The Libyan National Oil Corporation (NOC) ended on January 2 a fire that raged for days among tanks in Libya’s largest oil export terminal of Es-Sider, but the militia violence fed by the implosion of governance that caused it continues. Indeed, the levels of suffering, civilian casualties, refugees, and those internally displaced have increased steadily. The talks between Libya’s rival warring governments slated for today have been postponed. Meanwhile, extremist elements are taking greater advantage of the ongoing maelstrom.
The NOC managed to put the fire out, but three days of normal Libyan oil exports were destroyed. Of course, with Libyan crude exports already down to less than 400,000 barrels per day (only 1/3 of normal output), the fire’s impact on global markets was minimal.
Libya’s low exports since mid-2013 pose serious fiscal challenges for the country. The internationally recognized, relatively moderate House of Representatives (HOR), elected in June 2014, headed by Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni, and driven to take refuge in the small eastern city of Tobruk, is in fiscal crisis. The Libyan Central Bank, so far neutral between rival governments, has drawn down Libya’s currency reserves to cover spending. With two hostile governments, there is also no budget for the allotment of funds in 2015.
One might think government spending and a budget would be the least of Libya’s concerns. But beneath the government standoff and rule of local or extremist armed elements around the country, much of the Qadhafi-era’s largely socialist economy remains. If the Central Bank fails to pay government employees, those of the National Oil Corporation, personnel keeping most ports functioning, workers struggling to maintain the electric grid, civil police, and others life would grind to a halt. Goods would stop flowing, businesses would lose customers, and people would not be able to obtain goods and services at the most basic level. Fraud-ridden and often dysfunctional, presently there is an economy just the same.
Tripoli’s Power
Credit: NASA image by Jeff Schmaltz
The Es-Sider inferno was triggered by a rocket fired by Islamic Dawn (LD), the robust Islamist militia comprised of fighters from Libya’s third largest city of Misrata, near Tripoli. LD is the muscle behind the rival Tripoli government.
Since last August when it propped up the Islamist portion of the former parliament, the General National Council (GNC) as a “government,” LD has been gaining ground. Its ability to push nearly 400 miles eastward, to menace Libya’s twin oil ports of Es-Sider and Ras Lanuf plus their supporting oil fields to the south illustrates LD’s rising power at the expense of the HOR and its loyalist allies.
Likewise, 500 miles to the west, LD has been driving toward Libya’s other major oil and gas terminal of Mellitah, near the Tunisian border. Thinni has been struggling to halt this other LD drive using local tribal militias and air strikes. A NOC statement from late December, fearing the loss of Mellitah, said Libyan hydrocarbon production would fall below the levels needed to even meet Libyan domestic demand.
Bloody Benghazi
A severe impediment for the HOR and its loyalist allies is the more extremist militia grouping continuing to dominate much of Libya’s eastern second largest city of Benghazi. Led by the formidable al-Qaeda associated Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL), a militant alliance— despite see-saw fighting—has managed to hold various Libyan military units and former General Khalifa Haftar’s polyglot secular forces allied with the HOR in check.
The commitment of so many HOR military assets to the military meat-grinder in Benghazi to prevent ASL from moving eastward toward Tobruk has weakened its efforts elsewhere. Eleven more died and 63 were wounded in Benghazi on Dec. 22. In fact, most killed in clashes across Libya die in Benghazi. Eastern Libyan jihadists car bombed the HOR’s Tobruk hotel on Dec. 30 wounding 3 deputies.
Human Toll
The UN Support Mission in Libya and the UN’s High Commission for Human Rights announced on Dec. 23 that nearly 700 hundred Libyan civilians have died as collateral casualties of Libyan violence since August; many times that have been wounded. Combatant casualties would likely push fatalities over 1,000. This death toll is lower than those emerging from Syria and Iraq from the regime-rebel civil war in the former and Islamic State-related violence in both. Still, the UN warned commanders of Libyan armed groups they could be charged by the International Criminal Court (ICC) with criminal atrocities.
The refugee situation is far worse. By September, 1.8 million Libyan refugees had sought shelter in Tunisia. Added to those elsewhere, as in Egypt, refugees comprise approximately 1/3 of Libya’s entire population. Those in Tunisia have overwhelmed available humanitarian assistance, particularly now during the cold, rainy Mediterranean winter. Almost 400,000 Libyans are reportedly internally displaced.
No End in Sight
So far, diplomatic efforts seeking some sort of accommodation between Tripoli and Tobruk have been futile. Talks led by UN Envoy for Libya Bernadino Leon came to naught back in September. Leon tried to organize another round for Dec. 9, but this foundered due to more fighting triggered by a failed HOR effort to retake Tripoli. Leon reported to the UN Security Council on Dec. 23 that the two sides had agreed to meet today.
That initiative also collapsed. HOR airstrikes over the weekend against targets in Misrata (the home of the GNC’s “Libya Dawn” militia) came as a surprise. Two reportedly were wounded. An HOR military spokesman said the strikes were retaliation for renewed LD attacks against Es-Sider and Ras Lanuf where fighting has resumed. Yesterday a loyalist warplane struck a Greek tanker near the eastern port of Derna, killing two crewmen; a Libyan military spokesman claimed it was carrying militants.
Meanwhile, General David Rodriguez, head of US Africa Command, revealed on December 3 that “nascent” Islamic State (ISIS, ISIL or IS) training camps had been established in eastern Libya containing a “couple of hundred” militants. Fourteen Libyan soldiers were executed on Feb. 3 in southern Libya by a group calling itself the Islamic State of Libya. Even the more moderate Islamist GNC and LD, already hostile to ASL, condemned the killings. With Libya’s disarray and the grip of ASL and associated extremists over much of Benghazi plus areas nearby like militant-held portions of Derna, IS’s appearance at some point was inevitable.
Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Ahmed Kharti in December chaired a meeting of his counterparts from Libya’s neighbors to express concern about the Libyan crisis’ regional impact. Weighing heavily on participants was the near conquest of Mali in 2013 by extremists, many staging out of and receiving munitions from Libya’s lawless southwest. There also has been arms smuggling from eastern Libyan militants to Egypt’s Sinai-based Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis jihadists, many of whom affiliated themselves with IS in Fall 2014.
