by Jim Lobe

I guess that’s one of the things that occurred to me when I received this Press Release and the letter to the president (reproduced below my post) from the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) yesterday. All but one of the 47 members of the Committee signed on.

The [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Jim Lobe

I guess that’s one of the things that occurred to me when I received this Press Release and the letter to the president (reproduced below my post) from the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) yesterday. All but one of the 47 members of the Committee signed on.

The letter, which, normally reliable sources tell me, was initially drafted in the offices of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) calls for a whole new round of sanctions to be imposed against companies and countries doing business with Iran, notably in its mining, engineering and construction-based sectors, as well as other measures that will “increase the pressure on Iran in the days ahead.” While noting that president-elect Hassan Rouhani was “widely perceived as the most moderate of the candidates” running in last month’s election and that its outcome “reflected considerable dissatisfaction by the Iranian people with an autocratic and repressive government that has internationally isolated Iran,” it stressed that the election “unfortunately has done nothing to suggest a reversal of Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capacity.” “[T]here appears nothing ‘moderate’ about [Rouhani's] nuclear policies…”

“Our diplomatic goal,” it continues, “must be to reach a negotiated settlement in which Iran agrees to verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons program.”

Now that last phrase is particularly provocative because, as everyone who has paid the slightest attention to intelligence community (IC) estimates and statements over the last five-and-a-half years knows, Iran suspended what the IC had previously believed was a nuclear-weapons program in 2003 and the country’s leadership, including Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has not made a decision to produce a weapon. So what we see in this letter is deliberate disregard by 46 of the 47 HFAC members — both Democrats and Republicans — of the conclusions of the 17 agencies that make up Washington’s Intelligence Community. This is the same IC for which Congress last year approved nearly 54 billion dollars (not counting some $18 billion dollars more for military intelligence). Do you hear any echoes from Iraq here?

I’m prepared to believe that Iran is seeking a capability to build and deploy weapons relatively quickly; that is the same kind of capability as, say, Japan or Brazil has. Indeed, given the threats (and the pressure) to which it has been subject, seeking such a capability is hardly an unreasonable thing to do. In fact, it may even be possible that the expansion of its nuclear infrastructure, as cited by the letter, is a direct response to that pressure. If so, it would follow rather logically that reducing the pressure just might induce a reciprocal gesture on the part of Tehran. Conversely, ratcheting up pressure, as AIPAC and the HFAC members appear determined to achieve, may result in a further expansion and acceleration of the nuclear program, a result that would obviously be counter-productive to their professed goal of reaching a “negotiated settlement in which Iran agrees to verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons program [which the $54-billion-a-year IC says does not exist].”

But let’s return for a moment to AIPAC’s and HFAC’s analysis of the meaning — or lack thereof — of Rouhani’s election last month. The letter points out that Rouhani “indicated his support for Iran’s nuclear ambitions [implying he wants nuclear weapons although he has explicitly disclaimed that goal -- please note the vagueness of "ambitions"] in his first post-election press conference” and contends that there “appears nothing ‘moderate’ about his nuclear policies…” But that’s a rather tendentious interpretation of what Rouhani said at that press conference. Here’s what he said when asked about the nuclear program:

By God’s grace, we will have more active negotiations with the P5+1. This is the main point. And we are of the opinion that the nuclear issue can only and only be resolved through negotiations. Neither threats, nor sanctions are effective. The solution lies in holding negotiations and reaching a mutual trust. The solution of reaching a mutual trust is possible. This was done before. We will benefit from previous experiences. The fact is that the Iranian nation’s undeniable rights will always be considered by the future government. And it [future government] will constantly make efforts to save the people from the cruel sanctions step by step, and to be able to build better relations with the countries of the world, particularly the neighboring states, as I emphasized before.

And this is a quote about the nuclear program from his last televised debate with the other presidential candidates — the same debate in which Ali Akbar Velayati quite publicly ripped hard-line nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili for the latter’s inflexibility in negotiations with the P5+1 over Iran’s nuclear program:

It’s nice for the centrifuges to run, but people’s livelihoods have to also run, our factories have to also run.

And here’s what he said about relations with the U.S. in his post-election press conference:

The issue of relations between Iran and the United States is a complicated and difficult issue. It’s not a simple issue. After all, there is an old scar. Prudence has to be adopted to cure this scar. Of course, we will not pursue continuing or expanding tensions. We will not pursue adding to tensions. It would be wise for the two nations and countries to think more of the future. They should find a solution to the past issues and resolve them. They should think of the future. But any talks with the United States have to take place based on mutual respect, mutual interests, and mutual stances. It definitely depends on certain conditions. And those conditions have to be fulfilled. First, as stated in the Algiers Accord [brokered by the Algerian government between the United States and Iran to resolve the Iran hostage crisis in 1981], the Americans have to confirm that they will not interfere in Iran’s internal issues ever. Second, they have to officially recognize the Iranian nation’s rights, including the nuclear right. Third, they should avoid unilateral or bullying policies against Iran. And of course, under such circumstances, the grounds [for holding talks] would be ready. If we feel there is goodwill involved, then the grounds [for talks] would be different. But everyone should know that the future government will not ignore the rightful rights of the Iranian nation under any circumstances. And on this basis, we would be ready for the tension to become less, and even if we see goodwill, it would be possible to take steps toward building trust within a framework that the Islamic Republic of Iran has. And I have pointed out the framework.

