via The National Interest
Many who offer opinions on policy toward Iran, and particularly on how to handle negotiations over its nuclear program, implicitly claim an unusual ability to read the minds of Iranian decision-makers. Assertions are made with apparent confidence about what the Iranians want, fear [...]]]>
via The National Interest
Many who offer opinions on policy toward Iran, and particularly on how to handle negotiations over its nuclear program, implicitly claim an unusual ability to read the minds of Iranian decision-makers. Assertions are made with apparent confidence about what the Iranians want, fear or believe, even without any particular evidence in support. Several possible explanations can account for the misplaced confidence.
One is that we are seeing common psychological mechanisms in action. A well-established human tendency is, for example, to interpret cooperative behavior on another person’s part as a response to one’s own behavior, while ascribing uncooperative conduct to innate orneriness on the part of the other person. Thus there is a failure to understand how firmness in Iran’s negotiating position is a response to firmness on the Western side, and there is an accompanying tendency to interpret a lack of Iranian concessions as indicating an Iranian desire to stall and drag out negotiations.
Another explanation is that a particular frame of mind is imputed to the Iranians because it implies a U.S. policy that is politically popular for other reasons. Loading ever more onerous sanctions on Iran is a popular political sport, especially on Capitol Hill, to show toughness or love for Israel. The politicians who play that sport therefore favor a view of the Iranian mindset according to which the Iranians are simply not hurting enough and need to hurt some more, after which they will cry uncle.
A third explanation is that the supposed interpretation of Iranian thinking is a cover for another policy agenda held by the person offering the interpretation. This is especially the case with some of those arguing for more vehement threats of military attack against Iran. Some of those proponents have made no secret of the fact that they believe (for whatever strange reason) that war with Iran would be a good thing. Saber-rattling gives them a better chance of reaching that goal, because if an agreement is not reached with Iran then the advocates of saber-rattling would be among the first to cry that U.S. credibility would be damaged if the military threats were not carried out.
These possibilities come to mind in reading an op ed by Dennis Ross and David Makovsky of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. In particular, they are brought to mind by Ross and Makovsky’s statement, in explaining lack of progress in the negotiations, that “Iranian leaders seem not to believe that we will use force if diplomatic efforts fail.” What is their basis for that observation? Have the Iranian leaders themselves said anything like that? No, they haven’t. Ross and Makovsky seem to be basing such an observation solely on the Iranian negotiating position itself, and in so doing they are implying only a single cause for that position. Whatever Iran does in the way of making or not making concessions is all supposedly a matter of whether the Iranians see the possibility of U.S. military force being employed. Every other carrot, stick, belief or perception evidently does not matter at all.
Actually, those other things matter a lot. There is the little business of sanctions, for example. Ross and Makovsky are to be complimented for stating that if Iran is prepared to make the kind of concessions we are looking for, then “we should be prepared to lift the harsh economic sanctions.” But they do not mention that the United States and its negotiating partners have given the Iranians little or no reason to believe that we are so prepared. Instead, the only sanctions relief that has been incorporated in the Western proposals is stingy in comparison with the panoply of sanctions that Congress keeps piling on. We do not need any magical insight into secret Iranian thoughts to realize how important this dimension is in shaping Iran’s negotiating behavior. We only have to look at the demands and proposals that Iran has advanced at the negotiating table, as well as the actual economic damage that the sanctions have inflicted.
Ross and Makovsky get something else right, but for the wrong reason. Their piece is partly an argument in favor of making a comprehensive proposal rather than taking a step-by-step approach; they pooh-pooh the idea of confidence-building that is associated with step-by-step. A comprehensive proposal is a good idea, but precisely because a lack of confidence—which is glaring on both sides—is a major part of the problem. The Iranians lack confidence that the United States and its P5+1 partners ever want to get to an end state in which they fully and formally accept a peaceful nuclear program, with uranium enrichment, in the hands of the Islamic Republic of Iran, rather than indefinitely stringing out negotiations while the sanctions continue to inflict their damage. Again, we do not need to be mind-readers to realize this; the Iranians have been quite explicit in stating that they require a clearer idea of where the negotiations are heading.
So a “going big” comprehensive proposal is a good idea—but not as Ross and Makovsky pitch it, as some kind of ultimatum with a threat of military force functioning as an “or else” clause of the proposal. That kind of clause only stokes Iranian doubts about the West’s ultimate intentions and feeds Iranian interest in a possible nuclear weapon as a deterrent.
What is the explanation for Ross and Makovsky’s assertions about Iranian thinking? Are they exhibiting one of those psychological heuristics, or covering a hidden agenda, or something else? I don’t know; I don’t pretend to be able to read their minds.
]]>by Djavad Salehi-Isfahani
The latest round of talks between the P5+1 (the US, Russia, China, Britain, France, and Germany) and Iran in Kazakhstan concluded on Saturday without any tangible progress. While details of the reciprocal offers remain unclear, what we have learned indicates that neither side is in any particular hurry [...]]]>
by Djavad Salehi-Isfahani
The latest round of talks between the P5+1 (the US, Russia, China, Britain, France, and Germany) and Iran in Kazakhstan concluded on Saturday without any tangible progress. While details of the reciprocal offers remain unclear, what we have learned indicates that neither side is in any particular hurry to conclude the lengthy negotiations. In the meantime international sanctions, which have plunged Iran’s economy into its deepest crisis since the war with Iraq, will remain in force and may even be tightened. An important question now is whether the delay in resolving the crisis favors Iran or its Western foes, and the answer has to do in part with what one believes is happening to Iran’s economy.
Just before the talks restarted, a report in the New York Times entitled “Double-Digit Inflation Worsens in Iran” may have strengthened the belief of those in the US who think that time is on their side. If inflation — the most obvious, if not the most painful, effect of sanctions — has gotten worse for the sixth month in a row, then waiting a few more months might weaken Iran’s position. The article was based on new data released by Iran’s Statistical Center, which, when looked at more closely actually shows that inflation has been up and down in the last six months, falling as many times as it went up, though prices go only up (see a detailed graph of monthly inflation rates here). The persistence of high inflation has as much to do with sanctions as with Mr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s insistence on making good before he leaves office and ahead of the June presidential election by pushing ahead with his unfunded (and therefore inflationary) promises of cash transfers and low-cost housing.
