by Wayne White
Libya’s chaos and violence may seem like a continuum of painful replays. However, as the situation festers, the risk of extremist elements gaining a more dangerous foothold and broader freedom of action increases. Indeed, since the beginning of this year, militant Islamists have gained ground overall, undermining what little governance remains. Making matters worse, a Libyan Supreme Court decision has gone against the newly elected and relatively secular government.
Debating whether Libya is a failed state is academic even though the country has resembled one for the past six months. Even a senior Libyan official admitted back in August that most “factors at the moment are conducive to a failed state.” Unfortunately, Libya’s problems won’t be contained. Militant extremists and terrorists thriving amidst this mess will spread violence even farther beyond the country’s practically non-existent borders than they have already.
House of Cards
Most recognizable forms of authority in Libya have steadily imploded this year with the explosion of greater violence in the country’s two largest cities (Tripoli and Benghazi), the flight of foreign workers and embassies amidst kidnappings and murders, and the disarray affecting all manners of central governance (though its writ was already limited). In fact, Libya never evolved beyond the dominance of militias that refused to disarm following the struggle against Muammar al-Qadhafi.
Shaky stability in the capital city of Tripoli until mid-2014 depended on a wary balance of power between two powerful militias employed by Libya’s parliament, the General National Council (GNC). The Islamist militia comes from Libya’s third largest city of Misrata, while the other secular nationalist militia is from the tough Zintan mountain region south of Tripoli. The Misrata militia (now “Libya Dawn”) was linked to Islamist members, and the Zintani forces to its secular caucus. At the time, the GNC had a modest Islamist majority.
But the election in June of a secular majority permanent House of Representatives (HOR) triggered the collapse of the militia power balance. The larger Libya Dawn secured the upper hand over the Zintanis, seizing Tripoli. Libya Dawn reconvened mainly the Islamists from the GNC, proclaiming the body the true Libyan government.
The HOR fled east, taking refuge near the Egyptian border in the small city of Tobruk. Ex-General Khalifa Haftar’s effort since spring 2014 to crush extremists like the al-Qaeda affiliated Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL) had experienced mixed results. Then, after solid gains against ASL forces in Benghazi in October, the beleaguered HOR embraced Haftar as acting on behalf of the newly elected parliament.
But the Libyan Supreme Court declared the internationally recognized HOR unconstitutional on November 6, arguing that the committee that prepared the election law for the June poll, which elected the HOR, violated Libya’s provisional constitution. The court remains, however, in Tripoli under Islamist occupation and originally was not asked to address the legality of the HOR, making its ruling questionable. Moreover, even if there were some inconsistencies involving election procedure, they pale against Libya Dawn’s violent seizure of Tripoli and revival of a rump GNC that no longer has any legal mandate whatsoever. The most recent election, quite an achievement under the circumstances, at least reflected voters’ preferences.
A map featuring Libya’s major cities and border states.
Consequently, despite urgings from some quarters that the HOR be abandoned, the UN and most foreign governments have not done so. As of Nov. 17, Turkey and Chad appeared to be the only exceptions. Embracing the court decision, the rump GNC has offered a national dialogue, something that would have been of value prior to Libya’s descent into far greater chaos in 2014. Earlier this year, when there was more to work with, I had discussed the advantages of such a meeting being held at a neutral venue abroad and being overseen by the UN along with the governments that backed the anti-Qadhafi struggle in 2011.
Of course, Libya has only spiraled further downwards since then. But because both governments share the need for revenue, Libyan exports still rebounded to more than 800,000 barrels per day (BPD) in September (although still only 1/3 of capacity). Following the court decision, however, Libya Dawn sought to control the country’s oil, seizing the 300,000 BPD western El-Sharara field. But Sharara was shut down, with Zintani forces blocking the pipeline to its northern export terminal of Zawiya. Then a security guard strike over unpaid wages closed Tobruk’s Hariga export terminal last weekend. These closures have driven exports down to barely 500,000 BPD.