Rouhani also actually referred to “Israel” by its chosen name, forgoing the traditional aversion to pronouncing the name of the “Little Satan.”

These statements may, of course, disguise much more sinister and radical designs, but they sound pretty “moderate”, at least by Iran’s standards of the last eight years or so. And it’s worth remembering that they were made publicly in front of a large domestic audience whose votes appear to have actually been counted and who probably formed certain expectations that his words could translate into policy. That the AIPAC/Royce/Engel letter takes absolutely no account of any of this demonstrates the extent to which the 46 members of the Foreign Affairs Committee are actually paying the slightest attention.

Of course, in the event that any attention was paid to Rouhani’s words and the circumstances in which he offered them, the letter falls back on the familiar old chestnut that, of course, it is Khamenei, not Rouhani, who will decide the fate of Iran’s nuclear program, so the president-elect doesn’t really count (despite the fact that (a) Khamenei supposedly “allowed” Rouhani to win, and (b) he’s served on the Supreme National Security Council for some 15 years, many of them as Khamenei’s representative). And here we are reminded that Khamenei “has recently reiterated his view that Iran has no reason to normalize relations with the United States.” Well, he may indeed have said that recently (although I can’t find a recent quote to that effect, but it should be pointed out that Iran doesn’t have to normalize relations with the U.S. in order to reach an agreement over its nuclear program with the P5+1. Indeed, the whole issue of normalization in the context of the nuclear program is pretty much a non sequitur.

But let’s look more closely at what Khamenei has been saying. Here’s what he said on June 26, according to a Reuters dispatch:

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said on Wednesday the dispute over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear programme could easily be resolved if the West were to stop being so stubborn.

While accusing the West of being more interested in regime change than ending the dispute, Khamenei did express a desire to resolve an issue which has led to ever tighter sanctions on Iran’s oil sector and the wider economy.

“Some countries have organised a united front against Iran and are misguiding the international community and with stubbornness do not want to see the nuclear issue resolved,” Khamenei’s official web site quoted him as saying.

“But if they put aside their stubbornness, resolving the nuclear issue would be simple,” he said, without setting out what specific concessions he wanted Western nations to make.

…”The Islamic Republic has acted legally and transparently in the nuclear debate and offers logic in its arguments, but the aim of the enemies is through constant pressure, to tire Iran and change the regime and they will not allow the issue to be resolved,” Khamenei said.

…”Of course the enemies say in their words and letters than they do not want to change the regime, but their approaches are contrary to these words,” he said.

Again, this may all be deception, or “taqiyya”, as neo-cons who fancy themselves expert in matters Shi’a love to invoke when insisting that you can’t trust anything a Shiite tells you. But it certainly doesn’t preclude the possibility of reaching a deal based on such unimperial concepts like “mutual respect,” reciprocity, and international law.

As to relations with the U.S., there’s this other Reuters report that may be of interest to the 45 congressmen and women from June 12:

NEW YORK/ANKARA (Reuters) – Five months ago Iran’s foreign minister sent an unusual letter to the country’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. It was time, Ali Akbar Salehi wrote according to two sources who read the letter, to reach out to Tehran’s arch foe by entering into “broad discussions with the United States.”

The supreme leader, though cautious about the prospect, sent a reply to Salehi and the rest of the Cabinet: he was not optimistic but would not oppose them if they pursued the initiative.

The fact is, public debate about direct negotiations with the U.S. was more or less a taboo in Iran as recently as 18 months ago. But it is now openly talked about, even in public debates by candidates close to Khamenei, and it appears that the Supreme Leader himself is not necessarily averse. In light of the results of last month’s elections and Rouhani’s own words on this question, why are those 46 members of the Foreign Affairs Committee so certain that nothing has changed in Iran and that more pressure is the only solution, particularly when so many actual Iran experts agree that the election has created a major opportunity that Washington would be foolish to squander. Maybe it’s time for the Committee to consult with the IC’s analysts to see what they think. And maybe it’s time for members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to stop reflexively signing onto letters because they’re told AIPAC drafted them. It’s almost as embarrassing as giving Bibi Netanyahu 29 standing ovations.

Meanwhile, here’s a letter that has begun circulating in the House that offers a different approach (compare it to the one that follows):

Dear Colleague:

On June 14, the Iranian people elected Hassan Rouhani president, overcoming repression and intimidation by the Iranian government to cast their ballots in favor of reform.

This is not the first time that Iran has elected a president on a platform of moderation and reform, and history advises us to be cautious about the prospects for meaningful change. The Iranian government’s actions in the months ahead will certainly speak louder than Dr. Rouhani’s words.

Even so, given the stakes involved for the United States, Israel, and the international community, it would be a mistake not to test whether Dr. Rouhani’s election represents a genuine opportunity for progress toward a verifiable, enforceable agreement that prevents Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. We must also be careful not to foreclose the possibility of such progress by taking provocative actions that could weaken the newly elected president’s standing relative to Iran’s hardliners, who oppose his professed “policy of reconciliation and peace.”

