisers—to help break ISIL’s months-long siege of the town of Amerli.
“There’s ample potential here for more communication on a source of very high concern to both of us,” Pillar said at the report’s release at the Wilson Center. “[The Iranians] see the sources of instability in Iraq; they see it is not in their interest to have unending instability [there].”
A second area of mutual interest is Afghanistan from which US and NATO troops are steadily withdrawing amidst growing concerns about the ability of the government’s security forces to hold the Taliban at bay.
It is no secret that the US and Iran worked closely together in forging the government and constitution that were adopted after coalition forces ousted the Taliban in late 2001, noted Barnett Rubin, an Afghanistan expert who after the 9/11 attacks served in senior positions at the State Department and later the UN.
Lesser known is the fact that “the IRGC worked closely on the ground with the CIA and US Special Forces” during that campaign, he said.
With political tensions over recent election results between the two main presidential candidates and their supporters on the rise, according to Rubin, some cooperation between Iran and the US is likely to be “very important” to ensure political stability.
“A nuclear agreement would open the way for a diplomatic and political process that would make it possible to retain some of the important gains we have made in Afghanistan over the past 13 years,” he said.
As for Syria, Iran, as one of President Bashar al-Assad’s two main foreign backers, must be included in any efforts to achieve a political settlement, according to the report.
Until now, Iran has been invited to participate only as an observer, largely due to US and Saudi opposition.
“The Iranians are not wedded to …the continuation of the Baathist regime,” said Frank Wisner, who served as ambassador to Egypt and India, among other senior posts in his career.
In talks with Iranian officials he said he had been struck by “the degree to which they feel themselves over-stretched,” particularly now that they are more involved in Iraq.
The report anticipates considerable resistance by key US regional allies to any rapprochement with Iran that could follow a nuclear agreement, particularly from Israel, which has been outspoken in its opposition to any accord that would permit Iran to continue enriching uranium.
“It goes without saying that this is of primordial importance to Israel,” noted Thomas Pickering, who has co-chaired the Iran Project and served as US ambassador to Israel and the UN, among other top diplomatic posts.
Washington must make it clear to Israel and its supporters here that an agreement “would certainly improve prospects for tranquillity in the region” and that it would be a “serious mistake” for Israel to attack Iran, as it has threatened to do, while an agreement is in force.
Washington must also take great pains to reassure Saudi Arabia and other Sunni-led Gulf states that a nuclear agreement will not come at their expense, according to the report.
“Such reassurance might require a period of increased U.S. military support and a defined U.S. presence (such as the maintenance of bases in the smaller Gulf States and of military and intelligence cooperation with the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] states),” the report said.
“Riyadh would be willing to explore a reduction of tensions with Tehran if the Saudis were more confident of their American ally,” according to the report.
Photo: US Secretary of State John Kerry delivers remarks to the press in Baghdad, Iraq on Sept. 10, 2014. Credit: State Department
]]>Last week epitomized the highs and lows of hoping for an improvement in US-Iran relations. A BBC report on Sept. 5 that Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had approved Iranian cooperation with the US military in the fight against ISIS was met with near elation in many quarters. Some analysts (myself included) felt this announcement would clarify the strategic value of normalized US-Iran relations for the publics and policymakers of both countries. But after the ensuing Iranian denials that cooperation was in fact approved, the Americans went even further by denying even the possibility of formal cooperation. A Sept. 8 State Department briefing reiterated the exclusion of Iran from the broad 40-nation coalition announced by President Obama to combat ISIS, and Secretary of State John Kerry’s Sept. 12 assertion in Ankara that including Iran “would not be appropriate” because of its involvement in Syria and its alleged status as a “state sponsor of terror in various places” put the icing on the cake.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Iranian hardliners have taken heart from this very public snub. Even Marziah Afkham, the spokesperson for the Foreign Ministry, a stronghold of pragmatists who favors improved relations with the West, felt compelled toregister “serious doubts about [the coalition’s] seriousness to fight against the root and true reasons for terrorism.” She noted without elaboration that “[s]ome of the countries in the coalition are among the financial and military supporters of terrorists in Iraq and Syria.”
Unlike US policymakers, Iranian statesmen—and the wider public—have a long memory. As the recent anniversary of Sept. 11 reminds us to “never forget,” we can do little but remember the lives lost and contemplate how the United States was drawn into a global conflict with religious extremists 13 years ago. For Iranians, however, the fateful date came four years before.
The Taliban reached global prominence in 1998, a year when its fighters launched a devastating offensive in northern Afghanistan. Much as the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS) last month swept across northern Iraq, forcing the Kurdish Peshmerga to retreat to within 40kms of Erbil, the better-armed and better-organized Taliban overcame all resistance by the Iran and Uzbekistani-backed coalition there during that summer. On Aug 8, it captured Mazar-e Sharif, Afghanistan’s fourth largest city, located just 100km from the border with Uzbekistan. Overwhelming local militias, Taliban troops and their allies massacred an estimated 2,000 Hazara civilians in what Human Rights Watch called “one of the worst atrocities of Afghanistan’s long civil war.” In addition, they stormed the Iranian consulate, killing a journalist and ten members of the diplomatic mission, despite assurances from the government of Pakistan, a chief sponsor of the Taliban at the time, that diplomats would not be targeted.
The diplomats’ murder—as well as the massacre of civilians—outraged both the Iranian regime and the broader public. Foreign Ministry officials mourned their fallen colleagues, whom they celebrated as martyrs akin to those who died ”defending the borders of this great country during eight years of holy defense” during Iran’s 1980-88 war with Iraq. An official statement broadcast on Iranian state television asserted Iran’s ”right to defend the security of its citizens” and warned that “the consequences of the Taliban action is on the shoulders of the Taliban and their supporters.”