Iranian officials who were last year denying the impact of sanctions now praise them for helping Iran wean its economy from oil. Last month, Iran’s Minister of Economy, Shamseddin Hosseini, said that “Thanks to the sanctions [imposed] by enemies, a historical dream of Iran is being realized as the oil revenues’ share in the administration of the country’s affairs has been reduced.” The Minister for Industry, Mining and Commerce also added a humbling note, “What we had been unable to achieve on our own, sanctions have done for us.” He was referring to the huge inflow of cheap imports paid for by the oil revenues over which he has presided since 2009.
As these officials have discovered lately, oil money can stock the kitchens and living rooms of the average family while keeping their educated son or daughter out of a job. While imports increased eightfold over the last ten years, many local producers in agriculture or industry have either shut down or increased the import content of their production. Either way, jobs have been lost. Between 2006 and 2011, census figures show that Iran’s economy created zero new jobs, as the working age population increased by 3.5 million.
As I have argued before, the devaluation of the rial, which many saw as the reason why Iran restarted negotiating, is actually a reason why it may not be in such a hurry to resume its oil exports. A study last week that was surprising for its source — the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, which has always pushed for tougher sanctions on Iran — admitted that Iran is doing a good job of adjusting to reduced oil revenues. It shows how the balance of trade in non-oil items is improving and how the government budget is becoming less dependent on oil.
But adjusting to the financial sanctions is an entirely different story. After being cut off from the international banking system and with limited access to global markets, Iran is finding it extremely hard to turn its import-dependent economy around. If Iran could choose which of the two sets of sanctions to lose first, oil or financial, it would definitely be the latter.
]]>by Farideh Farhi
From the looks of it, the second round of talks with Iran in Almaty, Kazakhstan was a complete failure, with both sides unable to even find a common language to begin a process of give and take. The sense I get is that the US side is rather [...]]]>
by Farideh Farhi
From the looks of it, the second round of talks with Iran in Almaty, Kazakhstan was a complete failure, with both sides unable to even find a common language to begin a process of give and take. The sense I get is that the US side is rather unhappy, even more than expected, with Iran. After all, it made a slight move during the first round by reportedly not demanding the complete dismantling of Fordo and rather asking for its suspension with provisions that would make its return to operation difficult. In return, it offered some sanctions relief regarding the gold trade and petrochemical industry.
The Iranian leadership did not think this was a balanced offer even if they acknowledged the US move as a positive step. The closure or non-operation of Fordo is a key component of a solution to the nuclear conflict while the slight sanctions relief offered in return hardly impacts the complex web of trade and financial sanctions that have been imposed on Iran. More importantly, for negotiation purposes, Fordo — an under-mountain site built in reaction to the repeated refrain of “all options are on the table” — is Tehran’s most important leverage for the talks. So, giving it away cheaply is just bad negotiating strategy.
There were attempts by some members of Iran’s foreign policy establishment to sell the US offer as a good first step to the Iranian public but that didn’t work out. In private conversations, even those hoping that Tehran would take the offer talked about the need for the Leader to take the “poisoned chalice,” a reference to Islamic Revolution founder Ayatollah Khomeini’s famous words when he accepted a ceasefire with Iraq in 1988. In other words, even those hoping for the acceptance of the offer considered it unbalanced and only necessitated through circumstances.
Subsequent efforts to make the offer more balanced during the technical talks in Istanbul failed. Hence, as they have done before, the Iranian negotiating team shifted gears and began talking about a comprehensive solution to the Iran question that will address other regional issues (i.e. Syria and Bahrain) as well as delineate what the end game will be. The endgame for Tehran since everything began in 2003 has always entailed the right to enrich uranium on Iranian soil. In retrospect, we should have expected Iran’s shift back toward a comprehensive discussion — which also happened in Moscow — after efforts during the technical talks to make the revised proposal more balanced failed.
As a result, the question of “now what?” will have to be on the table for the US. By moving a bit, the Obama administration has acknowledged that just making demands without at least appearing to address some of Iran’s bottom lines won’t move the process forward. Similarly, the presumption that a successful sanctions regime will convince Tehran to accede to a perceived bad deal in order to rescue Iran’s economy also just received a solid beating.
The US can of course continue to tighten the economic noose on Iran, although it is not clear how much more “useful” damage that will actually do. Two recent reports from completely divergent outlets — the National Iranian American Council and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy — suggest that Iran’s economy is adapting to the limits that have been imposed on its oil exports. Neither of these reports deny the harm sanctions have inflicted or the opportunity costs that have resulted, but they do acknowledge that Iran has been able to adjust and limp along at least in terms of macro trade and budget numbers. Even a recent joint-report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Federation of American Scientists — while focusing on the costs and risks of Iran’s nuclear program — ends up acknowledging that costs from the loss of oil exports and opportunity costs resulting from the loss of foreign investment has been absorbed by Iran.
Indeed, continuing with what hasn’t worked in the past with the hope that it will one day work is what Gary Samore, Obama’s former nuclear advisor, expects. I guess the hope is that something magical will happen with Iran’s June 14 election and a newly elected president who will take charge by August. Perhaps he will be able to convince the Iranian leadership across the board that the offer Iran just designated as neither balanced nor comprehensive needs to be accepted.
This expectation or hope is a risky one. It is premised on the belief that Iran is a contested political environment and the harshness of sanctions will eventually pave the way for folks who think it’s time to abandon Iran’s nuclear program in favor of economic riches to gain the upper hand or argument. But the logic of Iran as a contested political terrain actually brings us to the opposite conclusion. One can more easily argue that the inability to begin a process of give and take on the nuclear issue before Iran’s election provides incentive to those who insist on Iran’s nuclear rights — and also happen to be in charge of the country — to make sure that a president is elected who will continue to toe their established line. In other words, the further escalation of sanctions may end up impacting the Iranian election, but not in the way that was intended.