We invite you to join us in sending the attached letter to President Obama urging him to reinvigorate U.S. diplomatic efforts to ensure Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. The letter does not take a position on whether current sanctions should be strengthened or relaxed, nor does it take a position on the potential use of military force by the United States or its allies. We know our colleagues hold different views on these sensitive issues, but we should all be able to agree on the need for a renewed diplomatic push as part of our broader strategy toward Iran.

If you would like to sign or have questions about this letter, do not hesitate to contact George McElwee with Rep. Dent (5-6411) or Asher Hildebrand with Rep. Price (5-1784).

Sincerely,

CHARLES DENT
Member of Congress

DAVID PRICE
Member of Congress

[gview file="http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/sites/republicans.foreignaffairs.house.gov/files/Iran%20Sanctions.pdf"]

by Reza Marashi

The election of Hassan Rouhani as Iran’s next president has elicited different interpretations in Washington. To some, Iranian officials from both sides of the political spectrum are cut from the same cloth, so a pox on both of their houses! To others, a centrist Iranian president offers the best [...]]]> via LobeLog

by Reza Marashi

The election of Hassan Rouhani as Iran’s next president has elicited different interpretations in Washington. To some, Iranian officials from both sides of the political spectrum are cut from the same cloth, so a pox on both of their houses! To others, a centrist Iranian president offers the best opportunity for finding a peaceful solution to the US-Iran standoff since Barack Obama’s first year in office. That said, Iranian politics can simultaneously produce continuity and change. A few key signposts stand out.

The Changes

A freshly elected Rouhani will feel bolstered in his views, and in turn, will work to push forward his agenda. Nevertheless, he is not all-powerful with regards to nuclear negotiations and improving US-Iran relations. In an effort to boost his chances of success internally, Rouhani will likely build a coalition government that utilizes diverse factional views and figures. This will pave the way for the return of many reformist and technocratic mindsets to the executive branch who have a demonstrated track record of seeking more professional approaches in addressing Iran’s foreign policy and national security challenges.

Yes, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei will have the last word on Iran’s nuclear program and on its relationship with the United States. But Rouhani’s coalition government will almost certainly facilitate the process. The diversity of views in his government may complicate negotiations at first, as different personalities and factions re-learn to work with one another, but finding creative solutions will likely become more feasible for one key reason: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s (and to be fair, Khamenei’s) insistence on using inexperienced forces in Iran’s diplomatic apparatus will no longer be a glaring weakness in Tehran.

Simply put, Ahmadinejad’s departure from office can provide a burst of momentum to facilitate reciprocal, confidence-building overtures between Tehran and Washington — momentum that was nearly impossible over the past eight years due to Ahmadinejad’s political toxicity.

The Continuity

From monarchists to mullahs, Iranian officials have long been focused on consolidating their country as a regional power, undeterred by the objections of great powers. The key cornerstones of this strategy will not change under a Rouhani presidency. As with the Rafsanjani, Khatami and Ahmadinejad presidencies, Iran will seek to improve ties with its immediate neighbors, as well as prominent Islamic countries. To that end, relations with regional powers Saudi Arabia and Turkey will likely be Rouhani’s top priority.

A Rouhani presidency will also continue Iran’s prioritization of improving its indigenous technological capabilities. The very existence of Iran’s nuclear program, missile development, satellite launches and arms procurement are key examples of issues deemed contentious by Washington and non-negotiable by Tehran. However, the contours of these activities are negotiable, and Iran is willing to place limitations on them — for the right price.

It’s critical for Washington to understand the value that all political factions in Iran — including Rouhani — place in the principle of standing up to western pressure. As the Supreme Leader’s chief foreign policy advisor (and potential Rouhani political appointee) Ali Akbar Velayati remarked, Iran will “never give in and never give up.”

The bottom line of Tehran’s nuclear negotiating stance — aimed at achieving acknowledgment of its right to enrich uranium on Iranian soil and the lifting sanctions — has transcended presidential administrations. The key difference between the governing style of Rouhani and his former campaign rival, Saeed Jalili, will be more in style rather than substance. Indeed, during the presidential debates Rouhani did not object to Jalili’s nuclear objective and rather to Jalili’s inability to avoid high costs while pursuing those objectives.

What Happens Now

An opening to the US during Rouhani’s presidency will likely be accepted by Iranian elites — provided it’s not interpreted as a sign of weakness and helps bolster rather than damage Iran’s regional standing. To that end, confidence-building measures have proven to be a difficult construct, largely due to what former President Mohammad Khatami describes as a “wall of mistrust” between the countries.

Contrary to popular assumption in Washington, the Iranian power structure has produced — not “allowed” — a shift in the Iranian presidency, which will likely produce some changes in policy. The degree to which these policy shifts are favorable to Washington’s interests will largely depend on its own actions in moving forward.

When Rouhani and his team attempt to challenge and re-define policies, it will be incumbent upon them to demonstrate an alternative narrative that is squarely in the best interest of the system. Few would argue against the notion that Ayatollah Khamenei’s prevailing narrative is predicated on the idea of nefarious US intentions. Since it will be vital to break Khamenei’s narrative for diplomacy to succeed, Washington must demonstrate through word and deed that it is not against Iran’s scientific, technological and regional progress.

