by Djavad Salehi-Isfahani
The diplomatic push by Iranian President Hassan Rouhani to resolve the decade-long dispute over Iran’s nuclear program reached its zenith during his visit to New York in late September, exactly one year after Iran’s currency collapsed under the weight of US-led sanctions. Although the timing is largely accidental, the [...]]]>
by Djavad Salehi-Isfahani
The diplomatic push by Iranian President Hassan Rouhani to resolve the decade-long dispute over Iran’s nuclear program reached its zenith during his visit to New York in late September, exactly one year after Iran’s currency collapsed under the weight of US-led sanctions. Although the timing is largely accidental, the correlation between sanctions and Iran’s willingness to negotiate is not. These measures have clearly hurt Iran’s economy, and its leaders are searching for an agreement with the West that includes sanctions relief.
Much analysis of the reasons for Iran’s new conciliatory approach credits sanctions for the improved diplomatic prospects for reaching a deal. Where opinions differ is how to respond to Iran. Should the West begin with positive gestures and take steps to ease sanctions or tighten them to squeeze a better deal from an adversary in retreat. The question then becomes: whose side is time on?
As Vali Nasr argued forcefully in the New York Times last week, Tehran does not feel pressed for time on political grounds because it sees itself approaching new negotiations from a position of strength.
Only a few months ago, Iran concluded a landmark presidential election that brought to power a popular government much closer to the reformist camp than to the Supreme Leader, challenging the notion of the Islamic Republic as a political system in demise. The charm offensive in this case is an olive branch, not a white flag.
Those who believe that time is on the West’s side argue that Rouhani’s election is actually a sign of Iran’s desperation. They argue that Iran’s economy is in such dire circumstances that it has forced Ayatollah Ali Khamenei into a domestic compromise that makes an external one possible.
So how bad is the state of Iran’s economy, and will it collapse with more sanctions?
The “collapse” scenario, which at times excites US sanctions advocates into a frenzy like what we saw following the crash of the rial last October, is being revived as a way to dissuade the Obama administration from reaching a compromise with Iran too soon.
Iran’s economy is “already on the verge of collapse”, wrote the Times last week, failing to mention that it has been regarded as on that verge for quite some time. A Brookings report in 2009 called Iran’s economy “teetering”, when in fact it was one of the few countries in the world that was still growing after the Big Recession.
However, unlike political systems, economies do not collapse, they shrink. Economic activity in Iran declined by 2.9% last year (5.4% if you count oil activity) according to government figures, and unemployment is at historic levels, though not as bad as what we’re seeing in Greece or Spain.
If sanctions tighten, Iran’s economy will continue to slide for a year or two but will eventually reverse course. Per capita income will probably fall from about 20% below Turkey today to 30% below, but still more than 50% above that of Egypt. This doesn’t foreshadow a collapse as much as it does a slow adjustment to more difficult circumstances.
Positive steps to push Iran’s economy onto a recovery path were in fact taken in the last months of the Ahmadinejad administration and continue today. The rate of growth of Iran’s money supply and inflation started to fall before Rouhani took office. For the past three months, the average rate of inflation has been below 20% annually, about half of what it was in the months before.
The new economic team is also much more competent and looking in the right direction — to the private sector — for solutions to Iran’s economic problems.
Rouhani’s administration is the most business-friendly team to rule the Islamic Republic. The head of Iran’s Chamber of Commerce, Mohammad Nahavandian, is Rouhani’s chief of staff and the closest person to the president. The head of a private bank is also the governor of the Central Bank. Former president Hashemi Rafsanjani, whose men fill key posts in the new administration, encouraged the private sector to view Rouhani’s government as “family”.
Unemployment is approaching 20%, a record level, but will not surpass it. One reason is demography. For every person who entered retirement age in the last few years, 5 new people reached the working age. In the next few years this ratio will fall to 3, substantially reducing the pressure on the labor markets.
Future growth will also likely bring more jobs. After 2005, a large inflow of oil revenues opened a floodgate to cheap imports that hurt local production, causing jobless growth. Thanks to a more realistic value for the rial, the local production of most consumer goods has become more economical for local producers. The easing of sanctions, especially on the banking sector, would be of enormous help to these producers, but this will not be the game-changer.
In deciding how far they can push Iran, the P5+1 negotiating team should bear in mind another important fact about the political context in which the peace initiative of Iran’s new president is taking place. For Rouhani, reaching a compromise with the West is important, but not if it risks losing the support of his conservative rivals who are deeply suspicious of this process.