Increasingly concerned about Libyan jihadist spillover, French President François Hollande urged the international community today to address Libya’s crisis. In a two-hour interview with France Inter radio, Hollande ruled out unilateral French intervention in Libya itself, but is establishing a base in northern Niger 60 miles from the Libyan border to help contain the menace. Last year, another French base was set up near the Malian border with Libya.
The longer Libya’s chaos remains on the global back burner, the nastier its impact will be in Libya and beyond. Crises left to fester sometimes find their own way to the front burner.
]]>by Mitchell Plitnick
Take a particularly provocative and grandstanding Israeli government and shift its focus from Hamas and Gaza to Jerusalem and you have a most explosive recipe. That potion is being stirred now, and the results could shake up the status quo in a way that we have only seen a few times in Israel’s history.
Much of the recent news narrative starts with the wounding of Yehuda Glick, a US expat who emigrated to Israel as child and became one of the leaders of the self-proclaimed “Temple Mount Movement.” In reality, this chapter of the endless and bloody saga of the Old City of Jerusalem began with the last Israeli election. That poll brought into power the most radically right-wing of Israeli governments, representing an odd mixture of zealous Zionism, modern Orthodoxy in Judaism and a curious impulse to completely disregard centuries of Jewish law regarding the Temple Mount. We’ll get back to that later, but first it’s important to recognize the potential fallout from further escalation.
The recall of Jordan’s ambassador to Israel is no small matter, and it reflects just how important this issue is to the Hashemite kingdom. Despite having lost the West Bank to Israel in 1967 and having relinquished its claim to it in 1988, Jordan is still the guardian of the Jerusalem holy sites for the Muslim world. This status is precious to the Hashemites, and the prestige it brings is a crucial element for their continued hold on power.
The Israeli threats have escalated steadily since the election and then ticked up sharply in the spring, when the Netanyahu government began its anti-Hamas crackdown throughout the West Bank, under the false cover of searching for kidnap victims the Israelis already knew had been brutally murdered. Tensions and demonstrations in Jerusalem were escalating throughout the summer, while everyone’s attention was, quite understandably, focused on Gaza.
This was the inevitable result of an intensely nationalistic government believing it had finally done away with the façade of negotiations in which Jerusalem was a central issue. Brazen statements, provocative visits, and then crackdowns and harsher limits on Palestinian worshippers at al-Aqsa Mosque were all to be expected.
One question that these events raise is whether this is the intention of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or the result of his unwillingness to challenge his coalition partners and members of his own party on a passionately populist issue. I tend to lean toward the latter belief, as Netanyahu has usually shown himself to be the sort of leader who does nothing unless he’s pressured by politics. In either case, the Israeli actions have raised concerns from Washington to Brussels to Cairo and, most resoundingly, to Amman.
Despite the peace treaty with Israel being massively unpopular in Jordan, where the majority of the citizens are Palestinian, it has not been a cause for major internal upheaval. For Jordan, peace has not only brought financial and diplomatic support from the United States, it has also opened up a new market with Israel, which exports goods to Jordan and thereby to the rest of the Arab world, despite the ongoing regional boycott against Israel.
Tinderbox
But now there is unrest and unease in Jordan. King Abdullah’s support of the United States’ efforts against the Islamic State (ISIS or IS) has helped rile some of the more radical elements in Jordan, adding to the tensions that already existed between the government and more mainstream Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. The country is undergoing a severe economic crisis, with massive unemployment, even while it is also burdened with refugees from Syria and Iraq, many of whom have sharp complaints about their treatment.
These conditions make Jordan a tinderbox. And Jerusalem is just as sure a fuse for a Jordanian tinderbox as it is for an Israeli-Palestinian one. These are the factors that led King Abdullah to recall his ambassador from Israel. Only once before, when Israel attempted to assassinate Hamas leader Khaled Meshal in Jordan, has peace between Jordan and Israel been so threatened.
The Israelis have surely given this consideration, but they likely estimate that Jordan would not dare abrogate its treaty with Israel. Such a move would surely endanger Jordan’s support from the US, and that could be fatal if, indeed, internal conflict does break out in the Hashemite kingdom. Ultimately, Israel probably believes that unless it tries to threaten the authority of the Islamic Waqf, which is the body that administrates the Temple Mount, or otherwise officially changes the status quo of the area, Jordan will not withdraw from the treaty.
That’s a reasonable assessment, but it should not be banked on too strongly. Given the precarious situation in Jordan, its leadership’s main concern now is avoiding an outbreak of civil conflict altogether. Even though the Jordanian military is far superior to that of, say, Iraq, a popular uprising triggered by conflict over the Jerusalem holy sites could quickly spread to encompass the mass dissatisfaction with both the economic conditions and Hashemite rule in the country in general. Abdullah does not want to gamble on his ability to contain all of that anger. Though unlikely, that concern does give him a reason to potentially take the bold step of ending peace with Israel, and deal with the consequences of that step later.
For Israel, such an outcome would mean near-total isolation again. Even the Sisi government in Egypt would have a difficult time continuing to work with Israel all by itself. Egyptians remember well the isolation they experienced from the rest of the Arab world after their treaty with Israel was first struck. It took a very long time, even after they were re-admitted into the Arab League, for Egypt to regain a position of some stature in the Arab world.
New Path
The entire approach the international community has taken toward Jerusalem needs to re-evaluated, and quickly. For years, Israel has treated Jerusalem as a flashpoint it could manipulate for nationalistic reasons, and for a long time, young Palestinian Muslims (sometimes all of them under the age of 50, other times the cutoff age has been as low as 35) have been unable to go to pray at the al-Aqsa Mosque. To be sure, there have also been many incidents of Palestinians using Friday prayers as a launching pad for protests and stone-throwing, sometimes down the hill at Jewish worshippers at the Western Wall.