For Iran, there was no question that the Taliban enjoyed the support of two states: Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Without significant financial support from Saudi sources and the help of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the Taliban would not have been able to stage such a brutal offensive. While it had taken Kabul two years before, the conquest of Mazar-e Sharif consolidated the Taliban’s position as the ruler of virtually all of Afghanistan, a status that no doubt contributed to its increasingly close cooperation with al-Qaeda.
Iran responded by building up its forces along the Afghan border and conducting major military exercises. But the Islamic Republic felt unable to commit to a costly and unpredictable war in Afghanistan unilaterally. It was only three years later, with 9/11, that the US came to realize the full nature of the threat posed by al-Qaeda and its Taliban collaborators.
Suddenly, Iran and the United States had a common enemy. As Washington mulled its strategy to rout the Taliban and destroy al-Qaeda, officials in Tehran reached out to offer strategic support. Years of experience in Afghanistan had given the Iranians deep insight into how the Taliban operated in the ethnically and geographically complex nation.
The secret discussions that occurred between American and Iranian officials in the weeks that followed were the highest-level talks held between the two countries since the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the subsequent hostage crisis. Many analysts believed that the new-found alignment of strategic interests, combined with President Mohammad Khatami’s reformist policies and conciliatory tone, would spur the US and Iran to normalize relations and actively cooperate against the terrorist threat.
In a grave blunder, however, neoconservatives and other hawks in the Bush administration opposed collaboration with Iran, thus depriving coalition forces of a valuable ally. Two months later, in a triumph of politics over pragmatism, Bush gratuitously lumped Iran together with Iraq and North Korea in his infamous “axis of evil,” a move that greatly strengthened hard-line forces in Tehran who had long argued that Washington simply could not be trusted.
It is striking how this situation mirrors that faced by the US and Iran today as both countries face the threat posed by ISIS. The Rouhani administration has opened the door to reconciliation, and the rise of reinvigorated Sunni extremism in the region gives Washington and Tehran a common enemy. Indeed, Iran has sent arms and advisers to Iraq to help the Peshmerga and Iraqi forces roll back ISIS’s recent advances.
Nonetheless, the US remains unwilling to include Iran in its coalition efforts. This position has given hardliners in Iran yet another opportunity to instill doubts about Washington’s sincerity and trustworthiness. Unsurprisingly, the events of 1998 and 2001 weigh heavily on Iran’s collective memory. Indeed, the conservative website Javan Online last week recalled “Iran’s bitter experience of cooperation with the US in Afghanistan,” citing it as reason to dismiss cooperation with Washington against ISIS. The conservative refrain that members of the coalition are “among financial and military supporters of terrorists” is also rooted in the historical memory of the 1998 offensive. Iran also continues to view Saudi Arabia as a key source both of funding for ISIS and other radical Sunni groups and of their intolerant and violent ideology, just as it was for the Taliban.
That Riyadh and its Gulf allies should be treated by Washington as central partners in the anti-ISIS coalition, while Tehran is excluded from any formal participation is particularly galling to Iranians who have suffered the brunt of US sanctions. Not only is this, in their view, illogical. To them, it also suggests that Washington is simply unable to learn from its past mistakes.
–Esfandyar Batmanghelidj is a founding partner of the 1st Europe-Iran Forum, a conference focused on commercial opportunities in Iran to be held in London in October. He has conducted extensive research on Iranian political economy and social history.
Photo: Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif shakes hands with US Secretary of State John Kerr on July 14, 2014 in Vienna.
]]>by David Collier*
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader, recently cast fresh doubt on the possibility of a nuclear deal by the July 20 deadline for the ongoing talks between Iran and world powers in Vienna. This came after Iranian foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif claimed the West was suffering from [...]]]>
by David Collier*
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader, recently cast fresh doubt on the possibility of a nuclear deal by the July 20 deadline for the ongoing talks between Iran and world powers in Vienna. This came after Iranian foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif claimed the West was suffering from illusions regarding Iran’s nuclear program.
Should the talks fail to reach agreement, what happens next? More sanctions, more enrichment, and more talk of military action are the most likely outcomes. What has been missing from the debate, and what could save the long-term relationship between Iran and the West, is more talk of enhancing “linkage” with Iran.
In a 2005 article in The Journal of Democracy, Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way defined linkage as the density of ties between two countries or regions. It forms a web of back and forth interaction on economic, geopolitical, social, and communication matters as well as amongst civil society. This interaction enhances mutual cooperation, trust, and understanding.
The current Western approach to Iran has centered on leverage, the use of overt tools for changing a country’s behavior through the use of sanctions, threats of military action, and attempts to isolate Iran from the international community. Linkage however, is more ethereal and subtle with a focus on deep connections and long-term relations. It can be understood as the soft power to the hard power of international leverage.
While some analysts and officials credit Western leverage with bringing Iran back to the negotiating table, others don’t regard this as a long-term solution. Patrick Clawson and Gary Samore have both cautioned that while sanctions may have helped kick-start negotiations, they do not guarantee their successful conclusion, or that Iran will stand by any agreement in the months and years ahead. It is to this end that the concept of linkage must join the debate.
Past Mistakes
The United States has historically enjoyed and abused the benefits of linkage with Iran, as well as suffered the consequences of its absence. In the 1940s and early 1950s, Iran was awash with American financial, military, and intelligence missions, as well as an active and influential embassy that maintained contacts with Iranians across the political spectrum.
It was this depth and scope of linkage, coupled with the leverage of the US’ position as a main source of financial aid to Iran, that allowed successive US administrations to greatly influence Iranian governmental policies, laws, cabinet position appointments, and even who should be prime minister. The success of the coup in 1953 against Iran’s only democratically elected prime minister would not have been possible without deep levels of linkage with Iranian society. While these policies proved ultimately disastrous for both the US and Iran in the long-term, Washington’s ability to achieve its aims, however misguided, was only possible thanks to the high level of linkage it maintained with Iran.
By the time the revolution began in 1978, however, this linkage had evaporated. Trust in the permanency of the Shah’s regime led to a decrease in contact and surveillance over Iranian society. As a result, the revolution came as a surprise to which Washington was unable to adequately comprehend or respond until it was too late.