Rouhani sees his election as a historic opportunity to move Iran closer to a more pluralistic and tolerant society and not merely to settle the nuclear dispute. Forcing him to choose between making peace abroad and keeping it at home, which more sanctions would do, will not yield a better outcome for Iran or the West.
]]>by Dina Esfandiary
Iran’s new president Hassan Rouhani has been sworn in. His cabinet has been approved. The rest of us are on the edge of our seats waiting to see if Iran and the US will hold meaningful negotiations to address the Iranian nuclear file. But scheduling talks is only the [...]]]>
by Dina Esfandiary
Iran’s new president Hassan Rouhani has been sworn in. His cabinet has been approved. The rest of us are on the edge of our seats waiting to see if Iran and the US will hold meaningful negotiations to address the Iranian nuclear file. But scheduling talks is only the first step, what needs to come next — the willingness to compromise on both sides — will indicate whether a solution to this interminable crisis is possible.
The last round of nuclear negotiations in the spring/summer of 2012 created high expectations as both sides seemed willing to have another go at solving the impasse. At the same time, neither appeared ready to compromise on issues that were of concern to the other. The P5+1 (US, Britain, France, China and Russia plus Germany) sought to address Iran’s ability to sprint towards a nuclear weapon with their “stop, ship and shut” proposal. Tehran was asked to stop producing 20% enriched uranium, export its accumulated stockpile and shut down its underground Fordow uranium enrichment facility all in exchange for minimal sanctions relief: the suspension of measures on gold and precious metals. Needless to say, the Iranians didn’t accept.
While getting all parties to meet and spell out their proposals after a long break in negotiations was a feat in itself, substantively, not much was achieved. Vali Nasr at Johns Hopkins University hit the nail on the head when he said: “The problem is that Iran is stuck in its position: it has to give up substantial things — trump cards — for talks to proceed substantively, and it needs serious concessions in return.” But the P5+1 is not prepared to give them.
Now the context has changed. A new Iranian president has entered the scene and he seems more amenable to meaningful negotiations than his predecessor. This doesn’t mean Rouhani is a reformer. He’s very much a regime insider who had to pass the Guardian Council’s screening process like all presidential candidates do. He’s also a cleric with a long tradition of loyalty to the Islamic Republic who’s served on numerous state bodies and, prior to his election, was Leader Ali Khamenei’s representative to Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. Of course, these are positive attributes for a president inside the Islamic Republic. Former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made enemies in almost every government department, whilst Mohammad Khatami’s reformist ways seriously threatened Iran’s hardliners. Both had their hands tied when it came to implementing significant changes.
Rouhani’s track record suggests he knows how to sell policies at home. In October 2003, when he was Iran’s top nuclear negotiator, he agreed to a limited suspension of its enrichment program while telling the Iranians this would buy time to advance it in other ways. This allowed him to silence his hardline critics who were accusing him of selling Iran out.
In addition to willingness and ability, Rouhani will need assurance that he has an international partner who’s interested in cooperation, and a reason to compromise on an issue that has been elevated to national importance in Iran. If faced with inertia or increasing sanctions, Iran’s hardliners will discredit him and force the country back into a policy of resistance. Both sides must be willing to give-and-take and show decisive leadership to reach a deal.
If the P5+1 wants to limit Iran’s enrichment ability, and possibly its future plutonium production, it will have to offer more in return. Iran will want reciprocity in the weight and substance of a deal. This means some form of significant sanctions relief, or, given the difficulties involved in removing sanctions, a timeline to that effect should Iran agree to curb its program. This would go some way in convincing a (perhaps rightfully) paranoid regime that sanctions were not designed for regime change. Given the difficulties the US faces with Congress, this is an area where the EU could play an important role.
The Iranians will also want some form of acceptance of their “right to enrich”. There is of course, no such right. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) explicitly refers to the right to peaceful nuclear technologies, not enrichment. Nevertheless, once again, Iran has elevated its interpretation of the NPT to such importance that it will have to be addressed. It remains to be seen whether Iran will accept enough limits on its enrichment to prove the peacefulness of its program and allow for the recognition of this “right”.
Rouhani’s presidency offers the P5+1 the best chance it has had in a while to reach some form of technical deal addressing the concerns surrounding Iran’s nuclear program. Will Iran’s negotiating partner be able to respond this opportunity?
– Dina Esfandiary is a Research Associate and foreign affairs and security analyst focusing on Iran, the Middle East and nuclear issues at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). An archive of her writings can be accessed here.