Israeli soldiers and police blocking Palestinians from one of the entrances to the old city in Jerusalem on March 14, 2010. Credit: Mel Frykberg/IPS
Now, Jerusalem is being used by different parts of Israel’s governing coalition. The further right elements are crystallizing nationalist fervor around it. Netanyahu, for his part, is using the violence that Israeli actions are stirring up to blame Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas as part of his campaign to convince people that all of Israel’s opponents—IS, Iran, Hamas, and the PA as led by Abbas—are essentially the same enemy of not only Israel, but the entire world. And, of course, Hamas, and Fatah as well, are using the Israeli actions as a rallying cry, spurring people to both organized and individual acts of resistance and/or terrorism.
But it’s high time reality set in and we understood this to be an issue of nationalism manipulating religion to its ends. Many of the Jewish Temple Mount activists claim that they are pursuing a civil rights issue. After all, they argue, if the Muslim right to pray at their third holiest site is sacrosanct, shouldn’t the Jewish right to pray at their holiest site be at least as high a priority?
Sorry, but that’s not what this is about. Religious Zionism has twisted many Jewish precepts over the years. But even Israel’s chief rabbis have reiterated continuously that Jews must not pray on the Temple Mount or even walk upon it for fear of treading upon the area of the Holiest of Holies, which was inside the Temple and where only the High Priest may enter.
Religious Zionists are split on this issue, as some religious leaders have, in a rather arbitrary fashion, decided that going up to the Temple Mount is acceptable. And, it must be noted, that this notion is an entirely modern phenomenon. It is only in recent years that even religious Zionists have tried to completely negate this particular tenet of Jewish tradition, which has been undisputed for most of our history.
As with so many issues regarding Israel, this is not about Judaism. In fact, it’s not about the terms of much of mainstream Zionism, either. It is a brazen effort by far-right nationalists, some because of a radicalized messianism, some with more secular motivations, to lay claim to Jewish rule over Jerusalem as a whole. It is of a piece with the escalating efforts by Jewish Israelis to spread the colonization of East Jerusalem in the hope of making a unified, Jewish Jerusalem a fait accompli.
Israel is playing with fire on a number of levels here, with the Palestinians and with the broader Arab and Muslim worlds. Thus far, the government has been justified in its belief that the United States and Europe would do nothing more than issue the usual condemnations, not recognizing that Israel’s actions could make compromise on Jerusalem a practical impossibility.
But at some point the US and EU must recognize that if Israel continues to increase its antagonism on the issue of Jerusalem, it’s going to radicalize a lot more than just the Palestinians in East Jerusalem, as well as complicate their efforts against IS and other concerns in the Arab World. If they don’t take some action to reign Israel in soon, they will also be paying the consequences.
Photo: View of the Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa Mosque on Temple Mount in the ancient city of Jerusalem. Credit: Sarah Ferguson
]]>by Wayne White
The reverberations of the desperate war inside Syria have increasingly radiated outward. In addition to the massive Syrian refugee exodus, Lebanon and Iraq in particular have been impacted adversely by heightened instability and violence. Yet actions associated with both have only increased their vulnerability. By contrast, the Turks [...]]]>
by Wayne White
The reverberations of the desperate war inside Syria have increasingly radiated outward. In addition to the massive Syrian refugee exodus, Lebanon and Iraq in particular have been impacted adversely by heightened instability and violence. Yet actions associated with both have only increased their vulnerability. By contrast, the Turks and Iraq’s northern Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) have boldly ramped up their mutual cooperation, in part to form a common front to counter an unwelcome rival Kurdish alliance taking shape inside Syria.
Despite rising violence in Lebanon, so far Iraq has been the most heavily affected overall of Syria’s neighbors. In addition to the almost daily backdrop of horrific bombings and attacks by gunmen on Shi’a and government-related targets (like those of Dec. 16 killing 65), there has been a surge in execution-style killings and beheadings, with bodies dumped in various locales (characteristic of the dark days of the 2006-2008 sectarian violence). Recently, Iranian workers on a gas pipeline in north central Iraq were also the objects of a massacre. Al-Qaeda associated elements have been the prime culprits, but Shi’a militias have become more active as well.
With more than 8,000 Iraqis already dead this year from extremist violence, Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari warned earlier this month of more danger from a jihadist “Islamic emirate” that could take hold in much of Syria. Yet, the Baghdad government’s own marginalization and persecution of Iraq’s Sunni Arab community under Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has been the leading cause for the powerful revival of Sunni Arab extremism in Iraq and its close linkage to the parallel phenomenon in Syria.
Meanwhile, hardline Grand Ayatollah Kazim al-Haeri (who has inspired Shi’a militias in Iraq for years) issued a fatwa on Dec. 15 pronouncing “fighting in Syria legitimate” and declaring those who die there “martyrs.” This fatwa probably will send many more Iraqi Shi’a into Syria to join over a thousand already believed to be fighting for the regime. But it also could intensify seething sectarian tensions within Iraq.
Other notable developments affecting Iraq, however, involve its northern Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). KRG President Masoud Barzani made his first visit to Turkey in any capacity since 1992 in mid-November. The obvious aim was to support Turkish President Erdogan’s peace efforts focused on the extremist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) as well as to help Ergodan secure more Kurdish favor in Turkey’s March 2014 municipal elections.
Such high-profile assistance from Iraq’s Kurds would seem odd but for two other pressing matters. First, both Turkey and the KRG were alarmed by the declaration before Barzani’s visit by Kurdish militias in northeastern Syria of an interim administration for an autonomous Kurdish region there. Although repressed in the pre-civil war era, these militias are believed to have made their move with the approval of the Syrian government, and to have received aid from Assad’s allies, Iran and the Maliki government (relationships both Erdogan and Barzani oppose). Moreover, the Iraqi Kurds and the Turks fear the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), with links to the radical PKK, is behind the recent unity move.
For Damascus, any such agreement probably represents a cynical wartime concession of iffy standing simply to harness the bulk of Syria’s 2 million Kurds against anti-regime Sunni Arab rebels. Support from the regime probably also made possible the only UN airlift of winter relief supplies for any area outside government control into this predominantly Kurdish region. The only other airlifts to rebel areas associated with the Syrian regime have involved bombs.