This absence of linkage continued in the post-revolution era, with Iranian and American leaders refusing direct contact for close to 35 years. The tradition was not broken until late in 2013 when President Hassan Rouhani spoke briefly with his American counterpart by phone on the issue of Iran’s nuclear program. This was a remarkable break from no presidential contact following the revolution and functions as an example of linkage that must be maintained and consolidated.
However, amid Tehran’s wariness of American desires to overthrow the regime, and the ongoing attempts by Iranian hardliners to scuttle the talks, establishing additional links will be difficult. Persistence will be necessary but is not a quality so far associated with Obama’s Iran policy. His engagement with Iran has instead been likened to a single roll of the dice with efforts made to reach out ending at the first sign of obstruction.
Engaging Iran
Instead, the US must be persistent and take every opportunity to engage Iran and Iranians on all levels. Influential American actors could take their lead from the scientific community, which has had numerous American-Iranian collaborations in recent years. Norman Neureiter, acting director for the American Association for the Advancement of Science, states that as a result of these efforts “Iranian and US scientists get along quite well.” More than that, one US Laureate invited to Iran was so feted by his hosts that he was measured for a sculptured bust, which now rests in the garden of the Pardis Technology Park outside of Tehran.
Another example of perhaps unexpected linkage was a meeting between the US Conference of Catholic Bishops and the Supreme Council of the Seminary Teachers of Qom in March of this year. Their dialogue led to a joint statement declaring opposition to violations of human life and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Sport has also transcended political obstacles; the US Wrestling Team was cheered on enthusiastically during the Greco-Roman World Cup in Tehran in May. American coach Steven Fraser was so moved that he gushed: “they love us Americans, and we love them!” Although the USMNT and Team Melli will not meet at the Estádio do Maracanã on July 13 to decide the 2014 World Cup, soccer diplomacy through friendly matches and tours could also be used to build relationships and understanding.
Collaboration in any form establishes linkages, both at the grass-roots level and between governments; Americans must seek every opportunity to reach out and create contacts with their Iranian counterparts. Recent reports of discussion between Iranian and American officials over Iraq is a perfect example of an unexpected window of opportunity that will hopefully be seized upon and lead to greater lines of communication on a wider range of issues in the future.
Such contact and collaboration, if taken, will help consolidate and institutionalize trust and cooperation. The primary goal of these endeavors should be the reestablishment of an embassy or interests section in Iran. Such a permanent and direct point of contact is the essential core of any linkage regime. Washington will hopefully be watching with interest when the United Kingdom reopens its own embassy in Iran that closed in 2011 following its ransacking by protestors.
If a deal is reached on July 20, establishing linkage with Iran will increase the probability of it being adhered to by both sides, even if future obstacles and disagreements present themselves. If no agreement is made, linkages must be established to prevent US-Iranian relations returning to the brink of conflict.
Creating this web of linkages between the United States and Iran will take time and can easily be destroyed by political rhetoric and grandstanding. However, through persistence and positivity, the two countries can rebuild trust and build peaceful relations in the long-term.
*David Collier holds a PhD in political science from Boston University and is currently working on a book on US-Iranian relations during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. He has studied Persian at Boston University and Ohio State University and is now based in Washington, DC.
]]>by Ellie Geranmayeh
The violence in Iraq has provoked serious considerations by the West as to whether cooperation with Iran is worth testing to secure regional stability. In the last decade, both sides have avoided expanding their dialogue beyond the nuclear issue in fear of giving the other side leverage or poisoning the [...]]]>
by Ellie Geranmayeh
The violence in Iraq has provoked serious considerations by the West as to whether cooperation with Iran is worth testing to secure regional stability. In the last decade, both sides have avoided expanding their dialogue beyond the nuclear issue in fear of giving the other side leverage or poisoning the talks. Now the search for ways to de-escalate the violence in Iraq comes at a critical juncture in the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program. While the terms for a final deal will not be impacted, Iran’s strategy in assisting Baghdad can add to or undermine the general confidence-building process in the talks. If Iran decides to be constructive, it gains points in the “trust bank” alongside the continued implementation of the interim “Joint Plan of Action” reached in Geneva last year. However, if Iranian actions inflame the Iraqi crisis or directly undermine Western interests, the ongoing process of détente could be seriously damaged.
In addition to the potentially constructive role Tehran could play in stabilizing conflict zones such as Syria and Iraq, the West has also been influenced by the “Rouhani factor.” The foreign policy of Iran’s new president has triggered unprecedented improvements in Western relations with the Islamic Republic. For Europeans, the signing of the interim nuclear deal last November opened the doors for increased contact through ten foreign ministerial visits to Tehran. Last week’s announcement of the UK embassy re-opening was a clear signal that Iran and the UK need and intend to enhance their direct channels of dialogue. The frankness of the White House and some influential Republicans towards potential collaboration with Iran in securing Baghdad was also a welcomed surprise. The culminations of these measures have been instrumental to trust-building with Iran after a cooling off period under former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Despite this new positive tone, Iranian-Western strategic cooperation on Iraq remains farfetched. Tehran has fresh memories of how its intelligence sharing with the West in 2001 in Afghanistan was rewarded by the Bush administration with an “axis of evil” badge. Powerful factions within Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps also believe that the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIL or SIS) has reached its height of power and faces inevitable decline. This reduces the need to make concessions on Iraq that do not serve Iran’s core interests. Meanwhile, Western powers view the Iranian Quds Force as having systematically undermined their interests in the region and see Iranian interests in Iraq as running contrary to the Western drive for national cohesion.
What should be expected and encouraged at the moment is the emergence of a transactional relationship between the West and Iran on regional security. The ISIS quandary may provide the right platform for both sides to engage on such concerns sooner than originally thought possible, and perhaps before a comprehensive nuclear deal is reached. The West’s current strategy in the region is anything but a success and testing the alternative route of dialogue with Iran may yield more concrete results. If security in Iraq and Afghanistan both unravel in the coming year, the Obama administration would face a true regional nightmare.