So are there other options? Yes, according to another recent report by the Atlantic Council called Time to Move from Tactics to Strategy on Iran. It calls upon the Obama administration to “lay out a step-by-step reciprocal and proportionate plan that ends with graduated relief of sanctions on oil, and eventually on the Iranian Central Bank, in return for verifiable curbs on Iranian uranium enrichment and stocks of enriched uranium, and assurances that Iran does not have undeclared nuclear materials and facilities.”
Various sections of the report appear like they have been written by different members of the Council’s Iran Task Force, but the process laid out is pretty close to what the Iranians have articulated; if the issue is Iran’s nuclear program, then let’s lay out a roadmap and endgame for how the nuclear issue can be resolved to the relative satisfaction of all sides. The report also calls for opening an US Interests Section in Iran and increased people-to-people contact. Although it doesn’t come right out and say it, it effectively endorses various improved relations (people-to-people or government-to-government) as a companion to or simultaneous with a clearly defined step-by-step framework that reduces pressure on Iran in exchange for limitations on its nuclear program.
I’m not sure if the individuals who wrote the section on people-to-people contact and the need to use stepped-up public diplomacy to make Iranians “aware of the real reasons for sanctions” (to ensure the peacefulness of Iran’s nuclear program) understand how hard it is even for the most adept propaganda machine — and our country does have a pretty good one — to sell the idea that the US is justified in collectively punishing Iranians for the policies of their leaders. Nevertheless, making the case that the US is really not that bad while the sanctions regime is being relaxed through a step-by-step process of negotiations is a whole lot easier than what is being done right now: escalating the process of squeezing Iran while denying responsibility for it.
The Council report curiously does insist on maintaining one aspect of the Obama administration’s approach. It says that the majority of the Iran Task Force favors maintaining the military option as a last resort. It calls on the Obama administration to make sure that the option remains credible despite the acknowledgment that “While the drawbacks of a nuclear Iran are grave, the ramifications of a premature military strike—what the US military refers to as “second- and third-order effects”—could also be dire.” My dictionary tells me that “dire” is much worse than “grave” and I guess the report tries to ignore this by highlighting its rejection of a “premature” strike, whatever that means. But the dire effects of the premature strike are the same, I suppose, as a rightly timed strike.
Beyond this, I am truly puzzled by the inability of those promoting this type of public discourse to understand the corrosive impact that the language of “all options are on the table” has on the so-called international community that the Obama administration claims to represent, as well as various stakeholders in Iran, including the “Iranian people” who we apparently love and are so interested in establishing contact with. These fighting words do nothing to make the threat of military attack credible to those who run Iran’s nuclear policy precisely because of the “dire” effects that the Council report lays out. They also undercut any claim to righteousness regarding the nuclear row for the people who occupy the land and buildings that are being threatened. I cannot claim to know what the “Iranian people” think, but I can say that the overwhelming majority of Iranians I know, inside and outside of Iran, consider this language vulgar and appalling and reflective of an utter disregard for other people’s lives and livelihoods. Who else speaks this way nowadays? North Korea?
America’s “now what?” moment regarding Iran could be a productive moment if it begins to come to terms with the fact that the sanctions regime has not changed the calculation of the Iranian government — as evidenced by what just happened in Almaty. It can only do so, however, if it acknowledges that the military option cannot be made credible because the idea is both stupid and offensive.
]]>According to former top advisers to George W. Bush and Barak Obama, the United States will preventively strike Iran in 2013 if no diplomatic settlement is reached over its nuclear program. From the Times of Israel:
During an on-stage discussion with Dennis Ross and Elliott Abrams halfway through the [...]]]>
According to former top advisers to George W. Bush and Barak Obama, the United States will preventively strike Iran in 2013 if no diplomatic settlement is reached over its nuclear program. From the Times of Israel:
During an on-stage discussion with Dennis Ross and Elliott Abrams halfway through the evening, Washington Institute director Robert Satloff asked the former officials, “Will either America or Israel employ preventive military action against Iran’s nuclear program – yes or no?”
The two replied in unison, “yes.”
“Will this happen in 2013?” Satloff pressed.
“Yes,” said Ross.
“Yes, I agree,” added Abrams.
Last week the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) said Iran could be referred to the United Nations Security Council if it had “not begun substantive cooperation with the IAEA” by March 2013. This caused Micah Zenko to speculate about a deadline for a US attack, while others suggested the path is simply being prepared for another resolution.
Some well-informed Iran watchers are saying that Ross and Abrams’ prediction is on par with that of White House insiders. Whether that’s true or not, it’s undeniable that pressure will be very high on Obama to ‘do more’ if no headway is made with Iran in the next 6 months.
But according to Zenko, deadlines, while helpful on the pressure-front, can also be detrimental:
]]>Setting a March deadline provides some certainty and perhaps coercive leverage to compel Iran to cooperate with the IAEA. But declaring deadlines also places U.S. “credibility” on the line, generating momentum to use force even if there is no new actionable intelligence that Iran has decided to pursue a nuclear weapon. Based on what we know right now, that would be a strategic miscalculation.
Examining a New Yorker article by the Israel-focused Washington Institute’s David Makovsky, Ali Gharib observes in the Daily Beast that in contrast to Makovsky’s analysis, “The lessons of the Israeli raid on Syria in 2007 can’t be applied to Iran’s nuclear program”:
Unlike the Syrian nuclear [...]]]>
Examining a New Yorker article by the Israel-focused Washington Institute’s David Makovsky, Ali Gharib observes in the Daily Beast that in contrast to Makovsky’s analysis, “The lessons of the Israeli raid on Syria in 2007 can’t be applied to Iran’s nuclear program”:
Unlike the Syrian nuclear program (or the Israeli one, for that matter), the Iranian nuclear program is not shrouded in complete secrecy. Far from a single reactor at a remote desert site, Iran has multiple nuclear facilities, all declared to U.N. authorities (the U.S. is “very confident that there is no secret site now,” after past deceptions). How, then, if there were to be an explosion at a well known and declared nuclear facility, could the Iranians save face as Assad did? By pretending that they scared off the Israeli jets, who just happened to jettison their munitions on top of the Fordow enrichment facilities?