Syrian Kurdish militias have been battling various rebels for over a year. On Dec. 13, cadres of the al-Qaeda linked Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) reportedly seized 120 Syrian Kurdish hostages near the Turkish border north of Aleppo, the latest of a number of such kidnappings. There has also been heavy skirmishing between the ISIL and extremist al-Nusra Front rebels and Syrian Kurdish militias along the edges of the Kurdish-controlled zone.
The second key driver in Barzani’s and Erdogan’s warming ties is oil. For years, Maliki’s government has been at odds with Barzani’s KRG over the KRG’s efforts to award its own contracts for large-scale oil and gas exports. KRG patience may have run out. In late November, Turkey and the KRG apparently came close to finalizing a comprehensive oil and gas deal — the latest move in Ankara’s cooperation with the KRG that has angered Baghdad.
Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz assured Iraqi officials on Dec. 1 that “any exports must be with the approval of the Iraqi government.” But with Iraq still balking over fears of greater KRG autonomy, the Turks and the KRG are keeping the pressure up; on Dec. 13, test flows of limited amounts of KRG crude were sent through a new pipeline already completed to carry Iraqi Kurdish exports Turkey sorely needs to diversify its energy dependence and secure oil and gas at a likely discount.
Lebanon has been paying ever more dearly for the ongoing sectarian violence just across its lengthy Syrian border and Hezbollah’s military intervention in Syria. Indeed, given Lebanon’s own complex sectarian mosaic, overspill was inevitable, with an ongoing litany of clashes, killings, threats, and squaring off otherwise among Sunni, Alawite and Shi’a communities radiating out from the border.
Tensions and sectarian violence, however, also have been rising in core areas of Lebanon. In the northern city of Tripoli, with a majority Sunni Arab community, a Lebanese soldier died and 7 others were wounded in a Dec. 5 clash with extremists sympathetic to the Syrian rebels. More than 100 have died in Tripoli so far this year in gun battles and a bombing pitting Sunni militants against the army, the police, Tripoli’s minority Alawite community, or Lebanese Shi’a elements. As a result, Lebanon’s caretaker Prime Minister, Najib Mikati, recently turned security there over to the army for 6 months.
Probably most damaging for Lebanon has been Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria, sending thousands of seasoned fighters to reinforce those of the Assad regime. Hundreds of its combatants have been killed in action, and heavily Shi’a-populated areas of Beirut in particular (home to many Hezbollah fighters) have not simply remained a quiet “home front” away from Hezbollah’s war across the border.
Bombings like the one against the Iranian Embassy in Beirut and nearby buildings on Nov. 19, which killed two dozen, have hammered Shi’a neighborhoods. On Dec. 4, a Hezbollah commander back from the Syrian front, Hassan al-Liqqis, was gunned down in front of his residence. Hezbollah blamed the Israelis, but it is more likely he was another victim of rising home-grown violence. Today, Hezbollah claims it thwarted an attempted car bombing believed to have been aimed at one of its bases in the largely Hezbollah-controlled Bekaa Valley 20 miles east of Beirut.
Many assumed through the 1st year of the Syrian conflict that refugees would comprise the main burden faced by Syria’s neighbors, but the savagery and destruction wrought by the Syrian regime especially magnified even that challenge far beyond early worse-case scenarios. The virtual explosion of the rebel al-Qaeda factor, Hezbollah’s robust intervention, and the anti-rebel stance taken — or forced upon — most of Syria’s Kurds was not foreseen. All this further complicates ongoing efforts to find some path out of the Hellish Syrian maelstrom, be they Western efforts to oust Assad & Co. or the recently revived international efforts to bring the parties together for talks in Geneva. All things considered, the prospects for an effective way forward out of this crisis remain grim.
]]>by Mitchell Plitnick
I’m always pleased when something surprises me in the realm of Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy. It doesn’t happen often. Today’s announcement that Secretary of State John Kerry has apparently succeeded at bringing Israel and the Palestinian Authority back to the table was one such surprise.
The announcement [...]]]>
by Mitchell Plitnick
I’m always pleased when something surprises me in the realm of Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy. It doesn’t happen often. Today’s announcement that Secretary of State John Kerry has apparently succeeded at bringing Israel and the Palestinian Authority back to the table was one such surprise.
The announcement should not be overstated, of course. At this writing, there is a proviso out there that a few details still need to be worked out. So, there’s a convenient back door that both parties can exit through.
Even if the talks did resume, there is no reason to believe they will succeed. As Stephen Walt details, Israel’s governing coalition remains hostile to a two-state solution, the Palestinians remain divided and, despite whatever pushes and prods Kerry used to achieve this outcome, the US remains politically paralyzed and feckless. Coming up with a positive scenario that is even marginally realistic is therefore not easy. But here is one shot at it.
One aspect of Kerry’s bridge-building between Benjamin Netanyahu and Mahmoud Abbas presumably included negotiating based on the 1967 borders without stating that publicly as a specific frame. But any talks that proceed in that fashion could result in Naftali Bennett’s Jewish Home party bolting the coalition. If that happens over peace talks, Labor and perhaps Meretz could join to support two states. Labor alone would increase the governing majority from 68 seats to 71 (out of 120) in the Knesset; if Meretz joins too, that makes 77 seats. Shas has also indicated willingness to support such a deal, but they have historically been pro-two-states while opposing a compromise on Jerusalem. Shahs’ joining would bring 11 more seats and potentially create a dominant majority, but they’re such a wild card that a two-state coalition might be better off without them.
A coalition that includes Labor and excludes Jewish Home would certainly be capable of approving any deal Netanyahu could conceivably sign. But it would still be restrained by the leading party, Likud’s opposition to two states and by the desire of the Israel Beiteinu party to minimize the Arab minority in Israel, not to mention Netanyahu’s own disposition against a viable and sovereign Palestinian state. Still, Bibi could probably count on enough votes outside his coalition — from Arab parties and some others — to get a deal done.