For Iran, taking a constructive role in stabilizing Iraq is an opportunity to demonstrate that when its interests overlap with the West, a zone of positive, mutual interaction is indeed possible. This cooperation involves the added bonus of laying foundational stones for further positive engagement. The two sides should at least explore areas where their regional policies can be more complementary, or at minimum not destructive to the interests of the other. This would have a positive impact for the nuclear talks by boosting the momentum required for achieving and implementing a final deal.
The recent Middle Eastern uprisings, rooted in domestic political grievances, have morphed into broader and now sectarian struggles in which the West lacks the ability to achieve its objectives and stability on its own. Going forward, Western powers require new and improved methods of implementing their policy agendas in the Middle East where the future power balance between Iran and Saudi Arabia will be vital to security. Working exclusively with one side of this fault line may not aid long-term Western interests — at times, the goals will be more closely aligned with Iran, and in other instances, will overlap better with Saudi Arabia and/or Israel. A more transactional relationship with Iran offers the West the option to balance opposing regional stakeholders and apply its leverage more effectively.
Western powers do not share Iranian ambitions, but given the Middle East’s dangerous regional trajectory, achieving some form of dialogue aimed at preventing a full regional implosion would be mutually beneficial. As demonstrated by the recent crisis in Iraq, there are instances of overlapping interests that make an alliance of convenience between Iran and the West an obvious choice. It is worth attempting — and in the end necessary — for the West to engage all sides when formulating sustainable solutions to the security threats, extremism and humanitarian crises overrunning this region.
The West has practiced a similar strategy in the past. For example, it accepted and at times encouraged cooperation between opposing March 8 and March 14 Alliance movements in Lebanon knowing full well that the alternative of civil war would further threaten its interests. This is not to suggest that the West or Iran will halt support towards traditional allies. Nor will Iran dramatically relinquish partnerships that safeguard Iranian interests. However, events in the coming months could create the political space necessary on both sides to selectively de-escalate shared hostility in pursuing some common regional goals. The new crisis in Iraq could just be “exhibit A.”
This article was first published by LobeLog and was reprinted here with permission. Follow LobeLog on Twitter and like us on Facebook
– Ellie Geranmayeh is an ECFR policy fellow and the author of the recently published report, “Détente with Iran; how Europe can maximise the chances of a final nuclear deal.”
]]>by Wayne White
Secretary of State John Kerry’s June 23 meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki sent a risky symbolic message, albeit unintended: perhaps the US could work with Maliki after all. So it was no surprise today when Maliki came out swinging with his standard litany of accusations against his [...]]]>
by Wayne White
Secretary of State John Kerry’s June 23 meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki sent a risky symbolic message, albeit unintended: perhaps the US could work with Maliki after all. So it was no surprise today when Maliki came out swinging with his standard litany of accusations against his political enemies, clearly determined to exploit the crisis to secure another term. If he stays on, the inclusive Iraqi political solution the White House seeks will remain elusive. The same could be said about the hopes for more speedy and successful action toward driving the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIL or ISIS) out from many of its holdings in Iraq, with or without strong US air support.
Excessive alarm, impatience
The Obama administration appears driven by worse case military scenarios that continue to dominate the US media. Much of ISIS’ recent acquisitions along the Iraqi-Syrian border, although troubling, have been against the relatively easy pickings of isolated garrisons. Even before these gains, ISIS had transited the border quite easily, and along the Jordanian border ISIS faces capable Jordanian military units.
In mixed areas along its battlefront, ISIS has run into some spirited resistance from not only Kurds, but even the Sunni Arab Naqshabandi Army (Baathists & former military cadres) southwest of Iraqi Kurdistan. The refinery complex in Baiji, its isolated garrison fiercely defending it for 2 weeks, appears to have been retaken. Likewise, although ISIS took Tal Afar near the Syrian border, this occurred after government security forces had again gamely taken it back from ISIS.
Iraq’s government forces are not without some obvious fighting power, and ISIS is unlikely to make substantial inroads into the predominantly Shia south or areas held by Kurds in the north.
Kerry raising the possibility that the US might begin air strikes against ISIS prior to the creation of a “transformative” government was another misstep: Washington seems too focused on the immediate situation on the ground at the expense of the basic political and military fundamentals. Due to the size of the ISIS challenge, the latter is more important. The US should have persisted with holding Baghdad’s feet to the fire over a credibly balanced new government (near impossible with Maliki as Prime Minister).
Kerry’s extraction from Maliki of a promise to speed up government formation in Baghdad already has been twisted to Maliki’s advantage; meeting with Maliki threw the beleaguered Iraqi leader a lifeline of sorts. Previously, the White House had said everything short of Maliki must go. The pressing need to peel Sunni Arab tribes and former pre-2003 regime cadres away from ISIS hinges on Maliki’s departure, which now seems less likely. Today Maliki exploited Kerry’s call for a new government within a week by promising to do so, lamely calling for unity, but lashing out again at other Iraqi politicians, Iraq’s Kurds, and foreign countries for conspiring to create the ISIS mess.
With Maliki’s history of broken promises and abuse concerning Iraq’s Sunni Arab community, Sunni demands that Maliki must go appear non-negotiable. In fact, ISIS has been using Maliki’s continued rule among Sunnis as a rallying cry for its military campaign: a struggle to punish Maliki for his anti-Sunni misbehavior.
Keeping the Kurds in hand
The President of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), Masoud Barzani, told CNN’s Christiane Amanpour this week that Maliki’s “wrong policies” brought on the crisis, and Barzani could see little hope that Iraq could “stay together” with Maliki in office. Maliki has broken promises to the Kurds too, becoming deadlocked or sparring endlessly with them over oil export and territorial issues.
Amidst the present crisis, many Kurds have also revived their calls for Iraqi Kurdish independence. Barzani said as much in his interview with CNN. Kerry pushed back against this, and a senior State Department official warned that Kurdish separation would be very damaging at this time.