The track record over the past fifteen years is clear: eased foreign tension empowers Iranian centrists and moderates; increased foreign pressure cements the anti-western narrative in Iran. Want to help Iranian hard-liners box in Rouhani? Want to push moderate elements of the Iranian elite into the mindset of distrusting the US? Increasing sanctions and other forms of pressure will almost certainly produce these outcomes.

Contrary to a reigning assumption in certain Washington circles, sanctions did not force the regime to “allow” Rouhani’s victory. Instead, pressure from the Iranian people at the ballot box forced the regime to honor the vote for fear of a 2009 post-election redux that could deepen existing wounds within the regime and, in turn, bring about its total collapse. Khamenei could cheat once, but not twice in a row.

The show of popular force behind Rouhani will provide him with a degree of latitude to break from the previous administration’s policies. But his political rivals won’t have to dig very far into their playbook to sabotage his efforts if new sanctions render him unable to fend off charges of weakness. In this scenario, rather than compromise with the US, Rouhani will be forced to back Khamenei’s narrative, “We respond to pressure with pressure.”

Failure on the part of Washington to seize the opportunity presented by Rouhani’s victory will render his more conciliatory approach to the US stillborn. Of course, for some, this is the preferred outcome.

– Reza Marashi is Director of Research at the National Iranian American Council.

– Photo Credit: Roohollah Vahdati

by Farideh Farhi

It is fair to say that since Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s disqualification, a good section of the Iranian pubic has been in a state of shock and silence. A friend who is also a keen observer of Iranian politics described the mood not only in Tehran but also the [...]]]> via Lobe Log

by Farideh Farhi

It is fair to say that since Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s disqualification, a good section of the Iranian pubic has been in a state of shock and silence. A friend who is also a keen observer of Iranian politics described the mood not only in Tehran but also the capital of a province she visits often as eerie silence.

The excitement that was generated by Hashemi Rafsanjani’s candidacy was unexpected, perhaps even to him. In all likelihood, it was also the reason for his disqualification. Iran’s conservative establishment would have preferred yet another Rafsanjani defeat at the polls as in 2005. But the potential for voter mobilization along the lines of 2009 made that route too risky.

So now the question of what to do must be on the minds of people who identify with the reformists and centrists. Their two key leaders — former presidents Mohammad Khatami and Hahsemi Rafsanjani — have been silent on this since the disqualification.

Voter silence may eventually transform into a turning of the back against the electoral process. It will not be an organized boycott but an effective lowering of the participation rate, particularly in large cities, to which the conservative establishment will probably respond by announcing “a higher than expected” turnout rate along the lines of the “epic” event so desired by Iran’s Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. This is what happened in the rather lackluster 2012 parliamentary election when a participation rate of 66.4 percent was announced to a skeptical and yet indifferent electorate at least in Tehran.

And it is precisely this possibility that compels the reformist and centrist political leaders to mull alternatives. After all, low participation rates have never posed a challenge to the conservative political establishment. Given the solid support from a committed base, lower participation rates can even ensure a conservative victory without ballot box-tampering if the conservatives can agree on a candidate — which as I will discuss hasn’t been the case so far — forcing them to face some decisions of their own in the next two weeks.

But going back to the self-identified reformist and centrist organizations and individuals, in the coming two weeks the two former presidents must decide whether to let the scenario that played out in the 2012 parliamentary election — involving essentially a competition between hardliners and traditional conservatives — to reoccur, or gamble on the energy that was generated for Hashemi Rafsanjani’s candidacy in support of one of the two non-conservative candidates: former nuclear negotiator Hassan Rowhani and former first vice president Mohammadreza Aref. Given their lack of name recognition throughout the country everyone knows that for either of these candidates to have any chance one probably has to withdraw in favor of the other and then receive the public backing of the two former presidents.

In other words, the silence that has followed Hashemi Rafsanjani’s disqualification is underwritten by a turn of the eye towards what these two politicians will call upon their supporters to do.

A call for a boycott is out of the question for Hashemi Rafsanjani who is still the chair of the Expediency Council. It is also highly unlikely for Khatami who knows that such a move would become an occasion for the further purging of reformist parties and organizations from the political system.

The two former presidents can tell their supporters to follow their conscience and vote for anyone they wish or actively try to use their clout in an attempt to shape the election’s outcome. After all, Khatami had already corralled the reformist support behind the centrist Hashemi Rafsanjani. Couldn’t the two former presidents do the same for either Rowhani or Aref — both of whom have performed well in their television appearances so far and staked positions on the economy and foreign policy that are similar to Hashemi Rafsanjani’s while being highly critical of the direction Iran has taken in the past eight years?

Uncertainty in response to this question is the reason for hesitance. Convincing supporters — as well as themselves — that the conservative establishment, which was willing to disqualify one of the fathers of the revolution, will not use other schemes to ensure a conservative presidency will be difficult. The only argument against this deep skepticism is yes, the other side might cheat, but non-participation may ensure its victory without cheating or any challenges.