- Photo Credit: Mehdi Ghasemi
]]>by Robert E. Hunter
Publication this month of Vali Nasr’s The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat, could not have been better timed. The US and the NATO allies are in the process of disengaging from Afghanistan — however they choose to describe the process — without first [...]]]>
by Robert E. Hunter
Publication this month of Vali Nasr’s The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat, could not have been better timed. The US and the NATO allies are in the process of disengaging from Afghanistan — however they choose to describe the process — without first developing clarity about what comes next and how to understand or secure the West’s continuing interests there or in the region. The Syrian civil war continues, seemingly without end and without success so far in the US government to develop a coherent policy or, apparently, efforts to fit that conflagration within developments in the region as a whole. President Obama has just visited the Near East, but there is as yet no promise that serious negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians will begin anytime soon. The standoff with Iran and its nuclear program continues. And there are widespread doubts about the staying-power of US commitments and policies throughout the Middle East and Southwest Asia. For some observers, including Nasr, all this leads to serious questioning about the overall conduct of American foreign policy, summarized in his judgment: “retreat.”
The author, now Dean of the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University in Washington, has had a special vantage point. From January 2009 until 2011 Nasr was special advisor to Ambassador Richard Holbrooke (who died in December 2010), who was the President’s (and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s) Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan — shortened to the more digestible “AfPak.” It is not too much to say that Dr. Nasr’s brief but intense experience in the US government at a high level was both disappointing and disillusioning — and he was not alone. His principal conclusion, at least as inferred by this reviewer, is that the Obama White House failed to take seriously the diplomatic opportunities that were afforded the US, not just toward AfPak, but in the region overall; that it continued to tolerate an excessive militarization of US policies begun by earlier administrations at the expense of a more integrated approach where diplomatic instruments could play their proper role; that the president himself was long on language — eloquently so — but short on action and in the process failed to come to grips with a number of regional developments; that the best efforts by the State Department, including by Secretary Clinton, to intervene in critical policy-making were too often either rebuffed or ignored; and that the US has failed in its essential leadership role. Indeed, the title of Nasr’s book, Dispensable Nation, is a play on a term first coined by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to the effect that the US in the post-Cold War world remains the “indispensable nation.”
(Nasr also does valuable service by eviscerating the case made for sanctions and yet more sanctions against Iran in order to get it to do what we want on its nuclear program, as well as on other matters, including the sub-rosa effort undertaken by the US, Israel and Saudi Arabia to eliminate Iran completely as a competitor for influence in the Middle East. However, the author’s insight comes at a price. His need to paint a dark picture of Iranian ambitions for the bomb and for regional hegemony, coupled with his shredding of the case for sanctions, leaves one wondering whether there is any alternative to war.
On China Nasr provides valuable service by alerting us to the fact that it — like often neglected countries such as Russia — also has major ambitions in Southwest Asia and parts of the Middle East. But he over-interprets available evidence, draws too many connections by linking murky data and too readily assumes that there will inevitably be contention, if not open confrontation, between the US and China.)
What Nasr says about the way in which the White House controlled foreign policy in Obama’s first term and made it highly subservient to domestic politics, at times thereby neglecting critical foreign interests, is a damning indictment – even if only partly true, and at this point in history, no outsider can judge. Nasr is not the only one to argue a similar thesis, but it is the first to be made, as far as this reviewer is aware, by someone as intimately involved in at least one major element of US policy implementation. This helps to explain why a book that has not yet hit bookstores has gained so much attention, apart from the usual Washington parlor game of welcoming “kiss and tell,” merged with a desire to see whoever the sitting president is stub his toe or worse. On all of this, Dispensable Nation delivers. It is a compelling read, even though it occasionally gets bogged down in detailed analyses of issues which most people will know little about. And while Nasr cannot be counted as a member of the new cottage industry of “declinists,” he does warn that, without a radical rethinking about the making and carrying out of US foreign policy, this nation can do itself and its role in the world serious injury, not least to its reputation and to the willingness of others to rely on it.
So far, so good. But there are some other facets of this book, which, while not reducing the author’s valuable insights listed above, at least present a somewhat different perspective. One might be a quibble on the part of an “old school” approach to government service: that someone who voluntarily “takes the King’s shilling” implicitly assumes a burden of not telling tales out of school, at least not until all the senior players have left the stage. Of course, breaking with that unwritten practice makes for a juicier read, but also leads one to ponder.