Despite Kurdish dreams of walling themselves off from the ugly challenges facing Arab Iraq, this is an illusion. Kurdish independence would render the effort to oust Maliki far more difficult by taking the Kurds out of the political fight in Baghdad, as well as leaving them with many of the same security concerns from which they want to walk away.
With mainly Sunni Arabs all along their western and southern borders, an independent Kurdish Iraq would still face a long battlefront. Over the past two weeks the KRG has moved its forces into disputed areas between it and both Sunni Arabs and Shia, including the contested oil center of Kirkuk. Under the present circumstances, this was prudent to prevent a possible ISIS takeover, but it is no secret that the Kurds would like to hold onto these areas for good — unacceptable to all Arab Iraqis. Such unilateral seizures further increase the likelihood of confrontation with either ISIS or a new government in Baghdad, be it united Arab or mainly Shia.
Governmental mess in Baghdad
Maliki’s State of Law coalition scored well in the April parliamentary elections. He and his cronies will fight hard to fend off all comers, fearing, among other things, possible retribution down the line for their abuses. By retaining the Defense, National Security, and Interior portfolios, Maliki also retains the power to intimidate.
Although a Maliki government could hold Baghdad and most of the south, such a government would not create the ethno-sectarian alliances needed to drive ISIS from the bulk of its vast acquisitions elsewhere. In fact, a narrowly based Maliki government could end up resorting to the same sort of destructive, bloody and inevitably indiscriminate slog in which the Assad regime has mired itself since 2011. Hopefully, today’s Syrian airstrikes are not an ominous harbinger of things to come.
Shia elements likely opposed to a new Maliki government also maintain an important role. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani all but declared at Friday prayers last week that Maliki and his policies are bankrupt, calling upon key parliamentary blocs to produce “an effective government that enjoys broad national support, avoids past mistakes, and opens new horizons toward a better future for all Iraqis.” If Maliki is indeed unacceptable to Sistani, that could make his bid to stay a lot tougher.
Meanwhile, Muqtada al-Sadr, repeatedly at odds with Maliki (who turned US forces loose on Sadr’s Madhi Army militia in 2008) commands the most powerful Shia force capable of aiding the Iraqi army against ISIS. Sadr knows Maliki cannot be trusted and might push back by making full support from his tens of thousands of armed, fanatical followers conditional on Maliki’s departure.
One major obstacle in dumping Maliki is the lack of an obvious alternative. No other Shia leaders in Baghdad enjoy any particularly strong political or popular support.
The notion that Iran could help the US forge a new government without Maliki is misplaced. The Iranians have supported Maliki’s hostile policies toward a Sunni Arab community known to harbor profoundly anti-Iranian views reminiscent of the Saddam Hussein era. Iran also values its close relationship with Maliki. In fact, elements of the Iranian leadership might well be counting (as is Maliki) on fears related to ISIS gains eroding US patience in holding back “intense and sustained” US military support pending a more promising political lineup in Baghdad.
With Maliki determined to exploit Kerry’s request for a new government merely to press ahead with his own candidacy, the prospects for a sustained, coordinated, ground, air and political effort against ISIS looks bleak. Since Maliki’s 2010 election campaign especially, he has been the main driver in turning Iraq into the writhing ethno-sectarian snake pit we see today. A well-grounded way out of this crisis remains far from clear.
This article was first published by LobeLog and was reprinted here with permission. Follow LobeLog on Twitter and like us on Facebook
Photo: US Secretary of State John Kerry, a State Department translator, and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki pose for a photograph before beginning a meeting in Baghdad on June 23, 2014. Credit: State Department
]]>Alarm about the advance in Iraq by the group known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has led even as inveterate a hawk as Lindsey Graham to see some advantage in cooperating with Iran. The United States and Iran may indeed seem like the ultimate in strange bedfellows, but [...]]]>
Alarm about the advance in Iraq by the group known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has led even as inveterate a hawk as Lindsey Graham to see some advantage in cooperating with Iran. The United States and Iran may indeed seem like the ultimate in strange bedfellows, but that is only because of rigid thinking that divides the world into allies and adversaries and rejects having anything to do with the adversaries. If those who subscribe to this Manichaean view would let go of it, they would see that the United States and Iran have numerous parallel interests, and America’s opportunities to advance its own interests through cooperation with Tehran go well beyond the current crisis in Iraq.
In Iraq itself, the convergence of American and Iranian interests goes beyond just stopping ISIS. Iranian objectives in Iraq are defined by the experience of Saddam Hussein launching the Iran-Iraq War, an eight-year-long conflict in which hundreds of thousands of Iranians died. Iran never wants to see an aggressive Iraq again, and neither should we. While Tehran might prefer an Iraq too weak to start another war, it does not want unending instability in its neighbor to the west. And while the Iranians are glad that their Shiite co-religionists are no longer subject to oppressive Sunni rule, they are smart enough to realize that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s narrow and increasingly authoritarian manner of governing is a recipe for the sort of Sunni extremism and unrest we see today. The best way for the United States and Iran to advance their shared interests in Iraq is to coordinate their messages to Maliki about political change being necessary to achieve anything approaching stability. There is no evidence, and no plausibility, behind the belief in parts of Washington that Iran wants to help al-Maliki turn this crisis into an all-out Sunni-Shiite war.
In Iran’s neighbor to the east, the United States already has experience in cooperating with Iran to bring about political change. Following the ouster of the Taliban from power in late 2001, U.S. and Iranian diplomats worked effectively together to forge a new political order in Afghanistan that would be presided over by Hamid Karzai. This experience could have led to expanded cooperation in other areas—as the Iranian government of the reformist president Mohammad Khatami surely hoped and probably expected. But then the administration of George W. Bush slammed a door in Iran’s face by declaring it to be part of an Axis of Evil.