Electoral mobilization has been the centrists’ and reformists’ only successful instrument against the conservative establishment over the years. True, the last successful mobilization turned into a disaster when post-election protests led to repression and the further securitization of Iran’s political environment. The tired and economically pressured Iranian population certainly has no stomach for a repeat. But throwing away the only instrument that societal forces who have been calling for change have to display their existence — and yes, potential power with — in fear of a repeat of a previous experiment’s consequences is tantamount to prematurely surrendering to authoritarian powers who are perfectly happy if voters mostly stay home.

This argument, while persuasive to me, will nevertheless have a hard time countering legitimate worries that electoral participation in support of either of these two candidates will be pocketed by the conservative establishment as a vote of confidence in the Islamic Republic without giving the centrists and reformists a fair chance.

Still, the decision by both Hashemi Rafsanjani and Khatami — to either not support anyone or clearly back one candidate — is yet to come. There is no reason for them to rush either. In the next two weeks of campaigning getting double air-time for two candidates with similar views that are not generally shown on state television is better than getting air time for only one. But in a week or so the pressure on them will increase to make their move. Already, the reformist Shargh Daily is reporting on a plan by the former presidents’ “advisors” to give support to a slate that has one of the two candidates at the top and the other campaigning as his first vice president in case of a win. The challenge of figuring out who should be at the top, the argument goes, will be resolved by the extent of support each can garner after his performance in the three television debates among the eight candidates that will begin this Friday and end next Friday.

There are two reasons why these former presidents and their supporters have not yet fully abandoned strategizing for a possible reformist/centrist victory. I already mentioned the first reason and it’s related to uncertainty about the length to which the conservative establishment will go to ensure a conservative victory. The argument that the system needs a “clean” election to erase the memory of the botched 2009 election works in favor of trying to mobilize the voters in order to force or impose an election day win.

But there is also a second reason that’s related to the disarray within the conservative camp itself. As I previously mentioned, the conservatives have been unable to consolidate support behind a single candidate. In fact, as of today two of their candidates — Saeed Jalili and Ali Akbar Velayati — have received organizational support from the two polls of the conservative spectrum. Jalili was formally endorsed by the hardline Steadfastness Front (Jebheye Paydari, which is sometimes translated as the Constancy Front) while Velayati was formally endorsed by the Followers of the Imam and Leadership Line Front, which consists of 14 traditionally conservative organizations and parties.

At this point, despite Jalili’s assiduous efforts to portray himself as such — because believe it or not, trying to convince people that one has the Leader’s support in Iran is an art that is practiced by quite a few people in order to push one’s self ahead — it is not clear which one of these two candidates will by Election Day be the favorite of the “system”, called nezam in Iran, or more accurately, Khamenei’s favorite. If the 2012 parliamentary election is any guide — and parliamentary elections occurring before the presidential race with no running sitting president have been good guides in the past — the candidate of the traditional conservatives should do better or become the favorite. But so far this decision doesn’t appear to have been made.

In any case, the interesting aspect of this election may be that for these two candidates even becoming the favorite may not ensure a win if there is no substantial fraud on Election Day. The so-called mashin-e entekhabat (electoral machine), an army of loyalists the system can mobilize in support of a particular candidate even at the last minute, is at most 6 to 7 million people. This is not sufficient for a win even if only 50 to 55 percent — a historical low only recorded for elections in which either a sitting president was seeking reelection (as in 1985 or 1993) or the victory of a specific candidate was assured like in 1989 — of the announced 50 million eligible voters participate. To be sure, both Velayati and Jalili can try to woo votes beyond the machine. But they do not have much in the way of independent organization and given their lack of personal charisma, and the fact that neither of them has held positions related to domestic policy making, the chances of their success is low. (Again, if the assumption is that the Interior Ministry, which is in charge of conducting the election, will inflate the participation rate, it’s unlikely to substantially tamper with votes in favor of one candidate or another).

The only conservative candidate who can add the machine vote to his own personal following is the more popular Tehran mayor Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, who has so far garnered no support from conservative organizations and parties. But Qalibaf has been organizing in almost every city and even quite a few villages throughout the country; he has been practically planning and running for the presidency for the past 8 years.

Yet his basic problem remains with the electoral machine vote, which in the 2005 election shifted in the last minute and favored Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, leaving him with only 4 million votes — and fourth position — out of the 28 million votes cast. A decision made to shift the machine towards Qalibaf will probably be dependent on the assessment of how well the reformist/centrist might do. If the election ends up going to the second round with no one mustering 50 percent plus one vote, then Qalibaf is probably the strongest candidate against the reformist/centrist choice — again provided the absence of a systemic will to ensure a conservative win at any cost either in the first round or by pitting two conservative candidates against each other in the second round.

At this point, all I can say is that betting on the win of any given candidate — or point of view — seems premature. It is true that some candidates such as former IRGC commander Mohsen Rezaie, former minister Mohammad Gharazi, or even former speaker of the parliament Haddad Adel have no chance, but some of the other candidates and their supporters will still have to make choices and react to the choices made by others. The reformist and centrist leaders’ choice to become more aggressive players at the immediate political and tactical level and risk the possibility that the electorate will not follow is a gamble that, if successful, will again force the multitude of conservative constituencies and candidates to revisit their calculations, formulate new tactics and tricks, and even re-arrange their alliances.

With the disqualification of former president and current chair of the Expediency Council Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani by a vetting body, the Guardian Council, Iran’s presidential campaign is opening with many in the country in a state of shock.