On the Palestinian side, things are more complicated. A sine qua non for any deal to actually take hold is the reunification of the West Bank and Gaza. No West Bank-only deal can possibly be acceptable. Robert Danin of the Council on Foreign Relations presented a plan to reconnect the West Bank and Gaza while marginalizing Hamas. A more ambitious route, with a much higher chance of success, would be for the US and Israel to allow and support new elections, treating both territories as a single unit and, this time, actually abiding by the outcome. If a realistic two-state deal is on the horizon — one which stands a chance of being at least minimally acceptable to the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories — Hamas would probably lose such an election, and in any case, it would have to find ways to accommodate itself to such an agreement. That is far from impossible for Hamas, as they can work in a government which they consider accountable to the will of the people while holding its own stances, such as refusing to recognize Israel. On the other side, the Likud would be doing something similar.
Any realistic agreement is probably going to involve Israel keeping the three large settlement blocs, which is going to be a tough sell to the Palestinians because of the way the Ariel and Ma’ale Adumim settlements slice apart the West Bank. Conversely, any conceivable agreement would also mean sharing Jerusalem and Israel taking at least token responsibility for the creation and long-term plight of Palestinian refugees, which might be an even tougher sell.
Therein lies the rub for all of this. For the past several years, I’ve maintained that the Oslo Process is dead, and the solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict needs to be reformed. This does not imply that a solution revolving around two states for two peoples cannot be reached, but that the Oslo parameters and thinking have failed. The upcoming round of talks may finally prove that thesis right or wrong.
Although it has become much more difficult as the Israeli public and body politic has drifted well to the right from where it was in the mid-1990s, there is reason to believe that enough Israelis would support an Oslo deal to make it work. It is not at all clear that the same can be said about the Palestinians.
The mistrust and frustration that resulted from Oslo has certainly hardened the resolve of many Palestinians. And while Palestinian refugees have always been central to the national narrative, few would argue that the refugees have a more prominent place in Palestinian negotiations today than they did twenty years ago. It will be much harder to sell an agreement now where Israel takes in zero or close to zero refugees than it was when the Oslo Accords were agreed upon. It will also be much harder to sell a demilitarized state to Palestinians weary and wary from years of violence from Israel.
If the United States was willing to allow a Palestinian unity government to form again, that might assuage some of the skepticism among Palestinians. Kerry was able to push Netanyahu a little more than usual this week, but that was nothing compared to what will be required to get Netanyahu to agree to sharing Jerusalem, provide some concession on the refugee issue and limit his own draconian security demands, which currently include a very large Israeli presence remaining in the Jordan Valley. There is no indication that the Obama administration is prepared to apply that kind of pressure or weather the ensuing political firestorm such a move would bring.
Still, some things have changed. It is no coincidence that the agreement to return to talks comes on the heels of the European Union’s announcement of new guidelines forbidding “grants, prizes and financial instruments funded by the EU from 2014 onwards” to be given to or shared with official entities of Israeli settlements. This was not a very significant financial blow, but even that bit of action caught Israel’s attention. It’s a lesson in what even the most moderate pressure on Israel can do, and why the major reason that peace is farther away than ever is that the US, and to a lesser extent other international actors, are shielding Israel from the consequences of its occupation.
Iqbal Jan is from Haska Mina district in Nangarhar province, bordering Pakistan. Under the communist government of Mohammad Najibullah (1987-92) it was a centre of jihadist groups. They were entrenched in its villages to target government forces – a tactic of war that is used now by the Taliban. Caught in the cross-fire, many civilians perished.
Jan’s family was killed in an air attack, he says, after Hezb-e-Islami forces led-by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar took up position behind his house. “A commander of the Hezb-e-Islami was firing at the (government) security posts from behind our house. I begged him not to fire from the village but the commander would not listen. The Russian (Soviet) helicopters levelled my house,” he remembers.
“I remember very well. It was a very cold winter day. At 3 O’Clock the Russian helicopters came and made a doomsday of my house.”
Nearly the entire family was wiped out. Iqbal Jan’s wife, two sons, his brother’s wife, a nephew and niece, a son, daughter and granddaughter of his uncle were all dead. “My uncle, his wife, his son, and I were seriously injured,” he says.
Jan says the commander was seeking to punish him because Jan refused to give him food when he requested it. “We had nothing. I told him so. He was so incensed he screamed, ‘I will kill you because you have become a communist’.”
Burrying the dead
“There were no government officials in our village to help us. Villagers who escaped injury immediately put the wounded on mules and transported them to hospital in Peshawar (across the Khyber Pass in Pakistan). The neighbours buried the dead in the night.”
It was not what Jan envisioned when he and his brother decided to move their famillies back to Afghanistan after years of living as refugees in Pakistan.
A few years before, at the start of the war between government forces and US-armed mujaheddin, the brothers had joined the tens of thousands of Afghan civilians who feld across the border into Teera in Pakistan. “It was a very dark night, and bitterly cold. My wife suddenly called out that the baby swaddled around her bosom was dead. We had nothing to eat, or keep warm — we should have died,” he says. “My lovely son was buried in the graveyard at Teera the next day. Then we moved to Kohat.”
In Kohat city in Pakistan’s Khyber Paktunkhwa province, the brothers worked as coolies (head-load workers) in the vegetable market. When Jan’s uncle visited them a few years later, he begged them to return to Afghanistan, saying the war had ended.
Having survived hunger, loss and hardship as refugees in Pakistan, the brothers returned for a new start in Haska Mina, only to see their families die in the rocket attack on their new home.
Closure
For a while, the remainder of his family – two of his own sons, a nephew and niece who also survived – lived on charity. Neighbours gave them food so they would not starve, a friendly shopkeeper would give them free fabric to make new clothes for Eid.
Fifteen years ago he remarried, and built himself a new house of stones and mud. But over two decades after the attack, he struggles to find closure.