The basis for fruitful U.S.-Iranian cooperation on Afghanistan continues today, as Karzai gives way to a successor and the U.S. troop presence winds down. Both the United States and Iran want a stable Afghanistan. Both want a broadly based system of governance that is not controlled only by Sunni Pashtuns and in which all ethnic and sectarian groups have a role. Iran also has a strong interest in getting the Afghan narcotics trade under control, given a major addiction problem among its own citizens.
To the south of Iran, security in the Persian Gulf is a subject in which Iran and the United States, in cooperation with the neighboring Arab countries, are the most important players. They are the two countries that most need to work together to ensure that incidents at sea and other possible misunderstandings do not escalate out of control. Both countries have an interest in not letting warfare endanger the oil trade.
Even where parallel interests are less apparent, such as with the civil war in Syria, interaction between Iran and the United States is not a zero-sum game. The relationship between Iran and the Assad regime has always been a marriage of convenience and not of love. The Iranians probably are open to political changes that would have a chance of concluding the war — indefinite continuation of which is not in the interest of either Iran or the United States.
The United States and Iran have wisely concentrated over the past year on negotiating an agreement on Iran’s nuclear program, believing that premature broadening of the bilateral agenda would make conclusion of a nuclear deal even more complicated than it already is. Cooperation on other matters would have to wait. The security crisis in Iraq has compressed that timetable. Completing a nuclear agreement — and conscientiously implementing it, including the rolling back of U.S. sanctions on Iran — is more than ever important not only in its own right, but in opening the way for other fruitful U.S.-Iranian cooperation. A nuclear deal would impart momentum and confidence necessary to overcome many years of estrangement.
Even with a nuclear deal, Iran and the United States will regard each other more as rivals than as friends or allies. There still will be divergent interests along with parallel ones—as there are in any bilateral relationship, whether with an ally or an adversary. To cooperate constructively based on the parallel ones is not a gift to Iran; it is an unshackling of U.S. diplomacy that will facilitate the advance of America’s own interests.
*This article was first published by the National Interest and was reprinted here with permission.
Photo: President Barack Obama talks with President Hassan Rouhani of Iran during a historic phone call in the Oval Office, Sept. 27, 2013. Credit: White House Photo by Pete Souza
]]>by Emile Nakhleh
Much blame could go around regarding the current chaos in Iraq and the recent territorial gains of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Four contributing factors stand out:
The 2003 decision by the Bush administration to dissolve the Iraqi army and “debaathify” the country (ban the Baath [...]]]>by Emile Nakhleh
Much blame could go around regarding the current chaos in Iraq and the recent territorial gains of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Four contributing factors stand out:
Senior US diplomat Paul Bremer’s decision in 2003 to dissolve the Iraqi army and to debaathify the country, with the approval of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney, was disastrous. Overnight, hundreds of thousands of soldiers and thousands of officers, many of whom were Sunni Muslims, found themselves on the streets without a job and with a debilitating loss of influence and status. Their anger fueled the first insurgency.
Most Iraqis were expected to hold Baath party membership under Saddam Hussein if they desired a position in the government and in the private sector, including education, health services, and corporations. Bremer’s decision to lay off these people because of their party affiliation produced millions of unemployed Iraqis — angry, alienated, desperate, and willing to carry arms against the new Shia-dominated power structure and the US occupation.
According to media reports and published memoirs, Vice President Cheney and his top advisers, including David Addington and Scooter Libby, believed on the eve of the invasion that Iraqis would view the US military as liberators, not occupiers.
They failed to realize at the time that Iraqis’ dislike for Saddam did not automatically translate into love of foreign occupation. Debaathification and dissolving the army created a “perfect storm,” which explains what’s happening in Iraq today.
Prime Minister Maliki has pursued a narrow-minded partisan policy, which excludes anyone — Sunni and Shia — who does not belong to his Dawa Party. Visitors to his office would be hard-pressed to find any senior employee without party affiliation.
Contrary to American advice, Maliki refused to keep thousands of Sunni tribesmen, who were involved in the “Awakening,” on the government payroll. Here again, thousands of these tribesmen who received regular incomes from the American military became unemployed.
Not surprisingly, they became the backbone of the second insurgency against the Maliki government.
Maliki misjudged his countrymen thinking that they would tolerate a regime based on divisiveness, sectarianism, systemic corruption, and a budding dictatorship. He promoted sectarianism even among the senior military officer corps and promoted party allegiance over competence and experience.
He thought mistakenly that for geopolitical reasons, both the United States and Iran would continue to support him despite his poor policies. This support is now tepid at best; even mainstream Shia political leaders are calling for his removal.
Maliki has clearly reached a dead end and should be replaced. Following the US departure, he failed to lead Iraq into a more inclusive and stable country. Key regional and international actors no longer believed his accusations that his critics were “terrorists.”
ISIS’ territorial advances, as were dramatically depicted on television screens around the world, highlight the disintegration of some divisions within the Iraqi army. It’s an embarrassment not only for the Iraqi army, but also more significantly for the US military, which trained these units.
Depicting ISIS’ sudden success as another case of “intelligence failure” is tempting. In reality, the US military had inadequate knowledge of the loyalties, commitment, professionalism, and sectarianism of the Iraqi military. Abandoning their uniforms and weapons and refusing to fight for their country meant Iraqi officers did not believe in what they were fighting for or their mission. Billions of dollars spent by the US on training these units went to naught.
Washington’s failure to bring about the fall of Assad early on has also emboldened Sunni militants to fight in Syria. “Jihadists” from across the globe, including from Western countries, descended on Syria for the same cause. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, and other Gulf countries have funded these groups.
Bashar al-Assad’s self-fulfilling prophecy that terrorism is the main enemy in Syria has come home to roost, not only in Syria, but also in Iraq.
The way forward
A failed state in Syria and a dismembered Iraq could push the entire Middle East toward sectarian wars and instability, which could in turn unsettle oil markets and rattle the global economy. Before the 2003 invasion, former Secretary of State Colin Powell warned President George W. Bush of the Pottery Barn rule. The United States pushed Iraq into this mess; it’s time Washington owns what it broke.