Although the eight qualified candidates offer [...]]]> by Farideh Farhi

via IPS News

With the disqualification of former president and current chair of the Expediency Council Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani by a vetting body, the Guardian Council, Iran’s presidential campaign is opening with many in the country in a state of shock.

Although the eight qualified candidates offer somewhat of a choice given their different approaches to the economy and foreign policy, the disqualification of Rafsanjani has once again raised the spectre that the conservative establishment intends to manipulate the electoral process in such a way that only a conservative candidate will win when voters cast their ballots Jun. 14.

Rafsanjan’s candidacy, which received solid support from former reformist president Mohammad Khatami, had created hope among a section of the Iranian population — unhappy with the policies of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad — that a real contest over the direction of the country was possible.

His stature and name recognition had immediately catapulted him as the most formidable candidate against the conservative establishment.

The possibility that the Guardian Council would disqualify a man who is the appointed chair of the Expediency Council and an elected member of the Clerical Council of Experts was deemed unfathomable by many.

In the words of conservative MP Ali Mottahari, who had pleaded with Rafsanjani to register as a candidate, “if Hashemi is disqualified, the foundations of the revolution and the whole system of the Islamic Republic will be questioned.”

Rafsanjani’s unexpected disqualification poses a challenge for his supporters, who include centrists, reformists and even some middle-of-the-road conservatives such as Mottahari: who, if anyone, will they now support in the election?

The slate of approved candidates includes two individuals — former nuclear negotiator Hassan Rowhani and former first vice president Mohammadreza Aref — who hold mostly similar views to Rafsanjani.

In fact, both had said that they would withdraw if Rafsanjani’s candidacy was approved. But neither is as well known as the former president and they will now have to compete against each other in attracting likeminded voters.

Rowhani has chosen to run as an independent, while Aref is running as a reformist. While Rafsanjani’s candidacy had energised and unified the reformists and centrists, the campaign of these two lesser known candidates may be cause for disunity and/or voter apathy.

A third candidate, Mohammad Gharazi — who may also have centrist tendencies — is even less known throughout the country.

He served first as the minister of petroleum and then post, telegraph, and telephone in the cabinet of then-prime minister Mir Hossein Mussavi — now under house arrest after his 2009 presidential bid — and then in Rafsanjani’s cabinet when he served as president.

But since 1997, Ghazari has not held public office. Furthermore, no one really knows his views or why he was qualified when several other ministers with more recent experience were not.

Reformist supporters, already distraught over the previous contested election and continued incarceration of candidates they voted for in 2009, may see Rafsanjani’s disqualification as yet another sign that their vote will not count.

Apathy or abstention in protest among supporters is now a real issue for the centrists and reformists. This challenge may — and only may — be overcome if one of the candidates agrees to withdraw in favour of the other and the popular former reformist president Khatami throws his support behind the unified candidate in the same way he did with the candidacy of Rafsanjani.

But even this may not be enough. The reality is that the low name recognition of both candidates limits the impact of such political manoeuvring and coalition-building by the reformists, especially if the conservative-controlled security establishment makes campaigning and the spread of information difficult. Already Aftab News, a website affiliated with Rowhani, has been blocked.

This leaves the competition among the other five candidates who come from the conservative bloc. One, former presidential candidate, Mohsen Rezaee, is also running as an independent and is both the most likely to last until Election Day and the least likely to garner many votes.

It is the competition among the other four conservative candidates — Tehran mayor Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, former foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati, former Parliamentary Speaker Gholamali Haddad Adel, and current nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili — that will in all likelihood determine the fate of the election.

If Rafsanjani had been qualified, there would have been an urge for unity among these candidates since, without such unity, the former president could have received the 50 percent plus one necessary to win in the first round.

Now, however, the same forces that had prevented the conservative candidates from rallying behind one candidate remain in play.

Polls published by various Iranian news agencies, although not very reliable, uniformly suggest that Qalibaf is the most popular conservative candidate because of his management of the Tehran megapolis and the vast improvement in the delivery of services he has overseen there.

But Qalibaf’s relative popularity has not yet been sufficient to convince other candidates to unite behind him. This may eventually happen after televised presidential debates if he does well in them and if Velayati and Haddad Adel drop out in his favour since, from the beginning, the three of them had agreed that eventually the most popular should stand on Election Day.

But there is no guarantee that this will happen. Velayati in particular has ambitions of his own and has implied that Leader Ali Khameni’s preference should be given at least as much weight as polls, giving rise to speculation that he is the Leader’s preferred candidate despite clear signs that he has not been able to create much excitement even among conservative voters.

Convincing the hard-line candidate Jalili to drop out in favour of Qalibaf will be even harder.

In fact, from now until Election Day there will probably be as much pressure on Qalibaf to drop out in favour of Jalili as the other way around in the hope that a unified conservative candidate can win in the first round, avoiding the risk of either Rowhani or Aref making it to the second round where the top two candidates will have to compete on Jun. 21.

Jalili is the least experienced — and well known — of all the conservative candidates and, in a campaign in which economy is the number one issue by far, there are real concerns regarding whether he is experienced enough to manage Iran’s deep economic problems.