It’s ironic, then, that the Israeli focus on Iran—constant pronouncements, threats, and public pressure on the U.S.—has driven the Iranian program into the spotlight, rendering moot the lesson of bombing Syria’s secret program. Nonetheless, because the Israeli Syrian strike was a success, it will be held up as an example, just as proponents of war with Iran hold up Israel’s 1981 attack on an Iraqi reactor as a success even though that claim doesn’t hold up to scrutiny.
Statements made by Israeli Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz during his talk this morning at a Brookings event here in Washington can be interpreted as supportive of Gharib’s argument. Halutz (whose father was Iranian) seriously criticized the fact that “too much was said publicly” about how to handle Iran’s nuclear program and refused to answer any related questions from the outset. Halutz also reiterated his criticism of the red line debate, noting that publicly defining red lines, which can easily change at any given time, enables “the other side…to know where are the borders”. He said that discussions about red lines, as well as when and how to take action on them, should be conducted behind closed doors. Quoting a line from The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, Halutz said: “When you have to shoot, shoot!” Halutz also repeatedly stressed that the use of force “absolutely should be the last, last, last resort”.
]]>Lobe Log publishes Hawks on Iran every Friday. Our posts highlight militaristic commentary and confrontational policy recommendations about Iran from a variety of sources including news articles, think tanks and pundits.
Patrick Clawson and Mehdi Khalaji, WINEP: Patrick Clawson and Mehdi Khalaji of the Israel-centric Washington [...]]]>
Lobe Log publishes Hawks on Iran every Friday. Our posts highlight militaristic commentary and confrontational policy recommendations about Iran from a variety of sources including news articles, think tanks and pundits.
Patrick Clawson and Mehdi Khalaji, WINEP: Patrick Clawson and Mehdi Khalaji of the Israel-centric Washington Institute for Near East Policy (aka Washington Institute or WINEP) argue that Iran may need to be shocked into submission with more crippling measures including a military attack:
Ultimately, changing this mindset may require a profound shock of some sort, be it remarkably tough sanctions, more-complete political isolation, or military action.
While claiming that sanctions alone are not enough, the authors recommend piling more on anyway:
Washington has long advocated sanctions as the key to spurring Iranian compromise, and the announcement of the latest round of financial measures certainly seemed central in getting Iran back to the negotiating table. At the end of the day, however, such measures have not persuaded Tehran to make even the minimum compromises that would be acceptable to the P5+1. Expecting the new sanctions alone to spur Iran toward a more favorable position may therefore be unrealistic — Washington and its allies would be well advised to plan additional sanctions.
Michael Eisenstadt, WINEP: The director of WINEP’s Military and Security Studies Program argues that the US should aggressively harden its stance against Iran by implementing increased pressure tactics and ramping up the military option through posturing and public preparation:
Successful diplomacy may well depend on the administration’s ability to convince Tehran that the price of failed negotiations could be armed conflict. To make this threat credible, Washington must first show Tehran that it is preparing for a possible military confrontation — whether initiated by Iran or a third country — and that it is willing and able to enforce its red lines regarding freedom of navigation in the Gulf and the regime’s nuclear program.
Jamie Fly, Lee Smith and William Kristol, Weekly Standard: While applauding a related bipartisan Senate letter that we noted last week, three of the most ardent neoconservative pushers of the Iraq War urge Congress to “seriously explore” an Authorization of Military Force against Iran:
Stephen Rademaker, one of the witnesses at a House Armed Services Committee hearing on June 20, testified that Iran has not been “sufficiently persuaded that military force really is in prospect should they fail to come to an acceptable agreement to the problem.”
The key to changing that is a serious debate about the military option. But even in the wake of the collapse of the talks, far too many otherwise serious people continue to hold out hope for a negotiated settlement brought about by increased economic pressure. All additional sanctions should be explored and enacted as soon as possible, but what the track record of more than a decade of negotiations with Iran tells us is that this is not a country about to concede. This is not a regime on the ropes or on the cusp of compromise, as many would have us believe.
This is a regime committed to developing nuclear weapons, despite the cost to the Iranian economy and the toll on the Iranian people. Time is running out and the consequences of inaction for the United States, Israel, and the free world will only increase in the weeks and months ahead. It’s time for Congress to seriously explore an Authorization of Military Force to halt Iran’s nuclear program.
Mark Dubowitz, Foreign Policy: The executive director of the hawkish Foundation for Defense of Democracies and influential sanctions-pusher Mark Dubowitz argues for more “economic warfare” to “to shake the Islamic Republic to its core” by “blacklisting Iran’s entire energy sector”, extending the sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran, targeting other areas of the Iranian economy and:
…if that’s insufficient to get Khamenei to strike a deal — and there is unfortunately no evidence so far that it will — the president needs to unite the country in moving beyond sanctions and preparing for U.S. military strikes against Iran’s nuclear weapons program.
Daniel Pipes, Washington Times: The aftermath of an Israeli attack on Iran wouldn’t be all that bad according to Daniel Pipes. From yesterday’s posting:
]]>Mideast focused pundit Daniel Pipes has positively reviewed a report by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) that discusses “likely” Iranian responses to an Israeli “preventive strike”. Pipes, who in 2010 argued that President Obama should bomb Iran to “to salvage his tottering administration”, repeats Michael Eisenstadt and Michael Knights’ assessment of how Iran would react to an Israeli military attack before concluding that the consequences would be “unpleasant but not cataclysmic, manageable not devastating.” The underlying assumption in Pipes’ article is that Iran is actively pursuing a nuclear weapon rather than nuclear weapon capability, which is what the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) and US intelligence agencies have asserted. And according to Pipes’ line of reasoning, the consequences of striking Iran pale in comparison to the only alternative he provides: “apocalyptic Islamists controlling nuclear weapons“.