Whether emanating from a now more aggressive Libya Dawn or the beleaguered ASL (most likely the latter), a number of bombings have also hit HOR-controlled locales in eastern Libya. One went off in the town of Shahat during a meeting there between HOR Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni and UN Libyan Envoy Bernadino Leon On Nov. 10. Several car bombings occurred two days later. One hit a busy street in front of the Tobruk hotel housing the HOR; another hit the airport used by al-Thinni near the town of Bayda. A third bomb blew up in Benghazi (where fighting between the forces of Haftar and the ASL has intensified again).
The fighting in Benghazi became so intense that Leon arranged a 12-hour humanitarian ceasefire on Nov. 19 so the Red Crescent could evacuate civilians and casualties from affected areas. The UN Security Council meanwhile blacklisted ASL branches in both Benghazi and Derna.
Located between Benghazi and Tobruk, Derna has been an extremist hotbed since the 1990s. Youthful demonstrators there declared their allegiance to the so-called Islamic State’s (ISIS or IS) “Caliph” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in late October. With Haftar’s air assets sorely limited, Egypt probably took aim at jihadi targets there with airstrikes on Nov. 12, despite Egyptian denials. Egyptian airstrikes have previously hit Tripoli and Benghazi. Fighter-bombers from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have also staged through Egypt against Benghazi’s extremists.
Spillover Effect
Libya remains a vast arsenal of weapons, ammunition and explosives. The Sinai-based Beit al-Maqdis, which has sworn allegiance to IS, continues to receive Libyan munitions despite Egyptian countermeasures. The Jihadi group killed 33 Egyptian soldiers on Oct. 24. It struck again on Nov. 13, killing five soldiers and police. Near the northern end of the Suez Canal, militants or their smugglers had fired on an Egyptian Navy patrol boat wounding 5 sailors a day earlier, with eight others still missing. Sinai jihadists also released a lengthy video on Nov. 14 showcasing their suicide bombing that killed the soldiers in October, with participants shouting: “good news to al-Baghdadi!” The violence appears to be continuing unabated, with a likely Beit al-Maqdis bombing having hit a police checkpoint in a Cairo suburb just yesterday.
Libya also continues to export violence in various other directions. Four Tunisian soldiers were killed and 11 wounded in a Nov. 5 bus bombing. Much of the residual violence in Tunisia meanwhile stems from the cross-border infiltration of munitions from ASL. Malian jihadists, using Libya as an arsenal and for sanctuary, attacked a border village in Niger on Nov. 19, killing nine Nigerien security personnel.
With the West’s attention absorbed by IS, the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, Israeli/Palestinian affairs, and more, Libya has been woefully neglected. Yet the longer the country’s problems fester, the worse they will get. Indeed, even more IS-inspired connections with Libyan and associated jihadists surely will emerge in this chaotic environment. Simply watching Libya’s meltdown has achieved nothing.
]]>by Wayne White
Nearly a year after the Benghazi attack and almost two since Muammar al-Qadhafi’s fall, Libya remains a governmental basket case. Political assassinations and militia violence are commonplace amidst the continued absence of effective central governance across much of the country. Recent labor unrest threatens what had been Libya’s one [...]]]>
by Wayne White
Nearly a year after the Benghazi attack and almost two since Muammar al-Qadhafi’s fall, Libya remains a governmental basket case. Political assassinations and militia violence are commonplace amidst the continued absence of effective central governance across much of the country. Recent labor unrest threatens what had been Libya’s one area of notable recovery: oil exports. As an experiment in post-authoritarian nationhood, the Libyan situation may be more troubling than at any time since the end of the struggle against the Qadhafi regime.
The central government recently has been in a state of flux. Beleaguered Prime Minister Ali Zeidan announced at the end of July he will decrease the number of cabinet positions or try to govern more effectively by meeting with a smaller group of core ministers. So far, however, the only notable result has been Deputy Prime Minister Awad al-Barasi’s resignation on August 3, blaming “a dysfunctional government where my powers are lost.” Meanwhile, despite the passage of time since the former regime’s demise, central authority has stagnated and instability has been on the rise.
Symptomatic of this problem is the continuation of various autonomous local governing entities centered on armed groups left over from the struggle against Qadhafi. They dominate various regions, one major city, many urban neighborhoods and frequently defy or hound portions of the central government even in the capital of Tripoli.