A more serious question is raised by the apparent assumption running throughout the book that, if a different approach had been taken to X or Y — in particular a greater reliance on diplomacy and giving free rein to diplomatic approaches advanced by the Special Representative, Ambassador Holbrooke (who appears in Dispensable Nation to have been the lead character of an “inside the Beltway” morality play), then very different, positive things would have resulted. This would be a reach in regard to any region of the world. With regard to the Middle East and its long history of complexities and imponderables — more even than what Winston Churchill said of Soviet foreign policy, “a puzzle inside a riddle wrapped in an enigma” — one should be chary of drawing hard-and-fast conclusions about the impact of different policies that might have been pursued. Thus, it is difficult to believe that, without other major factors changing, US leadership would on its own somehow have transformed Arab-Israeli peacemaking; that a different US approach to Egypt and other Arab countries would have produced a better course for the Arab Spring; that earlier intervention (but exactly what?) would have ended the slaughter in Syria; and that the negotiating strategy advocated by Ambassador Holbrooke would have brought the Afghanistan war to a successful conclusion (without taking us all back to Square One with the Taliban again in full control) and with US-Pakistan relations on better footing and the region stabilized.
To summarize, in addition to the highly relevant and well-argued analysis of the Obama administration’s shortcomings, many of the author’s suggestions for alternative approaches are more wishful thinking than the product of deep knowledge about the region and seasoned judgment concerning the very real limits of power, however “powerful” the actor. Perhaps that is an unfair conclusion, given that Nasr’s role in AfPak was the his first venture into government, but that gives greater weight to the admonition about being careful with drawing needlelike conclusions and making sweeping predictions about alternative strategies and their putative outcomes.
It might also have been useful if Dr. Nasr had drawn upon his experience to discuss whether the practice of using special representatives instead of common and garden-variety diplomacy is a good or bad thing. In some cases, appointing a US special negotiator has had positive effects – like in Arab-Israeli peacemaking, where a special negotiator can relieve a Secretary of State from having to deal virtually full-time with demanding and quarrelsome partners; or lengthy arms control negotiations, where having at the table experts from outside the Foreign Service can be essential, as the Obama administration, in this reviewer’s judgment, has ably and effectively done. But other than these exceptional circumstances, substituting a special representative for the regular practices and processes of the US government is just asking for trouble. This was certainly true in regard to the plethora of special representatives appointed during the first Obama administration, thereby short-circuiting the regular workings of government so much so that the expertise and experience needed to formulate and implement effective policies were at times missing or sidelined. Certainly, the balancing of contending (and legitimate) points of view from different elements of the bureaucracy (e.g., state, defense, CIA, NSC staff) risked being lost, to the detriment of coherent policy that could be effectively integrated for the longer-term with other related US concerns abroad beyond the purview of the special representatives.
Add to this the appointment of a special representative for AfPak who had achieved almost superstar status, with personal ambitions to match and a well-deserved sobriquet of “bulldozer,” and it would be surprising if all had gone smoothly within the US government — not least because Amb. Holbrooke, the hero of Dispensable Nation, had no experience in the region and no prior knowledge of the issues or the local political cultures. Indeed, it did not go smoothly, predictably so given Amb. Holbrooke’s career-long disdain for anyone who got in his way (along with his methods for eliminating competitors for either position or limelight), his lack of capacity for genuine strategic thinking as opposed to short-term tactical fixes, and his most undiplomatic approach to friend and foe. In fact, since his highly publicized spat with Afghan President Hamid Karzai who, like it or not, is someone the US has had to deal with, Holbrooke’s role as an interlocutor ceased to be useful to the United States.
In sum, Nasr has not only given us a good read but also a former insider’s judgments about what happens when a US administration does not place a high enough priority on getting right the US role in the world; does not assess adequately what it truly needs to do (instead of issuing slogans like “pivot to Asia” that confuse allies and imply reduced US interest in the Middle East and Southwest Asia at the very time when peril to American interests there is increasing); that inserts domestic political judgments at the start of the process instead of after due consideration of foreign policy choices; that permits a continuing imbalance between military and non-military instruments of power and influence; and that does not yet adequately “think strategically” about the future two decades after the end of the Cold War made such strategic thinking imperative.
Whether Dr. Nasr is right on both his analysis and his prescriptions will now be hotly debated. In any case, Dispensable Nation has emerged as valuable evidence supporting one important point of view.