For a devout Muslim like Jan, praying at the graveside on the anniversary of a realtive’s death is an important ritual – one he can’t perform. “I don’t know who is buried where in the unmarked graves,” he says.
“God has given me four daughters and two sons,” he says piously. “But I still dream of my martyred relatives who were buried in the dark by our neighbours.”
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Emile Nakhleh is a retired Senior Intelligence Service Officer, a Research Professor at the University of New Mexico and a National Intelligence Council associate. Since retiring from the United States Government in 2006, he has been consulting with different US government entities and departments on national security issues, particularly Islamic radicalization, [...]]]>
Emile Nakhleh is a retired Senior Intelligence Service Officer, a Research Professor at the University of New Mexico and a National Intelligence Council associate. Since retiring from the United States Government in 2006, he has been consulting with different US government entities and departments on national security issues, particularly Islamic radicalization, terrorism, and the Arab states of the Middle East. At the CIA, Nakhleh was a senior analyst and director of the Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program and of regional analysis in the Middle East. During that time he and his analysts briefed policymakers on how Bashar al-Assad used repression to maintain stability.
In February, Nakhleh wrote in the Financial Times that intervention in Syria was “only a matter of time” and that Realpolitik should not guide the West’s approach to the humanitarian crisis that was unfolding. Seven months later, the fighting and divisions within Syria continue to worsen. An estimated 8,000 to 20,000 people have been killed and tens of thousands of Syrians have fled their homes into neighboring countries. The Obama administration has been reluctant to become directly involved in the conflict, but according to Nakhleh, a diplomatic solution is no longer possible and the longer the West waits to assist the rebels with NATO and Turkey’s lead, the bloodier the conflict will become. This following interview was conducted in Washington, DC and a shortened version was published in IPS News.
Q: What is your current assessment of the situation in Syria?
A: I wrote an article about Syria in the Financial Times in February and some of the things I wrote about then are happening now. Namely, there’s more talk about a security zone. The regime is basically fraying and is going to fall and the question is how it’s going to fall and what kind of chaos and instability will follow. I’m not that concerned about these fears of instability and Islamic extremist groups. These fears are being pushed by the regime to scare people. The regime is saying: we are providing security and stability and the alternative is insecurity and instability. There are some Jihadist and Al Qaeda elements, but the fact is that those were also in Libya and some of them were in Tunisia.
Q: Why then is the United States saying that one of the reasons it’s not directly supporting the rebels is because it’s unsure who they are?
A: That is a legitimate excuse. In fact, that argument was one of the reasons that delayed our recognition of even the Libyan rebels in Ben Ghazi and our action there. It was the same argument in Egypt, though not in Tunisia so much because we weren’t actually involved at all in Tunisia. But we used the same argument in Egypt and we kept hearing the word “leaderless”. Well, they are leaderless, we don’t know what leaders to deal with, and therefore we delay action. But I suggest that assistance now from the US and its NATO allies, especially Turkey, are very crucial and I’m not saying necessarily direct military participation but I consider the Syrian regime, as one Syrian expert recently said, as a Mafia. There’s no negotiating with them. They’re going to go down fighting and in the process destroy Syria and kill so many more.
Q: So what should support to the rebels look like?
A: My suggestion now, the regime is strong in air and tanks so the rebels, through Turkey perhaps, need to have RPGs against tanks and stringer missiles against planes. They need to even the playing field in those two areas. That is where now the opposition is frustrated. And they need ammunition.
We could recognize a geographic area, something like a safe haven contiguous to Turkey, and then we can deal with this unclear leadership a bit later. We can deal with something now; we can deal with the military, the Free Syrian Army, the political opposition in Turkey. But my point is once we recognize that, then through Turkey we can send humanitarian assistance, medical aid, and other logistical assistance. I say Turkey because then we can go around the Security Council by saying that this is a NATO thing. We are members of NATO and so is Turkey, which could argue it feels threatened by the growing insecurity on its border.
Turkey can act, but we should be wary a bit of Saudi and Qatari support.
Q: Why?
A: Because there is already suppression of the Saudi opposition in that country. They don’t have a clean record and we should not be aligned openly and strongly with a country that is already suppressing its own people and indirectly contributing to the spread of radical Salafism.
Q: But we already are, aren’t we?
A: We are, but to say that Saudi Arabia is supporting the march of democracy and freedom is a bit disingenuous.
Q: But aren’t Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar already assisting the rebels with Turkish logistical assistance and Gulf funds? Does Turkey have the capacity to take over that role or are the Gulf countries necessary financially?
A: No, Turkey can do it. Turkey can accept money from Saudi Arabia but the assistance for and management of the safety security zone should be by Turkey as a NATO member.
Q: What is everyone waiting for then?
A: They are waiting because the West is not pushing and the Russian and Chinese are strenuously objecting to any perceived military action against the Assad regime.
Q: So Turkey is waiting for an okay from the US?
A: Yes, but I’m not going to speak for anyone. But that’s why Turkey initially went to NATO as well and I think NATO’s role can be increased. I don’t mean flying there or doing a no-fly zone and protecting the people through NATO planes as they did in Libya. They’re not going to do that but what they can do is arm the opposition with anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons and the opposition can do the job. That’s an important distinction – it also will keep the Western and NATO powers more free to act.
Q: What about those who argue that best time to do what you suggest has already passed and arming the opposition now will only result in the government cracking down even harder?
A: That argument too is passé. That argument would have been acceptable before the regime began to employ heavy weapons. But the regime now is bombing cities and civilian neighborhoods haphazardly using heavy weapons, tanks, and airplanes.
Q: So a diplomatic resolution is no longer possible?
A: That too has passed because the regime is not interested in negotiating with the opposition. If you listen to their propaganda, the opposition is labeled as foreign terrorists, and yet, what about these thousands of people that have been killed? Most of them are Syrians, they’re not foreigners. Those who are still talking about diplomacy are using it as a delay tactic while providing their own form of assistance. But now it’s time to fully assist the rebels without necessarily putting boots on the ground.