But his late entry in the presidential race, minutes after Rafsanjani entered it, has also given rise to speculation that he, instead of Velayati, may be the Leader’s preferred choice.

What is not a subject of speculation is the fact that Jalili takes the hardest line of all the candidates.

His campaign slogan of “hope, justice, and resistance” suggests that he is the most likely to continue current policies, although perhaps with less bombast and populist flair than the current president.

As such, Jalili stands apart from the other seven candidates who will campaign on the need for both change and competent leadership.

Jalili jumped into the race at the last minute as a hard-line counter to Rafsanjani’s call for moderation. Ironically, with the latter’s disqualification, he now stands alone as the candidate whom others will try to mobilise voters against.

by Farideh Farhi

Okay, it is time to admit that the only thing predictable about Iranian politics these days is its unpredictability!

There are people who know Iran well and as early as a few months ago thought that the next president of the country was already decided by the powers [...]]]> via Lobe Log

by Farideh Farhi

Okay, it is time to admit that the only thing predictable about Iranian politics these days is its unpredictability!

There are people who know Iran well and as early as a few months ago thought that the next president of the country was already decided by the powers that be. There are also others who will say that they predicted all this. I am not one of these.

I am stunned. As of late yesterday (Friday), I did not think that former president and current Expediency Council chair Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani would run for the presidency. All the talk about his entry – and the previous talk and hope about former president Mohammad Khatami’s entry – was mostly tactical, I thought. The loud calls – and pleas – for either Khatami or Hashemi Rafsanjani to run were to show the depth of their support among various sectors of Iranian society, from a good number of the urban middle classes to the business community. I thought it was sort of a flexing of social power muscle. But, given the hysterical reaction both former presidents elicit from the hardliners, I thought they would ultimately be reluctant to run, in the end preferring to throw their support to another candidate who would try to carefully pull the country to the middle.

Khatami had said that if he thought his candidacy would cause further turbulence and polarization, he would not run and made clear in the past week that his candidacy was not forthcoming. Hashemi Rafsanjani had explicitly stated that he would only run with the consent of the Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. I thought he would act the same way as Khatami.

Well, I was wrong big time! The 78-year-old Hashemi Rafsanjani decided to run and with him came a whole slew of candidates signing up at Minute 90 (what else but a soccer reference). Former foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati also walked into the Interior Ministry at the last minute. So did Saeed Jalili, Iran’s current nuclear negotiator, who had previously said he would not run; and so did Esfandiar Rahim Mashaie, Ahmadinejad’s beloved who has been talked about as Medvedev to his Putin. Against all tradition (and perhaps even the law), Mashaie, in presenting his candidacy was flanked by Ahmadinejad himself and several other cabinet ministers, raising eyebrows about whether his interior ministry can run an impartial election when the president is so openly supporting one candidate.

So here we are. There are now more than 35 relatively well known candidates and over 600 unknown candidates, including 30 women – one of whom named Eshrat Kazemi insists on being called Elizabeth! The Guardian Council will have five days to go through these applications and disqualify almost all of them. Given the high number of well-known candidates, the Council may eventually extend its examination period for another five days in order to figure out what to do. But that’s all the law allows. Campaigning in full force among the very few who get past the Guardian Council for the June 14 election will begin no later than ten days from now.

So what does it all mean and how will it all work out? In this rather competitive political environment, it is very hard to say. It is like trying to guess the next move in a three-dimensional chess game. Folks who have called upon Rafsanjani to run -– including Khatami, as well as the conservative MP Ali Mottahari who visited Rafsanjani just a couple of hours before he made his decision to run — have done so based on the argument that second-tier centrist or reformist candidates will not be strong or popular enough to issue a significant challenge and change the direction of the country from its trajectory of the last four years which, from their point of view, has underwritte both its domestic economic troubles and international woes.

No matter what the reason, both Hashemi Rafsanjani’s and Mashaie’s candidacy pose a couple of challenges for the political system as well as for the conservative political players.

First, there is the question of their qualification by the Guardian Council. It is hard to imagine how the this body can disqualify the current chair of the Expediency Council. Hardliners – including the current Intelligence Minister Heydar Moslehi – have accused Rafsanjani of being the “source of sedition,” a reference to the former president’s statement that he had foreseen the post-2009 election turmoil and had a tape of his warnings to prove it. So the Guardian Council could conceivably disqualify him on these grounds. But then this move will shine the spotlight on Khamenei who re-appointed Rafsanjani to chair the Expediency Council after the 2009 protests.

Mashaie’s disqualification may be less of a challenge. After all, there is already a public letter written by Khamenei to Ahmadinejad asking for the Mashaie’s removal as first vice-president. So, conceivably disqualifying him for president given the fact that he was not seen as suitable for vice-president should not be that hard. Nonetheless, some may argue that now that Rafsanjani is running, the Council will more likely approve Mashaie’s candidacy to block Rafsanjani. In this view, the two would then split the anti-systemic vote and allow a conservative to rise. This to me is not a convincing argument. Mashaie’s candidacy arguably poses more of a challenge to conservatives due the likelihood that it would draw votes away from whichever candidate they eventually develop a consensus around, if, in fact such a consensus is in the cards. I cannot fathom the Guardian Council risking the election going to a second round – a real possibility with multiple candidates – with Rafsanjani and Mashaie as the two top candidates running against each other. But all bets are off at this point. In this messy political environment, I have a hard time believing that a backroom deal has been made to qualify both Rafsanjani and Mashaie, but I will no longer be surprised if the latter is qualified.