]]>by Jasmin Ramsey
We’ve been hearing that line, or variations of it, since people in the US began taking the uprising in Syria seriously. But what exactly does that statement mean? It sounds simple enough: the leadership in Syria and Iran are allies, so the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime will [...]]]>
by Jasmin Ramsey
We’ve been hearing that line, or variations of it, since people in the US began taking the uprising in Syria seriously. But what exactly does that statement mean? It sounds simple enough: the leadership in Syria and Iran are allies, so the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime will make Iran weaker. It’s always more complicated than that, however, as foreign policy expert Vali Nasr’s points out during this March 19 interview with Der Spiegel:
Nasr: The US policy is still catching up with others. Qatar and Saudi Arabia, even Turkey are much more engaged in the conflict than the United States. They understand it is of vital importance.
SPIEGEL: And Iran is particularly engaged.
Nasr: Basically everybody in the region on the good side and the bad side is “all in” in Syria. Every nation that is, but the US.
SPIEGEL: If the US government managed to settle that conflict, would that be the biggest blow to Iranian ambitions in the region?
Nasr: Iran would only get a blow if there was a very clear victory for the anti-Assad faction, and that does not look like it will happen.
That last answer is another loaded one-liner. Now unpack that one before reading about the “Free Syria Act of 2013“.
]]>While the column really must be read in full, Nasr argues that recent actions taken by Iran add up to a “defiance [that] marks a change” in its previously muted response to Western pressure.
They now see the U.S. policy on Iran — of toughening sanctions and also, at the United Nations, addressing Iran’s human-rights record and support for terrorism — as one aimed at regime change.
That makes attaining nuclear weapons of critical importance to the clerics. Without such weapons, Iran could face the Libya scenario: economic pressure causing political unrest that invites intervention by foreign powers that feel safe enough to interfere in the affairs of a non-nuclear-armed state.
In Nasr’s view, the “policy debate in Tehran” appears to have been settled in favor of a considerably more hostile stance. The column concludes:
]]>Obama administration officials think Iran is weak and isolated. They focus on the country’s shambolic economy, its faltering relations with Europe, and the effect the Arab Spring has had in turning public opinion in the Middle East against Iran.
But Iran’s rulers have a different outlook. Here’s what they see: The U.S. and Europe are economically weak and extremely vulnerable to high oil prices. China and Russia have broken with the U.S. and Europe over Iran. The U.S. is hastily leaving Iraq and abandoning the war in Afghanistan. U.S. relations with Pakistan are unraveling.
Iran’s rulers believe the new Middle East is a greater strategic challenge to the U.S. than to Iran. For the U.S., the region will be far less pliable under rising Islamists than it was under secular dictators. As those Islamists take control of governments from Morocco to Egypt, new opportunities arise for Tehran to forge diplomatic and economic ties.
Consequently, the Iranian regime thinks it can counter international pressure on its nuclear activities long enough to get to a point of no return on a weapons program.
Rather than discourage this aggressive Iranian position, U.S. policy is encouraging it, making a dangerous military confrontation more likely. There are no easy options for dealing with Iran, but not persisting in a failing strategy is a good place to start.
Saudi is the cartel member most interested in earning political ‘points’ with consuming countries, and maintaining its image as a reliable supplier of last resort….Venezuela and Iran likely feel they have less to gain politically by increasing quotas as a symbolic gesture.
And according to policy analyst Ian Bremmer of the Eurasia Group, global oil supplies are healthier than they seem because “the most substantial fallout from the Arab world’s recent upheaval is behind us,” more additional supply is coming and OPEC’s biggest producer Saudi Arabia increased production anyway.
Bremmer ends his piece in the Financial Times by noting
Economically stressed oil producers such as Iran and Venezuela always want higher oil prices. But the Saudis and other Gulf Co-operation Council producers maintain a longer-term moderating outlook and they are the ones with the spare capacity to make the difference.
Ahmadinejad is a threat to clerical supremacy, but without him, Khomeinism is even more vulnerable to reformist challengers. The alternative would be a right-wing ideological state — nationalist, fundamentalist, populist, and ruled by militarism, something akin to the Japan of the 1930s. And that cannot last. In this contest between Iran’s elite factions, the world should be rooting for the clergy — their victory will bring about the quickest end to the Islamic Republic.
While an Iran nationalist-led Islamic Republic of Iran could indeed prove to be more powerful than the one led by the increasingly hated clergy, Nasr’s statement that “[a]round the region, Ahmadinejad has had little impact” is questionable.
As shown by a 2010 Sadat Chair/Zogby International poll surveying Arab public opinion in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, when asked about the world leader Arabs admired most, Ahmadinejad came in 3rd place, behind Recep Erdoğan and Hugo Chavez. This amounts to quite an impact, no?