Q: Would you agree that one of the reasons why the Libyan model is not being applied to Syria is because in Libya the assessment was that the intervention would be clean and that the government had close to no support, whereas the situation differs in Syria?
A: No, the Libyan model is not working because of Russian and Chinese opposition in the Security Council. Western powers, including Turkey, can’t get the Security Council to act in Syria. That’s the only reason. The Russians and the Chinese believe they were duped by the Security Council about Libya. They supported the UNSC resolution on Libya because in their view it was meant to protect civilians and then they found out that no, it was about regime change.
Another factor driving Russia’s objection to any action against the Assad regime is that Syria is the only foothold that Russia has in the Eastern Mediterranean. They have a naval base in Tartus. But the time will come when the Russians will decide to flush Assad down the drain. They will eventually realize that the regime has lost credibility among its people. They have lost legitimacy amongst most Arab countries.
What to do? First recognize a safe zone or security zone. Then, two, provide specific military gear, equipment, and appropriate weapons through Turkey, which could include anti-aircraft and tank weaponry.
Q: But just to be clear, what should the US’s role be in all this?
A: Encouragement and logistical and communications support. According to media reports, the US already has contacts with the opposition and is perhaps already providing covert support in the areas of control, command, intelligence, and communications. But basically I don’t expect the US, as we are heading toward the presidential election, to play a major open military role in Syria. Necessary weapons could be provided by Turkey, with NATO’s approval, to help the opposition save their own towns and save lives.
I was never really in favor of direct and massive military action in Syria. I have argued elsewhere that military action should develop gradually. The opposition already controls a safe zone and other geographic areas in rural and urban Syria. When I wrote the FT column, there were no geographic areas that were under the control of the opposition. Now there are areas that the regime does not control. The fact is, well, I don’t know if it’s exaggerated, but take the statement made by the Prime Minister who recently defected, speaking in Jordan, who said the regime now controls 30%. That’s difficult to verify, but most observers agree that there are areas that the regime doesn’t control, next to Turkey, and elsewhere. If that’s true, the opposition obviously controls these areas. So then we can recognize that territory, deal with the opposition that’s there on the ground—civilians and military leadership. We can engage Syrian politicians in Turkey or somewhere else and the Syrian National Council, and then start providing needed support—humanitarian, medical, food, fuel, munitions, etc. in order for the Syrian opposition to be able to defend their own people.
Q: But what about the fact that Syrians themselves are arguing that the politicians who are based in other countries are too disconnected from the uprising on the ground? If this is the case, whom should we deal with?
A: We can speak with opposition elements on the ground, including the Free Syrian Army, army officers who have defected and who are fighting, civilian fighters, including Islamist groups. We shouldn’t hesitate to engage different groups in the opposition because they all share the same goal namely to get rid of the regime. We should be able to have access to opposition groups through the territory they control.
Q: And a goal is to keep the military in tact?
A: Well, keeping the Syrian military in tact after the collapse of the regime is critical. We don’t want a repeat of what happened in Iraq. Two other goals include keeping national civil society institutions functioning and avoid draconian de-Ba’thification measures. In addition, the US can openly work with current and potential high-level defectors through Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.
Q: If the regime does fall, what will happen to groups that were aligned with the Alawite leadership?
A: The Christians have already moved away. It’s like what the Palestinians did with the Arab Spring. The Palestinians would not want to repeat what Arafat did in 1990 with supporting Saddam, which resulted in Kuwait kicking out almost half a million Palestinians. But the Christians have been very quiet and to me the change occurred when Aleppo exploded. In Aleppo, many of the business class tend to be Christians, Armenians, and Sunnis. Aleppo was safe for quite a while as far as the regime was concerned. After Assad’s fall, the new government, which presumably will be dominated by Sunni Muslims, should reach out and include representatives of the religious and ethnic minorities in governance. Inclusion in decision-making at the highest level will guarantee success in Syria, a country known for its cultural, ethnic, and religious mosaic.
Q: What about the Shia?
A: The Shia is a very small minority; I am afraid the major backlash will be against the Alawites. Not necessarily the poor Alawites, but the wealthy ones who have been the security and financial backbone of the regime. The backlash will also be directed against the ruling family. If the regime persists in its bloody crackdown, its fate will be similar to what happened to the Hashemites in Iraq in 1958. Leaders of the Hashemite monarchy were killed and dragged down the streets because of their perceived suppression of their people. The Assad family runs the country like a Mafia organization through repression, fear, corruption, patronage, and the security apparatus, much like what Saleh did in Yemen. So there will be violence after the regime collapses, including forced population flight and even ethnic cleansing, especially in rural areas.
Q: Will the push come after the US presidential election?
A: Possibly; I don’t think much will be done before the Presidential election until the administration receives information about movement or the use of chemical and biological weapons by the regime or agents of the regime. As the President indicated recently, he would use the military option against the regime should Assad become desperate and use chemical and biological weapons against his people. I don’t know how long the regime will last. I have always thought it won’t survive beyond the end of 2012.
Q: Where could they go though? Won’t Assad fight to the death?
A: There are very few places available to them unless it’s part of a deal. It’s not just one person. It’s a whole family. His brother – is the butcher of Damascus – cousins, in-laws, etc. the more besieged they feel, the more violently they act. But I don’t think Assad is going anywhere. His wife can go to the UK because she’s a UK citizen, but I don’t think he will go anywhere.
Q: So the rebels don’t have a chance unless they get a no-fly zone and more arms?
A: Well, the no-fly zone could have been a step in arming the rebels with weapons. So once the opposition is able to neutralize the regime’s massive force machine, they would be able to fight without overt outside help. This way you would be able to avoid the legal issues involved in officially declaring a no-fly zone. The assistance would then come from NATO, not the UN Security Council, which would sideline through Russian and Chinese objections.
Q: You say the regime won’t last beyond 2012, do you consider the high-level defections a main indicator of that?
A: I do. The regime is losing territory, legitimacy and even security. To see bombs explode in the heart of the security structure in Damascus is a clear sign the regime is losing control. It is being attacked and penetrated. Not even Syrians buy the regime argument that this is a foreign, terrorist-backed struggle. There may be foreign terrorists, but they didn’t start the struggle and they are not the ones who are keeping it going.