Which brings me to the second challenge Hashemi Rafsanjani’s candidacy poses. This one is to the conservatives – or the Principlists as they are called in Iran – who have been acting more like a herd of cats than a solid political front. Unlike 2005, when Rafsanjani was challenged by both conservatives and reformists, this time he will be coming in with solid support from the reformists. It is true that the reformists are also a herd of cats, but few doubt Khatami’s ability to convince the herd to rally behind Rafsanjani. In fact, most reformist and centrist candidates have already said that they will withdraw if Rafsanjani runs. The exception may be former nuclear negotiator Hassan Rowhani, but, without support from Rafsanjani or Khatami, he will not be a significant candidate anyway. In effect, if Rafsanjani is qualified by the Guardian Council and if he chooses not to back off in favor of another candidate, the conservatives will be facing a centrist/reformist consensus candidate who may even peel away some of their own, particularly the ones in the commercial sector and many in the clerical community in Qom and elsewhere.

The conservatives meanwhile have not been able to reach consensus on a candidate of their own. The hard-line conservatives now have at least three candidates – former health minister Kamran Bagheri Lankarani, MP Alireza Zakani, and Saeed Jalili. They now have to decide whether to field one of the three – both Lankarani and Zakani have said that they will withdraw if Jalili runs – or join others in finding yet another candidate behind whom they can all mobilize. But they are not the only ones facing the need for readjustment with Rafsanjani’s entry into the race.

The most important conservative alliance – involving former foreign minister Velayati, Tehran Mayor Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, and former Parliament speaker Gholamreza Haddad Adel – has also not been able to decide which one of them should run. All three have now registered, and there is a real possibility that both Qalibaf and Velayati will run. Finally, there are the old-style traditional conservatives. Deputy speaker of the Parliament Mohammad Hassan Abutorabifard has registered on their behalf but so has former foreign minister Manuchehr Mottaki who chose to ignore the choice of traditional conservatives and enter the race himself.

Rafsanjani’s entry into the fray with solid support from Khatami and his followers will force the conservatives not only to scramble for a consensus candidate, but also search for one who is relatively popular or at least better known. The opinion polls reportedly suggest that the most popular conservative candidate is Qalibaf because of his widely hailed management of the city of Tehran. He also has quite a following in his home province of Khorasan Razavi and where he won in the first round of the 2005 presidential election (Khorasan Razavi is one of the most important provinces in electoral calculations given its population of over 5.6 million, second only to Tehran as the country’s most populous province).

Qalibaf, however, has a problem with the most committed base of the Islamic Republic. In fact, in the 2005 election, it was that base that shifted its allegiance from him to Ahmadinejad, reportedly due to its anger over the flamboyant and western-style campaign he ran. This time around, Qalibaf is not making the same mistake. In his interviews and public speaking he is emphasizing that he is NOT a “technocrat,” a term used to refer to Rafsanjani supporters and worldview. He keeps talking about jihadi economic management and jihadi foreign policy –which presumably combines revolutionary ideals and strivings with competence and prudence – to distinguish himself from the technocratic brand that the die-hard conservative base considers a liability. He may do a Romney and move to the center if he emerges as the consensus conservative choice, either through negotiation prior to the June 14 election or by process of elimination if he manages to get to the second round. But his path to becoming the consensus conservative candidate is not smooth.

Meanwhile, the hardliners who really don’t like Qalibaf will be scrambling to push for another consensus conservative candidate. Whether that candidate will be Jalili – who doesn’t have any executive experience and as such raises the specter of another Ahmadinejad in terms of his management capabilities at a time when competence and prudence are central campaign issues – or Velayati “because he is really the candidate Leader Khamenei wants,” or somebody else is yet to be determined.

Also yet to be determined is the extent to which this election will end up being relatively tamper free among the candidates who are cleared by the Guardian Council. Lack of clarity regarding who is really the “system’s favorite candidate” should work in favor a competitive election; that is, within the ideological confines of the Islamic Republic, of course. But with Rafsanjani’s entry, a rather intense battle over the direction of the country has been unleashed with many players having to reassess their previous stances based not only on who they would like to see win but also who they think might win.

Starting with his famous July 17, 2009 post-election speech, Hashemi Rafsanjani has repeatedly made clear that he does not think the highly securitized turn the country has taken has been the right approach. He has also harshly criticized Ahmadinejad’s economic policies and erratic management style and has expressed serious concern about the direction of Iran’s foreign policy. Finally, he has also made the case that, in the face of the external threats the country faces, domestic reconciliation among all significant forces should be the framework for the next government which he says must include representatives from across the political spectrum.

In the coming month, the Iranian electorate will listen to what he and others have to say and will have to decide whether their own participation will also make a difference in the country’s direction. After the traumatic 2009 election experience, the decision to participate on the part of a good number of voters cannot be considered a given. But my bet is that Rafsanjani’s candidacy has just made the Iranian election a bit more interesting even to them.