One salient ongoing dispute revolves around the status of literally thousands of political prisoners often languishing in miserable, improvised local holding pens outside government control. The most notorious case is that of Saif al-Qadhafi, the deceased dictator’s most important son and senior lieutenant. Despite repeated demands for custody on the part of the central government and the International Criminal Court (ICC), Saif remains in Zintan in Libya’s arid central mountains, a prisoner of the local Berber militia that originally captured him. The only outside contact he has had was a meeting last year with his Australian ICC-appointed defense attorney, who was then also detained for three weeks. Since then, new charges have been brought against Saif by authorities in Zintan: allegedly giving his ICC attorney “national security information.”
Justice Minister Salah al-Marghani recently declared that the central government would not allow “Mickey Mouse trials.” However, militias holding the real power in many locales claim the national judiciary remains dominated by officials from the former regime; they have stormed Marghani’s office in anger over delays and enforced their own justice in areas they control. To wit, the autonomous militia controlling Libya’s third largest city, Misrata, sentenced Qadhafi’s former Education Minister, Ahmad Ibrahim, to death on July 31. Technically, the Libyan Supreme Court must confirm such a sentence before he faces a firing squad, but whether that will happen is questionable.
It seems encouraging to many Americans that Washington finally handed down an indictment against some of those responsible for the Benghazi consulate attack last year, most notably local Benghazi militia chief Ahmad Abu Khattala. Yet, US authorities involved in the investigation such as the FBI have been hampered seriously by the woeful law enforcement situation across Libya — also the reason it took this long to bring charges against at least some of those involved in that infamous assault.
Such difficulties should come as no surprise. In a country flush with competing local and regional identities as well as all manner of weaponry in the hands of various armed groups, Benghazi alone has been hit with a wave of political killings over the past couple of weeks. Those murdered include judicial officials, lawyers, political activists, a senior police official and other members of the Libyan security services. Most recently, on August 9, the anchor of a popular Benghazi TV show was assassinated. Many of the victims spoke out against or sought to curb the power of local militias. At the end of July, there also were two bombings — one near a courthouse and the other close to a Justice Ministry office. Some of these incidents have triggered demonstrations or attacks by angry mobs against sites associated with Benghazi-based armed groups presumed responsible, in one case, the Muslim Brotherhood.
Another glaring example of central government weakness came shortly after the attack on the offices of the Muslim Brotherhood: a riot inside and around Benghazi’s al-Kwafiya Prison that resulted in the breakout of roughly 1,200 prisoners. Most escaped inmates were accused of serious crimes or had been associated with the Qadhafi Regime; intervention to contain the situation by government special forces apparently had relatively little effect. The mass escape most likely reinforced the determination of autonomous local authorities and militias not to turn over their prisoners to the government.
Despite the unrest, the unexpectedly rapid rebound of Libya’s oil export capabilities had been one major success. Yet, since July, a wave of protests and strikes by oil workers and guards has shut down two key oil export terminals, Libya’s largest refinery, and threatened to reduce production at inland oil fields. Oil exports for July were down 20 percent; so far August exports are down a staggering 50 percent. Workers are reacting to management and pay issues.
A resolution to this crisis does not yet seem imminent, in part because Oil Minister Abelbari al-Arusa initially took a defiant stance. Now, however, Prime Minister Zeidan has warned that Libya’s national budget is imperiled, and there are talks. In fact, the two terminals re-opened over the weekend, only to close only hours later today without any oil being lifted. Meanwhile, foreign investors already reluctant to inject money into an unstable Libya have been further shaken.
The overriding question at this point may not be how a way out of this maelstrom can be charted, but whether any truly game-changing progress can be made in the near-term. Most all Libya’s challenges today are deeply enmeshed in the complex fractured politics of a country with the least developed sense of national identity and civil society among the five key Arab North African states. So the ability of the international community to help is limited (compounded by drawdowns in diplomatic personnel and curtailed travel inside Libya in view of the dangers now posed by serving there).
Consequently, there is the very real possibility Libya could remain unstable for quite a while. Such a situation would, of course, continue to provide havens for extremist elements both foreign and domestic stemming from exceedingly weak, insufficiently coherent and geographically constrained national governance (as with the recent al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb intrusions into southeast Libya and last year’s Benghazi consulate assault).
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