Michael Eisenstadt & Michael Knights, WINEP: Contradicting ongoing warnings from former and current
Michael Eisenstadt & Michael Knights, WINEP: Contradicting ongoing warnings from former and current high-level U.S. national security officials, experts and several Israeli counterparts about the potentially catastrophic effects of an Israeli strike on Iran, two analysts from the hawkish pro-Israel Washington Institute (aka WINEP) paint a relatively rosy picture about an Iranian response to Israeli-waged “preemptive” war. Eisenstadt and Knights’ report title begins with “Beyond Worst-Case Analysis” and they certainly delve into best-case scenarios like Matthew Kroenig infamously did in December. But even Kroenig argued against an Israeli strike because he believes the U.S. is much better equipped for the job. In any case, highly qualified critiques of Kroenig’s argument (here, here, here and here) also apply in many ways to this WINEP production.
Interestingly, it is in the last paragraph of the paper that the authors mention one of the most important and alarming effects of any strike on Iran’s nuclear program–that it could (or rather most likely would) result in immediate Iranian withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the halting of all International Atomic Energy Association monitoring mechanisms, as well as propel Iran to quickly build a nuclear weapon. As former Pentagon Mideast advisor to the Obama administration Colin Kahl and other experts have stated, you can’t bomb knowledge and the Iranians already have nuclear weapon know-how. For this reason Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association adds that the key to stopping an Iranian nuclear weapon requires the power of persuasion rather than brute force. Eisenstadt and Knights also ignore the fact that U.S. support for a preemptive strike would violate both U.S. and international law according to Yale Professor Bruce Ackerman. Then there’s that pesky issue of costs to human life. Never mind all that though. Write Eisenstadt and Knights:
In short, although an Israeli preventive strike would be a high-risk endeavor carrying a potential for escalation in the Levant or the Gulf, it would not be the apocalyptic event some foresee. And the United States could take several steps to mitigate these risks without appearing complicit in Israel’s decision to attack. The very act of taking precautionary measures to lessen the impact of a strike, moreover, would enhance the credibility of Israeli military threats and bolster the P5+1’s ongoing nuclear diplomacy. Less clear, however, is whether a strike would prompt Tehran to expel inspectors, withdraw from the NPT, and pursue a crash program—overt or clandestine. And whether enhanced international efforts to disrupt Iran’s procurement of special materials and technologies would succeed in preventing the rebuilding of its nuclear infrastructure remains an unknown.
Clifford D. May, National Review: The president of the hawkish and neoconservative-dominated Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) makes clear his obsession with Iran, which he calls “the single most important strategic threat facing the U.S. — hands down” (eat your heart out China!) in an article overwhelmingly implying that the U.S. should arm and aid Syria’s opposition forces mainly because doing so would weaken Iran:
Those facing Assad’s guns are not asking us to put boots on the ground. What they do want are the means to defend themselves, secure communications technology, and a limited number of other assets that will give them a fighting chance — though no guarantees. Providing such assistance will give us a fighting chance to influence the opposition now and the post-Assad environment later — though no guarantees.
The alternative is to stay on the sidelines, leaving the opposition to the tender mercies of Assad and his patrons in Tehran who are supplying weapons, advisers, and more. They grasp that the Battle of Syria is hugely consequential. They know that the fall of Assad would be a major blow to them. By the same token, it will be a major blow to the West if, despite Washington’s pronouncements and posturing, Khamenei, with assistance from the Kremlin, rescues and restores his most valued Arab bridgehead. And should Khamenei move from that victory to the production of nuclear weapons, we’re in for a very rough 21st century.
Henry Kissinger meanwhile argues that U.S. intervention in Syria could harm U.S. interests.
President Barak Obama (New York Times report): David Sanger writes that while Obama was allegedly fervently pursuing diplomacy with Iran, he was secretly accelerating a cyberwar that began with the George W. Bush administration:
Mr. Obama decided to accelerate the attacks — begun in the Bush administration and code-named Olympic Games — even after an element of the program accidentally became public in the summer of 2010 because of a programming error that allowed it to escape Iran’s Natanz plant and sent it around the world on the Internet. Computer security experts who began studying the worm, which had been developed by the United States and Israel, gave it a name: Stuxnet.
According to Russian cyber security expert Eugene Kaspersky, with these actions the U.S. is getting closer to opening Pandora’s box. Reports Vita Bekker in the Financial Times:
Eugene Kaspersky, whose Moscow-based firm discovered the Flame virus that has attacked computers in Middle East countries, including Iran, said on the sidelines of the Tel Aviv conference that only an international effort could prevent a potentially disastrous cyberattack.
“It’s not cyberwar, it’s cyberterrorism and I am afraid it’s just the beginning of the game . . . I am afraid that it will be the end of the world as we know it,” Mr Kaspersky, whose company is one of the world’s biggest makers of antivirus software, was quoted by Reuters as saying: “I am scared, believe me.”
Misha Glenny concurs.
John Bolton, Washington Times: The former Bush administration official with close ties to neoconservatives has no qualms about agitating for war on Iran. Bolton has a history of hawkishness and “insanity” about the country and how it should be dealt with. In January he told Fox News that sanctions and covert attacks won’t prevent a nuclear-armed Iran, but attacking “its nuclear weapons program directly” will. This week he breathed a sigh of relief over the fact that no agreement was reached between Iran and the West during recent talks:
Fortunately, however, the recently concluded Baghdad talks between Iran and the U.N. Security Council’s five permanent members and Germany (P-5+1) produced no substantive agreement.
Find Ali’s in-depth report here.
]]>Weekly Reads/Watch:
News: Iran nuclear talks: Are sanctions on the table?News:
Weekly Reads/Watch:
- News: Iran nuclear talks: Are sanctions on the table?
News: Iran Talks ‘Will Fail’; Oil Risk Prevails: Roubini Analyst
News: U.S. Treasury Claim of Iran-Al-Qaeda “Secret Deal” Is Discredited
News: Biden: Israel still has time to strike Iran
News: Ayatollah Khamenei gives Iran nuclear talks unprecedented legitimacy
News: Pinched Aspirations of Iran’s Young Multitudes
Opinion: Roundtable on Iran Crisis, Part 2: On Attacking Iran
Opinion: Critical Threshold in the Iran Crisis
Opinion: What an Israeli attack on Iran will mean for the Muslims
Opinion: Zakaria: Under Netanyahu, Israel is stronger than ever
Opinion: Deconstructing Krauthammer’s Misinformation On Iran And Israel
Opinion: Israeli generals balk at PM’s Iran policy
Watch: “Deja Vu All Over Again?: Iraq, Iran and the Israel Lobby”
Jennifer Rubin, Washington Post: The Post’s militantly pro-Israel blogger gleefully opines that the Israeli Prime Minister’s new coalition government increases Benjamin Netanyahu’s ability to strike Iran and defy President Obama:
A more broad-based, secularized government with latitude to strike Iran and to move cautiously on the “peace process”? J Street’s worst nightmare — an emboldened Netanyahu without the baggage of the religious right. Good luck stirring up opposition to that here or in Israel.