This article was first published by LobeLog and was reprinted here with permission. Follow LobeLog on Twitter and like us on Facebook.
Photo: Demonstrators carry al-Qaeda flags in front of the provincial government headquarters in Mosul, 225 miles (360 kilometers) northwest of Baghdad, Iraq on June 16, 2014.
by Wayne White
President Barack Obama’s news conference today showed some well-placed White House caution against acting in ways that would support more substantially Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s sectarian agenda in Iraq. Hopefully, Obama’s repeated implicit criticism of Maliki’s government and his expressed desire for key Iraqi players to form a new [...]]]>
by Wayne White
President Barack Obama’s news conference today showed some well-placed White House caution against acting in ways that would support more substantially Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s sectarian agenda in Iraq. Hopefully, Obama’s repeated implicit criticism of Maliki’s government and his expressed desire for key Iraqi players to form a new government will raise the chances of Maliki’s ouster. Yet the announced measures do carry risks — potentially for greater US involvement with Malki & Co, and to US personnel in Iraq, the US itself, and US diplomacy aimed at defusing Sunni Arab support for the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).
The White House correctly views Maliki’s remarks yesterday as insufficiently reflective of a genuine desire for inclusiveness. Although Maliki briefly admitted “mistakes” and called upon Sunni Arabs to abandon the extremist ISIS, he offered no meaningful concessions with which to change their minds. Instead he railed against traitorous politicians and Iraqi officers, alleged conspiracies, as well as Saudi Arabia for generating the current crisis. In fact, the key figure in setting the stage for the stunning ISIS breakout in Iraq was Maliki.
Any hands on cooperation with Iraqi units that could collapse or be partnered with vicious Shia militias would expose US troops to possible violence and more direct association with inevitable retaliatory Shia atrocities against Sunni Arabs. However, the president’s proposal involves the very real possibility of so-called “mission creep” toward even closer military involvement at the unit level.
The deployment of up to 300 more US military advisors to Iraq with their mission unclear — but apparently not merely aimed at better securing our embassy — carries risks. According to the AP, US officials say they will be embedded in teams with Iraqi forces. Thus, there may be the distinct possibility that they will be tactically very close to the action, perhaps contradicting Obama’s claim that US troops will not be involved in combat roles. Likewise, placing military personnel in joint operations centers in Baghdad and the Kurdish north brings in the danger of the US becoming more associated with Maliki’s military effort and the atrocities that will surely result.
Both actions, part of a US effort to “increase support for Iraqi security forces,” also conflict with Obama’s statement that the US would not support “one side against another” amidst Iraq’s seething ethno-sectarian divide. Ideally, both measures would have been withheld until the behavior of political leaders in Baghdad became more consistent with Washington’s vision.
Moreover, such actions (as well as the statement about supporting government security forces) not only makes ISIS more likely to target the US or Americans, but also could undermine Secretary of State John Kerry’s diplomatic mission, presumably aimed at restoring a more “stable, inclusive society” in Iraq. Indeed, countries able to communicate with Iraq’s Sunni Arab tribes and former military officers (many of the latter supporting ISIS one way or another because of anger toward Maliki) will be unhappy with Obama’s less forward-leaning military package.
Another problem is Iran. Regardless of US advisors, Tehran will have a lot more clout with the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad. Iranian military advisors are already on the scene. It is unlikely those advisors — or the Iranian leadership — will be nearly as concerned as their US counterparts with avoiding sectarianism and atrocities (and association with both). Obama himself underscored Iran’s differences with the US concerning Washington’s hope for a less inflamed sectarian environment in the region, suggesting Iran would not shift such positions when he said “Old habits die hard.”
The most refreshing aspects of Obama’s remarks today were his repeated statements implicitly calling for Maliki’s removal. His assertion that “we don’t have” an inclusive government that Sunni Arabs can trust to serve their interests and noting of doubts among other Iraqi leaders are revealing in that respect. Obama’s call for Iraq’s parliament to form a unity government at a time when the makeup of Iraq’s post-election political lineup is still pending, as well as deeming the need for change a “test” for Iraq’s leadership, also says everything short of: “Maliki needs to go.”
NBC’s leading Foreign Correspondent Richard Engel reported before Obama’s remarks that NBC had received word of ongoing consultations regarding the government in Najaf (where influential Shia Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani resides). Obama also mentioned questions among some Iraqi leaders in Baghdad, suggesting the US has information of possible maneuvering against Maliki. It could be that Obama’s decision to withhold airstrikes and more lower-level US military guidance might embolden Iraqi leaders yearning for greater American involvement to attempt dumping Maliki.
All told, Obama’s decision is a mixed bag, but remains relatively cautious. Hewing to such a stance in the face of intense pressure from critics on Capitol Hill and those hyping the immediate ISIS threat to the US (the latter noted in my June 14 analysis) was difficult. Let us hope that in the coming days and weeks President Obama has the will to resist pressures that could significantly increase the US military role in Iraq (and likewise the risk to US interests and American personnel inside Iraq).
This article was first published by LobeLog and was reprinted here with permission. Follow LobeLog on Twitter and like us on Facebook
by Wayne White
Coverage of the Iraqi crisis from the media to Capitol Hill has been characterized by scary worst-case scenarios and exaggerations of the military capabilities of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Yet this Islamic extremist group has probably already seized most of the important Iraqi real estate it [...]]]>
by Wayne White
Coverage of the Iraqi crisis from the media to Capitol Hill has been characterized by scary worst-case scenarios and exaggerations of the military capabilities of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Yet this Islamic extremist group has probably already seized most of the important Iraqi real estate it is going to get. It is vital for the US to avoid simply doing Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s sectarian dirty work for him and returning Iraq to its previously miserably unbalanced status quo. Under the circumstances, however, avoiding that misstep poses daunting challenges.