According to the principal investigator Professor Shibley Telhami
My own analysis of the results suggested that Iran is benefiting from the sentiment that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” This was particularly visible when those polled were asked to identify the two states that posed the biggest threat to them: 88 percent identified Israel, 77 percent identified the United States and 10 percent identified Iran. While the results on this latter issue varied somewhat from country to country, the trend held across countries polled.
But this year the populist leader isn’t only the enemy of the West, he’s also a public enemy of Iran’s traditional ruling elite and it will be interesting to see how Arab populations respond to the increasing attacks on him.
The catch? For years the United States has been accused [...]]]>
The catch? For years the United States has been accused of lending support to Jundullah as a way of fomenting instability in Iran’s ethnic Baluchi southeast.
From State’s press release:
On November 3, 2010 the Secretary of State announced the designation of Jundallah, a violent extremist organization that operates primarily in the province of Sistan va Balochistan of Iran, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) [...]
Since its inception in 2003, Jundallah has engaged in numerous attacks resulting in the death and maiming of scores of Iranian civilians and government officials, primarily in Iran’s Sistan va Balochistan province. Jundallah uses a variety of terrorist tactics, including suicide bombings, ambushes, kidnappings and targeted assassinations.
Iran responded late last month to an invitation to the November P5+1 talks on its nuclear program. Whether the latest move by the U.S. is a concession or a confidence building measure, it’s worth noting the State Department recently seems to be taking aim at Iranian national pride, such as referring to the “Persian Gulf” as the “Arabian Gulf” (see here and here).
Nonetheless, the statement on Jundullah was welcomed in Tehran, even as it bashed U.S. covert support for anti-regime groups there. According to the Iran’s semi-official news service, ISNA:
Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast called the US designation of Rigi group as terrorist a “right measure.”
“Fighting terrorism is a general responsibility of all nations and the Islamic Republic of Iran regards the US measure in blacklisting Rigi terrorist group as a right measure,” he added.
“The Islamic Republic of Iran will evaluate change in the US policy on supporting terrorist groups of Jundullah (Soldiers of God), PJAK and Tondar in practice.”
Politico foreign policy blogger Laura Rozen suggests that the designation of Jundallah as a terror group could be “signal” to Iran ahead of negotiations. She quoted an unnamed Washington Iran expert who said the move is clearly aimed at engaging Iran:
The designation of Jundullah shows “one bureaucratic fight in favor of engagement was won,” one Washington Iran expert said on condition of anonymity. “But whether it’s sufficient or not and how it is followed up remains to be seen.”
U.S. geo-strategists Flynt and Hillary Mann Leverett, writing on their blog, called the move a “notable turn-around” and “long overdue.” They lay out some little known history that early-on the Obama administration had considered designating Jundullah, but didn’t do so in the wake of Iran’s disputed June 2009 election. The Leveretts point out:
Since then, the perception that the United States continues to have ties to Jundallah and other groups considered terrorists by most Iranians has had a deeply corrosive effect on Iranian assessments of the Obama Administration’s seriousness about strategic engagement with Iran and its ultimate intentions towards the Islamic Republic.
As the Leveretts report, Obama inherited the wide-ranging covert program against Iran from George W. Bush, whose administration had greatly increased funding for regime change activities and subversion on Iran’s nuclear program.
In July 2008 New Yorker, investigative journalist Seymour Hersh wrote about the expansion of Bush’s program (with my emphasis):
One of the most active and violent anti-regime groups in Iran today is the Jundallah, also known as the Iranian People’s Resistance Movement, which describes itself as a resistance force fighting for the rights of Sunnis in Iran. “This is a vicious Salafi organization whose followers attended the same madrassas as the Taliban and Pakistani extremists,” [Council on Foreign Relations scholar Vali] Nasr told me. “They are suspected of having links to Al Qaeda and they are also thought to be tied to the drug culture.” [...] According to [former CIA agent Bob] Baer and to press reports, the Jundallah is among the groups in Iran that are benefitting from U.S. support.
A blog post on the Wall Street Journal website sums up much of the (thin) evidence for U.S. support of Jundullah, and quotes an earlier unequivocal denial to the blog from the State Department that such support had ever occurred:
]]>“We have repeatedly stated, and reiterate again that the United States has not provided support to Jundallah,” a [State] spokesman emailed. “The United States does not sponsor any form of terrorism. We will continue to work with the international community to curtail support for terrorist organizations and prevent violence against innocent civilians. We have also encouraged other governments to take comparable actions against Jundallah.”