The irony is rich. Netanyahu is riding high while his nemesis, President Obama, is struggling for his political life. The latter will be in a weakened position to challenge the former on Iran or much else for the balance of the year.
Elliott Abrams, World Affairs: George W. Bush’s neoconservative Deputy National Security Advisor Elliott Abrams argues in favor of an Israeli attack on Iran if the U.S. fails to wage war first:
President Obama, like many world leaders, has called an Iranian nuclear weapon “unacceptable.” He is right, and that should remain the US position—not just that it would be a bad outcome, not just that we would be angered by it, but that we refuse to accept it and, as the president also once said, will prevent it. If we are unwilling to act, or to act soon enough, it should be our position that Israeli action is justifiable.
It’s telling, by the way, that Abrams uses belligerent Iranian anti-Israel rhetoric to justify his call to war while failing to mention that almost every day we read something about how Israel, nuclear-armed and in possession of the world’s top militaries, might strike Iran. He also fails to mention that a figure who actually matters recently stated that Iran does not seek military confrontation with Israel. You can argue that the Supreme Leader’s adviser Mohammad Javad Larijani was lying, but then again, when has Iran militarily invaded another country? Remember, the Iran-Iraq war was initiated by Saddam Hussein who actually used chemical weapons against Iranians and his own people. And how many times has Israel militarily and covertly attacked other countries in the last 60 years? When has Iran militarily occupied territory? In the case of Israel, the question would not be when, but for how long. You can argue that all Israeli aggression has been self-defense, but you’d have to apply the same standard to Iran too, no? And then where would we be?
Robert Wexler, Foreign Affairs: The former house Democrat who now heads a pro-Israel organization called the S. Daniel Center for Middle East Peace makes a long-winded argument for a U.S. war on Iran after the other options he outlines have been exhausted according to his terms:
Moreover, it is clear that should a military option ultimately prove necessary, an American-led strike would best serve Israel and the Middle East generally.
A strike led by the United States would allow for the creation of a large international coalition of nations, similar to the coalition built by President George H. W. Bush in the lead-up to the Gulf War. The US, unlike Israel acting unilaterally, would be able to gain the support of its European allies, NATO assistance, and a degree of official and unofficial support from the Arab world. Just as the Gulf states shouldered the vast bulk of the financial burden for the first Gulf War, a coordinated effort could allow for them to play a comparable role in this case.
Top Israeli military officials have also stressed their deep preference for an American-led strike. Israel’s former head of military intelligence, Major General (ret.) Amos Yadlin, wrote in a recent New York Times op-ed: “America could carry out an extensive air campaign using stealth technology and huge amounts of ammunition, dropping enormous payloads that are capable of hitting targets and penetrating to depths far beyond what Israel’s arsenal can achieve.”
Yadlin went on to aptly suggest that “Mr. Obama will therefore have to shift the Israeli defense establishment’s thinking from a focus on the ‘zone of immunity’ to a ‘zone of trust.’ What is needed is an ironclad American assurance that if Israel refrains from acting in its own window of opportunity—and all other options have failed to halt Tehran’s nuclear quest—Washington will act to prevent a nuclear Iran while it is still within its power to do so.”
Patrick Clawson, Foreign Affairs: In January the Washington Institute’s (WINEP) director of research endorsed covert deadly attacks on Iran. Clawson’s line of reasoning implied that only military options were available:
Mr. Clawson said the covert campaign was far preferable to overt airstrikes by Israel or the United States on suspected Iranian nuclear sites. “Sabotage and assassination is the way to go, if you can do it,” he said. “It doesn’t provoke a nationalist reaction in Iran, which could strengthen the regime. And it allows Iran to climb down if it decides the cost of pursuing a nuclear weapon is too high.”
This week he said that the goal of U.S. sanctions should be regime change. That’s the essence of his argument, regardless of all the other wonderful things he also talks about:
Whether or not diplomacy results in an agreement, the sanctions have already fulfilled the core objective of the Obama administration — namely, kick-starting negotiations. But that is not the right goal. Given Iran’s poor track record of honoring agreements, negotiations remain a gamble because they may never lead to an agreement, let alone one that can be sustained. Rather than focus on talks that may not produce a deal, then, the United States should place far more emphasis on supporting democracy and human rights in Iran. A democratic Iran would likely drop state support for terrorism and end its interference in the internal affairs of Arab countries such as Iraq and Lebanon, improving stability in the Middle East. And although Iran’s strongly nationalist democrats are proud of the country’s nuclear progress, their priority is to rejoin the community of nations, so they will likely agree to peaceful nuclearization in exchange for an end to their country’s isolation.
The United States could assist democratic forces in Iran by providing money and moral support. It could fund people-to-people exchanges and student scholarships; support civil society groups providing assistance to Iranian activists; work closely with technology companies such as Google on how to transmit information to the Iranian people; and overhaul Voice of America’s Persian News Network, where journalistic standards have suffered under uneven management. It could also raise human rights abuses in every official meeting with Iranian officials, such as the ongoing nuclear negotiations, and bring Iranian rights violations to the United Nations and the International Court of Justice. Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, understands the danger of a popular revolution in his country and has done everything in his power to prevent it. If the United States is going to take a risk, it should aim not for a partial, insecure nuclear arrangement but the best return possible — a democratic Iran.