The successes of ISIS in Iraq do represent a dicey problem for Iraqi authorities in Baghdad and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in the north. ISIS now commands the majority of Iraq’s Sunni Arab heartland as well as a large swathe of mixed ethno-sectarian areas, albeit those with substantial Sunni Arab populations. However, very little territory remains outside ISIS’ current holdings where a Sunni Arab extremist movement would be received with open arms or even passive resignation.
Collapse of dysfunctional army units
Admittedly, the performance of Iraqi Army units assigned to Sunni Arab areas like Mosul has been dismal. Retreating in the face of a few thousand lightly armed militants largely without a fight would have been bad enough. However, the loss of all cohesion, mass desertion, and the abandonment of valuable armaments, ammunition, and equipment compounded the collapse and gave additional advantages to ISIS.
These events revealed just how badly crippling internal problems have undermined the Iraqi Army. This has been especially so since Iraq’s dominant Shia establishment made it effectively impossible for American military advisors and trainers to remain in Iraq beyond the US withdrawal in 2011.
Throughout the ranks, the army has suffered from a high degree of politicized, sectarian, or bribe-generated appointments and promotions, debilitating corruption, and a severe lack of intelligence concerning Sunni Arab areas of the country. Its political favoritism and corruption appear to exceed what prevailed during the Saddam Hussein era. The units that collapsed apparently had no clue ISIS was about to attack Mosul. There have also been suggestions that self-serving unit commanders were more concerned about their personal safety than rallying their troops.
Tamping down the panic
As I noted on June 11, Maliki and his cronies woefully underestimated Sunni Arab tolerance for and potential pushback against years of exclusion and abuse. Now, however, a stunned and reeling Iraqi government probably is overestimating ISIS. Correspondingly, in the wake of its run of unexpectedly easy successes, ISIS might well be returning the favor by underestimating Iraqi Army units and militias in Baghdad.
In any upcoming fighting in Baghdad and the south, ISIS would be far more vastly outnumbered than it was in Mosul and likely to encounter armed Shia elements mustering quite a bit of fanaticism of their own. Only one portion of the army was routed in the north; a city many times the size of Mosul would be a huge mouthful for so small a force of ISIS fighters; and Iranian combatants could very well join the fight.
Moreover, despite Senator Lindsey Graham’s comment yesterday that the US “should have discussions with Iran” about the Iraq crisis, this may be irrelevant. Whether talks occur or not, Tehran, already closely aligned with the present Iraqi government, will likely act as it sees fit in Iraq to serve Iranian interests — regardless of US views on the matter.
Finally, if, as expected, the US commences air strikes, ISIS’ task of moving farther south would be that much more daunting. Near the top of the target list of those anticipated US air (and drone) strikes should be major pieces of military equipment seized by ISIS in the north. That would prevent ISIS from deploying them over the border into Syria (already in progress) or putting them to use in its upcoming clashes with Iraqi government forces.
Homeland imperiled by ISIS gains?
Those harping on ISIS’ “threat to the Homeland” are exaggerating that aspect of the problem. Since adopting the ISIS moniker in April 2013, and during operations by its antecedents since January 2012 in Syria (and going back 10 years in Iraq), ISIS has posed little threat to US interests outside Syria and Iraq.
Of late, its efforts have been consumed by its struggle to overthrow the Assad regime in Syria, combat moderate and other Islamist rebel rivals in Syria, and recently moving against the Iraqi government. There is a threat to the US to consider, but that is likely to emerge further down the line (but, ironically, could be heightened by US air strikes against ISIS in defense of Maliki & Co.)
One potential direct threat to the US that has also existed as part of the Syrian rebellion since 2012 is that of numerous US and other Western European citizens fighting with ISIS and the extremist al-Nusra Front. The prospect of those militants entering the US at some point (US visa requirements are typically waived for Western Europeans) does pose a threat. That threat is magnified by the difficulty Western intelligence and law enforcement agencies have had in gathering precise data on the identities of such individuals.
Trying to harness the Maliki government
Extracting substantial change in the Iraqi government’s abusive behavior toward its Sunni Arab community poses an extremely tough challenge for US policymakers. Holding back US air and other military support to secure this agreement could render getting assurances the easiest part of this endeavor.
If substantial portions of Sunni Arab Iraq were recovered from ISIS, it is difficult to envision how Iraqi government compliance with a more tolerant policy could be monitored reliably. And accountability is critical; Maliki has broken such pledges before. In fact, it would be best all-round if Maliki could be dumped as prime minister in the ongoing negotiations to form Iraq’s post-election government, but there are no indications that his Shia backers would cooperate.
Further complicating this crucial issue, the upcoming mainly sectarian face-off will inevitably result in atrocities on both sides. Already, ISIS has claimed and videoed its execution of large numbers of captured Iraqi soldiers, inflaming the atmosphere. The recruitment of Shia volunteers (with many hardened Shia militiamen undoubtedly among them) along with the possible employment of elite Quds Force cadres from Iran has also been reducing Baghdad’s control over the behavior of its own combatants.
Atrocities will undermine the ability of even a well-intentioned government in fielding a policy of communal toleration. Even worse, instead of a fast-paced government campaign to drive ISIS out of most of its Iraqi holdings, portions of the coming fight might resemble the more prolonged and grueling 2003-08 US-Iraqi struggle against the Sunni Arab insurgency and ruthless Shia militias.
Sorting out a workable way to thread this complex needle toward a new Iraqi national sectarian compact should be as high a priority for the Obama administration as military measures meant to defeat ISIS. The international community could perhaps be drawn into the task of monitoring Baghdad’s compliance in the coming years. Still, preventing a return to pre-crisis sectarian hostility is likely to be as difficult as the immediate military task of containing and rolling back ISIS — if not more.
This article was first published by LobeLog and was reprinted here with permission.
Photo: Carry weapons and waving Iraqi flags, volunteers join the Iraqi army to fight militants from the radical Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in eastern Baghdad June 15, 2014.
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