Q: If more is not done to assist the rebels do you think they will turn to those forces?
A: As a matter of fact, some rebels are already making this argument, namely that if they don’t get weapons from the West, they would accept them from any source, including terrorist groups. The point is that this regime is creating an environment that is conducive to terrorists and bringing in the Jihadists. And the Saudis are doing the same thing they did in Afghanistan in the 80s and in Iraq and Bahrain more recently. The Saudi and Bahraini governments are looking the other way when some of their own Salafis go to Syria. The head of a Bahraini Salafi group recently met with Syrian opposition in Syria. It’s a dangerous game that the Saudis are playing.
But the fact is, as Rami Khouri argued in a column last week in the Daily Star, Syrians have a civil society, they are educated, sophisticated people who have state structures, civil society structures. It’s not tribal like Libya, so they will be able to restructure after the fall.
The issue is really with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. However, to run a government, they would have to play a role like the Egyptian or Tunisian Muslim Brotherhoods. Other centers of power in Syrian society, and the Syrian MB will have to compete. I’m not really worried about this. Raising fears of Islamists and similar issues is more of an excuse not to act. That doesn’t mean there are no Salafis or Al Qaeda types in Syria. Unfortunately, the Saudis and other Gulfies have encouraged radical Sunni groups to enter Syria in the name of fighting Shia, Alawites, Iran, and Hezbollah.
A: But I’m still unclear as to why the US is even staying away from giving a go-ahead to Turkey.
Q: The US wants to have international legal legitimacy and that comes through the UN Security Council; they’ve tried time and again only to have resolutions vetoed by the Russians and Chinese. That’s why Ambassador Susan Rice gets so irritated in her comments against the Russians.
A: What can the US do to convince Russia to stop striking down those resolutions?
Q: Until Russia reaches a point where it’s convinced that Assad is finished, it’s not going to abandon him. It’s like when we were convinced that Mubarak was finished, we abandoned him. Russia hasn’t reached that point yet. And that’s a misreading of the situation because I am convinced that the regime is finished.
Q: Should Iran be involved with a solution for Syria?
A: I think the fall of Assad will produce the consequence of the breakdown of what I call the trilateral axis of resistance – Iran, Syria and Hezbollah. Iran shouldn’t necessarily be involved because it’s already not a neutral partner – it’s a major ally of the Syrian regime. And, it’s no longer about politics and negotiations; it’s about the precipitous fall of the regime. So what role could Iran play? They are propping up the regime, they’re not going to assist its fall.
Q: There was an article in the Washington Post last week arguing that sanctions against Syria were “hindering the opposition”. What’s your take on that?
A: Sanctions are only effective against individuals and it’s interesting how quickly the Syrian Prime Minister’s name was taken off the sanctions list after he defected. So that’s a weapon to encourage some of the top people to defect. But sanctions are not hindering the opposition. They are not getting financing through banking and so on. But if the regime is intent on continuing its current method of survival, sanctions aren’t going to affect the regime either way.
]]>What if another wave of xenophobic violence unfurled, like the one that shook South Africa to the core a year ago? It left 50 dead and about 150,000 displaced, [...]]]>
When friends ask me about the World Soccer Cup in South Africa in June 2010, I say there is only one if, but a big if.
What if another wave of xenophobic violence unfurled, like the one that shook South Africa to the core a year ago? It left 50 dead and about 150,000 displaced, terrified and destitute immigrants – black, African and foreign. (Click here to see a slideshow)
The army stepped in and the violence subsided. But xenophobia still simmers. In June, IPS reported on yet more murders of Somalis in the Western Cape province. These are so common – 52 in 2008 – they don’t even make national news. Only a really gruesome murder of Somalis – a mother and her children killed and dismembered in their spaza shop last year – makes the front page. Otherwise, murdered Somalis earn only a short news item.
Zimbabweans, Congolese, Tanzanian, Ethiopians and Bangladeshis were also murdered this year – shot, burnt alive, and pushed off a sixth floor from Durban to Cape Town.
“Violence against foreigners is rapidly becoming fully integrated into the standard politics of some townships,” Loren Landau, director of the University of the Witwatersrand’s Forced Migration Studies Programme, told IPS.
A recent report by the Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa notes that there were no convictions for rape and murder committed during the 2008 attacks, sending a message of impunity.
The report “Protecting refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants in South Africa” says there is little reason to believe that attacks against “outsiders” will not happen again.
For now, the country is in honeymoon period with the new government elected in April on a platform of service delivery and job creation, topped with the success of the soccer Confederations Cup in June.
But if disappointment over unmet expectations coupled with recession sets in, frustration could turn into xenophobic violence.
Violent masculinities
Earlier this year, an insightful and distressing collection of essays, “Go Home or Die Here”, analysed the 2008 attacks.
Photo: IPS
From a gender perspective, the authors argue that “negrophobic xenophobia is couched as a battle between two sets of men. (…) the anxieties provoked by economic exclusion and social fragmentation have found expression in violent masculinities, in which weapons are an extension of maleness, and women are no more than bodies to be possessed.”
The striking photos by Alon Skuy illustrate this point. Most are men – rioters armed with sticks and machetes, rifle-toting policemen, bloodied corpses. The few women are at camps for the displaced.
The book’s graphic layout is so sleek that I found it disturbing – a coffee table book on xenophobia? It is borderline with the glamorisation of violence – the gold light bathed photos of angry young men grinning as they chase hapless foreigners.
The photos gave me the same eerie feeling I had in the cholera camps of Goma, in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide in 1994. Talking to genocidaires, I felt in them pure hatred and a taste for violence. “The problem is that we didn’t kill all the Tutsi cockroaches,” one told me.
The Consortium report notes that “rumours of groups mobilising to finish the job started in May 2008 (…) may easily lead to further violence and displacement”.
If that happens, don’t expect many Africans to come watch soccer in South Africa in 2010.
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