]]>
*This week’s must-reads/watch:
- News: U.S. War Game Sees Perils of Israeli Strike Against [...]]]>*This week’s must-reads/watch:
- - News: U.S. War Game Sees Perils of Israeli Strike Against Iran
- - News: P5+1 political directors to meet in Europe this week on Iran
- - News: Hawks Steering Debate on How to Take On Iran
- - News: Nuclear watchdog chief accused of pro-western bias over Iran
- - News: Rafsanjani’s Reappointment Provokes Speculation in Iran
- News: U.S. Exempts Japan and 10 Other Countries From Sanctions Over Iran Oil - - News: Special Report: Intel shows Iran nuclear threat not imminent
- – Opinion: Israel’s Gift to Iran
- - Opinion: Heeding the Experts on Iran
- Opinion: The False Iran Debate
- Opinion: The Only Option on Iran
- Opinion: Pivoting from the Military ‘Option’ Back to Diplomacy - - Research Publication: CFR: Iran Talks: What Should Be on the Table?
- - Research Publication: Iran’s Internal Politics: The Supreme Leader Grows Ever Lonelier at the Top
Mark Dubowitz, New York Times: After providing a long explanation for why Republicans should stop criticizing President Obama for high gas prices that have resulted from the U.S.’s Iran sanctions policy (which Dubowitz’s FDD career seems based on), the executive director of the hawkish Foundation for Defense of Democracies says working together now can result in more unity among Republicans and Democrats when “pursuing” war:
Republican candidates have boxed Obama in. Their dual line of attack might be smart politics, but it’s not smart policy. Either gas prices go down or Obama imposes suffocating sanctions on Iranian oil exports. They can’t have it both ways.
…
We are fast approaching a point when sanctions will no longer be able to stop Iran’s nuclear weapons program. As tempting as it may be, Republican candidates should set aside the opportunity to score quick political points and support the president in taking a bold step on sanctions that could destroy Iran’s oil wealth. And if Ayatollah Khamenei still refuses to compromise, Republicans and Democrats may find themselves more united in moving beyond sanctions and pursuing a military option.
Bret Stephens, Wall Street Journal: Not a week goes by without Lobe Log being forced to feature some alarmist, hawkish article about Iran in the WSJ. So here is Bret Stephens, the former Jerusalem Post editor believed to be one of the main writers of the Journal’s unsigned editorial board pieces, declaring that U.S. intelligence about Iran should be ignored and people should just go with their (his?) gut feelings instead. Writes Stephens (brace yourself now):
It should come as no surprise that an intelligence community meant to provide decision makers with disinterested analysis has, in practice, policy goals and ideological axes of its own. But that doesn’t mean it is any less dangerous. The real lesson of the Iraq WMD debacle wasn’t that the intelligence was “overhyped,” since the CIA is equally notorious for erring in the opposite direction. It was that intelligence products were treated as authoritative guides to decision making. Spooks, like English children, should be seen, not heard. The problem is that the spooks (like the children) want it the other way around.
How, then, should people think about the Iran state of play? By avoiding the misdirections of “intelligence.” For real intelligence, merely consider that a regime that can take a rock in its right hand to stone a woman to death should not have a nuclear bomb within reach of its left. Even a spook can grasp that.
Michael Singh, Washington Institute: Founded in 1985 by the former research director of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), Martin Indyk, the Washington Institute or WINEP is an influential think tank that makes confrontational policy recommendations about Iran. In a 20-page publication titled “To Keep the Peace with Iran, Threaten to Strike”, WINEP’s managing director accordingly argues that the “threat of force” against Iran should be emphasized and regarded as a “complement” to Obama’s Iran strategy:
The strenuous American efforts to ease the tensions and reassure Iran, whileunderstandable, were counterproductive. If Iran’s intention in issuing its threatswas to gauge the U.S. appetite for conflict, it can only have been comforted by theresponse. It revealed a superpower not girding itself, even reluctantly, for a militaryconflict, but scrambling to avoid one, seemingly bent on convincing itself andothers that a war would be futile. This episode likely only underscored what Iranmay see as the United States’ diminishing appetite or capacity for conflict, aperception fueled by the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, its impending withdrawal fromAfghanistan, large planned cuts to the U.S. defense budget as well as the size of U.S.forces, and the backseat approach the United States took (and celebrated) in Libya.Ironically, downplaying the threat of force may increase the odds that theUnited States will be left with little choice buteither to employ force or accept an Iraniannuclear weapons capability. While Washingtonand its allies clearly and appropriately see militaryaction as a last resort, this should not imply thatestablishing the credibility of the threat of forcebe left to a later, final phase of their approach toIran. Indeed, the threat of force is not analternative to sanctions or negotiations, but acomplement to them in forming a coherent Iran strategy.
Richard Cohen, Washington Post: In February the Post’s weekly columnist argued for “regime change” in Iran and for the U.S. to establish at minimum the perception that U.S. and Israel policy are aligned. This month he downplays the cons of an Israeli strike while emphasizing the pros:
]]>Sanctions may cause Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons program, if indeed that’s where it is now heading. But critics of Israel’s approach have to understand that Iran’s program looks different from Tel Aviv than it does from Washington. In the long run, an Israeli attack on Iran will accomplish nothing. In the short run, it could accomplish quite a lot.
The drama never stops unfolding around the Clarion Fund, the operation behind a string of movies dubbed “anti-Muslim” by critics.
The group’s latest salvo is an hour-long documentary called “Iranium”, which more or less gives airtime to a gaggle of neoconservatives and their [...]]]>
The drama never stops unfolding around the Clarion Fund, the operation behind a string of movies dubbed “anti-Muslim” by critics.
The group’s latest salvo is an hour-long documentary called “Iranium”, which more or less gives airtime to a gaggle of neoconservatives and their allies on the Israeli right to advocate for a hawkish posture against the Islamic Republic of Iran.
While warning of an ideologically-driven, religiously-inspired Iran, however, the filmmaker behind the movie himself comes from among the religious extremes of another Middle Eastern state.
The writer and director of “Iranium”, Alex Traiman, hails from the Israeli West Bank settlement of Beit El, one of the ideological religious Jewish outposts in occupied Palestinian territory bedeviling U.S.-Israel relations.
I spoke to Traiman, who sported a black kippah and a bright red tie, after a screening of “Iranium” at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, where neoconservative don Richard Perle introduced the film.
“That’s where I live,” Traiman told me, after a deep breath, when I asked him if he lived in Beit El. “I just live there.”
Traiman worked for four years for the Beit El-based Arutz Sheva, or Channel Seven, also known as Israel National News, a former pirate radio station aligned with Israel’s religious settlers. He has in the past referred to Beit El as “a Jewish settlement… located in the Biblical province of Samaria, commonly referred to today as the West Bank.” Settlers refer to the West Bank by the Biblical “Judea and Samaria.”
On Tuesday at Heritage, Traiman, who has also written for a U.S.-based conspiracy website, called the World Net Daily, and presumably other occupied Palestinian territories, as “disputed territories in Israel.”
Beit El is a religious nationalist settlement near Ramallah in the West Bank, where some 5,500 settlers live, Founded in 1977, the settlement is built in land seized in 1970 by the military on what Israeli courts, according to Idith Zertal and Akiva Eldar, later deemed to be bogus security justifications.
Unlike their secular counterparts, who usually move into settlements to take advantage of government housing subsidies, the enclave of Beit El is a religious-nationalist settlement where residents think that God gave them the land that Palestinians lived on.
Palestinians view settlements as gobbling up land on which they hope to eventually build their state. In a peace deal, the border between Israel and Palestine would likely be doctored to include large settlement blocks in Israel.
But at a recent Washington Institute forum on potential maps for a peace deal, Washington Post columnist Jackson Diehl, a Middle East hawk, said Israeli annexation of Beit El is not realistic in a final peace deal: “Beit El dominates the road between the two major Palestinian towns of Ramallah and Nablus… This type of scenario is unacceptable to Palestinians.”
Last fall, a diplomatic row erupted when Israel refused a U.S. request for a three-month extension of a settlement construction freeze. The freeze extension was aimed at rescuing peace talks, and when Israel refused, with Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu in the thrall of his pro-settler coalition members, the U.S.-sponsored talks collapsed.
The crumbling of the settlement freeze was celebrated in Israel’s settlements, whese construction boomed.
Other characters in and around “Iranium” come from the hardest of the hard-line ‘pro-Israel’ camp and the Israeli right, those who have long opposed Israel relinquishing control of the West Bank in any peace deal.
Not surprisingly, the Capitol Hill premiere in February is being hosted by a group, EMET, whose president and advisors worked together in the 1990s, behind the backs of Israeli and American leadership, to spike the Oslo process. Indeed, EMET’s Hill activism for a Greater Israel seems to be matched only by the efforts of key people from the Clarion Fund.
Ties between Clarion and Aish Hatorah, an evangelist Israeli ultra-orthodox group, are well know and long-established through Clarion’s founder and executive producer of its movies, Canadian-Israeli Raphael Shore, not to mention a host of registration and tax documents that make Clarion appear to be little more than an Aish off-shoot.
But Traiman, a former radio host and PR flak brought on board by Clarion to write and direct “Iranium,” appears is literally on the frontiers of the Israeli right.
According to social networking websites, Traiman worked at Arutz Sheva for four years, editing, writing, hosting a show, and acting as marketing director. In 2006, Traiman did a fundraising junket for the channel that brought him to New York and New Jersey, where he went to high school. (Arutz Sheva also raises money from U.S. Christian Zionists.)
Just two months before that trip, Traiman wrote an article for the U.S.-based conspiracy website World Net Daily (WND), where he gave space and sympathetic coverage to several Rabbis who theorized that the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war — then still raging — was caused by a gay pride parade in Jerusalem. At the end of the article, Traiman was listed as a writer for the Jerusalem bureau of WND, which has published articles about how Al Qaeda has 40 nukes (some already in the U.S.) and how “soy is making kids ‘gay’.”
The current chief WND‘s Jerusalem bureau is Aaron Klein, a birther and the New York Times best-selling author of “The Manchurian President: Barack Obama’s Ties to Communists, Socialists and Other Anti-American Extremists”. (Klein also conducted the interview where Imam Faisal Abdul Rauf refused to condemn Hamas.)
Klein and Traiman co-edited their college paper when they were both at New York City’s Yeshiva University. “Following his completely secular education, Traiman decided to pursue a Jewish education at the only first tier university that could provide one,” says an article from the paper of the modern-orthodox Jewish university. If and how long Klein and Traiman worked together at WND is not clear.
Leaving WND aside, Arutz Sheva, where Traiman hosted a show, wrote and edited, and directed marketing efforts, has some conspiracy theory issues of its own. Last year, to celebrate the anniversary of the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, the “settler news organization,” as the New York Times labeled it, held a contest to find the best conspiracy theory providing a version of events different from the accepted history.
The accepted history, of course, is that religious Zionist Yigal Amir killed Rabin at a peace rally in 1995. In their 2009 book, “Jewish Terrorism in Israel”, Professors Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger wrote that Amir would have been inspired by the religious edicts from rabbis in West Bank settlements declaring Rabin din rodef, or a Jew who was willing to harm other Jews, a judgement punishable by death according to Jewish law. The professors also drop this nugget while recalling Amir’s machinations: “Only a fellow law school student, Margalit Har-Shefi—resident of one of the most prestige settlements, Beit El, and daughter of settler nobility—was let in on the finer details of the plan.” Har-Shefi even tried to break into the Beit El armory to get a weapon for the plot.
Arutz Sheva was founded by, according to various sources, either Beit El-based extremist Rabbi Zalman Melmand or Yaakov Katz, a politician from Israel’s National Union party, which has been accused of having ties to Israel’s banned extremist Kahanist political faction. Rabbi Meir Kahane was thought to be the “spiritual guide of those who allegedly conspired to kill Rabin.”
“There is a clear irony in having Israeli settler religious extremists urging the U.S. to bomb religious extremists in Iran,” said Lara Friedman, an expert on settlements and U.S. policy in the Middle East with American’s for Peace Now, in an interview.
Ali Gharib is a freelance writer based in Brooklyn, NY. He’s a regular contributor to the LobeLog.
]]>